

ĀNVĪKṢIKĪ

आन्वीक्षिकी

Volume VII

December 2011

Chief Editor: Devendra Nath Tiwari

Editors:

Sachchidanand Mishra

Abhimanyu Singh

**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION**

**BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY, VARANASI-221005**

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## EDITORS' NOTE

Varanasi has been famous as a centre for learning since a long time; this is indeed the capital of all kinds of knowledge, *sarva vidyā kī rājadhānī*. The Department of Philosophy and Religion, Banaras Hindu University is known all over the world. Eminent persons like Sir S Radhakrishnan, T R V Murti, J L Mehta were faculty members of this department, who made very significant contributions in the field of Philosophy and Religion. This journal had been published time to time being edited by great scholars like Prof. T R V Murti. Publication of this journal however was not regular and the present issue is coming after a long break.

There is a need of a good bilingual journal in Philosophy and Religion. The present volume is a small step in this direction. We are convinced to bring out the volumes, enriched with a good number of quality research papers, of this journal regularly.

Many senior scholars of Indian Philosophy and some young talented research scholars have contributed their valuable, innovative and insightful research papers on very important topics, which have raised the standard and value of this issue. To ensure the quality of research papers they have been refereed by advisory board members and some other senior scholars. However, we do not think that we could achieve the quality, we are aiming at, but we are convinced that in coming volumes we will surely make a few steps ahead.

We, the editors, request the scholars of philosophy, specially who are working in the field of Indian Philosophy, to contribute good and thought-provoking research papers, so that we could bring out the coming volumes of this journal timely and more enriched. This will make the philosophy in general and Indian Philosophy in particular grow and prosper.

## CONTENTS

### EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

अम्बिकादत्त शर्मा	01-20
<i>प्रमाण-अपरोक्षतावाद की सम्भावना</i>	
सच्चिदानन्द मिश्र	21-52
<i>आचार्य शङ्कर के अद्वैत की तार्किक भूमिका</i>	
अरुण मिश्र	53-78
<i>भासर्वज्ञ द्वारा संशय-सूत्र की व्याख्या: भाष्य एवं वार्तिक के परिप्रेक्ष्य में</i>	
A.K. CHATTERJEE	79-84
<i>A Note on Śūnyatā in Buddhism</i>	
P. K. MUKHOPADHYAY	85-114
<i>Must Jñāna Be Propositional?</i>	
RAGHUNATH GHOSH	115-122
<i>Philosophical Methodology: An Indian Perspective</i>	
ARVIND KUMAR RAI	123- 128
<i>Impossibility of Jīvan-Mukti in Advaita-Vedānta</i>	

MUKUL RAJ MEHTA 129-138

*Anekāntavāda in Jainism and Modernity*

DEBAMITRA DEY 139-146

*The Anti-Theistic Views of Kumārila*

### **LOGIC AND LANGUAGE**

D.N.TIWARI 147-166

*Language and Communication*

MADHU KAPOOR 167-184

*A Peep into the Secrets of Intravenous Existence*

DURGESH CHAUDHARY 185-190

*Propositions and Truth*

### **ETHICS AND RELIGION**

CLEMENS CAVALLIN 191-224

*Religion as a Human Phenomenon vs. Openness to Transcendence*

GRACE DARLING 225-238

*Suffering In Buddhism and Christianity: A Comparison*

## प्रमाण-अपरोक्षतावाद की सम्भावना

अम्बिकादत्त शर्मा

सामान्य तौर पर भारतीय दर्शन में प्रमाणों को प्रत्यक्ष और परोक्ष कोटि में विभाजित किया जाता है। इन्द्रियादि साधनों से विषय की साक्षात् उपलब्धि को प्रत्यक्ष तथा अनुमानादि शेष प्रमाणों को परोक्ष कोटि में रखा जाता है। दूसरे शब्दों में कहें तो विषय की साक्षात् उपलब्धि तब होती है जब उस उपलब्धि का करण (असाधारण कारण) कोई पूर्ववर्ती ज्ञान ही नहीं होता (ज्ञान-अकरणक) जबकि परोक्ष उपलब्धि का करण (असाधारण कारण) सदैव कोई-न-कोई ज्ञान ही हुआ करता है (ज्ञान-करणक)। परन्तु अद्वैत वेदान्त का 'शब्दापरोक्षतावाद' जो अत्यन्त ही प्रसिद्ध है, इस सर्वसाधारण धारणा का अर्थात् प्रमाणों के उपर्युक्त प्रत्यक्ष तथा परोक्ष विभाजन का अपवाद प्रस्तुत करता है। द्रष्टव्य है कि शब्द प्रमाण 'ज्ञान' का एक परोक्ष साधन है लेकिन अद्वैतवेदान्ती इसे सन्दर्भ विशेष में अपरोक्ष ज्ञान का उत्पादक मानते हैं। प्रश्न उठता है कि परोक्ष ज्ञान के अन्य साधन भी क्या सन्दर्भ-विशेष में अपरोक्ष ज्ञान के उपपादक हो सकते हैं? प्रस्तुत आलेख में हम 'प्रमाण अपरोक्षतावाद' अथवा 'प्रमाण साक्षात्कारतावाद' पदावली का प्रयोग इसी आशय-विशेष के सन्दर्भ में कर रहे हैं। यद्यपि भारतीय दर्शन में 'प्रमाण अपरोक्षतावाद' संज्ञा से न तो कोई प्रकरण प्रसिद्ध है और न ही प्रमाणों के विनियोग के किसी प्रसंग में इस पदावली का प्रयोग ही किया जाता है। फिर भी प्रकृत प्रसंग में हम अद्वैत वेदान्त के 'शब्दापरोक्षतावाद' को आधार बनाकर अन्य प्रमाण सम्बद्ध इसके विस्तार की सम्भावना को तलाशते हुए यह दिखाने का प्रयास करेंगे कि शब्द प्रमाण और उससे अतिरिक्त, कम से कम उपमान और अनुमान जैसे परोक्ष प्रमाण भी कैसे और किन परिस्थितियों में विषयापरोक्षग्राही हो सकते हैं।

(१)

अद्वैत वेदान्त में शब्दापरोक्षतावाद<sup>1</sup> का स्थूल रूप में मंतव्य यह है कि शब्द साधारणतया परोक्ष ज्ञान के ही साधन हुआ करते हैं। लेकिन शब्दों का विशेष परिस्थिति में विशेष प्रकार से प्रयोग किये जाने पर उनके द्वारा साक्षात्कार सदृश अपरोक्ष प्रमिति श्रोता में

उत्पन्न की जा सकती है। शब्द की ऐसी अनोखी ज्ञानमीमांसीय भूमिका को स्पष्ट करने के लिए एक काल्पनिक उदाहरण अद्वैतवेदान्त के ग्रन्थों में प्रायः ही दिया जाता है। उदाहरण इस प्रकार का है<sup>2</sup>—एक गाँव के निवासी दस मूर्ख उस गाँव की नदी के पारवाले दूसरे गाँव की ओर जाने के लिए निकल पड़े। वे सभी अच्छे तैराक नहीं थे, फिर भी नदी में कम पानी होने के कारण वे साहस करके किसी तरह तैरकर नदी के दूसरे तीर पर पहुँच गये। वहाँ पहुँचते ही उन सबके मन में संदेह उत्पन्न हो गया कि शायद उनमें से कोई नदी में डूब तो नहीं गया। इस संदेह के निवारणार्थ उनमें से प्रत्येक व्यक्ति सबको गिनने लगा, परन्तु हर कोई अपने को छोड़कर शेष व्यक्तियों को ही गिनता। इस तरह प्रत्येक व्यक्ति की गणना नौ संख्या तक ही पहुँचती, जो कि स्वाभाविक ही था। इस तरह सभी अत्यन्त दुःखी हो गये कि उनका कोई एक साथी अवश्य ही नदी में डूब गया। अब एक राह चलते मुसाफिर ने उनकी कातर दशा पर तरस खा कर उन्हें आश्वस्त किया कि यदि वे उसकी बात मान लें तो वह उनके दसवें व्यक्ति को नदी में डूबने से बचा लेगा। उस राहगीर ने उन मूर्खों को एक कतार में खड़ा कर कहा कि जैसे-जैसे वह एक-एक व्यक्ति के पास जायेगा वैसे-वैसे प्रत्येक व्यक्ति अपनी संख्या को जोड़ते हुए उद्धोष करेगा इस प्रक्रिया में जब वह कतार के अन्तिम व्यक्ति के पास पहुँचा तो उस व्यक्ति ने दस संख्या का उद्धोष किया। इस उद्धोष के होते ही राहगीर ने उस व्यक्ति के पीठ को थपथपाते हुए कहा कि दसवें व्यक्ति तुम हो (दशमस्त्वमसि)। इस तरह राहगीर के इस कथन को सुनते ही एक व्यक्ति को दसवें व्यक्ति के रूप में स्वयं की अपरोक्षानुभूति हुई और शेष सभी मूर्ख आश्वस्त हो गये कि उनमें से कोई भी व्यक्ति नदी में डूबा नहीं है।

उपर्युक्त कल्पित उदाहरण से यह निरूपित करना अद्वैतवेदान्त को अभिप्रेत रहा है कि शब्द परोक्ष कोटि का प्रमाण होते हुए भी विशेष रूप से प्रयुक्त होने पर साक्षात्कार जैसी उत्कट आन्तरिक अनुभूति को उत्पन्न कर सकता है। इस उदाहरण में शब्द प्रमाण का हेतु वही रहता है जिससे शब्द अक्सर परोक्ष प्रमिति उत्पन्न करता है, लेकिन यहाँ उन्हीं हेतुओं के साथ प्रयुक्त शब्द उस व्यक्ति में दसवेंपन के रूप में सर्वथा अपरोक्ष प्रमिति उत्पन्न करता है। परन्तु न्याय-मीमांसादि दर्शन अपनी ज्ञान-मीमांसा में इस बात को मानने के लिए कभी तैयार नहीं हो सकते। उनकी प्रमाण-मीमांसा में प्रत्यक्षादि सभी प्रमाण अपने-अपने ढंग से

ज्ञान उत्पन्न करते हैं। विषय एक ही होने पर उसके ज्ञान की अलग-अलग विधायें हो सकती हैं और ज्ञान की विधा की भिन्नता के परिप्रेक्ष्य में ही अलग-अलग प्रमाण परिभाषित होते हैं। अतएव दो या दो से अधिक प्रमाणों का विषयमूलक सम्प्लव तो हो सकता है, लेकिन वे प्रमाण अपनी प्रतिस्विकता में ज्ञान की जिस विधा को लेकर प्रस्तुत होते हैं, उन विधाओं का सम्प्लव नहीं हो सकता। उदाहरण के लिए सम्मुख उपस्थित वस्तु का इन्द्रिय जन्य प्रत्यक्ष उसके सामान्य-विशेषात्मक स्वरूप का ग्रहण करता है। पुनः उसी वस्तु के सम्मुख उपस्थित नहीं हो पर अनुमान के द्वारा होने वाला ज्ञान केवल सामान्य रूप ही होता है। अब इस संदर्भ में अद्वैत वेदान्त की दृष्टि थोड़ी भिन्न प्रतीत होती है। उदाहरण के लिए 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' इस अनुमिति को ही लिया जा सकता है। इस अनुमिति में पक्षभूत पर्वत अनुमाता को प्रत्यक्षतः ही ज्ञात होता है। केवल वह्नि, जो प्रत्यक्ष गोचर नहीं है, वही धूम के द्वारा अनुमित होता है। अब यहाँ प्रश्न उठता है कि यदि तथाकथित अनुमित्यात्मक ज्ञान का विशेष्य (पर्वत) प्रत्यक्ष गोचर ही है तो अनुमिति का आकार 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' जैसा कैसे हो सकता है? इस पर यदि यह कहा जाय कि 'वह्नि' या 'वह्निमत्त्व' मात्र ही अनुमिति का विषय है तो क्या 'अत्र वह्निः' अथवा 'किञ्चित् वह्निः' को अनुमिति का आकार माना जा सकता है? पुनः यदि यह बात सही नहीं है, तो फिर अनुमिति या शुद्ध अनुमिति का आकार निश्चित करना अनिवार्यतः अपेक्षित हो जाता है। अनुमान को प्रमाण के रूप में साधने के धुरंधर नैयायिक इस कठिनाई से बचने के लिए 'वह्निमत्त्व विशिष्ट पर्वत' अथवा 'पर्वतवृत्तित्वविशिष्ट वह्नि' को अनुमिति के विषय के रूप में उपवर्णित कर सकते हैं, भले ही अनुमिति का आकार ऊपर बताये गये आकार जैसा ही क्यों न प्रतीत हो।

परन्तु उपरोक्त समाधान को पूरे तौर पर संतोषजनक नहीं कहा जा सकता। अद्वैत वेदान्ती सामान्य अनुभव का अनुसरण करते हुए यह मानने में हिचकिचाते नहीं कि 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' आकार वाला अनुमित्यात्मक ज्ञान विशेष्यांश में प्रत्यक्ष और विशेषणांश में अनुमित्यात्मक होता है।<sup>3</sup> इस पर यदि यह प्रश्न हो कि एक ही ज्ञान उभयविध कैसे हो सकता है? तो इसका उत्तर यह हो सकता है कि जैसे एक ही विषय विभिन्न प्रमाणों से जाना जाता है वैसे ही एक ही ज्ञान प्रत्यक्ष और अनुमेय विषयग्राही समझा जा सकता है। दूसरे



शब्दों में कहें तो एक ही ज्ञान परोक्षापरोक्ष प्रमिति में सम्प्लवित हो सकता है। न्याय और उससे सगोत्रीयता रखने वाले दार्शनिक सम्प्रदाय प्रमाणों का विषयोपलब्धि मूलक सम्प्लव तो स्वीकार करते हैं लेकिन 'तदन्यथाधिगतेः' कहते हुए प्रमिति का सम्प्लव कदापि स्वीकार नहीं करते। अद्वैत वेदान्तियों का शब्दापरोक्षतावाद अपनी ज्ञानमीमांसीय भूमिका में वस्तुतः इसका विरोध करता है और साथ ही साथ यह दिखाता है कि शब्दजन्य परोक्ष प्रमिति किस प्रकार अपने विशिष्ट विनियोग द्वारा अपरोक्ष प्रमिति में सम्प्लवित होती है।

अद्वैतवेदान्ती इस ज्ञानमीमांसीय दृष्टि का उपयोग अपने स्वयंस्व सौष्टव के लिए दो प्रकार से करते हैं। इसका एक उपयोग तो 'स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो' जैसे औपनिषद वाक्यों का अर्थनिर्णय करते हुए परमात्मा-जीवात्मा का अभेद<sup>4</sup> प्रतिपादित करने लिए और दूसरा अतीव विस्मयकारी उपयोग श्वेतकेतु जैसे ब्रह्मजिज्ञासु अथवा शिष्य को उसकी वास्तविक लेकिन पूर्णतः<sup>5</sup> अज्ञात चैतन्य रूप आत्मसत्ता (सेल्फ आइडेंटिटी) अवबुद्ध कराने के लिए किया जाता है। 'तत्-त्वं-असि इस वाक्य में सर्वनाम तत् पद परमात्मा या परब्रह्म के लिए प्रयुक्त हुआ है और त्वं सर्वनाम श्वेतकेतु रूप जीवात्मा का वाचक है। यद्यपि ये दोनों एक दूसरे से भिन्न समझे जाते हैं तथापि इनके ऐक्य का उपदेश गुरु द्वारा श्वेतकेतु को किया गया है। वस्तुतः यही इस वाक्य की अनुपपत्ति है और इसका निवारण अद्वैतवेदान्ती भागत्यागलक्षणा द्वारा करते हैं। इस लक्षणा में लक्ष्य शब्द के रूढ़ अर्थ का कुछ अंश त्याग कर शेष अंश वाक्यार्थ निर्णय के लिए रख लिया जाता है। द्रष्टव्य है कि तत् पद वाच्य 'परब्रह्म' और त्वं पद वाच्य जीव के गुण-धर्म न केवल एक दूसरे से भिन्न हैं बल्कि परस्पर विरोधी भी हैं। अतः भागत्याग लक्षणा के द्वारा दोनों सर्वनाम भूत तत्त्वों के परस्पर भिन्न और विरोधी समझे जाने वाले गुण धर्मों का परित्याग कर उनके आधारभूत अथवा विशेष्यभूत शुद्धचैतन्य को दोनों पदों का लक्ष्यार्थ ठहराया जाता है। इस प्रकार इस महावाक्य का 'जीव-ब्रह्मैक्य अर्थ उद्घाटित होता है।

परन्तु इस प्रकार के अर्थ निर्धारण तक ही इस महावाक्य की उपयोगिता सीमित नहीं है। प्रकृत प्रसंग में एक गुरु द्वारा इस महावाक्य का प्रयोग अति प्रभावी ढंग से श्वेतकेतु को लक्ष्य कर किया गया है। श्वेतकेतु की स्वरूप विषयक संभ्रान्त स्थिति इस प्रयोग की पूर्वभूमि है। उदाहरण के लिए मानो कोई सोया हुआ व्यक्ति भयानक स्वप्न देखते हुए

अचानक घबराकर जाग जाता है और कुछ क्षण के लिए स्तब्ध होकर यह भी भूल जाता है कि वह कौन है। श्वेतकेतु भी यहाँ ऐसे ही किसी व्यक्ति का प्रतिनिधित्व कर रहा है, जो अपनी तादात्म्यानुभूति खो बैठा है। परन्तु बात ऐसी भी नहीं कि हम सामान्यतः जागृतावस्था में अपनी तादात्म्यानुभूति को सतत जगाये रहते हुए सभी क्रिया व्यापारों को करते जाते हैं। वास्तव में यह अनुभूति स्वतः अज्ञात रूप से हमारे सभी क्रिया-कलापों के साथ चिपकी रहती है और उससे प्रकट भी होती रहती है। इसीलिए अगल-बगल के लोग हमें रोबोट अथवा पागल व्यक्ति नहीं समझते। अतएव श्वेतकेतु भी एक प्रकार से स्वतादात्म्यबोध से विहीन अथवा उसके प्रति शंकाकुल जैसा होकर अपने स्वतन्त्र की खोज में व्यस्त व्यक्ति है। ऐसी स्थिति में गुरु का यह उपदेश कि तुम शुद्ध चैतन्य हो, जीवमात्र हाड़-मांस का पुतला भर नहीं हो, उच्चरित किये जाने पर श्वेतकेतु में एक नई तादात्म्यानुभूति जागृत होती है। ऐसा भी कहा जा सकता है कि गुरु के शब्द श्वेतकेतु में एक नये तादात्म्य का निर्माण कर उसे उसके मन में प्रतिष्ठापित करते हैं। यह बात कुछ-कुछ वैसी ही है जैसे देवता की मूर्तियों को पूजनयोग्य बनाने के लिए मंत्रोच्चार पूर्वक उनकी प्राणप्रतिष्ठा की जाती है, वैसे ही गुरु के शब्द उपदेश रूप में उच्चरित होकर श्वेतकेतु में उस खोये हुए तादात्म्य को पुनः प्रतिष्ठापित करते हैं। यह श्वेतकेतु का स्वात्मसाक्षात्कार अथवा अपरोक्ष स्वरूपानुभव है जो गुरु के उपदेशात्मक शब्दों के श्रवण मात्र से उत्पन्न होता है। महाकवि भवभूति ने अपने प्रसिद्ध नाटक 'उत्तररामचरितम्' में एक वर्णन के प्रसंग में कुछ इसी प्रकार के भाव को प्रकट करते हुए कहा है कि "लौकिकानां हि साधुनां अर्थ वागनुवर्तते। ऋषीणां पुनराद्यानां वाचमर्थोऽनुधावति॥ तात्पर्य यह है कि लौकिक व्यक्ति चाहे साधु ही क्यों न हो, उसकी भाषा अर्थ का अनुगमन करती है, लेकिन ऋषि-मुनियों (साक्षात्कृतधर्माण ऋषयो बभूवुः) की वाणी में इतनी सामर्थ्य होती है कि अर्थ ही उस वाणी के पीछे दौड़ते हैं। दूसरे शब्दों में कहें तो ऋषि-वाणी के उच्चारण मात्र से उसकी वाच्यभूत घटना घटित होकर लक्ष्यभूत व्यक्ति को उसका साक्षात्कार या हार्दिक अनुभूति करा देती है। ऋषियों के द्वारा दिये जाने वाले शाप-वरदान इत्यादि की फलवत्ता के मर्म को इस दृष्टि से भी समझा जा सकता है।

द्रष्टव्य है कि आजकल आधुनिक मनोविज्ञान में 'रिग्रेसिव हिप्नोटिज्म' बहुविध रूप से प्रचलित है। इसका एक प्रयोग किसी व्यक्ति की वर्तमान असह्य पीड़ा को मिटाने के लिए उसे उसके अतीत का अतीव प्रभावी ढंग से स्मरण दिला कर किया जाता है। इस प्रक्रिया

पर ज्ञानमीमांसीय दृष्टि से विचार किया जाय तो स्पष्ट ही विदित होता है कि इसमें किसी व्यक्ति की वर्तमानारूढ़ स्वतादात्म्य को स्थगित कर अतीतकालीन स्वतादात्म्य को पुनरुत्पादित किया जाता है। इससे यह भी स्पष्ट होता है कि व्यक्ति को एक विशेष प्रकार के तादात्म्यबोध से दूसरे प्रकार के तादात्म्यबोध में अन्तरित किया जा सकता है। दिन-प्रतिदिन के जीवन में भी स्वाभाविक रूप से व्यक्ति के स्वतादात्म्य बदलते रहते हैं। परन्तु ध्यातव्य है कि इस प्रकार के सभी तादात्म्य बोध सोपाधिक ही हुआ करते हैं। 'दशमस्त्वमसि' के पूर्वोक्त उत्थापित उदाहरण में भी एक सोपाधिक स्वतादात्म्य को बाधित करते हुए दूसरे सोपाधिक स्वतादात्म्य बोध में संचरण है। प्रश्न उठता है कि व्यक्ति का कोई निरुपाधिक स्वतादात्म्य भी सम्भव है क्या? वस्तुतः अद्वैतवेदान्त शारीरक की सत्वसमीक्षा करते हुए 'श्वेतकेतो तत्त्वमसि' महावाक्य के द्वारा व्यक्ति के शुद्ध चैतन्य रूप निरुपाधिक स्वतादात्म्य की ही उपपत्ति प्रस्तुत करता है। इसीलिए यह उपपत्ति मनोवैज्ञानिक स्तर पर घटित नहीं होकर आध्यात्मिक धरातल पर चरितार्थ होती है। 'दशमस्त्वमसि' और 'श्वेतकेतो तत्त्वमसि' के बीच के अन्तर में भी इस बात को देखा जा सकता है। यद्यपि दोनों में शाब्द ज्ञान की भूमिका और ज्ञान का आकार (तदुत्पन्न अपरोक्षानुभूति) एक ही जैसा है, फिर भी दोनों के बीच के सूक्ष्म अन्तर की अनदेखी नहीं की जा सकती। पहले में नवें व्यक्ति के रूप में स्वतादात्म्य बाधित होकर दसवें व्यक्ति के रूप में स्वतादात्म्य अधिगत होता है और दूसरे में एक बारगी सभी सोपाधिक स्वतादात्म्यों का बाध और निरुपाधिक चैतन्य में त्रिकालाबाधित स्वतादात्म्य प्रतिष्ठ होता है। पुनः पहले में 'दशमस्त्वमसि' सुनकर 'दशमोऽहमस्मि' का अपरोक्षानुभव होता है। अतएव इसमें ज्ञानमीमांसीय दृष्टि से वृत्तिव्याप्यत्व और फलव्याप्यत्व दोनों रहते हैं। दूसरे में 'तत्त्वमसि' वाक्य को सुनकर 'तत् अहमस्मि' रूप अपरोक्षानुभूति नहीं होती क्योंकि इस अपरोक्षानुभव में वृत्तिव्याप्यत्व तो रहता है लेकिन इसकी फलव्याप्ति नहीं होती।<sup>6</sup>

इस प्रकार हम देखते हैं कि शब्द के माध्यम से सामान्य तौर पर किसी वस्तु का ज्ञान परोक्षतया ही होता है, यहाँ तक कि शब्द का प्रयोग परोक्ष वस्तु के वर्णनार्थ ही प्रयुक्त किया जाता है। यदि कोई वस्तु वक्ता-श्रोता के सम्मुख उपस्थित हो तो उसके लिए शब्द का प्रयोग साक्षात्कार सदृश होने पर भी प्रत्यक्ष ही उस वस्तु के लिए उपयुक्त माना जाता है।

अंगुली से निर्देश करते हुए जब किसी व्यक्ति को यह कहा जाता है कि देखो सामने हिरण दौड़ रहा है तो इस परिस्थिति में वस्तुतः हम अपने प्रत्यक्ष को परार्थ बनाते हैं लेकिन वह परार्थ-प्रत्यक्ष होता नहीं है। यहाँ शब्द केवल ध्यान आकर्षित करने के हेतु बनते हैं। श्रोता को 'हिरण दौड़ रहा है' ऐसा ऐन्द्रियक प्रत्यक्ष ही होता है। परन्तु 'दशमस्त्वमसि' तथा 'तत्त्वमसि' के सन्दर्भ में शब्द हेतु से सर्वथा अपरोक्ष स्वात्मसाक्षात्कार होता है। ऐसा भी नहीं कहा जा सकता कि इस स्थिति में शब्द हेतु से प्रथमतया परोक्ष ज्ञान ही उत्पन्न होता है और बाद में मनन, निदिध्यासन से सहकृत होकर वह स्वात्मविषयक मानस ज्ञान में पर्यवसित हो जाता है।<sup>7</sup> वास्तव में देखा जाय तो यहाँ अन्वय-व्यतिरेक से वाक्य की ही साधकतम कारणता निश्चित होती है। अन्यथा वाक्य सुनने से पहले चक्षु और मन आदि अन्य सामग्रियों के होते हुए भी साक्षात्कार क्यों नहीं उत्पन्न हो जाता। इसलिए इस सन्दर्भ-विशेष में शब्द ही साक्षात्कार का हेतु होता है (तस्माच्छब्द एव तत्र साक्षात्कारहेतुः)।<sup>8</sup> पुनः इस संदर्भ में यह भी नहीं कहा जा सकता कि यहाँ शब्द का प्रत्यक्ष में अन्तर्भाव हो जा रहा है। द्रष्टव्य है कि बोध्य से भिन्न अर्थ वाले शब्द से अतिरिक्त होते हुए प्रत्यक्ष प्रमा का कारण होना ही प्रत्यक्ष में अन्तर्भाव होने का नियामक है।<sup>9</sup> परन्तु दशमत्व का ज्ञान इन्द्रिय से नहीं होता, क्योंकि घोर अन्धकार में अथवा लोचनहीन को भी उक्त वाक्य के श्रवण से दसवेंपन का बोध हो ही जाता है। यह बोध लेश्यतोऽपि परोक्ष नहीं क्योंकि एक ओर 'अस्मि'प्रतीति अपरोक्षबोध का ही प्रत्यायक होती है तो दूसरी ओर इस साक्षात्कार में विषयी ही विषय होता है। 'तत्त्वमसि' के सन्दर्भ में अपरोक्षता का प्रत्ययायन 'अस्मि'प्रतीति से युक्त नहीं होता, फिर भी वह अपने स्वरूप -बल से सर्वथा अपरोक्ष होता है। यहाँ स्वरूपबल का तात्पर्य अपरिच्छिन्नता, स्वयंप्रकाशता, साक्षिभाष्य न होना और विषयी का ही विषय होना तथा फलव्याप्ति न होना इत्यादि हैं। इस प्रकार अद्वैतवेदान्त के शब्दापरोक्षतावाद का निष्कर्ष यह है कि जैसे परोक्षत्व-व्याप्त एक मानसत्व है और अपरोक्षत्व-व्याप्त दूसरा इन्द्रियत्व है, वैसे ही शब्दत्व को भी परोक्षापरोक्ष मानने में कोई दोष नहीं।

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अब अद्वैत वेदान्त सम्मत शब्दापरोक्षतावाद के उपर्युक्त स्पष्टीकरण के उपरान्त यहाँ 'उपमानापरोक्षतावाद' का प्रतिपादन अभीष्ट है। यद्यपि यह बात उपमान प्रमाण के

पुरस्कारक दर्शनों के द्वारा पूर्ण रूप से विचारित नहीं हुआ है तथापि अद्वैत वेदान्त की शब्दापरोक्षतावादी अन्तर्दृष्टि को आगे बढ़ाया जाये तो उपमानादि शेष प्रमाणों को भी एक सीमा तक 'प्रमाणापरोक्षतावाद' से जोड़ा जा सकता है। द्रष्टव्य है कि स्वैतर बाह्य घट-पटादि वस्तुओं का शब्दजन्य अपरोक्षानुभव अद्वैतवेदान्तियों को भी मान्य नहीं है। यह केवल स्वतादात्म्य उद्बोधक वाक्यों पर ही घटित होता है। परन्तु उपमानजन्य अपरोक्षानुभव का सन्दर्भ और परिप्रेक्ष्य ऐसा नहीं है। यह उपमान और उपमेय दोनों के ही अपरोक्षानुभव की सम्भावना को उपस्थित करता है। इस सम्भावना को उद्घाटित करने के लिए सर्वप्रथम उपमान प्रमाण का एक सामान्य उदाहरण लेना उपर्युक्त होगा। गवय को न जाननेवाला एक ग्रामीण व्यक्ति किसी आरण्यक से यह जानता है कि गवय नामक प्राणी गाय के आकार-प्रकार का होता है। कुछ समय के उपरान्त वह ग्रामीण व्यक्ति जंगल में भ्रमण करते हुए गाय के आकार-प्रकार का प्राणी देखता है और उसे आरण्यक की बात याद आती है कि गवय गाय के आकार-प्रकार का प्राणी होता है। इस प्रकार तत्काल वह ग्रामीण व्यक्ति जान लेता है कि सम्मुख स्थित या उसके जैसे ही चतुष्पाद प्राणियों को गवय कहा जाता है। इस संज्ञानात्मक प्रक्रिया में गवय में गौ का सादृश्य देखना कारण है। आरण्यक के कथन का स्मरण व्यापार है। सम्मुख दिखता हुआ पशु गवय पद वाच्य है, उपमिति प्रमा है। इस उपमिति रूप प्रमा को प्रत्यक्ष नहीं कहा जा सकता क्योंकि इन्द्रिय व्यापार के उपरत हो जाने पर भी यह ज्ञान उत्पन्न होता है। इसे अनुमिति भी नहीं कहा जा सकता क्योंकि व्याप्ति ज्ञान के बिना ही यह ज्ञान उत्पन्न होता है। यह शब्द ज्ञान भी नहीं क्योंकि यहाँ गवयत्वविशिष्ट का उपस्थापक कोई शब्द नहीं है, प्रत्युत गवय पद के अर्थ का ग्रहण हो रहा है। इस प्रकार उपमान एक स्वतंत्र प्रमाण है जिसका अन्तर्भाव किसी अन्य प्रमाण में नहीं किया जा सकता।

भारतीय दर्शनों में मीमांसा, अद्वैत वेदान्त और नैयायिकों ने उपमान प्रमाण की स्वायत्तता को पर्याप्त महत्त्व के साथ स्वीकार किया है, लेकिन ये तीनों दार्शनिक सम्प्रदाय अपने-अपने प्रयोजनों के अनुरूप इसकी अलग-अलग व्याख्या करते हैं। मीमांसकों को 'प्रकृतित्वत् विकृतयः कर्तव्याः' ऐसे व्यापक अतिदेश में प्रविष्ट सादृश्य बोधक 'वत्' शब्द की उपपत्ति तथा अर्थ स्पष्टीकरण के लिए सादृश्य वस्तु के ज्ञापक की अपेक्षा है। अतएव

मीमांसक सादृश्य ज्ञान के साधक रूप में उपमान प्रमाण तथा फल रूप में उपमिति प्रमा को स्वीकार करते हैं। अद्वैत वेदान्तियों का लक्ष्य है ब्रह्म की अद्वितीयता को सिद्ध करना और मिथ्यात्व के लक्षण में ही यह निहित है कि वह सत्, असत् और सदसत् आदि कोटियों से विलक्षण होता है। इस वैलक्षण्य की व्याख्या साधर्म्य-वैधर्म्य ज्ञान के बिना सम्भव नहीं। अतः अद्वैतवेदान्तियों के लिए सादृश्य प्रमा-रूपा उपमिति और उसका करण उपमान को मानना आवश्यक हो जाता है। नैयायिक शाब्द ज्ञान के उपजीवक के रूप में उपमान का प्रामाण्य मानते हैं। इसमें शब्द का शक्ति ग्रहण अथवा शब्द का अर्थ समझना फल होता है। नैयायिकों के लिए उपमा या उपमान प्रमाण के प्रयोग से प्राप्त किया गया ज्ञान एक नये शब्द के अर्थ का ज्ञान है। इसीलिए शब्द-शक्ति-ग्रह के अन्यतम साधन के रूप में उपमान की गणना न्याय परम्परा में विशेष रूप से की जाती है।<sup>10</sup>

अब उपर्युक्त तीनों दर्शनों में अपने-अपने दार्शनिक प्रयोजनों के अनुसार उपमान की जैसी व्याख्या की गई है वह दो परस्पर उल्टी दिशाओं में गति लेती है। एक गति गौनिष्ठ गवयसादृश्य की ओर है। इसका समर्थन मीमांसक और अद्वैत वेदान्ती करते हैं। दूसरी गति गवयनिष्ठ गोसादृश्य की ओर है। इसका समर्थन केवल नैयायिक करते हैं। पहले में उपमान की फलवन्ता 'गवयसदृशी मदीया गौः' रूप ज्ञान में होती है। ज्ञान के इस रूप में प्रत्यक्ष, स्मृति और शब्द का सहकार होता है। इसीलिए मीमांसकों और अद्वैतवेदान्तियों के उपमान को लेकर अन्तर्भाव की समस्या येन-केन प्रकार से उठाई जाती रही है। दूसरे में उपमान की अन्तर्वस्तु गवयनिष्ठ गो सादृश्य ही है लेकिन यह गवयपदवाच्यत्व प्रकारिका प्रतीति के रूप में फलित होता है। यहाँ यह कहना अनुचित नहीं होगा कि नैयायिकों की शब्द-शक्ति-ग्रह के एक महत्त्वपूर्ण घटक के रूप में उपमान की अवधारणा उपमान विषयक उहापोह का उत्कृष्टतम निष्कर्ष है। उपमान के इस स्वरूप को लेकर भी अन्तर्भाव की समस्या उठाई जा सकती है कि प्रकृत प्रसंग में शब्द-शक्ति-ग्रह अन्य प्रमाण से भी हो सकता है। परन्तु इस बात को यदि मान भी लिया जाय तो यह मानने में कोई हानि नहीं कि एक स्थिति ऐसी भी हो सकती है जहाँ शब्द-शक्ति-ग्रह उपमित्यात्मक रूप से ही होती हो।

द्रष्टव्य है कि मनुष्य की संज्ञानात्मक प्रक्रिया में साधर्म्य-वैधर्म्य-प्रत्यक्ष की महत्त्वपूर्ण भूमिका होती है। हम अपने व्यावहारिक जीवन में साधर्म्य-वैधर्म्य बोध के साथ

उपमानों का बहुआयामी प्रयोग करते हैं। ऐसे प्रयोगों से उपमेय और उपमान के ज्ञान में जो अर्थ प्रकर्षात्मक विलक्षण अभिवृद्धि होती है और यहाँ तक कि दोनों के आन्तरिक स्वरूप के सर्वथा अभिनव आयाम द्रष्टा के समक्ष उभरते हैं। नैयायिक उपमान के इस आयाम में विशेष अभिरुचि नहीं लेते। यद्यपि वात्स्यायन ने<sup>11</sup> 'एवमन्योऽपि उपमानस्य लोके विषयो बुभुत्सितव्य इति' यह कहते हुए उपमान के अवान्तर आयामों को संकेतित तो किया है लेकिन परवर्ती नैयायिकों ने उपमान के प्रयोग से एक नये शब्द के अर्थ की जानकारी प्राप्त कर लेना ही पर्याप्त समझा है। वस्तुतः साहित्यशास्त्र में इदंप्रथमतया उपमान प्रमाण के उस आयाम को उद्धाटित किया जाना सम्भव हुआ है जिसे दार्शनिकों ने या तो देखा नहीं या फिर अपनी अवधारणात्मक योजना में उसे शामिल करना उचित नहीं समझा। साहित्यकारों के लिए उपमान एक अलंकार है जो वाक्यार्थ की शोभा बढ़ाने का शाब्दिक साधन है। महापण्डित अप्पय दीक्षित<sup>12</sup> ने उपमा जन्य अर्थ विप्रकर्ष को ध्यान में रखते हुए उचित ही कहा है कि 'उपमा यत्र सादृश्यलक्ष्मीः उल्लसति द्वयोः'। अर्थात् उपमान और उपमेय के सादृश्य प्रयोजक गुण-धर्मों की शोभा उपमान प्रमाण के प्रयोग से खिल उठती है। इन दोनों के सम्बन्ध में प्रत्यक्षादि प्रमाण के द्वारा जिन बातों को हम जान नहीं पाते हैं उसे एक दूसरे से उपमित कर जान पाना सद्यः रूप से सम्भव हो पाता है। उपमान प्रमाण के इस आयाम को साहित्यशास्त्र के उपमालंकार विषयक विभिन्न प्रयोगों और सन्दर्भों में देखा जा सकता है। इस तथ्य के स्पष्टीकरणार्थ सम्प्रति कालिदास कृत रघुवंश के एक प्रारम्भिक श्लोक को यहाँ उदाहृत करना प्रासंगिक होगा।

क्व सूर्यप्रभवो वंशः क्वच अल्पविषया मतिः।

तितीर्षुर्दुस्तरं मोहादुडुपेनास्मि सागरम्॥

इस श्लोक में महाकवि कालिदास कहते हैं कि सूर्यवंशी महाप्रतापी रघु, अज आदि राजाओं की वंशपरम्परा की श्रेष्ठता का बखान करने में मेरी क्षुद्र बुद्धि समर्थ नहीं हो सकती है। फिर भी मैं ऐसे कार्य को सम्पन्न करने का प्रयास कर रहा हूँ। यह मेरा प्रयास ठीक वैसा ही है जैसे कि एक छोटी सी नैया के द्वारा समुद्र को पार करने का एक अनाड़ी व्यक्ति का प्रयास। इस वर्णन में उपमेयभूत जो कालिदास का रघुवंश वर्णन परक काव्यरचना का प्रयास है उसकी उपमानभूत महाप्रतापी रघुवंश की असाधारण श्रेष्ठता के साथ तुलना कर उपमेय की आत्यन्तिक क्षुद्रता और उपमान की आत्यन्तिक श्रेष्ठता बड़े रोचक ढंग से

प्रदर्शित की गई है। यह उपमेय और उपमान के आन्तरिक स्वरूप का एक प्रकार से साक्षात्कार जैसा ही है जो उपमान प्रमाण के काव्यात्मक प्रयोग से सम्भव हुआ है। अतएव कहा जा सकता है कि जो बात सामान्यतः ज्ञात या प्रतीत होती है उसे अच्छी तरह अर्थात् उसके अंतरंग में प्रवेश कर जानने हेतु उसकी तुलना अन्य अज्ञात या उससे असम्बद्ध प्रतीत होने वाली बात से करना उपमान प्रमाण का कार्य है। उपर्युक्त उदाहरण में छोटी सी नाव का रघुवंशीय राजाओं के चरित्र वर्णन से कोई सम्बन्ध नहीं है परन्तु कवि-प्रतिभा ने इन दोनों को उपमानोपमेयभाव सम्बन्ध से ग्रथित कर इन दोनों के आन्तरिक स्वरूप का हस्तामलकवत् प्रकटीकरण किया है। इस प्रक्रिया में साहित्यशास्त्रीय सिद्धान्तों के अनुसार उपमान और उपमेय बिम्ब-प्रतिबिम्ब जैसे कार्य करते हैं। उपमान के जैसे गुण उपमेय में और उपमेय के जैसे गुण उपमान में अपने आप इस प्रक्रिया से प्रस्फुटित होते हैं। वास्तव में यह उपमान और उपमेयभूत वस्तु के स्वरूप का साक्षात्कार अथवा अपरोक्षानुभव ही है जो किसी न किसी तरह उपमान प्रमाण के विशिष्ट प्रयोग से जुड़ा हुआ है। एक श्रोत्रिय ब्रह्मनिष्ठ गुरु जिस प्रकार अपने उपदेश (श्वेतकेतो तत्त्वमसि) के द्वारा एक योग्य शिष्य को उसकी विस्मृत या अज्ञात चैतन्यमय सत्ता का साक्षात्कार करा देता है वैसे ही उपमान का प्रयोग भी कविगण वस्तुस्वरूप साक्षात्कार के लिए किया करते हैं। वस्तुस्वरूप का ऐसा साक्षात्कार स्पष्ट ही ऐन्द्रिय प्रत्यक्ष के लिए अनुपलब्ध ही रहता है। इस प्रकार कहा जा सकता है कि उपमान प्रमाण के काव्यशास्त्रीय प्रयोग में उपमान प्रमाण के सभी गुण-सूत्र वैसे ही अन्तर्विष्ट रहते हैं लेकिन तज्जन्य प्रमिति और अर्थबोध का विस्तार एक साक्षात्कारी आयाम को अवाम कर लेता है।

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अब शब्द प्रमाण और उपमान प्रमाण के सम्बन्ध में प्रमाण अपरोक्षतावाद का विचार करने के उपरान्त यहाँ अनुमिति मूलक प्रमाण अपरोक्षतावाद की सम्भावना को तलाशना विवक्षित है। द्रष्टव्य है कि परोक्ष प्रमाणों में अनुमान का स्थान न केवल आधारभूत है बल्कि मानक प्रकार का भी है। इसीलिए अनुमानेतर परोक्ष प्रमाणों का अन्तर्भाव भी प्रायशः अनुमान में ही किया जाता है। इस कारण अनुमान की गणना अनन्तर्भाव्य परोक्ष प्रमाण के रूप में की जाती है। अद्वैत वेदान्ती भले ही अनुमान को अंशतः प्रत्यक्षात्मक मानते हैं। लेकिन अनुमान की प्रक्रिया पूर्ण होने तक वह परोक्ष विषयावगाही ही होता है। ऐसी स्थिति में अनुमान प्रमाणमूलक अपरोक्षतावाद का समर्थन



निश्चय ही एक चुनौतीपूर्ण कार्य है फिर भी इस सम्भावना की जाँच-पड़ताल के लिए सर्वप्रथम अनुमान का एक सामान्य उदाहरण लेना और उसके निहितार्थों का विश्लेषण करना उचित होगा।

कोई पर्वत के शिखर से धुएँ के अंबार को उठते देख कर यह अनुमान कर लेता है कि धुएँ के आस-पास आग भड़की हुई है। अवधेय है कि अग्नि विषयक यह अनुमान अग्निविशेष का अनुमान नहीं होता क्योंकि अग्नि के अनेक प्रकार सम्भव हैं। उदाहरण के लिए बम फटने से उत्पन्न होने वाली, बिजली गिरने से पैदा होने वाली, वायुमंडल में भयानक उष्णता के कारण अपने आप भड़क उठने वाली अग्नि के ऐसे अनेक प्रकार हो सकते हैं। प्रकृत प्रसंग में धुएँ को देखकर कोई भी द्रष्टा धुएँ का कारण किस प्रकार की अग्नि है, यह कदापि नहीं जान सकता। वैसे भी जिस हेतु और साध्य की व्याप्ति के ज्ञान के आधार पर अनुमाता धूम को देखकर अग्नि का अनुमान करता है वह व्याप्ति सामान्यात्मक ही होती है। सामान्यात्मक इस अर्थ में कि कोई न कोई धूम किसी न किसी अग्नि से अवश्य सहचरित होता है। अब चूँकि धूम और अग्नि से मध्य व्याप्ति का स्वरूप ऐसा ही होता है, इसलिए धूम विशेष के दृष्टिगोचर होने पर भी अनुमाता उसके आधार पर अग्नि सामान्य का ही अनुमान कर पाता है। यही कारण है कि अनुमान के सम्बन्ध में सिद्धसाधनता का दोष प्रायशः उद्भावित किया जाता है। इस दोष का समाधान तर्करसिक नैयायिक संतोषप्रद रूप से दे पाये हों, ऐसा निश्चित तौर से कह पाना कठिन ही है। यह दोष इसलिए उत्पन्न होता है कि हेतु और साध्य की व्याप्ति नितान्त सामान्यात्मक होने से व्याप्ति ज्ञान के समय ही यह बात ज्ञात हो जाती है कि जहाँ कहीं भी धूम होता है वहाँ आस-पास अग्नि आवश्यक रूप से रहती है। अतः सिद्ध साधनता का व्याप्ति आधारित अनुमान की प्रक्रिया में आक्षिप्त हो जाना स्वाभाविक ही है।<sup>13</sup> इस आक्षिप्त दोष के निराकरणार्थ ही आंग्ल तार्किक जॉन्सन ने दो प्रकार के आनुमानिक प्रामाणिकताओं को प्रस्तावित किया था। इसमें पहले को कॉन्स्टीट्यूटिव वैलिडिटी और दूसरे को एपिस्टिमिक वैलिडिटी कहा जाता है। अनुमान घटित होने से पूर्व हेतु का साध्य के साथ जो नियत सम्बन्ध ज्ञात होता है और उसके आधार पर साध्य की जो सिद्धि सामान्य रूप से होती है उसका ज्ञान की दृष्टि से विशेष महत्त्व नहीं है। इस सिद्धि (कॉन्स्टीट्यूटिव वैलिडिटी) के बावजूद भी अनुमान स्थल में 'अग्नि है' यह ज्ञान उस स्थल में दृग्गोचर हुए धूम के ज्ञान से ही हो सकता है। इसी ज्ञान को ज्ञानमीमांसीय सिद्धि (एपिस्टिमिक वैलिडिटी) कह सकते हैं क्योंकि आनुमानिक ज्ञानमीमांसीय प्रक्रिया यहीं पूर्णता को प्राप्त होती है। नैयायिक इस दोष का समाधान दूसरे

प्रकार से करते हैं। उनके अनुसार आनुमानिक निष्कर्ष का स्वरूप उपर्युक्त स्थल में 'वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् पर्वतो वह्निमान्' ऐसा होता है।<sup>14</sup> इस निष्कर्ष पर सिद्धसाधनता दोष का आरोप नहीं लगाया जा सकता। परन्तु जैसा भी हो, एक बात तो उपर्युक्त विप्लेषण से अवश्य ही उभर कर सामने आती है कि आनुमानिक प्रक्रिया से प्राप्त होने वाला ज्ञान बहुत कुछ चर्वित-चर्वण जैसा ही होता है।

इस कारण अब इस बात को देखना रोचक हो सकता है कि अनुमान को एक विशेष प्रकार का साक्षात्कार अथवा अपरोक्षानुभव का साधन एक विशेष प्रक्रिया के तहत कैसे ठहराया जा सकता है? एतदर्थ ज्योतिर्विज्ञान से सम्बन्धित एक घटना को उदाहृत करना यहाँ समीचीन होगा।<sup>15</sup> प्रसिद्ध ज्योतिर्विद बोवर्ड के द्वारा यूरेनस नामक आठवें ग्रह की खोज किये जाने के कुछ ही दिनों बाद एक युवक ज्योतिर्विज्ञानी लेवेरियर को यह दिखाई पड़ा कि यूरेनस ग्रह का जो भ्रमण कक्ष निर्धारित किया गया है उससे वह हटकर ही भ्रमण करता है। अब इस पहली पर सोचते हुए कि यूरेनस विचलित भ्रमण क्यों करता है, लेवेरियर के सामने अनेक विकल्प सूझने लगे। जैसे यह सम्भव है कि सौरमण्डल का कोई बलवान् ग्रह अपनी आकर्षण शक्ति से यूरेनस को उसकी कक्षा से दूर ढकेल देता हो या फिर यह भी सम्भव है कि कोई बाहरी ग्रह उसे अपनी ओर आकृष्ट करता हो। इस तरह के अनेक विकल्पों का परीक्षण और विश्लेषण गणितीय एवं सौर मण्डल की ज्ञात स्थितियों के आधार पर करते हुए लेवेरियर को अकस्मात् साक्षात्कार जैसी प्रतीति हुई कि कोई बाहरी ग्रह, जिसका आकार कक्ष और गति गणितिक रूप से निर्धार्य है, यूरेनस को उसकी पूर्व निर्धारित कक्षा से दूर हटाता है। स्पष्ट है कि लेवेरियर को यूरेनस विषयक जो अपरोक्षानुभूति हुई वह तद्विषयक भिन्न-भिन्न जानकारियों और हेतुओं को योग्य तरीके से समायोजित करने से ही सम्भव हुई। अपनी इस प्रतीति के आधार पर लेवेरियर ने इंगलैण्ड के राज्य ज्योतिषी को सूचित किया कि आकाश में एक विशेष स्थान पर वेध करने से एक विशेष प्रकार का, अब तक अज्ञात, ग्रह दिखाई पड़ सकता है। इस सूचना के आधार पर राजज्योतिषी ने वेध तो किया लेकिन विलम्ब से, फिर भी लेवेरियर की प्रतीति शतप्रतिशत सत्य सिद्ध हुई। इस उदाहरण में एक ही सत्य निष्कर्ष के भिन्न-भिन्न अंशों को भिन्न-भिन्न हेतुओं द्वारा निर्धारित किये जाने के पश्चात् उन्हें सही तरीके से जोड़कर एक समुचित निष्कर्ष निकाला गया है। यह भिन्न-भिन्न अंशों के योग्य समायोजन करने की दृष्टि ही अपरोक्षानुभव या आनुमानिक साक्षात्कार सदृश कही जा सकती है। यदि यह दृष्टि द्रष्टा को निसर्गतः प्राप्त न हो तो वह अनुमान के

लिए अपेक्षित सभी जानकारियाँ हासिल कर भी उपयुक्त समुचित निष्कर्ष तक नहीं पहुँच सकता। उच्च कोटि के खोजी व्यक्ति में यह दृष्टि हुआ करती है और इतिहास के कई एक महत्त्वपूर्ण खोजों में आनुमानिक साक्षात्कार की यह दृष्टि चरितार्थ भी हुई है। इसके न होने पर कैसे निष्कर्ष सम्बन्धी अपेक्षित जानकारियों को प्राप्त कर भी अनुमान गलत निष्कर्ष पर पहुँच जाता है, इसके लिए किंवदन्ती पर आधारित एक उदाहरण लेना यहाँ स्थाने होगा। कहा जाता है कि एक विख्यात ज्योतिषी अपने एक शिष्य को ज्योतिष शास्त्र में पारंगत कर परीक्षणार्थ एवं सम्मानार्थ राजा विक्रमादित्य के दरबार में ले गया। राजा ने इस नवोदित ज्योतिषी के परीक्षणार्थ अपनी मुट्टी में हीरे की एक अंगूठी रख लिया और पूछा कि मेरी मुट्टी में क्या है? नवोदित ज्योतिषी ने गोचर ग्रहों की स्थिति और प्रश्न काल के गणना के आधार सर्वप्रथम यह बताया कि मुट्टी में कोई गोल वस्तु होनी चाहिए। पुनः ग्रहस्थितियों का और भी सूक्ष्मता से परीक्षण करने के उपरान्त ज्योतिषी ने दूसरा निष्कर्ष यह बताया कि उस गोल वस्तु के बीच में छेद होना चाहिए, इसके बाद तीसरा निष्कर्ष ज्योतिषी ने बताया कि उस गोल वस्तु के मध्य में जो छिद्र है, उसमें धातु की बनी हुआ कोई छोटी वस्तु जड़ी होनी चाहिए। राजा इस नवोदित ज्योतिषी के फलित ज्ञान को देख कर बहुत प्रसन्न हुए और यह कहकर उठे कि आप वास्तव में ज्योतिष शास्त्र में पारंगत हो गये हैं। अब तो आप लगभग जान ही गये हैं कि मेरी मुट्टी में क्या बंद है, तो सभी लोगों को यह बता ही दीजिये कि मेरी मुट्टी में आखिर है क्या? नवोदित ज्योतिषी ने तपाक से कहा कि आपकी मुट्टी में चक्री है। द्रष्टव्य है कि अच्छे खोजी भी किस प्रकार निष्कर्ष को विभिन्न सम्भावनाओं के बीच प्रतीकतया साक्षात्कृत कर पाने की निसर्गतः परिपक्व दृष्टि के अभाव में गलतियाँ कर बैठते हैं।

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इस प्रकार उपर्युक्त विवेचित उदाहरणों से इस तथ्य पर किंचित् प्रकाश अवश्य पड़ता है कि अनुमान का एक ऐसा आयाम सम्भव है जहाँ पीछे प्रदर्शित उदाहरणों के मुताबिक अनुमान की कॉन्स्टीट्यूटिव वैलिडिटी अपरोक्षानुभव या साक्षात्कार रूप एपिस्टेमिक वैलिडिटी में फलित होती है। सामान्य अनुमानों में यह बात उभर कर सामने नहीं आती। ऐसे अभ्यस्त अनुमान (धूम से वह्नि का अनुमान) तो अनुमान जैसे ही नहीं लगते। बर्टेण्ड रसेल ने ऐसे अनुमानों को जो दैहिक अनुमान (फिजियोलाजिकलस इन्फरेंस) कहा था वह एक सीमा तक अनुभव संगत ही प्रतीत होता है। यहाँ कुछ लोग ऐसा सोच सकते हैं कि अनुमान का पूर्वभावी प्रत्यक्ष तो स्वयं में साक्षात्कार है ही। इस कारण अनुमान

के साथ साक्षात्कार या अपरोक्षानुभव जुड़ा ही रहता है। अतः इस बात को अलग से सिद्ध करने की आवश्यकता ही नहीं है। परन्तु वास्तविकता ऐसी नहीं है। द्रष्टव्य है कि पाश्चात्य विश्लेषणवादियों और बौद्धनैयायिकों ने प्रत्यक्ष को चीरफाड़कर उसे एक अनभिलाप्य बिन्दुक्षण में रूपान्तरित कर दिया है जो वास्तव में उस ज्ञान की दृष्टि से अज्ञेय क्षण (ज्ञानेन प्रापयितुमशक्यत्वात्) है जो ज्ञान अनुमान पूर्वभावी रूप में अनुमान का आधार बनता है। सेन्स-डेटा, सेन्स-कन्टेन्ट इत्यादि जो क्षणमात्र के लिए इन्द्रिय-सम्मुख प्रकट होकर तिरोहित हो जाते हैं, वही पश्चिमी विश्लेषणवादियों के लिए प्रत्यक्ष का विषय है। बौद्ध नैयायिकों का मंतव्य भी लगभग इसी प्रकार का है। प्रत्यक्ष विषयक ऐसे मंतव्य को ध्यान में रखते हुए कहा जा सकता है कि अत्यन्त कर्णप्रिय और मधुर संगीत अनन्त विसदृशक्षणावच्छिन्न तानों की संतति मात्र है। वास्तव में गीत-संगीत नाम की कोई वस्तु ही नहीं है। यह सबकुछ कल्पनामात्र, कल्पना-विलास है। इस तरह देखा जाय तो यह प्रत्यक्ष का एक प्रकार से दार्शनिक अप्रत्यक्षीकरण है और इस प्रक्रिया में हृदयग्राही साक्षात्कारात्मक अनुभूति के लिए कोई स्थान ही नहीं रह जाता।

न्याय दार्शनिक प्रत्यक्ष की ऐसी चीर-फाड़ नहीं करते। उनका प्रत्यक्ष मनुष्योचित साधारण अनुभव से अधिक निकटता रखता है। इन्द्रियों से गुणजात्यादियुक्त समग्र वस्तु का ही प्रत्यक्षज्ञान हुआ करता है भले ही उस वस्तु का एक ही अंश इन्द्रिय सम्मुख क्यों न होता हो। परन्तु प्रश्न उठता है कि वस्तु विषयक ऐसे ज्ञान को भी क्या सही अर्थों में साक्षात्कारी ज्ञान या अपरोक्षानुभव से अभिहित किया जा सकता है? द्रष्टव्य है कि साक्षात्कार सही अर्थों में सम्मुख स्थित वस्तु का पूर्ण रूप से विषयीकरण मात्र नहीं है। विषयी द्रष्टा विषय के अतरंग में एक प्रकार से प्रवेश कर जब तक उस विषय के साथ तादात्म्यानुभव नहीं करता, तब तक उसे विषयसाक्षात्कार हुआ ऐसा नहीं कहा जा सकता। अद्वैत वेदान्ती जब औपनिषद् दृष्टि को प्रस्तावित करते हुए यह कहते हैं कि 'ब्रह्मविद् ब्रह्मैव भवति' तो यह बात सम्पूर्ण भारतीय ज्ञान-मीमांसा के लिए एक महत्त्वपूर्ण अन्तर्दृष्टि है। अवधेय है कि अद्वैत वेदान्ती इस ज्ञानमीमांसीय अन्तर्दृष्टि को केवल ब्रह्मज्ञान तक ही सीमित नहीं रखते बल्कि इसका सम्प्लव घटपदादि वस्तुओं के ज्ञान में भी दिखाते हैं। ब्रह्मज्ञान का ही वर्णन करते हुए उपनिषद् में पुनः कहा गया है कि 'यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यां किंचन नान्तरमेवमेवायम्.....।' <sup>16</sup> जिस प्रकार अपनी प्रियतमा के आलिंगन में आबद्ध होने पर प्रणयी सबकुछ भूलकर प्रियतमा के अस्तित्व में अपनी और

अन्य सभी सत्ताओं को विलीन कर देता है, उसी प्रकार न केवल ब्रह्म साक्षात्कार बलिक साधारण वस्तुओं का भी साक्षात्कार हो सकता है। वस्तुतः हमारी देहाधिष्ठित वस्तुमात्र के नैसर्गिक विषयीकरण की जो प्रक्रिया है, वह साक्षात्कार को प्रतिबन्धित कर देती है। आत्मप्रत्यक्ष भी तो प्रत्यक्ष ही है। क्या हम आत्मा का मनःपूर्वक विषयीकरण कभी करते हैं? यह बात अलग है कि शरीराधिष्ठित विषयीकरण की प्रवृत्ति में अभ्यस्त होने के कारण हम अपनी आत्मा के सम्बन्ध में भी तटस्थता से वस्तुवाची पदावली में ही बाते करते हैं। यदि आत्मानुभव अपने स्वरूप में पूर्णतया विषयीभाव से रहित होता है, तो अन्य वैषयिक अनुभव भी ऐसे क्यों नहीं हो सकते, वस्तुओं का विषयीकरण या उन्हें अपने से भिन्न एक प्रदत्त विषय के रूप में आकलन करने की हमारी देहाधिष्ठित प्रवृत्ति एक प्रकार से उनपर किया गया ज्ञानमीमांसीय अनाचार ही है। इसी प्रवृत्ति के फलस्वरूप हम अधिकांश वस्तुओं को अपने से अत्यन्त भिन्न प्रकार की जड़ात्मक और यहाँ तक कि सत्तात्मक दृष्टि से निम्न कोटि का समझते हैं। जबकि वास्तविकता यह है कि ज्ञान की व्याख्या में ज्ञाता-ज्ञेय सम्बन्ध के भागीदार दोनों सम्बन्धियों की प्रस्थिति और भूमिका को लेकर इस प्रकार के भेदभाव के लिए कोई स्थान ही नहीं होना चाहिए।

अतएव उपर्युक्त बातों को यदि ध्यान में रखा जाय तो ज्ञान की व्याख्या को दैहिक सन्दर्भ से हटाकर चेतना के सन्दर्भ में व्याख्यायित किया जा सकता है। यद्यपि चेतना ज्ञानोन्मुख व्यापार में आवश्यक रूप से दैहिक-ऐन्द्रिक माध्यम से ही प्रवर्तित होती है लेकिन इसका मतलब यह नहीं कि माध्यम की प्रस्थिति और भूमिका को ही इतना गरिमामय मान लिया जाय कि वही वास्तविक विषयी को विस्थापित कर स्वयं विषयिभावापन्नता को अवाप्त कर ले। भारतीय दर्शनों में केवल अद्वैत वेदान्त ही एक सीमा तक ज्ञान की व्याख्या में इस ज्ञानमीमांसीय दृष्टि को चरितार्थ करता है। इसीलिए अद्वैत वेदान्तसम्मत प्रत्यक्ष की अवधारणा में साक्षात्कारित्व का जो स्वरूप उभर कर सामने आता है उसे उसका वास्तविक स्वरूप कहा जा सकता है।<sup>17</sup> उनके अनुसार द्रष्टा के अन्तःकरणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्न चैतन्य का विषयावच्छिन्न चैतन्य के साथ एक रूप हो जाना ही प्रत्यक्ष की प्रक्रिया का घटित होना है। प्रत्यक्ष होने की स्थिति में वस्तुतः विषयविषयिभाव समाप्त हो जाता है और अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्न चैतन्य रूप द्रष्टा अपनी तात्कालिक ऐन्द्रिक वृत्ति के द्वारा विषय के साथ एकाकार होकर एक प्रकार से उसका आलिंगन करता हुआ उसकी सत्ता में अपनी सत्ता को विलीन कर देता है। यही स्थिति प्रत्यक्षात्मक साक्षात्कार की वास्तविक स्थिति है। व्यवहारदशा में ऐसे साक्षात्कारित्व का अनुभव अत्यन्त मधुर

संगीत सुनते हुए अथवा अत्यन्त मनोहारी दृश्य देखते हुए द्रष्टा को अक्सर प्राप्त होता है। दैहिक-ऐन्द्रिक सन्दर्भ में ज्ञान की व्याख्या करते हुए ऐसे प्रसंगों की व्याख्या दुष्कर होती है क्योंकि इस प्रकार के अनुभवों में विषयविषयिभाव का वह प्रारूप जो साधारण प्रत्यक्ष में दृष्टिगोचर हुआ करता है, उसका एक तरह से अतिक्रमण हो जाता है। इस स्थिति में तो द्रष्टा की आत्मरूप विषयिता भी शुद्ध आनन्दमय चेतना में विलीन हो जाती है। द्रष्टव्य है कि साधारण प्रत्यक्ष में हम वस्तुओं को देखी-अनदेखी या ध्वनि को सुना-अनसुना कर देते हैं, क्योंकि व्यावहारिक जीवन में कोई भी ज्ञान कामचलाऊ समझकर ही प्रयोग में लाया जाता है। ज्ञेय कैसा भी हो लेकिन ज्ञाता की ज्ञानमीमांसीय भूमिका में हम ज्ञेय विषय की अपेक्षा ज्ञाता को श्रेष्ठ ही समझते हैं। इस कारण ज्ञेय के साथ एकतानता का अनुभव हमें क्वचित् ही हो पाता है। अद्वैतवेदान्तीय प्रत्यक्ष की अवधारणा इसी एकतानता अथवा विषय-विषयी की तात्कालिक एकरूपता का संकेत करती है। यदि अद्वैत वेदान्त की प्रमाण मीमांसा में प्रत्यक्ष के अतिरिक्त अन्य प्रमाणों की अवधारणा भी इसी दृष्टि को चरितार्थ करते हुए की जाती तो यह निश्चय ही ज्ञानमीमांसीय चिन्तन के लिए एक महत्त्वपूर्ण पहल होती। हमने तो यहाँ केवल इसी अन्तर्दृष्टि को आत्मसात् करते हुए शब्द, उपमान और अनुमान प्रमाण के सन्दर्भ में विषय-विषयी की एकतानता के उस आयाम की सम्भावना को रेखांकित करने का प्रयास किया है, जहाँ उनका सम्बन्ध प्रमाण अपरोक्षतावाद से जुड़ता है। स्वयं अद्वैतवेदान्ती भी यद्यपि 'दशमत्वमसि' के प्रसंग में शब्दापरोक्षतावाद को तो देख पाये, परन्तु अन्य प्रमाणों से सम्बद्ध प्रमाणापरोक्षतावाद को नहीं देख सके। वस्तुतः दैहिक-ऐन्द्रिक सन्दर्भ में ज्ञान की व्याख्या करते हुए इन प्रमाणों की अपरोक्षतावादी प्रवृत्ति को नहीं देख पाना एक तरह से उनके समक्ष अव्याप्ति-प्रसंग को उपस्थापित करता है लेकिन विशुद्ध चेतना के सन्दर्भ में ज्ञान की मीमांसा करते हुए यावत् प्रमाणों की प्रवृत्ति को 'नोइंग बाय बींग' अर्थात् जानने का मतलब होने के प्रारूप में पूरे तौर से व्याख्यायित किया जाना अभी शेष है।

आचार्य

दर्शन विभाग

डा. हरी सिंह गौर विश्वविद्यालय

सागर, (म. प्र.)

Email—sharma.ambikadatta@gmail.com

## संदर्भ एवं पाद टिप्पणी

1. अद्वैत वेदान्त के इतिहास में शब्दापरोक्षतावाद की उपपत्ति भामती और वार्तिक सम्प्रदाय के मध्य ब्रह्मज्ञान के साधनों को लेकर हुई है। “आत्मा का अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः” इस श्रुति द्वारा स्पष्ट रूप से श्रवण, मनन और निदिध्यासन का विधान ब्रह्मज्ञान के साधनभूत रूप में किया गया है। इसमें भामतीप्रस्थान का अभिमत यह है कि श्रवण-मनन से संस्कृत और शुद्ध हुआ मन ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कार का कारण बनता है। अतः श्रवण, मनन वास्तव में निदिध्यासन के प्रति अंग हैं और निदिध्यासन ही अंगी अथवा प्रधान है। इसके विपरीत वार्तिक प्रस्थान का अभिमत यह है कि श्रवण ही प्रधान है और मनन तथा निदिध्यासन उसके अंग हैं। यहाँ विवाद का विषय यह है कि जब श्रुति यह कहती है कि ‘यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद् ब्रह्म’ तो ब्रह्मानुभव को भी सर्वथा अपरोक्ष होना चाहिए। ऐसी स्थिति श्रवण मात्र से ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कार नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि शब्द परोक्ष प्रमा का साधन है। पुनः ब्रह्मज्ञान का प्रतिबन्ध यदि भ्रम रूपा अविद्या है तो उसकी निवृत्ति प्रत्यक्ष प्रमा से ही होती है। इसपर वार्तिक प्रस्थान का (सुरेश्वराचार्य का) प्रत्युत्तर यह है कि शब्द प्रमाण का फल प्रत्यक्ष या अपरोक्ष रूप हो सकता है। इसलिए ‘श्वेतकेतो तत्त्वमसि’ वाक्य के श्रवण से ही श्वेतकेतु को ब्रह्म साक्षात्कार हो जाता है। इसके लिए मनन व निदिध्यासन की आवश्यकता नहीं है। अब प्रश्न उठता है कि शब्द किस प्रकार अपरोक्ष प्रमा रूप फल को उत्पन्न करता है तो इसी के उत्तर में ‘दशमस्त्वमसि’ को उदाहृत करते हुए विवरण प्रस्थान में शब्दापरोक्षतावाद का अनुपम प्रतिपादन किया गया है। शाब्दविधावेवं वेदान्तेषु निराकृते। अपरे पण्डितम्मन्या विध्यन्तरमिहोचिरे।।
2. नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धि (पृ0 146) एवं बृहदारण्यकभाष्य वार्तिक में द्रष्टव्य
3. पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानस्य वह्न्यंश एवानुमितित्वं न पर्वताद्यंशे। तदंशे प्रत्यक्षत्वस्योपपादितत्वात्-वेदान्त परिभाषा, पृ0 151, म0 म0 अनन्तकृष्ण शास्त्री, कलकत्ता विश्वविद्यालय, 1930.
4. परमात्मा तथा जीवात्मा दोनों के ही ब्रह्मस्वरूप होने के कारण जीवात्मा तथा परमात्मा का अभेद सम्भव होता है।
5. हालाँकि उसको पूर्णतः अज्ञात कहना सही नहीं है क्योंकि वह अवेद्य होते हुए भी अपरोक्षव्यवहार का विषय हुआ करता है।

6. फलव्याप्यत्वमेवास्य शस्त्रकृद्भिर्निवारितम्। ब्रह्मण्यज्ञाननाशाय वृत्तिव्यामिरपेक्षिता॥ पंचदशी-790-92.
7. वाचस्पति मिश्र इत्यादि का ऐसा अभिमत बौद्ध नैयायिकों के योगिप्रत्यक्ष अर्थात्- 'भूतार्थभावनाप्रकर्षपर्यन्तज्ञानम्' की तरह है। बौद्धों के अभिमत में भी भावना प्रकर्ष के कारण भूतार्थ विषयक विकल्पात्मक शाब्दी ज्ञान निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष में रूपान्तरित हो जाता है।
8. न च तत्र वाक्यात्पदार्थमात्रोपरिस्थितौ मानसः संसर्गबोध इति वाच्यम्। सर्वस्मिन्नपि वाक्ये तथा सम्भवेन शब्दप्रमाणमात्रोच्छेदापत्तेः .....अत एवं वाक्यात् परोक्षज्ञानान्तं मानसज्ञानान्तरमेव भ्रमनिवर्तकमित्यपास्तम्.....अन्यथा वाक्यश्रवणात् पूर्वमेव सामाग्रयाः सम्भवेन मनसा चक्षुरादिना वा साक्षात्कारजननप्रसंगात्। वाक्यमपि तत्र सहकारीति चेत् तर्ह्यायातं वाक्यस्यैव प्रामाण्यम्, मनसोऽसाधारणसहकारित्वात्। तस्माच्छब्द एव तत्र साक्षात्कारहेतुः। वेदान्तकल्पलतिका पृ. 79, गवर्नमेंट सं. पुस्तकालय, बनारस, 1920.
9. यं शब्दबोधमाहाय यस्य बोध्यत्वं, तत्साक्षात्कारार्थं तदभिन्नार्थावगाहित्व-निमित्तकमित्युक्तदोषानवकाशात्। न च एवं प्रत्यक्षान्तर्भावः शब्दस्य स्यादिति वाच्यम्, बोध्यभिन्नार्थकशब्दातिरिक्तत्वे सति प्रत्यक्षप्रमाकरणत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षस्यान्तर्भावे तंत्रत्वात्। अद्वैतसिद्धि-पृ. 877, निर्णय सागर मुद्रणालय 1937.
10. शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानकोषामवाक्याद् व्यवहारतश्च। वाक्यस्य शेषाद्विवृतेर्वदन्ति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः॥ न्यायसिद्धान्तमुक्तावली, शब्दखण्ड।
11. न्याय भाष्य-1.1.6
12. अप्पयदीक्षित-कुवलयानन्द-11, उपमा यत्र सादृश्यलक्ष्मीरुद्रसति द्वयोः। हंसीव कृष्णते कीर्तिः स्वर्गगामवगाहते॥
13. विशेषेऽनुगमाभावः सामान्ये सिद्धसाध्यता। अनुमानपंकभंगेस्मिन्नमग्ना वादिदन्तिनः॥ पार्थसारथिमिश्र ने शास्त्रदीपिका (पृ. 63) पर चार्वाक का पूर्वपक्ष उद्धृत करते हुए यह श्लोक उद्धृत किया है।
14. उदयनाचार्य ऐसा अनुमान का आकार मानते हैं। परन्तु परवर्ती नव्यनैयायिक इसको स्वीकार नहीं करते।
15. प्रसिद्ध तर्कशास्त्री इरविंग एम. कोपी ने अवशेषविधि के अन्तर्गत इस घटना को उद्धृत किया है।



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16. बृहदारण्यक उप. 4-3-22, तद् यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन नान्तरमेवमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किंचन वेदान्तरम्।
17. अद्वैतवेदान्त सम्मत प्रत्यक्ष के ऐसे स्वरूप की व्याख्या प्रो. नारायण शास्त्री द्रविड ने अपने एक आलेख “प्रत्यक्ष की वेदान्तीय परिभाषा” में सम्यक् रूप से किया है। यह आलेख स्वातन्त्र्योत्तर दार्शनिक प्रकरण-1, “समेकित दार्शनिक विमर्श” (पृ0 329-336) में सम्पादित है। इसी आलेख के उत्तरार्ध को पढ़ते हुए मेरे मन में प्रमाण अपरोक्षतावाद का बीजबोध हुआ था। बाद में श्रद्धेय शास्त्री जी से फोन पर (आकलैंड से) इस सम्बन्ध में बहुत सुझाव एवं समर्थन मुझे प्राप्त हुए थे। मैंने उन सबको अपनी समझ की अनुमत सीमा में इस आलेख में व्यवस्थित किया है। आज स्वर्गीय शास्त्री जी का समर्थन ही मेरे लिए इस प्रतिपादन का प्रामाण्य है।

## आचार्य शङ्कर के अद्वैत की तार्किक भूमिका

सच्चिदानन्द मिश्र

“आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः” इस श्रुति के आलोक में भारतीय दर्शनों में सामान्यतया आत्मा का ज्ञान सर्वोत्कृष्ट लक्ष्य के रूप में प्रस्तुत किया जाता है। दर्शन को यदि आत्मविद्या शब्द से जाना जाये तो कुछ गलत नहीं होगा और मानव जीवन के सर्वोत्कृष्ट लक्ष्य मोक्ष की प्राप्ति के लिए आत्मज्ञान ही प्रमुख साधन है, इसमें सन्देह नहीं। अद्वैतवेदान्त श्रुति की महत्ता को परम आदर के साथ स्वीकार करता है। इस सम्प्रदाय का दावा है कि अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व का ज्ञान भी श्रुतिप्रमाण के द्वारा ही सम्भव है। भगवत्पाद आचार्य शङ्कर “शास्त्रयोनित्वात्” इस सूत्र की व्याख्या करते हुए कहते हैं—“शास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणमस्य ब्रह्मणो यथावत् स्वरूपाधिगमे” (ब्रह्मसूत्र शाङ्करभाष्य १-१-३) परन्तु अद्वैतवादी दर्शन होने के कारण अद्वैतवेदान्त किसी भी प्रकार के नानात्व या भेद को पारमार्थिक नहीं मानता, अपितु परमार्थ के धरातल से उतार कर व्यवहार की भूमि पर प्रतिष्ठित करता है। ऐसी स्थिति में अद्वैतमत के अनुसार स्वीकार्य नित्य, शुद्ध, बुद्ध, मुक्तस्वभाव, निर्विशेष, निर्धर्मक, समस्त भेदरहित परमार्थ आत्मतत्त्व का ज्ञान किस प्रमाण से सम्भव हो सकेगा? आखिर अद्वैत के अनुसार तो प्रमाण-प्रमेय भेद को भी पारमार्थिक नहीं ही स्वीकार किया जा सकेगा। इस कारण किस तरह कोई भी प्रमाण अद्वैत का ज्ञान करा पाने में सफल हो सकेगा? प्रमाण की प्रवृत्ति की प्रक्रिया में ही कुछ ऐसा है जो ब्रह्म को प्रमाणातीत मानने का संकेत देता है क्योंकि प्रमाण-प्रमेयव्यवहार करते हुए किस प्रकार से अद्वैत तक सामान्य व्यक्ति की पहुँच हो सकती है? यदि ऐसा है तो क्या शास्त्र या कोई भी प्रमाण अद्वैत का ज्ञान करा पाने में सक्षम है? यहाँ पर यह भी ध्येय है कि परमार्थ तथा व्यवहार का यह अन्तर किस आधार पर स्वीकार किया जाये? क्या इस भेद को स्वीकार करने का कोई तार्किक आधार बनता है? यदि नहीं तो अद्वैत दर्शन के लिए कोई आधारभूमि नहीं रहेगी। मैं अपने इस आलेख में यह खोजने का प्रयास करूँगा कि किस प्रकार सामान्य लोकानुभव से ऊपर उठते हुए आचार्य शङ्कर के अद्वैत की प्रतिष्ठा की जा सकती है क्योंकि समस्त दर्शनों का वैचारिक आरम्भबिन्दु सामान्य लोकानुभव ही है।

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लौकिक अनुभवों के माध्यम से हम सामान्यतया तीन प्रमाणों से परिचित हैं। इन्हें हम स्वाभाविक प्रमाण मान सकते हैं क्योंकि अपने दैनिक जीवन में प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान व शब्द प्रमाण का ही हम प्रचुरतया उपयोग करते हैं। परन्तु इनमें से किसी भी प्रमाण के द्वारा अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व का ज्ञान सम्भव नहीं दिखता।

अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व का ज्ञान बाह्येन्द्रियजन्य प्रत्यक्ष के माध्यम से नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि किसी भी बाह्येन्द्रिय की सामर्थ्य उस अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व का ज्ञान करा पाने की नहीं है। हमारे समस्त बाह्येन्द्रियजन्य प्रत्यक्ष किसी न किसी शर्त पर निर्भर करते हैं—चक्षुरिन्द्रिय से सामान्यतया उसी का प्रत्यक्ष सम्भव हो पाता है जो कि रूपवान् हो, स्पर्शेन्द्रिय से स्पर्शमात्र या स्पर्शयुक्त द्रव्य का ही प्रत्यक्ष सम्भव हो पाता है। अन्य घ्राण, रसना तथा श्रोत्र इन्द्रियाँ तो क्रमशः गन्ध, रस व शब्द का ही प्रत्यक्ष करा पाती हैं। इस कारण किसी भी बाह्येन्द्रिय के द्वारा अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व का प्रत्यक्ष कराया जा सकता हो ऐसा लगता नहीं। इन समस्त बाह्येन्द्रियों के द्वारा जो भी ज्ञान कराये जा रहे हैं, उन समस्त ज्ञानों में भेद भी प्रतिभासित होता रहता है। यदि अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व के ज्ञान की बात की जाये तो आत्मा या प्रत्यक् चैतन्य का समस्त जड़-चेतन के साथ यदि अभेद का ज्ञान होता हो, तो वही ज्ञान अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व का ज्ञान कहा जा सकता है, परन्तु ऐसा ज्ञान तो किसी भी बाह्येन्द्रिय के द्वारा नहीं कराया जा रहा। तो क्या अन्तरिन्द्रिय मन के द्वारा अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व का ज्ञान उत्पन्न हो सकता है? सम्भव तो यह भी नहीं दिखता। न्याय आदि दर्शनों के अनुसार मन के द्वारा 'मैं सुखी हूँ' 'मैं दुःखी हूँ' ऐसे प्रत्यक्ष उत्पन्न होते अवश्य हैं, परन्तु उन प्रत्यक्षों का विषय भी वस्तुतः अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व हो रहा हो ऐसा नहीं माना जा सकता क्योंकि इन प्रकार के अनुभवों के द्वारा भी अहमप्रत्यय से जो समझा जा रहा है, उसकी सुखवत्ता या दुःखवत्ता समझी जा रही होती है, वह अहमप्रत्यय से वेद्य, त्वमप्रत्ययवेद्य तथा तत्प्रत्ययवेद्य से भिन्न ही प्रतीत होता है। अहमप्रत्यय के द्वारा जिसको हम समझते हैं, त्वमप्रत्यय व तत्प्रत्यय के द्वारा भासमान का उससे भेद ही प्रतीत होता है। 'मैं' के रूप में जिसे हम जानते हैं उसको 'तुम' के रूप में या 'उस' के रूप में हम नहीं जानते। इस कारण 'मैं सुखी हूँ' 'मैं दुःखी हूँ' ऐसे अनुभवों के द्वारा भी वस्तुतः अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व का अनुभव

सम्भव नहीं। इस तरह अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व का ज्ञान प्राथमिक प्रमाण प्रत्यक्ष के द्वारा तो सम्भव नहीं ही दिखता। इसके विपरीत हमारी यह प्रत्यक्षानुभूति आपाततः अद्वैतसिद्धान्त के विरोध में ही खड़ी प्रतीत होती है।

अनुमान भी अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व का ज्ञान कराने के लिए प्रवृत्त नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि अनुमान की कुछ अपनी सीमाएँ हैं। पहली बात तो यह कि अनुमान प्रत्यक्षमूलक होता है। प्रसिद्ध उक्ति है “प्रत्यक्षबाधिते ह्यर्थेऽनुमानमपि दुर्लभम्” प्रत्यक्ष से जो अर्थ बाधित होता है, उसका अनुमान भी दुर्लभ है। अद्वैत वेदान्त के अनुसार अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व ब्रह्म को निर्धर्मक (किसी भी धर्म से रहित) स्वीकार किया जाता है। निर्धर्मक में अनुमान की प्रवृत्ति आखिर किस प्रकार से हो सकती है? अनुमान की पद्धति ही है कि किसी धर्मी में सामान्यतया हम किसी एक धर्म को प्रत्यक्ष के द्वारा या प्रमाणान्तर से जानकर दूसरे धर्म का अनुमान करते हैं। परन्तु निर्धर्मक ब्रह्म का न तो कोई अपना धर्म है और न तो वह ब्रह्म ही किसी का धर्म है। इस कारण ब्रह्म को पक्ष बनाकर सत्ता का या अद्वितीयत्व का अनुमान करना किसी भी प्रकार से सम्भव तथा अद्वैतवेदान्तानुसारी सिद्धान्तों के साथ सङ्गत नहीं होगा। अतः निर्धर्मक ब्रह्म का अनुमापक कोई लिङ्ग (हेतु) किस प्रकार सम्भव होगा तथा उसे अनुमान के द्वारा जान पाना कैसे सम्भव होगा? यहाँ तक कि सगुण ईश्वर की सत्ता को भी अनुमान के द्वारा निगमित नहीं किया जा सकता, जैसा कि न्याय-वैशेषिक सम्प्रदाय के अनुगामी दार्शनिक प्रयास करते हैं। कार्यत्व को हेतु बनाकर संसार के कर्ता का अनुमान भी वस्तुतः सम्भावनामात्र होने के कारण युक्तिमात्र है। भले ही उस सम्भावना के उत्कटकोटिक होने के कारण उसको अनुमान मानने का भ्रम पाल लिया जाये, परन्तु उसको अनुमान प्रमाण के रूप में नहीं स्वीकार किया जा सकता। जिस प्रकार अनेक उदाहरण उपलब्ध होते हैं कि जो कार्य हैं वह किसी कर्ता के द्वारा उत्पादित हैं, जैसे कि घट, पट आदि। उसी प्रकार ऐसे भी अनेक उदाहरण संसार में प्राप्त हैं जिनका कार्य होना तो निश्चित है, परन्तु जिनका कर्ता प्रत्यक्ष के द्वारा अनुपलब्ध है, यथा जंगल में उत्पन्न वृक्ष, लताएँ आदि। अतः निर्विशेष ब्रह्म की सत्ता अनुमान प्रमाण से सिद्ध हो पाने की बात तो बहुत दूर की है, सविशेष सधर्मक ईश्वर की सत्ता भी अनुमान प्रमाण के द्वारा नहीं सिद्ध हो सकती।

शब्द प्रमाण के द्वारा भी उसी वस्तु का ज्ञान सम्भव होता है, जो किसी शब्द के द्वारा वाच्य हो सके। हर किसी शब्द की प्रवृत्ति का एक निमित्त होता है, जिसको प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त कहा जाता है। शब्द अपने उन्हीं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तों जाति, गुण, क्रिया अथवा यदृच्छा को

आधार बना कर प्रवृत्त होते हैं। अनेक शब्द जाति को निमित्त बनाकर प्रवृत्त होते हैं यथा घट आदि शब्द घटत्व जाति को निमित्त बनाकर प्रवृत्त होते हैं, जिसमें घटत्वजाति है उसको बोधित करने के लिए घट शब्द का प्रयोग किया जाता है। नील आदि शब्द गुण को निमित्त बनाकर प्रवृत्त होते हैं, नीलरूप जिस व्यक्ति या वस्तु में विद्यमान है, उसी व्यक्ति या वस्तु को बोधित करने के लिए हम नीलशब्द का प्रयोग करते हैं। अनेक शब्द क्रिया को अपनी प्रवृत्ति का निमित्त बना कर प्रवृत्त होते हैं, जैसे पाचक, धावक आदि शब्द। ये शब्द पाकक्रिया, धावनक्रिया आदि को अपना निमित्त बना कर प्रवृत्त होते हैं, जिस व्यक्ति में पाकक्रिया का कर्तृत्व है उसको हम पाचक कहते हैं तथा जिसमें धावनक्रिया का कर्तृत्व है उसे धावक। अनेक शब्द यदृच्छा यानी वक्ता के सङ्केतविशेष को प्रवृत्ति का निमित्त बनाकर प्रवृत्त होते हैं। जैसे किसी व्यक्ति के द्वारा सङ्केत कर दिया गया कि घट शब्द का प्रयोग करने पर पट को समझना, तो उस व्यक्ति के द्वारा घट शब्द का प्रयोग करने पर पट को ही संकेत से परिचित श्रोता समझता है। परन्तु अद्वैतवेदान्त में स्वीकृत अद्वैत निर्विशेष ब्रह्म सिद्धान्ततः किसी भी धर्म जाति, गुण, क्रिया आदि से युक्त नहीं है, तो फिर शब्द किस प्रकार से उस अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व का बोधन कर सकेगा? उपर्युक्त सभी प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तों में से किसी के भी न रहने के कारण ब्रह्म किसी भी शब्द का वाच्य नहीं हो सकता। इस प्रकार अभिधा वृत्ति के द्वारा श्रुति ब्रह्म का प्रतिपादन करने में नितान्त असफल है। अतः निगमित किया जा सकता है कि यदि ब्रह्म किसी भी शब्द के द्वारा वाच्य नहीं हो सकता, तो निश्चय ही शब्द प्रमाण के द्वारा ब्रह्म का ज्ञान कम से कम सीध-सीधे तो नहीं कराया जा सकता।

यह प्रश्न हो सकता है कि ब्रह्म भले ही किसी पद के द्वारा वाच्य न होता हो, परन्तु वाक्य का अर्थ तो हो ही सकता है। जो वाक्यार्थ होता है वह पदार्थ नहीं होता क्योंकि वाक्यार्थ नियमतः ही पदार्थ से अतिरिक्त होता है। इसी कारण नैयायिकों का सिद्धान्त है कि पदों के द्वारा जो अर्थ उपस्थापित होते हैं, वाक्य के द्वारा उन अर्थों का सम्बन्ध ही बोधित होता है, तथा वह सम्बन्ध किसी भी पद का अर्थ नहीं हो सकता, न तो होता ही है। अगर सम्बन्ध किसी पद का अर्थ है तो वह सम्बन्ध वाक्य के द्वारा बोधित नहीं हो सकेगा। परन्तु ध्येय है कि उस सम्बन्ध में भी यह योग्यता है कि वह पद के द्वारा बोधित हो सके क्योंकि जाति, क्रिया, गुण या यदृच्छारूपी प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तों के द्वारा उनका बोधन सम्भव होता है। इसी कारण समवायादि सम्बन्धों के भी वाचक पद भाषा में प्राप्त होते हैं। परन्तु जो किसी

भी पद का अर्थ नहीं है या कहा जाये कि जाति, क्रिया, गुण या यहच्छारूपी प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तों में से किसी से भी युक्त न होने के कारण स्वरूपतः किसी भी पद का अर्थ बनने की सामर्थ्य ही जिसमें नहीं है, ऐसा ब्रह्म क्या किसी भी प्रकार से वाक्यार्थ बन सकेगा? सम्भाव्य तो यह भी नहीं दिखता क्योंकि हमारे समस्त वाक्यप्रयोगों में पदार्थों का सम्बन्ध ही वाक्यार्थ बन कर भासित होता है। परन्तु निर्धर्मक ब्रह्म में किसी भी सम्बन्ध की कल्पना नहीं की जा सकती। इस कारण ब्रह्म किसी भी प्रकार से वाक्यार्थ भी नहीं बन सकेगा। निर्धर्मक ब्रह्म की स्थिति शायद शशविषाणादि शब्दों के समान ही है, ऐसा लगता है। जैसे शशविषाण शब्द का प्रयोग करने पर हमें शब्द सुनायी पड़ता है, कुछ ज्ञान भी होता ही है परन्तु कोई तत्त्व या वस्तु नहीं रहता। उसी प्रकार ब्रह्म शब्द को सुनकर भी शब्द तथा ज्ञान की कुछ अवधारणा बनती तो है परन्तु उस ज्ञान की विषय कोई वस्तु है, यह निर्धारण मुश्किल ही दिखता है। योगदर्शन का सूत्र है “शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः”<sup>1</sup> विकल्प एक ऐसा ज्ञान है, जिसमें शब्द तो है, ज्ञान भी है परन्तु वस्तु नहीं है। एक ऐसा ज्ञान जिसका कोई वस्तुगत आधार नहीं। वस्तुतः तो शशविषाण आदि शब्दों के द्वारा केवल समासघटक शब्दों के अर्थों का विशुद्धलित रूप में बोध होता है, परस्पर सम्बन्ध होकर शशसम्बन्धी विषाण का बोध नहीं होता। यद्यपि “अत्यन्तासन्नप्यर्थे ज्ञानं शब्दः करोति हि” “अर्थ के अत्यन्त असत् होने पर भी शब्द ज्ञान को उत्पन्न कराता ही है” इस वैयाकरण सिद्धान्त को स्वीकृति देने पर शब्दजन्य ज्ञान के विषय शशविषाणादि भी हो सकते हैं, परन्तु वे शशविषाण आदि बौद्ध अर्थरूप ही होंगे। यद्यपि ब्रह्म शब्द शशविषाण आदि शब्दों की तरह समस्त शब्द नहीं है, परन्तु दोनों शब्दों की व्यवस्था प्रायशः एक समान ही दिखती है। आंग्ल भाषा आदि में अनेक असमस्त पद इसी प्रकार के हैं जैसे पेगॉशस आदि। यदि ब्रह्म का उस प्रकार बोधन किसी प्रकार कर भी दिया गया, तो उससे अद्वैती का कार्य सम्पन्न नहीं होता। इस प्रकार के ब्रह्म के बोधन से अद्वैतसिद्धान्त का व्यवस्थापन असम्भव है। इस कारण किसी भी प्रमाण से ब्रह्मज्ञान सम्भव नहीं दिखता। भाषा या तो प्रमाणलब्ध किसी अर्थ को बताती है या तो विकल्प से प्राप्त किसी विषय को। ब्रह्म किसी प्रमाण से लब्ध होता दिखता नहीं, इस कारण वह विकल्प से ही विषय के रूप में प्राप्त हो सकता है।

एक दूसरी बात भी ध्येय है—हमारे जो भी ज्ञान होते हैं, उन समस्त ज्ञानों की उत्पत्ति की प्रक्रिया ही कुछ ऐसी है कि उसमें अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व का ज्ञान सम्भव नहीं दिखता, किसी भी प्रमाण के माध्यम से अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व तक पहुँचना सम्भव नहीं दिखता। वात्स्यायन न्यायभाष्य में न्यायसूत्र के प्रथमसूत्र का अवतरण लिखते हुए कहते हैं कि—

“अर्थवति च प्रमाणे प्रमाता प्रमेयं प्रमितिरित्यर्थवन्ति भवन्ति।...चतुसृषु चैवं विधास्वर्थतत्त्वं परिसमाप्यते”।

प्रमाण के अर्थवान् हो जाने पर प्रमाता, प्रमेय तथा प्रमिति ये तीनों भी अर्थवान् हो जाते हैं। इन्हीं चारों विधाओं में समस्त अर्थतत्त्व की परिसमाप्ति हो जाती है। वात्स्यायन की यह दृष्टि अत्यन्त उचित है कि ज्ञानोत्पत्ति के समस्त अवसरों पर ऐसा ही होता है। कोई प्रमाता, कोई प्रमेय, कोई प्रमाण तथा एक प्रमिति होती है। इस कारण ज्ञान की प्रक्रिया में ही द्वैतप्रपञ्च आ जाता है। फिर अद्वैत की बात की ही कैसे जा सकती है?

इस विवेचन के आधार पर प्राथमिक रूप से यही प्रतीत होता है कि ब्रह्म किसी भी प्रमाण से ज्ञेय नहीं है। इस परिस्थिति में श्रुतियों की भी निरर्थकता होगी, क्योंकि श्रुतियाँ किसी भी प्रकार से ब्रह्म का ज्ञान कराने में सक्षम नहीं हो सकेंगी। इसी कारण समस्त गुरुशिष्यसंवादरूप उपदेश भी निरर्थक होंगे क्योंकि वे भी ब्रह्म का ज्ञान करा पाने में असमर्थ ही होंगे। फिर क्या किसी भी सुबुद्ध जिज्ञासु के लिए युक्तिसङ्गत रूप से अद्वैतसिद्धान्त की स्वीकृति सम्भव होगी?

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ब्रह्म किसी प्रमाण के द्वारा ज्ञेय होता है या नहीं? इस प्रश्न को हमने प्राथमिक रूप में उपस्थित किया। परन्तु इससे भी अधिक मौलिक प्रश्न शायद कुछ अन्य हों। क्या लौकिक अनुभवों से सम्प्राप्त प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान व शब्द इन प्रमाणों को प्रमाण के रूप में मान्यता देना आवश्यक है? या क्या हमारा अपने आप को इन तीन प्रमाणों तक ही सीमित करना उचित है? क्या इनसे अतिरिक्त या कम प्रमाणों को स्वीकार करने का पक्ष सम्भव नहीं है? यहाँ पर यह भी ध्येय है कि ये प्रमाण केवल मनुष्यों के द्वारा ही उपयोग में नहीं लाये जाते, अपितु पशुओं के द्वारा भी इन तीनों प्रमाणों का भरपूर उपयोग किया जाता है। पशु भी हाथ में दण्ड लिये हुए पुरुष को देखकर उस व्यक्ति के क्रोध का अनुमान कर लिया करते हैं, तथा तदनुसार आचरण करने लगते हैं। कुत्ते आदि अनेक पशु भी अपने अनुसार मनुष्यों के

अनेक वाक्यों का अर्थ समझ लेते हैं, यह भी व्यवहार में देखा गया है। उपर्युक्त समस्त प्रश्नों को एक साथ मिलाकर देखा जा सकता है कि क्या लोकानुभव द्वारा प्राप्त ये प्रमाण लोक में स्वीकृत अनेक अप्रामाणिक अभ्युपगमों के समान ही विना परीक्षा के स्वीकार किये जा सकते हैं? या क्या हम विना परीक्षा के प्रमाणों को स्वीकृति दे सकते हैं? अगर हम ऐसा करते हैं तो निश्चय ही हम एक ऐसे दर्शन की प्रतिष्ठापना करने का प्रयास कर रहे होंगे जिसकी अपनी कोई नींव ही नहीं होगी। इस कारण हम प्रमाणों की प्रमाणता भी तब तक नहीं स्वीकार कर सकते जब तक कि उनकी परीक्षा न कर ली जाये। परन्तु इसमें एक मुश्किल है, प्रमाणों की परीक्षा किससे की जाये? आखिर प्रमाणों के द्वारा ही हम सबकी परीक्षा करते हैं, फिर प्रमाणों की परीक्षा किससे करें? समस्या है तो मुश्किल। हम अपरीक्षित का स्वीकार भी नहीं कर सकते तथा प्रमाणों की परीक्षा के लिए प्रमाणों से अतिरिक्त कुछ है भी नहीं जिससे प्रमाणों की परीक्षा की जाये। तो यह परीक्षा भी वस्तुतः प्रमाणों के द्वारा ही, तर्क की सहायता से सम्पादित की जानी है क्योंकि हमारे पास कोई अन्य उपकरण हैं ही नहीं। हम किसी अन्य विधि से शुरुआत नहीं कर सकते।

परन्तु प्रमाणों के प्रामाण्य की परीक्षा के लिए प्राथमिक रूप से हमें यह निर्धारित करना होगा कि ज्ञान का आदर्श क्या हो सकता है? यह देखना होगा कि किस आधार पर किसी ज्ञान को सत्य माना जाये तथा किसी ज्ञान को असत्य। यह भी एक महत्त्वपूर्ण बिन्दु है कि आदर्श ज्ञान होने के लिए क्या ज्ञान की सत्यता के साथ ज्ञान की सुनिश्चितता भी आवश्यक है? पाश्चान्त्य दर्शनपरम्परा में बहुधा ज्ञान की सुनिश्चितता आदर्श ज्ञान होने की एक अनिवार्य व अपरिहार्य शर्त के रूप में देखी गयी है। इसी कारण गणितीय ज्ञान को आदर्श ज्ञान के रूप में देखा गया। भारतीय दार्शनिक परम्परा गणितीय ज्ञान को ज्ञान के आदर्श के रूप में नहीं देखती। वस्तुतः गणितीय ज्ञान विकल्पात्मक ज्ञान के अन्तर्गत ही परिगणित होने का अधिकारी है, जिसमें शब्द भी है तथा ज्ञान भी परन्तु वस्तु नहीं है। वह ज्ञान वस्तुनिष्ठ ज्ञान का आदर्श किस प्रकार हो सकता है? हमारे समस्त प्रमाणजन्य ज्ञान तो वस्तुनिष्ठ होते हैं। गणित आपको यह बतायेगा कि दो और दो का योग चार होते हैं, भले ही आप दो शेरों का दो बकरियों के साथ योग कर रहे हों, एक व एक का योग दो ही होता है भले ही आप जल की एक बिन्दु का योग द्वितीय बिन्दु के साथ कर रहे हों। हमारा अनुभव इन गणितीय ज्ञानों की वैधता को निश्चित तौर पर चुनौती देता है, जिसके आधार पर हम सुनिश्चित तौर पर जानते हैं कि दो शेरों का दो बकरियों के साथ योग का परिणाम चार नहीं



होता और न तो जल की एक बिन्दु का द्वितीय बिन्दु के साथ योग का परिणाम ही दो होता है। पाश्चात्य परम्परा में भी काफी समय के अन्तराल पर यह महसूस किया गया कि वस्तुतः गणितीय ज्ञान हमें कोई नवीन जानकारी नहीं प्राप्त कराता<sup>2</sup> क्योंकि वह एनालिटिक होता है, विश्लेषणात्मक होता है। इसी कारण दो शेरों का दो बकरियों से योग चार न होने पर भी हम यह कभी नहीं मानते कि “दो तथा दो का योग चार होता है” यह बतानेवाला गणित असत्य है। बल्कि हम यह कहते हैं कि दो बकरियों को शेरों ने खा लिया है, इस कारण दो शेर ही रह गये हैं। इस प्रकार यह नितान्त सत्य है कि गणितीय ज्ञान की सत्यता हमारे व्यावहारिक कठिनाइयों से निषिद्ध नहीं होती। आदर्श त्रिभुज के तीन कोणों का योग 180 अंश होता है, इस गणितीय ज्ञान का इस तथ्य से कोई लेना देना नहीं है कि व्यावहारिक जगत् में सचमुच में कोई आदर्श त्रिभुज है भी या नहीं। ए. जे. एयर का यह कहना नितान्त संगत है कि विश्लेषणात्मक तर्कवाक्य (प्रपोजीशन) इस कारण खण्डित नहीं होते क्योंकि वे हमारे आनुभविक जगत् के बारे में कोई वस्तुकथन नहीं करते।<sup>3</sup> यदि वे हमारे आनुभविक जगत् के बारे में कुछ कथन कर रहे होते, तो कदाचित् हमारे आनुभविक विरोधों से उनका निराकरण सम्भव होता। जबकि ऐसा है ही नहीं। इस कारण इस बात से उन तर्कवाक्यों की सत्यता पर कोई फ़र्क नहीं पड़ता कि वे आनुभविक जगत् में सत्यापित हो भी रहे हैं या नहीं। अतः विश्लेषणात्मक गणितीय ज्ञान की सत्यता का मापदण्ड हमारे आनुभविक ज्ञानों की सत्यता का निर्धारण करने के लिए समग्रता में स्वीकृत नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि हमारे आनुभविक ज्ञान विश्लेषणात्मक न होकर संश्लेषणात्मक होते हैं। अपनी इस मौलिक विभिन्नता के कारण इन दोनों ही प्रकार के ज्ञानों की सत्यता के मापदंड समग्रता में तो समान कतई नहीं हो सकते। दोनों के मानदंड भिन्न-भिन्न होने चाहिए।

फिर आदर्श आनुभविक ज्ञान होने का आधार क्या है? ज्ञान के सत्य होने का आधार क्या है? किन शर्तों को पूरा करने से किसी ज्ञान को हम सत्य ज्ञान कह सकते हैं?

ज्ञान के सत्य होने के लिए एक शर्त संवादिता की प्रस्तुत की जाती है, बहुत बार ज्ञान की संवादिता के आधार पर ज्ञान के सत्य होने की बात की जाती है। ज्ञान यदि संवादी है तो वह सत्य है। अनेक दार्शनिक सम्प्रदायों ने अविस्वादाक ज्ञान को प्रमात्मक मानने का पक्ष प्रस्तावित किया है। परन्तु ज्ञान की संवादिता ज्ञान के सत्य होने का आधार नहीं हो सकती। इसकी वजह है कि प्रथम ज्ञान संवादी है या नहीं इसका पता हमें सीधे-सीधे नहीं चल सकता। हमारे पास कोई ऐसा आधार नहीं है जिससे ज्ञान के उत्पन्न होने के साथ-साथ

उसकी संवादिता का भी निर्धारण किया जा सके। ज्ञान वस्त्वनुसारी है या नहीं यह स्वतः जानना कथमपि शक्य नहीं है। फिर ज्ञान के वस्त्वनुसारी होने का निर्धारण करने के लिए हमको द्वितीय ज्ञान पर भरोसा करना पड़ेगा। इसी प्रकार द्वितीयज्ञान की संवादिता का निर्धारण करने के लिए तृतीय ज्ञान पर भरोसा करना पड़ेगा। यह धारा कहीं पर समाप्त होने का नाम नहीं लेगी। अतः अनिवार्य रूप से अनवस्था होगी। इस प्रकार कहीं न कहीं तो हमारे सामने ऐसी परिस्थिति आ जायेगी जहाँ पर जिस ज्ञान की संवादिता अभी निर्धारित नहीं है, उसी ज्ञान के आधार पर उससे भिन्न ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य स्वीकार करना पड़ेगा। उदाहरण के रूप में प्रथम ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य जिस द्वितीय ज्ञान के द्वारा निर्धारित होगा, उस द्वितीय ज्ञान का ही प्रामाण्य स्वयं निर्धारित नहीं है। वह द्वितीय ज्ञान संवादी है या नहीं इसका पता तृतीय ज्ञान से सम्भव है जिसकी संवादिता अभी स्वयं सवालों के घेरे में है। इस प्रकार वस्तुगत रूप में आप ऐसे ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य स्वीकार कर रहे हैं, जिसकी संवादिता अभी तक निर्धारित नहीं हो सकी है। इस कारण संवादिता को ज्ञान की सत्यता का पर्याय नहीं माना जा सकता। जो दार्शनिक इस अनवस्था को व्यवहार की अविरोधिनी बता कर अपने पक्ष को संगत सिद्ध करने का प्रयास करते हैं, वह खुद अपने आपको खण्डित कर रहे होते हैं क्योंकि इसका निहितार्थ यह हुआ कि व्यवहार में जिस प्रामाण्य के आधार पर हमारी प्रवृत्तियाँ हो रही हैं, वह प्रामाण्य कम से कम संवादिता रूपी प्रामाण्य तो नहीं है। यदि संवादिता ही प्रामाण्य है तो निश्चय ही प्रवृत्ति के पूर्व इस संवादिता का निर्धारण शक्य नहीं। यह संवादिता किसी द्वितीय ज्ञान के द्वारा ही परिज्ञात हो रही है। इसी कारण सामान्य रूप से प्रवृत्ति के लिए ज्ञान के प्रामाण्य को जानना आवश्यक नहीं होता, ज्ञान में यदि अप्रमात्व का ज्ञान नहीं हुआ है तो उसी ज्ञान से हमारी प्रवृत्ति हो जाती है। इससे इतना स्पष्ट है कि जिस संवादिता को विभिन्न दार्शनिक प्रमात्व मानते हैं, उसका हमारे व्यवहारिक जीवन में कोई खास उपयोग नहीं है क्योंकि प्रवृत्ति के लिए उस संवादिता को जानना आवश्यक नहीं रहता।

दूसरी एक और बात है जिस पर ध्यान देना आवश्यक है वह यह कि संवादिता के एक खास अर्थ पर ध्यान दिया जाये तो अनेक बार गलत ज्ञान भी संयोगवश संवादी हो जाते हैं। ज्ञान की संवादिता का निर्धारण करने के लिए हमें यह देखना पड़ता है कि कौन सा ज्ञान अर्थक्रियाकारी है तथा कौन सा ज्ञान अर्थक्रियाकारी नहीं है। यदि कोई अर्थक्रियाकारी है तो हम उस ज्ञान को संवादी मानते हैं तथा यदि अर्थक्रियाकारी नहीं है तो उसको

विसंवादी मानते हैं। धर्मकीर्ति ने प्रमाणवार्तिक में स्पष्ट रूप से इस समस्या का उपस्थापन किया है। मणि की प्रभा में मणि का ज्ञान होने पर यदि कोई व्यक्ति मणि को प्राप्त करने के लिए प्रवृत्त होता है, तो उस व्यक्ति की प्रवृत्ति सफल होती है। परन्तु यदि प्रदीप की प्रभा में मणि की बुद्धि से प्रवृत्ति हो तो प्रवृत्ति सफल नहीं होती। देखा जाये तो मणि की प्रभा में होनेवाला मणि की भ्रान्ति तथा प्रदीप की प्रभा में होनेवाली मणि की भ्रान्ति 'दोनों ही भ्रान्तियाँ' हैं तो भ्रान्तियाँ ही, परन्तु एक में अर्थक्रियाकारिता है परन्तु दूसरी में अर्थक्रियाकारिता नहीं है। इस कारण यदि अर्थक्रियाकारिता को संवादिता का पर्याय माना जाये तो भ्रमात्मक ज्ञान भी अर्थक्रियाकारी होने के कारण संवादी होने के कारण सत्य हो जाता है। यह निश्चय ही एक विचित्र किस्म का अन्तर्विरोध है। इस कारण अर्थक्रियाकारित्वरूपी संवादिता को ज्ञान की सत्यता का पर्याय मानना समुचित नहीं दिखता।

एक दूसरी शर्त भी पाश्चात्य परम्परा में प्रचलन में रही है जिसे हम ज्ञान की सुसंगतता का सिद्धान्त कहते हैं। परन्तु ज्ञान की सुसंगतता सत्य ज्ञान की न तो अनिवार्य शर्त है तथा न तो सत्यता का पर्याय। विभिन्न ज्ञानों के परस्पर सुसंगत न होने पर भी उनके सत्य होने की सम्भावना को नकारा नहीं जा सकता। वस्तुतः ज्ञान की सुसंगतता की माँग मानव मस्तिष्क की देन है, हमारी चिन्तनपद्धति की देन है। हमारी चिन्तनपद्धति ही कुछ ऐसी है कि हम उस ज्ञान को ही सत्य मानने के लिए बहुधा तैयार होते हैं जो कि सुसंगत होता है। मानवमस्तिष्क उसे सत्य मानने के लिए तैयार नहीं होता जो संगत नहीं दिखायी देता। इसी कारण अनेक अन्धविश्वासों को सुसंगत न होने के कारण हम खण्डित कर देते हैं, छोड़ देते हैं। परन्तु यह माँग अपने आप में ही एक अन्धविश्वास का रूप ले लेती है, जब हम उसे सत्य की पहचान मानने का दावा करने लगते हैं। यह किसी भी तरह से निर्धारित नहीं किया जा सकता कि सत्य हमेशा सुसंगत ही होगा। आज तो वैज्ञानिक भी ऐसी सम्भावनाओं को नकारते नहीं। वैज्ञानिक सिद्धान्त भी केवल किन्हीं खास परिस्थितियों में ही सुसंगतता की माँग करते हैं। हर किसी परिस्थिति में ज्ञान के सुसंगत होने की माँग स्वयं में हास्यास्पद है। अनेक झूठों को भी इस प्रकार से बुना जा सकता है, जोकि सुसंगत दिखायी देते हों। जैसा कि हम विभिन्न उपन्यासकारों के रोचक उपन्यासों में देखते हैं। परन्तु उनकी असत्यता अध्येता को उस उपन्यास का अध्ययन करते समय ही उद्घाटित रहती है।

फिर ज्ञान की सत्यता क्या है? शायद इस प्रश्न का समाधान हमें प्रत्यक्ष के विवेचन से प्राप्त हो सके जो कि समस्त प्रमाणों में वरिष्ठ है। समग्र भारतीय दार्शनिक परम्परा ज्ञान का आदर्श प्रत्यक्ष में देखती है।<sup>4</sup> समस्त ज्ञानों का आदर्श प्रत्यक्षात्मक ज्ञान को मानने का आधार यह है कि प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान वस्तुनिष्ठ, स्फुट तथा सुस्पष्ट होता है। उस प्रत्यक्षात्मक ज्ञान की विवेचना हमें यथार्थ ज्ञान की मूल भित्ति तक पहुँचा सकती है। परन्तु ज्ञान के आदर्श सर्वप्रमाणवरिष्ठ प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण की अपनी भी कुछ समस्याएँ हैं। देकार्त की यह युक्ति बहुत समुचित लगती है कि जिसने हमें एक बार धोखा दे दिया हो उस पर फिर से भरोसा करना उचित नहीं है। ज्ञान का आदर्शभूत सर्वप्रमाणवरिष्ठ प्रत्यक्ष भी बड़ा विचित्र है। यदि देकार्त की इस युक्ति के परिप्रेक्ष्य में देखें तो हमें पता चलता है कि अनेक बार यह प्रत्यक्ष ही हमें ठगता है। बहुधा हमारे अनुभव में आता है कि हम अब तक प्रत्यक्ष से जो जान रहे थे वह गलत जान रहे थे। हम बचपन से प्रत्यक्ष से यही जान पा रहे होते हैं कि सूर्य पृथ्वी की परिक्रमा कर रहा है। परन्तु विज्ञान हमें बताता है कि वस्तुतः ऐसा नहीं है, सूर्य की परिक्रमा पृथ्वी कर रही है। वैसे सूर्य पृथ्वी की परिक्रमा कर रहा है, इस बात को हम प्रत्यक्ष से नहीं जान सकते क्योंकि सूर्य की गति हमारे लिए प्रत्यक्ष सिद्ध नहीं है। हम भिन्न-भिन्न देशों में सूर्य का प्रत्यक्ष करते हैं, तथा उससे अनुमान (ग़लत अनुमान) करते हैं कि सूर्य में गति है। विज्ञान बाद में इसी अनुमान को ग़लत सिद्ध करता है। परन्तु सूर्य के परिमाण का तो हम बचपन से ही प्रत्यक्ष कर रहे होते हैं, उसे एक थाली के आकार का देख रहे होते हैं। बाद में हमें ज्ञान के अन्य साधनों से इस प्रात्यक्षिक ज्ञान की असत्यता का पता चलता है। इस कारण यह तो सुस्पष्ट है कि हर कोई ज्ञान सत्य नहीं माना जा सकता। उसी ज्ञान को सत्य माना जा सकता है जो कि परीक्षित है। परन्तु ज्ञान के परीक्षित होने से मिला क्या? परीक्षित ज्ञान को ही प्रमा मानना तो क्यों?

ऐसा लगता है कि यह विवेचन सही बिन्दु से आरम्भ नहीं हो रहा। ज्ञान की सत्यता के निकष का निर्धारण करने के लिए हमारा प्रयास यदि इस बिन्दु से प्रारम्भ होता कि ज्ञान की असत्यता क्या है? तो शायद हमारे लिए इस समस्या का समाधान करना अधिक युक्तिसंगत रीति से सम्भव होता। इस कारण इसी बिन्दु से हम अपनी बात प्रारम्भ करें— ज्ञान की असत्यता क्या है? ऊपर के समस्त विवेचनों में ज्ञान की सत्यता का निर्धारण करने के बाद उसके विपरीत रूप में असत्यता का निर्धारण किया गया था। इस कारण ऊपर के समस्त सिद्धान्तों में ज्ञान की असत्यता का प्रश्न प्राथमिक नहीं था, गौण था। परन्तु

हमने अपने कोण को बदल कर इसी प्रश्न को प्राथमिक बना दिया है। ज्ञान की असत्यता उस ज्ञान की बाधितता ही है। हम किसी भी ज्ञान को बाधित या बाध्य होने के कारण ही असत्य मानते हैं। अतः ज्ञान की असत्यता को स्वीकार करने का कोई दूसरा आधार नहीं हो सकता। ज्ञान की संवादिता को जिस प्रकार से ज्ञान की सत्यता का आधार नहीं माना जा सकता उसी प्रकार से ज्ञान की असत्यता का आधार ज्ञान की विसंवादिता नहीं हो सकती क्योंकि विसंवादिता का पता भी हमें सीधे-सीधे नहीं चलता। ज्ञान को विसंवादी भी हम इसीलिए मानते हैं क्योंकि वह बाधित है। इस कारण ज्ञान की विसंवादिता भी वस्तुतः ज्ञान के बाधित होने के कारण ही स्वीकार्य है। किसी अन्य कारण से नहीं। इस प्रकार हमारे सामने यह बात उपस्थित होती है कि जो ज्ञान बाधित है वह गलत है। परन्तु ज़रा सा रुकें जो अभी तक बाधित नहीं है परन्तु भविष्य में बाधित होगा, या युक्तियों से जिसके भविष्य में बाधित होने का हमें पता चले गलत तो उसे भी मानना होगा। इस कारण जो बाध्य है वह गलत है। अब यदि ज्ञान बाध्य होने के कारण असत्य है तो अबाध्य होने के कारण ही वह सत्य होना चाहिए। जो अबाध्य है, वही सत्य है। अब हमारे पास कुछ आधार उपस्थित हो गये हैं जिससे ज्ञान की सत्यता तथा असत्यता का निर्धारण हम कर सकते हैं—वह आधार है ज्ञान का अबाध्य होना तथा बाध्य होना। किसी भी ज्ञान की परीक्षा के द्वारा हम यही तो निर्धारित करते हैं कि कहीं वह ज्ञान बाध्य तो नहीं है? इसी कारण ही तो परीक्षित ज्ञान का प्रामाण्य है, क्योंकि परीक्षा हो जाने पर उस ज्ञान का अबाध्यत्व एक सीमा तक निर्धारित हो जाता है। अन्यथा परीक्षा के द्वारा उस ज्ञान में अन्य कोई विशेष तो नहीं ही आपादित होता। इसी कारण परीक्षित ज्ञान को सत्य मानने का लोकाभिमान है। विश्लेषणात्मक ज्ञानों की सत्यता का मूल भी इसी में है कि विश्लेषणात्मक ज्ञान परीक्षित होने पर बाधित नहीं होते। दो बकरियों से दो शेरों के योग के चार न होने पर भी दो और दो चार होते हैं यह बतानेवाला गणितीय ज्ञान बाधित नहीं होता क्योंकि वह दो बकरियों से दो शेरों के योग को चार बताने का आग्रह नहीं पालता। वह आनुभविक जगत् के विषय में कोई वस्तुकथन करता ही नहीं है, इसी कारण आनुभविक शर्तों के द्वारा परीक्षित कर उसको झुठलाया नहीं जा सकता।

अब हम इस बिन्दु “जो ज्ञान अबाध्य है वह सत्य है” से आगे बढ़ेंगे। सामान्य लौकिक आनुभविक जगत् से अपनी विचार की धारा को बढ़ाते हुए हम यहाँ पर पहुँचे हैं। इस बिन्दु पर भी विचार किया जाना चाहिए कि ज्ञान बाधित क्यों होता है? वह क्या है जिसके आधार पर हम ज्ञान को बाधित या बाध्य कहते हैं? ज्ञान का द्वितीय ज्ञान से विनाश

हो जाना किसी ज्ञान का बाधित होना नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि हर एक ज्ञान अपने बाद में उत्पन्न होनेवाले ज्ञानान्तर से या किसी अन्य मानसिक वृत्ति के द्वारा विनाशय होता है। अधिकांश दार्शनिक इसे तथ्य के रूप में स्वीकार करेंगे कि सामान्यतया अनेक ज्ञान एक साथ नहीं उत्पन्न होते अपितु क्रमभावी होते हैं। फिर किसी ज्ञान का बाधित होना तथा किसी ज्ञान का अबाधित होना क्या है? वस्तुतः कोई भी ज्ञान उस ज्ञान के विषय के बाधित होने से ही बाधित होता है। विषयबाध के अधीन ही ज्ञान का बाध्यत्व है। यदि किसी ज्ञान का विषय बाधित हो रहा है तो हम कहते हैं वह ज्ञान बाधित हो गया। विषय के बाधित हुए विना ज्ञान कभी भी बाधित नहीं होता। ज्ञान का सत्यत्व या असत्यत्व कभी भी विषय से निरपेक्ष नहीं हो सकता। यह एक बहुत बड़ी तार्किक भूल होगी यदि हम समस्त ज्ञानों की सत्यता या असत्यता का निर्धारण विना विषय की चिन्ता किये करने लगे क्योंकि ज्ञान की सत्यता या असत्यता विषयनिरपेक्ष नहीं हो सकती। हालाँकि कुछेक ज्ञान(?) ऐसे होते हैं जिनके बारे में हम अपनी राय सीधे-सीधे ही दे सकते हैं यथा 'गोल त्रिकोण विषयक ज्ञान' की असत्यता बतलाने के लिए हमें अपने आनुभविक जगत् की ओर झाँकने की आवश्यकता नहीं होती। परन्तु यदि ध्यान से देखें तो हम पायेंगे कि इन ज्ञानों की स्थिति कुछ अलग किस्म की है, ये आनुभविक ज्ञान हैं ही नहीं। इस कारण गोल त्रिभुज के न होने के ज्ञान में हमें कोई नवीन जानकारी नहीं प्राप्त होती। तथापि इन ज्ञानों की भी असत्यता इनके विषयों की असम्भाव्यता के कारण ही होती है। सचमुच में तो इन ज्ञानों की असम्भाव्यता इनके विषयों की असम्भाव्यता के कारण होती है। ज्ञान की असत्यता तथा असम्भाव्यता अलग चीजें हैं। दूसरे प्रकार से इस परिघटना को इस रूप में व्याख्यायित किया जा सकता है कि गोल त्रिभुज का ज्ञान हमें होता ही नहीं, तथा इसी प्रकार गोल त्रिभुज के न होने का ज्ञान भी हमको नहीं होता। होता मात्र इतना है कि हम गोल त्रिभुज विषयक विचार के समरूप किसी ज्ञान की कल्पना करते हुए उसके असत्य होने का निष्कर्ष निकाल लेते हैं। इस कारण सचमुच में कहा जाये तो गोल त्रिभुज का न होना भी हमें किसी प्रमाण के द्वारा ज्ञात नहीं होता। त्रिभुज के ज्ञान में ही उसका गोल न होना अन्तर्भूत है।

किसी भी ज्ञान के सही या ग़लत होने का निर्धारण हम सिर्फ़ उस ज्ञान के विषय के सही या ग़लत होने के आधार पर ही कर सकते हैं। यदि ज्ञान का विषय सही है तो ज्ञान सही और यदि ज्ञान का विषय ग़लत तो ज्ञान ग़लत। इन दोनों कोटियों के अलावा कोई तीसरी कोटि नहीं हो सकती। बहुधा अद्वैतवेदान्त के सिद्धान्तों को समझने के क्रम में सत्, असत्

तथा अनिर्वचनीय इन तीन कोटियों की चर्चा बीच में आ जाती है, तथा इस कारण बात एकदम से उलझ जाती है। इन तीनों कोटियों पर चर्चा करते समय बहुधा हम एक बहुत मामूली सी गलती कर देते हैं। इन तीनों कोटियों को वस्तु की कोटियाँ मान लेते हैं। जबकि ये तीनों वस्तु की नहीं विचार की कोटियाँ हैं क्योंकि विचार सत्, असत् तथा अनिर्वचनीय तीनों को विषय कर सकता है। परन्तु ज्ञान केवल दो को ही विषय कर सकता है सत् को तथा अनिर्वचनीय को क्योंकि वस्तु की कोटियाँ केवल दो हैं। असत् को जानने के लिए हमारे पास कोई साधन ही नहीं है। अगर असत् को जानने के लिए हमारे पास कोई साधन होता, तो वह असत् ही नहीं होता क्योंकि ऐसी स्थिति में वह या तो सत् होता या अनिर्वचनीय। स्मरण रखना होगा अद्वैतवेदान्त के अनेक बार उद्धृत किया जानेवाला वाक्यांश “असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत” अगर कोई भासमान वस्तु असत् होती तो प्रतीत ही नहीं होती। वस्तु का प्रतीत होना वस्तु के असत् न होने का ही उद्घोष है। ज्ञान वस्तुतन्त्र होता है तो किसी भी ज्ञान का विषय असत् कैसे हो सकता है? जैसे किसी वस्तु का गोल होना उस वस्तु के त्रिकोण न होने का पुष्ट प्रमाण है, उसी प्रकार वस्तु का भासित होना उसके असत् न होने का पुष्ट प्रमाण है। वस्तु या तो अबाध्य हो सकती है अर्थात् सही हो सकती है और या तो बाध्य हो सकती है यानी ग़लत। जो सही है—अबाध्य है, उसे ही अद्वैतवेदान्त नाम देता है सत् का तथा जो ग़लत है—बाध्य है, उसे ही नाम देता है अनिर्वचनीय। हम ज्ञान के ही सही या ग़लत होने की बात कर सकते हैं, विचार के सही या ग़लत होने की बात नहीं कर सकते। पश्चिमी दर्शन में सुप्रसिद्ध मध्यम परिहार का नियम इसी कारण ज्ञान के ऊपर तो भलीभाँति लागू हो सकता है, परन्तु ज्ञान तथा विचार के इस अन्तर को समझे बिना यदि वाक्यमात्र पर इस मध्यम परिहार के नियम (the law of excluded middle) को लागू करने का प्रयास किया जायेगा, तो उसी तरह की विसंगतियाँ उभर कर सामने आयेंगी, जिनका समाधान करने का प्रयास माइनांग तथा रसेल इत्यादि पाश्चात्य दार्शनिक निषेधात्मक अस्तित्ववाचक वाक्यों के विषय में चिन्तन के क्रम में करते दिखते हैं। अगर विचार के सही या ग़लत होने की बात हम कर भी सकें तो भी कम से कम उस अभिप्राय से तो विचार के सही या ग़लत होने की बात नहीं ही कर सकते जिस अर्थ में ज्ञान के सही या ग़लत होने की बात हम करते हैं।

ज्ञान तथा विचार में एक बहुत महत्त्वपूर्ण अन्तर है जिसकी ओर हमेशा ध्यान देना चाहिए। हमारे विचार सत्, असत् तथा अनिर्वचनीय तीनों को ही विषय बना सकते हैं,

परन्तु ज्ञान तीनों को विषय नहीं बना सकता। हम असत् के बारे में सोच तो सकते हैं परन्तु जान नहीं सकते। खरगोश की सींग, गोल त्रिभुज के बारे में हम सोच तो सकते ही हैं और हम सोचते भी हैं। परन्तु न तो हम खरगोश की सींग के बारे में जान सकते हैं, और न तो गोल त्रिभुज के बारे में ही जान सकते हैं। हमारी सोच पर किसी का कोई जोर नहीं, कोई रोक नहीं, परन्तु हमारे ज्ञान पर है। इसी कारण आचार्य शंकर क्रिया तथा ज्ञान के मध्य अन्तर करने की अनिवार्यता पर जोर देते हैं। वे सुस्पष्ट करते हैं कि क्रिया वह है जिसको करने में कर्ता का स्वातन्त्र्य हो, कर्ता चाहे तो उसे करे चाहे तो न करे या चाहे तो अलग तरीके से करे। परन्तु ज्ञान के विषय में ज्ञाता को इस प्रकार का स्वातन्त्र्य नहीं प्राप्त है। ज्ञाता ज्ञान के विषय में परतन्त्र है, अगर ज्ञान की सामग्री है तो ज्ञान उत्पन्न होगा ही। कोई भी व्यक्ति यह जानना नहीं चाहेगा कि उसका शत्रु समृद्ध हो गया है या उसका पुत्र दिवंगत हो गया है। परन्तु अपने कारणों के द्वारा इस प्रकार के ज्ञान भी उत्पन्न होते ही हैं। शत्रु की समृद्धि को भी हम प्रत्यक्ष के द्वारा जानते हैं, उसके वाहन, भवन आदि को देखकर अनुमान से भी जानते हैं। पुत्रादि के दिवंगत होने को भी प्रमाणों से जाना जाता ही है, इसमें कोई अनुभवविरोध तो नहीं है। हमारा कोई वश नहीं चलता इस पर। हम ऐसा नहीं कर पाते कि इस प्रकार के ज्ञान हमें उत्पन्न ही न हों। इस कारण जानने तथा सोचने में (ज्ञान तथा विचार में) अन्तर किया जाना बहुत ही आवश्यक है। विचार एक क्रिया है परन्तु ज्ञान उस प्रकार की क्रिया नहीं है। अत्यन्त खेद का विषय है कि पाश्चात्य दार्शनिक परम्परा के अनेक स्वनामधन्य चिन्तकों ने ज्ञान तथा विचार के अन्तर पर ध्यान नहीं दिया, तथा इसे अपेक्षित महत्त्व नहीं देकर उपेक्षित कर दिया। आचार्य शङ्कर इस विषय में अत्यन्त सावधान हैं।

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ज्ञान की वस्तुतन्त्रता की स्वीकृति के साथ-साथ अबाध्यत्व को ज्ञान की सत्यता का आधार मानना ये दो ज्ञानमीमांसीय सिद्धान्त आचार्य शङ्कर के दर्शन के मूलाधार हैं। ज्ञान का अबाध्यत्व ज्ञान की सत्यता का तथा वस्तु की सत्ता का व्यवस्थापक है। प्रतिभासोत्तरकाल में जिस ज्ञान के विषयभूत वस्तु का बाध हो रहा है, प्रतिभासमात्रकाल में उस वस्तु की सत्ता भी ज्ञान की वस्तुतन्त्रता के सिद्धान्त से निगमित होती है। कालान्तर में ज्ञानान्तर से बाध्य होने के कारण उसकी पारमार्थिक सत्ता नहीं है, ऐसा निर्धारण हो जाता है। उसके मिथ्यात्व का आधार भी यही है। तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद् के भाष्य में आचार्य शङ्कर कहते हैं—“जो जिस रूप में निश्चित हुआ है, यदि उस रूप को व्यभिचरित न करे तो सत्य



है। तथा यदि जिस रूप में निश्चित हुआ है, उस रूप को व्यभिचरित करे तो अनृत है”<sup>5</sup>। इसी कारण रज्जु में भासमान सर्प की अनृतता या मिथ्यात्व है क्योंकि वह रज्जु सर्प के रूप में निश्चित हुई है, परन्तु उस रूप को वह व्यभिचरित करती है। इसी कारण ही विकारों की अनृतता है क्योंकि वे जिस विकार के रूप में निश्चित होते हैं, बाद में उसको व्यभिचरित करते हैं। सुवर्ण कुण्डल के रूप में निश्चित होने के उपरान्त उस कुण्डलरूप को व्यभिचरित करता है, तथा कंकण आदि रूपों में निश्चित होता है। इस प्रकार खण्डशः जागतिक वस्तुएँ भी जिस रूप में निश्चित होती हैं, कालान्तर में उस रूप को व्यभिचरित करती देखी जाती हैं। कालान्तर में उस रूप को व्यभिचरित करना भी हमारे अनुभव के द्वारा ही निर्धारित होता है। सामान्य अनुभव के द्वारा निश्चित होनेवाला स्वरूप उनका पारमार्थिक स्वरूप नहीं है, इसका पता भी हमारा सामान्य अनुभव ही दे देता है। इसी कारण उनका वह पारमार्थिक स्वरूप नहीं है, यह निर्धारित होता है। यह अकारण नहीं है कि अद्वैत के मधुसूदन सरस्वती इत्यादि अनेक आचार्य प्रपञ्च के मिथ्यात्व का अनुमान दृश्यत्व को हेतु बनाकर दे रहे हैं। वस्तु का दृश्य होना उस वस्तु के मिथ्या होने के लिए आधार प्रदान करता है क्योंकि हमारे समस्त अनुभव कुछ एक पूर्वशर्तों पर निर्भर करते हैं। कुछ ऐसा है जो अनुभवप्राणामी है, अनुभव उत्पन्न होने की पूर्वशर्त है। इस कारण अनुभवात्मक ज्ञान सत्य किस प्रकार से हो सकता है? यदि सत्य है तो कुछ न कुछ शर्तों पर ही सत्य है। इस कारण समस्त आनुभविक ज्ञान औपाधिक ही होते हैं, तथा यदि आनुभविक ज्ञान औपाधिक हैं तो मिथ्या ही होंगे। औपाधिक होने का भी तात्पर्य इसीलिए मिथ्या होना है। इसी कारण अद्वैती ईश्वर के भी मिथ्यात्व का उद्घोष कर देता है और जीव के भी, क्योंकि ईश्वर तथा जीव ये दोनों ही भेद औपाधिक ही हैं। एक उपाधि के आधार पर ईश्वर तथा द्वितीय उपाधि के आधार पर जीव, इस प्रकार एक ही परमसत् में उपाधि के आधार पर द्वैत बन जाता है। दोनों ही किसी वस्तुगत आधार पर भिन्न नहीं होते। इस विषय में एक अत्यन्त प्रसिद्ध उदाहरण लिया जा सकता है—बाल्टी में रखे हुए पानी के अन्दर हम यदि एक लकड़ी रख दें जिसका कि आधा भाग जल के बाहर और आधा जल के अन्दर रहे, तो वह लकड़ी मुड़ी हुई तब तक दिखायी पड़ती रहेगी जब तक कि हम पानी से लकड़ी को अलग नहीं करते। हम जानते रहेंगे कि लकड़ी टेढ़ी नहीं है, परन्तु वह लकड़ी टेढ़ी दिखती रहेगी। एक अन्य उदाहरण भी लिया जा सकता है—जिस व्यक्ति को पीलिया हुआ है, उसको यह ज्ञात रहने पर भी कि शंख पीला नहीं होता, शंख पीला ही दिखेगा। संसार भी कुछ उसी प्रकार का है—अद्वैतावबोध

(ब्रह्मज्ञान) हो जाने पर भी संसार दिखायी देता रहता है, जब तक कि उस संसार के दिखने का कारण विद्यमान है। इसी को वेदान्ती व्याख्यायित करते हैं कि प्रारब्ध जब तक है तब तक संसार दिखता ही रहता है, बाधितानुवृत्ति चलती ही रहती है। हम जानते रहेंगे कि ब्रह्म ही सब कुछ है, कुछ भी ब्रह्म से अतिरिक्त नहीं है, परन्तु पानी में रखी हुई लकड़ी के टेढ़ेपन के समान संसार में भेद दिखता ही रहेगा।

जो ज्ञान अबाध्य है वह सत्य है, परन्तु ज्ञान की अबाध्यता विषय की अबाध्यता पर आधारित होगी जैसाकि हम स्पष्ट कर चुके हैं। विषय जब तक बाधित नहीं होगा, तब तक ज्ञान नष्ट तो हो सकता है बाधित नहीं हो सकता, क्योंकि ज्ञान का बाध्यत्व विषयबाध्यत्व के अधीन है। तो देखना चाहिए कि क्या कुछ ऐसा है जो बाध्य नहीं है? यदि कोई ऐसा तत्त्व है, तो उस तत्त्व को हम सत् कहेंगे। इस कारण ब्रह्म में कोई प्रमाण है कि नहीं? यह प्रश्न इसी प्रश्न में समाहित हो जाता है कि क्या कोई ऐसा तरीका है जिस तरीके से हम इस निष्कर्ष पर पहुँच सकें कि कोई ऐसी वस्तु है जो बाध्य नहीं है। ऐसा तत्त्व कौन सा है? विचार की तीन कोटियों में आनेवाले अत्यन्तासत् शशशुद्ध आदि निश्चित रूप से किसी प्रमाण के द्वारा बाध्य नहीं होते क्योंकि बाध्य होने के लिए उनको किसी न किसी प्रमाण का विषय होना पड़ेगा। किसी प्रमाण का विषय यदि वे बनते हैं, तो वे अपनी तृतीय कोटि का परित्याग कर देंगे। इस कारण अत्यन्तासत् शशशुद्ध आदि किसी प्रमाण के द्वारा बाध्य नहीं हो सकते यही मानना होगा क्योंकि बाध्य होने के लिए भी किसी न किसी प्रमाण के द्वारा उनकी प्रतीति होनी चाहिए। इस कारण वे अबाध्य तो हैं। परन्तु शशशुद्ध आदि का कोई ज्ञान सम्भव नहीं है क्योंकि वे वस्तु ही नहीं हैं और ज्ञान वस्तुतन्त्र होता है। इस कारण शशशुद्ध के अबाध्य होने पर भी किसी ज्ञान का विषय न होने के कारण उनको सत् नहीं माना जा सकता है। हालाँकि वे अबाध्य हैं, परन्तु किसी भी प्रमाण के द्वारा गम्य न होने के कारण उनको सत् नहीं माना जा सकता।

हमारे गणितीय ज्ञानों के साथ भी यही समस्या है। हमारे गणितीय ज्ञान भी बाध्य नहीं हैं, परन्तु वे किसी प्रमाण के द्वारा प्राप्त नहीं होते क्योंकि वे वस्तुतः न तो कोई नवीन जानकारी देते हैं तथा न तो किसी वस्तु के विषय में ही जानकारी प्रदान करते हैं। हम जानते हैं कि प्रमाण होने के लिए आवश्यक है कि वह कोई न कोई नवीन जानकारी प्रदान करे। परन्तु गणितीय ज्ञान कोई नवीन जानकारी नहीं देते। इस कारण बाध्य न होने पर भी शशशुद्धादि तथा गणितीय तथ्यों को हम सत् के रूप में स्वीकार नहीं कर सकते।

यह प्रश्न हो सकता है कि ब्रह्म के ऊपर भी क्या यही बात लागू नहीं की जा सकती? तो इसका उत्तर नकारात्मक ही होगा क्योंकि ब्रह्म का तात्पर्य शुद्ध सत्ता से है और हमारा हर एक ज्ञान सत्ता को अन्तर्भूत करता हुआ ही उत्पन्न होता है। इस कारण ब्रह्म या शुद्ध सत्ता को वस्तुतः हर एक प्रमाण विषय करता है। इसी कारण कहा जाता है कि हर एक ज्ञान में ब्रह्म अधिष्ठानात्मक विषय के रूप में आता ही है।

यह निर्धारित किया जा सकता है कि ज्ञान वही प्रबल है, भरोसे के काबिल है, जिसकी परीक्षा की जा चुकी हो। लेकिन जो ज्ञान परीक्षित नहीं है, जब तक उसका बाध न हो, हम भरोसा तो उस ज्ञान पर भी करते ही हैं। ऐसा तो नहीं है कि जिस ज्ञान की परीक्षा नहीं हुई है, हम उस ज्ञान पर बिल्कुल ही विश्वास न करते हों। प्राभाकर सम्प्रदाय में उक्ति प्रचलित है—

“अहो बत! महानेषः प्रमादो धीमतामपि।

ज्ञानस्याप्यनाश्वासे विश्वासः किंनिबन्धनः॥”

“अरे! बुद्धिमानों का भी यह कैसा प्रमाद है कि वे ज्ञान पर भी विश्वास नहीं करते, परन्तु ज्ञान पर भी हम विश्वास न करें तो विश्वास करें किस पर?” इस कारण प्राभाकरों ने पक्ष रखा कि भ्रमात्मक ज्ञान तो होता ही नहीं, समस्त ज्ञान यथार्थ ही होते हैं। ‘औत्सर्गिकं हि ज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यम्’ ज्ञानों का प्रामाण्य नियमतः हुआ करता है। आचार्य शङ्कर भी कुछ परिवर्तन के साथ इसी बात को प्रस्तुत करते हैं कि—“ज्ञान वस्तुतन्त्र है”<sup>6</sup>। ज्ञान की वस्तुतन्त्रता का तात्पर्य यही है कि कोई भी ज्ञान विना वस्तु के नहीं होता। समस्त ज्ञानों का वस्तुनिष्ठ आधार अवश्य होगा। इस कारण इतना निश्चित रूप से मानना होगा कि भ्रमात्मक प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान का भी वस्तुनिष्ठ आधार अवश्य है। वाचस्पति मिश्र अनेक स्थलों पर कहते हैं कि—“संविदेव भगवती वस्तूपगमे नः शरणम्” भगवती संवित् ही, ज्ञान ही वस्तु की सत्ता का स्वीकार करने के लिए हमारे लिए शरणस्थल है। जो कुछ भी हमारे अनुभव में आ रहा है, उसे सत् मान लेना तो अविचारित निर्णय होगा। इसलिए सीधा-सीधा निष्कर्ष यही आता है कि जो कुछ भी हमारे अनुभव में आ रहा है, वह सत् है कि नहीं यह विचार हम बाद में करें, परन्तु यह तो तय है कि वह असत् नहीं है। हम भगवती संवित् के विपरीत जाकर कुछ भी स्वीकार या अस्वीकार नहीं कर सकते। इस कारण यदि जागतिक वस्तुओं का भान हमें हो रहा है, तो इतना तो तय है कि वे वस्तुएं नहीं हैं, ऐसा नहीं कहा जा सकता। उनका अपलाप नहीं किया जा सकता। न केवल इतना ही, वरन् स्वप्नकालीन

अनुभव के विषयों को भी असत् नहीं माना जा सकता क्योंकि वे भी भासमान हैं। आखिर स्वापनिक वस्तुओं का ज्ञान भी तो हमें हो ही रहा है। इसलिए न तो स्वापनिक वस्तुएँ और न तो जागतिक वस्तुएँ ही असत् हैं क्योंकि असत् का भान नहीं हो सकता है। इसी प्रकार भ्रमकाल में भी जिन वस्तुओं का भान होता है, उनकी सत्ता भी इसी प्रक्रिया से सिद्ध तथा स्वीकार्य है क्योंकि अवस्तु का भान नहीं हो सकता 'अवस्तुनोऽभानात्'। इसी कारण आचार्य शङ्कर कहते हैं कि—“ब्रह्मज्ञान के पहले तक समस्त व्यवहारों की सत्यता की उपपत्ति हो जाती है, जैसे जगने के पहले तक स्वप्न सत्य होता है”<sup>7</sup>। इस प्रकार प्राथमिक निष्कर्ष यही प्रतीत होता है कि जो भी अनुभवगम्य है उसकी सत्ता स्वीकार करने का अन्धविश्वासपूर्ण आग्रह न करते हुए इन समस्त आनुभविक वस्तुओं को असत् न माना जाये, यही तार्किक माँग प्रतीत होती है। परन्तु यहीं पर एक ग्रन्थि है, समस्या है—हम भगवती संवित् के विपरीत जाकर कुछ भी स्वीकार या अस्वीकार नहीं कर सकते। भ्रम के स्थल में प्राथमिक ज्ञान हमें बताता है कि पुरोदृश्यमान वस्तु सर्प है तथा अनन्तरक्षणभावी द्वितीय ज्ञान बताता है कि पुरोदृश्यमान वस्तु सर्प नहीं है। हमें यदि भगवती संवित् पर ही भरोसा करना है, तो हमारे पास कोई आधार नहीं है कि परस्पर विपरीत विषय का उपस्थापन करनेवाले इन दोनों ज्ञानों में से एक ज्ञान को यथार्थ मानें तथा द्वितीय ज्ञान को अयथार्थ। ज्ञानत्व व अनुभवत्व दोनों ही ज्ञानों में समान है। दोनों ही ज्ञान ज्ञान की सामग्री से ही जन्म ले रहे हैं इस कारण या तो दोनों ही ज्ञानों को सही माना जाये या तो दोनों को गलत माना जाये। दोनों को गलत मानने की समस्या यह है कि क्या दोनों ही ज्ञान समग्रता में असत्य हैं। दोनों ही ज्ञानों को समग्रता में असत्य मानने का मतलब होगा कि ज्ञान की वस्तुतन्त्रता को ही अस्वीकार करना। यदि ज्ञान वस्तुतन्त्र है तो वह असत्य किस प्रकार से हो सकता है? इसके विपरीत दोनों ही ज्ञानों को समग्रता में सत्य मानने का मतलब होगा कि विना विचार का कोई भी प्रयास किये ज्ञानमात्र को ही यथार्थ स्वीकार करना। दोनों ही स्थितियाँ युक्तिसंगत तथा स्वीकार्य नहीं दिखतीं। तो क्या माना जाये?

आचार्य शङ्कर व्यावहारिक रूप से दोनों ही ज्ञानों को सत्य मानने का पक्ष रखते दिखते हैं। ज्ञान स्वरूपतः हमेशा सत्य होता है क्योंकि समस्त ज्ञान अपने विषय के साथ संवाद रखते हैं, कभी भी अवस्तु का भान नहीं होता। यदि ज्ञान असत्य हो तो वह वस्तुतन्त्र ही किस प्रकार से हो सकेगा? इसको इस रूप में कहा जाये कि जो भी ज्ञान उत्पन्न होता है वह अपने विषय के साथ संवाद निश्चित रूप से रखता है। हमारे इस वक्तव्य से अनेक

विद्वान् शायद असहमति व्यक्त करें तथा प्रश्न करें कि भ्रमात्मक ज्ञान किस प्रकार से अपने विषय के साथ संवादी हो सकता है? परन्तु आचार्य शङ्कर का सिद्धान्त इसी पक्ष में अवस्थित दिखता है। रस्सी को सर्प जब हम समझते हैं तो उस स्थल में रज्जु में उत्पन्न सर्पज्ञान का भी अपने विषय के साथ संवाद है ही क्योंकि उस सर्पज्ञान का विषय प्रतिभासकाल में उत्पन्न प्रातिभासिक सर्प है<sup>8</sup>। अद्वैतियों का सिद्धान्त इस विषय में यही तो है। समस्त लौकिक भ्रमस्थलों में भ्रम का विषय प्रातिभासिक ही होता है। स्वप्नादि के काल में जो भी अनुभव होते हैं, उन अनुभवों के विषय के साथ भी उन अनुभवों का संवाद होता ही है क्योंकि उसके द्वारा भी स्वप्नादि अनुभव के काल में उत्पन्न विषय ही विषय किये जाते हैं। प्रमात्मक अनुभवों के संवादी होने के विषय में तो कोई प्रश्न ही नहीं है। यदि प्रमारूप प्रत्यक्षात्मक ज्ञान वस्तुतन्त्र है, तो भ्रमात्मक प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान भी वस्तुतन्त्र ही होना चाहिए। यह सम्भव नहीं है कि प्रमात्मक प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान को तो आप वस्तुतन्त्र मानें, परन्तु भ्रमात्मक प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञान को वस्तुतन्त्र न मानें। इस प्रकार का स्वीकरण वस्तुतः आधी मुर्गी को मार देना तथा आधी को अंडे देने के लिए रखने जैसा होगा। इसका निहितार्थ यह है कि भ्रमात्मक ज्ञान भी वस्तुतः अपने विषय के साथ संवाद रखता है। परन्तु देखना चाहिए कि रज्जु को विषय करनेवाला 'यह सर्प है' इस प्रकार का प्राथमिक भ्रमात्मक ज्ञान तथा उसी विषय में उत्पन्न होनेवाला 'यह सर्प नहीं है' इस प्रकार का अनन्तरक्षणभावी भ्रमनिवर्तक ज्ञान दोनों ही, जो कि परस्पर एक दूसरे के विरोधी दिखते हैं, किस प्रकार से संवादी हो सकते हैं?

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आचार्य शंकर के अनुसार वस्तुस्थिति यह है कि दो प्रमाण कभी भी एक दूसरे के विरोधी नहीं हो सकते। कोई प्रमाण दूसरे प्रमाण का विरोधी नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि यदि कोई प्रमाण किसी दूसरे प्रमाण का विरोधी हुआ तो सामान्य लोकप्रवृत्ति का अनुसरण करते हुए उन दोनों में से कोई एक ही प्रमाण है तथा द्वितीय अप्रमाण है, यही माना जाता है। परन्तु एक प्रमाण प्रमाण नहीं है यह स्वीकार स्वयं का ही अपलाप करना होगा। इसी कारण आचार्य शङ्कर कहते हैं कि "प्रमाण कभी भी किसी दूसरे प्रमाण से विरुद्ध नहीं होता। जो विषय प्रमाणान्तर से ज्ञात नहीं होता है, उसी को दूसरा प्रमाण बतलाता है"<sup>9</sup>। आचार्य शङ्कर का यह वक्तव्य हमारे समस्त आनुभविक ज्ञानों को वैधता प्रदान करने के साथ-साथ भ्रमात्मक ज्ञान की परिघटना को भी समुचित रूप से व्याख्यायित करता है। रज्जु को विषय करनेवाला 'यह सर्प है' इस प्रकार का प्राथमिक भ्रमात्मक ज्ञान तथा उसी विषय में उत्पन्न

होनेवाला 'यह सर्प नहीं है' इस प्रकार का अनन्तरक्षणभावी भ्रमनिवर्तक ज्ञान दोनों ही, जो कि परस्पर एक दूसरे के विरोधी दिखते हैं, वस्तुतः एक दूसरे के विरोधी नहीं हैं। इसका कारण यह है कि दोनों ही ज्ञानों के विषय ही भिन्न-भिन्न हैं, फिर दोनों में विरोध कैसे हो सकता है? प्रथम ज्ञान का विषय प्रातिभासिक सर्प तथा द्वितीय ज्ञान का विषय पूर्वानुभूत स्मर्यमाण सर्प से भेद है। यदि प्राथमिक ज्ञान का विषय सर्प से इदं का अभेद तथा द्वितीय ज्ञान का विषय सर्प से इदं का भेद होता, तो इन दोनों ज्ञानों में विरोध सम्भव होता। परन्तु ऐसा तो है ही नहीं। इस कारण दोनों ज्ञानों के परस्पर अविरोधी होने के कारण दोनों ही ज्ञानों का प्रामाण्य स्वीकार करने में कोई असुविधा तो नहीं दिखायी देती। हमारे दैनिक अनुभवों के द्वारा पृथिवी का जो चिपटापन अनुभूयमान है, विज्ञान उसकी व्याख्यामात्र करता है। विज्ञान हमारे दैनिक अनुभवों के द्वारा ज्ञायमान पृथिवी के चिपटेपन को झुठलाता नहीं बल्कि हमारे दैनिक अनुभव की व्याख्या करता है कि हालाँकि पृथिवी गोल है फिर भी वे कौन से कारक हैं जिनकी वजह से पृथिवी चिपटी दिखायी दे रही है। विज्ञान यह बताता है कि पृथिवी के गतिशील होने पर भी किन कारणों से हमारे दैनिक अनुभवों में वह स्थिर सी प्रतीत होती है। यदि इस दृष्टिकोण से देखा जाये तो पता चलता है कि हमारे दैनिक अनुभव में काम आनेवाले प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण के द्वारा जो ज्ञान प्राप्त कराया गया है, विज्ञान के द्वारा प्राप्त होनेवाला ज्ञान उसका विरोध न करते हुए कुछ नवीन जानकारी प्रदान करता है। उस नवीन ज्ञान के परिप्रेक्ष्य में पृथिवी के चिपटा तथा स्थिर दिखायी पड़ने की व्याख्या सम्यक्तया हो जाती है।

इसी प्रकार शास्त्र भी प्रत्यक्षादि का विरोध करने के लिए प्रवृत्त नहीं है क्योंकि प्रत्यक्षादि से विरुद्ध किसी सिद्धान्त का प्रतिपादन करना शास्त्र के द्वारा सम्भव ही नहीं है। अग्नि शीतल है, सूर्य तपता नहीं है, इत्यादि प्रतिपादन शास्त्र के द्वारा किसी भी प्रकार से सम्भव नहीं क्योंकि अग्नि, सूर्य आदि वस्तुएँ दूसरे प्रमाणों से अन्यथा अवगत हैं।<sup>10</sup> तो शास्त्र किसी भी प्रकार से प्रत्यक्षादि प्रमाणों के द्वारा प्रतिपादित विषयों का निराकरण नहीं कर सकता, न तो करता ही है। इस कार्य में शास्त्र प्रवृत्त ही नहीं हुआ। परन्तु यदि शास्त्र पदार्थों का अन्यथा प्रतिपादन करने में प्रवृत्त नहीं हुआ है, तो किसलिए प्रवृत्त है? वस्तुओं का जैसा स्वरूप है उसका प्रतिपादन करने के लिए शास्त्र प्रवृत्त हुआ है।<sup>11</sup> यही बात समस्त प्रमाणों के ऊपर लागू होती है। एक प्रमाण से जो अज्ञात रह गया है, वही द्वितीय प्रमाण से ज्ञात होता है। रज्जु में सर्प के भ्रम के स्थल में प्राथमिक प्रत्यक्ष सर्प का प्रत्यक्ष है।

हमें ज्ञान होता है कि 'यह सर्प है' तथा क्षणोपरान्त वहीं उसी स्थल पर ज्ञान होता है कि 'यह सर्प नहीं है रस्सी है'। तो इन स्थलों में हम क्या करें? किस ज्ञान को सही मानें तथा किस ज्ञान को ग़लत? अनुभव पर ही अगर भरोसा करें (याद रखें कि हमारे पास दूसरा कोई रास्ता नहीं है) तो वस्तुस्थिति यही बनती है कि प्रथम ज्ञान को भी हम तब तक ग़लत नहीं समझते, जब तक कि उसका विरोधी द्वितीय ज्ञान उत्पन्न नहीं हो जाता। दूसरे शब्दों में कहा जाये तो प्रथम ज्ञान को भी हम तब तक सही ही समझते हैं जब तक उसका विरोधी द्वितीय ज्ञान उत्पन्न नहीं हो जाता। इस अनुभव की संगति तभी हो सकती है, यदि हम किसी प्रकार असंज्ञातविरोधी ज्ञान के प्रमात्व का व्यवस्थापन कर सकें। यह उसी स्थिति में सम्भव है जब हम मानें कि वह प्रथम ज्ञान तत्कालीन दर्शन क्षण में उत्पन्न ऐसे सर्प को विषय कर रहा है, जो कि केवल प्रतिभासमात्र काल में है। चूँकि प्रतिभासमात्र काल में विद्यमान सर्प को वह प्राथमिक ज्ञान (जिसे हम अनेक बार भ्रमात्मक ज्ञान कहते हैं) विषय कर रहा है, इसकारण वह प्राथमिक ज्ञान भी वस्तुतन्त्र होने के कारण सत्य है। कुछ क्षणों के बाद भ्रान्ति की निवृत्ति के अवसर पर उत्पन्न होनेवाला 'यह सर्प नहीं है' ऐसा द्वितीय ज्ञान भी वस्तुतः उस सर्प का निषेध नहीं कर रहा है, जो कि प्रतिभासित हो रहा था। अपितु वह ज्ञान प्रसङ्गवश स्मृत अन्यत्र अवस्थित सर्प का निषेध कर रहा है। अथवा पुरोदृश्यमान सर्प के पारमार्थिकत्व का या परमार्थसर्प का निषेध कर रहा है।<sup>12</sup> इस कारण न तो प्रथम ज्ञान ही भ्रान्ति है, तथा न तो द्वितीय ज्ञान ही। दोनों ही ज्ञान सत्य हैं। सत्य इस कारण हैं क्योंकि इन दोनों ही ज्ञानों का अपने-अपने विषयों के साथ संवाद है। परन्तु दोनों ही ज्ञान आपेक्षिक रूप से सत्य हैं, निरपेक्ष रूप से नहीं क्योंकि इन दोनों ही ज्ञानों का अपने विषयों के साथ संवाद होने पर भी मिथ्याविषय के साथ संवाद हो रहा है, इस कारण इन ज्ञानों को हम मिथ्याज्ञान कहते हैं। इसी कारण पञ्चपादिका के लेखक पद्मपादाचार्य सुस्पष्टतया लिखते हैं कि "इस कारण मिथ्याविषय का आलम्बन करनेवाला ज्ञान ही मिथ्याज्ञान है, स्वतः तो किसी भी ज्ञान का मिथ्यात्व नहीं होता क्योंकि वस्तुतः अगर देखा जाये तो बाध होता ही नहीं"<sup>13</sup>। इस कारण वस्तुतः बाध का तात्पर्य मात्र इतना है कि ज्ञान के द्वारा अज्ञान के कार्यभूत विषय के साथ बोद्धा के अज्ञान की निवृत्ति हो जाना<sup>14</sup>। सर्पभ्रम के स्थल में जब सर्पनिषेधप्रतीति हो जाती है तो अनुभविता सर्प के लिए कभी भी प्रवृत्त नहीं होता क्योंकि जिस अज्ञान के कारण वह सर्प की निवृत्ति के लिए प्रवृत्ति हो रही थी, उस अज्ञान की निवृत्ति हो गयी। इसी प्रकार इस समस्त संसार की प्रतीति जब तक हो रही है, तब तक हो

रही है, तब तक संसार का सत्ता भी है ही। परन्तु यह संसार की सत्ता की पारमार्थिक इस कारण नहीं है क्योंकि श्रुति के द्वारा उसका बाध किया जा रहा है।

मात्र प्रथम ज्ञान के परिप्रेक्ष्य में सर्प की अनुभूति तत्त्वानुभूति है, तथा मात्र द्वितीय ज्ञान के परिप्रेक्ष्य में वह सर्पानुभूति तत्त्वानुभूति नहीं है। वस्तुसत्ता को स्वीकार करने या अस्वीकार करने का आधार प्रमाण ही है, प्रमाण ही वस्तुसत्ता को व्यवस्थापित या अव्यवस्थापित करते हैं। प्रमाणों का प्रामाण्य तत्त्वावेदकत्व ही है। “तत्त्वावेदकत्वं हि ज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यम्” ज्ञानों का प्रामाण्य तत्त्वावेदकत्व ही है। भ्रमस्थल में प्रथमोत्पन्न ज्ञान वस्तुसत्ता को व्यवस्थापित कर रहा है, तथा द्वितीय ज्ञान वस्तुसत्ता को अव्यवस्थापित करने की स्थिति में है। रज्जु में सर्प का ज्ञान सर्प का ही व्यवस्थापन कर रहा है तथा रज्जु के रज्जु होने का ज्ञान सर्प का अव्यवस्थापन कर रहा है। इस कारण यदि इन दोनों ही परस्पर विपरीत प्रतीत होनेवाले ज्ञानों के परिप्रेक्ष्य में विचार किया जाये तो सवाल होगा कि उस सर्पानुभूति को तत्त्वानुभूति कहा जाये या अतत्त्वानुभूति कहा जाये? दोनों ज्ञानों का सन्दर्भ अगर हम लेते हैं तो हम एक मुश्किल में पड़ जाते हैं। क्या मानें इसे? तत्त्वानुभूति या अतत्त्वानुभूति? हमारे पास कोई और विकल्प नहीं है क्योंकि वस्तु की दो ही कोटियाँ हैं। इसके साथ हमारे पास किसी एक ज्ञान के पक्ष में अपना निर्णय सुनाने का कोई आधार भी नहीं है। इस कारण कहना यही पड़ेगा कि कह नहीं सकते। यही *कह नहीं पाना* ही तो मिथ्यात्व है। आचार्य शङ्कर अनेक बार एक पदावली का प्रयोग करते दिखते हैं— “तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीये”। न तो तत्त्व कहा जा सकता है न तो अतत्त्व, इन दोनों ही प्रकारों से अनिर्वचनीय। उसे तत्त्व कहना भी मुश्किल क्योंकि बाध हो रहा है। तत्त्व से अन्य या अतत्त्व कहना भी मुश्किल क्योंकि प्रतीति हो रही है। संसार का प्रतीत होना अपने आप में एक ऐसा तथ्य है जो सैद्धान्तिक रूप से उसके असत् न होने का उद्घोष करता है। इस प्रकार हम इसी निष्कर्ष पर पहुँचते हैं कि यह आनुभविक समस्त जगत् न तो तत्त्व है न तो अतत्त्व, अपितु अनिर्वचनीय है। हमारे अनुभव की निष्पक्ष विवेचना हमें इसी निष्कर्ष पर पहुँचाती है कि हमारा आनुभविक जगत् सत् नहीं हो सकता, परन्तु असत् भी नहीं हो सकता। निष्कर्षतः हमारा आनुभविक जगत्—हमारे अनुभव की परिधि में आनेवाला सबकुछ—सत् तथा असत् से विलक्षण है, यानी मिथ्या है। इस प्रकार इन दोनों ही ज्ञानों के विषय चूँकि मिथ्या हैं, इस कारण ये दोनों ही ज्ञान मिथ्या हैं।



हमारी अनुभव की परिधि में आनेवाले समस्त विषयों के मिथ्या होने का कारण यही है कि हमारे अनुभव में आनेवाले समस्त ज्ञान कुछ अपेक्षाओं को आधार बना कर उत्पन्न होते हैं। यह अकारण नहीं है कि मधुसूदन सरस्वती इत्यादि अनेक आचार्य दृश्यमात्र के मिथ्यात्व का विधान करते दिखते हैं। किसी भी वस्तु का दृश्य होना कुछ न कुछ पूर्वशर्तों को साथ लेकर ही सम्भव हो पाता है, अन्यथा नहीं। यदि पूर्वशर्तें आ गयीं तो ज्ञान को गलत होना ही है, क्योंकि ऐसी स्थिति में वस्तु का अन्यानपेक्ष स्वरूप नहीं ज्ञात होगा, जो कि तत्त्व है, अन्यानपेक्ष स्वरूप ही अवगत होगा जो कि तत्त्व है ही नहीं।<sup>15</sup> इसी कारण उस ज्ञान के विषय को भी मिथ्या होना है क्योंकि ज्ञान के विषय के मिथ्या हुए बिना ज्ञान के गलत या मिथ्या होने की बात बेमानी है।

सदसद्विलक्षणत्व के द्वारा इसी अनिर्वचनीयत्व का अभिप्राय सुस्पष्ट किया जाता है तथा विवरणप्रस्थान में स्वीकृत प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वरूपी मिथ्यात्व का भी मूल इसी में है। सत्तात्रैविध्य स्वीकार करने का मूल भी ज्ञान के इसी विवेचन में निहित है। जो वस्तु प्रतिभासकाल में ही भासमान है, तथा प्रतिभासोत्तरकाल में ही बाध्य है। उसकी सत्ता भी है क्योंकि प्रतिभासमात्रकाल में तो वह भी अबाध्य ही है। परन्तु प्रतिभासकाल मात्र में अबाध्य होने पर भी वह बाध्य है, इसी कारण ही तो मिथ्या है। इस कारण जो भी भासमान है उसकी सत्ता पर किसी प्रकार अनाश्वास नहीं किया जा सकता? यह ध्यातव्य है कि जगत् की सत्ता का निषेध शशशृङ्गादि की सत्ता के निषेध के समान नहीं समझा जाना चाहिए क्योंकि शशशृङ्गादि का तो स्वयं निषेध ही नहीं किया जा सकता। जो प्रमाण से सिद्ध ही नहीं है उसका निषेध किस प्रकार से करोगे? यह एक मिथ्या आरोप होगा यदि हम मानें कि आचार्य शङ्कर जगत् की सत्ता का निषेध करते हैं। वस्तुस्थिति तो इसके विपरीत है, वे जगत् की सत्ता का निषेध नहीं करते। यहाँ तक कि वे तो भासमान वस्तुमात्र की सत्ता का स्वीकार करते हैं। स्वापिक व भ्रमभात पदार्थों की सत्ता भी यदि है, तो जगत् की सत्ता का निषेध करने का प्रश्न ही कहाँ उपस्थित होता है। परन्तु इनकी सत्ता पारमार्थिक नहीं है क्योंकि जगत् तथा भ्रमादि में भात पदार्थ भान के काल में होने में पर भी बाध्य होते हैं। कालान्तर में बाध्य होने के कारण ही उनको परमार्थसत् नहीं माना जा सकता। परमार्थतः सत्ता का तात्पर्य अबाध्यत्व है परन्तु भ्रमविषय पदार्थों का अबाध्यत्व केवल प्रतिभास काल में है, तथा जगत् का अबाध्यत्व व्यवहार काल में है। इस कारण एक ही अबाध्यत्वरूपी सत्ता का उपाधि के भेद से भेद हो जाता है। इस प्रकार एक ही सत्ता का

त्रैविध्य भी वस्तुतः औपाधिक होने के कारण व्यावहारिक ही है, अन्यथा परमार्थतः तो अबाध्यत्वरूपी सत्ता का ऐक्य ही है।

परन्तु व्यवहार के काल में बाध्य न होने के आधार पर यह आग्रह पाल लेना उचित नहीं लगता कि ये द्वैतप्रपञ्च इसी रूप में है जिस रूप में उसकी प्रतीति हो रही है। नैयायिक इस प्रकार के अबाधित लोकानुभव पर कभी प्रश्न नहीं करते। परन्तु आचार्य शङ्कर की दृष्टि में अबाधित लोकानुभव भी परीक्षणीय है। विना परीक्षा के उसको भी सत्य नहीं स्वीकारा जा सकता। सम्भवतः यही न्याय तथा अद्वैतदृष्टि में मौलिक विभेद है।

हम सभी लोगों का एक समान प्रात्यक्षिक अनुभव होता है कि 'आकाश नीला है' 'समुद्र नीला है' परन्तु क्या इन प्रात्यक्षिक अनुभवों पर हमें सन्तुष्ट हो जाना चाहिए? क्या हम यही मानकर सन्तुष्ट हो जायें कि हमें आकाश व समुद्र के नीलेपन का हमें हमेशा भान हुआ करता है, तो वह नीलापन समुद्र व आकाश का धर्म ही है। वस्तुतः हम इसी स्थल पर रुक नहीं जाते। आगे भी देखते हैं, प्रमाणान्तर से परीक्षा करते हैं। जब अन्य प्रमाण से यह सिद्ध हो जाता है कि वस्तुतः आकाश व समुद्र का नीलापन एक भ्रान्ति है, तो उसको हम स्वीकार कर लेते हैं। प्रत्यक्ष को सर्वप्रमाणवरिष्ठ मानकर हम उस पर प्रश्न ही न खड़ा करें यह तो उचित नहीं। अद्वैती आँख मूँदकर किसी भी प्रमाण पर भरोसा करना उचित नहीं समझता। यह ठीक है कि हमारे ज्ञान की प्रक्रिया में हमारा अनुभव जहाँ तक जाता है वहाँ तक प्रमाता, प्रमेय, प्रमाण व प्रमिति का भेद दिखायी देता है। परन्तु देखना यह चाहिए कि क्या प्रमाता, प्रमेय, प्रमाण व प्रमिति का यह भेद किसी प्रमाण के द्वारा सिद्ध हो रहा है। वस्तुतः प्रमाता, प्रमेय, प्रमाण व प्रमिति का यह भेद किसी भी प्रमाण के द्वारा सिद्ध होने के बजाय समस्त प्रमाणों की प्रवृत्ति के मूल में अवस्थित है।

इस परिस्थिति में शास्त्र अद्वैत का प्रतिपादन करता हुआ वस्तुतः किसी भी प्रमाण के द्वारा प्रतिपादित किये जानेवाले विषय का विरोध नहीं करता। शास्त्र वस्तुतः यही करता है कि प्रत्यगात्मा के रूप में अविषयतया ब्रह्म का प्रतिपादन करते हुए वेद्य, वेत्ता तथा वेदन आदि भेदों को दूर कर देता है। शास्त्र ब्रह्म का प्रतिपादन 'यह ब्रह्म है' इस प्रकार से नहीं करता। वेद्य, वेत्ता तथा वेदन आदि के मध्य भेद किसी भी प्रमाण के द्वारा सिद्ध नहीं है। वस्तुतः इसी कारण वह अविद्या के द्वारा कल्पित है। उस अविद्या के द्वारा कल्पित भेद का निवारण कर देने मात्र से शास्त्र की सार्थकता हो जाती है।<sup>16</sup> शास्त्र यदि ब्रह्म का प्रतिपादन इदं के रूप में करे तो शास्त्रप्रतिपाद्य वह ब्रह्म भी मिथ्या ही होगा। इसी कारण जिस ब्रह्म को

शास्त्र इदं के रूप में बताता है, वह ईश्वररूपी ब्रह्म मिथ्या ही माना जाता है। शास्त्रप्रमाण से जो ब्रह्म ज्ञेय है, वह जगज्जन्मादि का कारणभूत ब्रह्म ही ज्ञेय है। वह ब्रह्म ईश्वरस्थानीय है। शुद्ध, बुद्ध, मुक्तस्वभाव, निर्गुण, निर्धर्मक ब्रह्म तो शास्त्र के द्वारा भी ज्ञेय नहीं है। शास्त्र का भी विषय नहीं है। इसी कारण शुद्ध ब्रह्म का शास्त्रयोनित्व भी लाक्षणिक रूप से ही है।

गुलाब के फूल की अपेक्षा से दिखायी पड़नेवाली स्फटिक की रक्तिमा तो स्फटिक का तत्त्व नहीं है। वह रक्तिमा तो औपाधिक है। उसी प्रकार से अखण्ड, शुद्ध, सत्तामात्र चैतन्य में उपाधिवश आनेवाला ज्ञातृत्व, ज्ञेयत्व आदि भी आत्मा का तात्त्विक स्वरूप किस प्रकार से हो सकते हैं? इसी प्रकार कारणव्यापार से अनुभूयमान होनेवाले घट-पट आदि भी अन्यापेक्ष स्वरूपवाले हैं। सम्पूर्ण संसार ही इसी प्रकार से अन्यापेक्ष स्वरूपवाला है, तो ये किस प्रकार से तत्त्व हो सकते हैं। कभी ज्ञत्व तो कभी अज्ञत्व ये दोनों ही आत्मा के वास्तविक स्वरूप नहीं हो सकते। आत्मा का वास्तविक स्वरूप अवेद्य होते हुए भी अपरोक्षव्यवहार का विषय होना ही है। आत्मा कभी भी वेद्य नहीं होता, परन्तु वेद्य न होते हुए भी अपरोक्षव्यवहार का विषय होता है।

वस्तुतः तो अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व की सिद्धि के लिए हमको किसी भी प्रमाण की अपेक्षा या आवश्यकता नहीं होती क्योंकि जो सन्दिग्ध हो, उसके ज्ञान के लिए प्रमाण की आवश्यकता हो सकती है। परन्तु जो समस्त संशयों से परे है, उसके विषय में किसी को भी कभी भी प्रमाण की आवश्यकता नहीं होती। आत्मा तो स्वयं समस्त संशयों से परे है। हमें कभी भी अपने अस्तित्व के विषय में सन्देह नहीं होता। इसी कारण आचार्य शङ्कर कहते हैं कि—“आत्मा किसी के लिए भी आगन्तुक नहीं है, इसी कारण स्वयंसिद्ध है। अतः आत्मा आत्मविषयक प्रमाण की अपेक्षा से सिद्ध नहीं होता क्योंकि प्रमाण कभी भी प्रमाता की सिद्धि के लिए प्रवृत्त नहीं होते अपितु अप्रसिद्ध प्रमेयों की सिद्धि के लिए गृहीत होते हैं। आकाशादि इस प्रकार से प्रमाणों से निरपेक्ष होकर स्वयंसिद्ध हैं ऐसा कोई भी स्वीकार नहीं करता। इसके विपरीत आत्मा तो प्रमाणादि व्यवहारों का आश्रय होने के कारण प्रमाणादि व्यवहारों के पूर्व ही सिद्ध रहता है। जो प्रमाणादि व्यवहारों की प्रवृत्ति के पूर्व ही सिद्ध है, उस प्रमाता का निषेध किस प्रकार से किया जा सकता है? क्योंकि आगन्तुक वस्तु का निराकरण होता है, वस्तु के स्वरूप का निराकरण नहीं होता। क्योंकि जो निराकर्ता है वही तो उसका स्वरूप है।”<sup>17</sup> इस कारण आत्मा की सिद्धि के लिए किसी प्रमाण की अपेक्षा ही नहीं है। उस आत्मा का निराकरण न तो किसी प्रमाण के द्वारा सम्भव है तथा न तो किसी

तर्क के द्वारा। आत्मा इसी कारण स्वयंसिद्ध है क्योंकि वह अबाध्य है। इसी कारण उस आत्मा को सत् मानना आवश्यक है। हमारे समस्त अनुभवों की पूर्वशर्त है आत्मा की स्वीकृति। इस प्रकार यदि पश्चिमी दर्शन की शब्दावली का प्रयोग करने की अनुमति दी जाये तो यह कहना होगा कि आत्मा वस्तुतः प्रागनुभविक (A Priory) रूप से सिद्ध है। वही आत्मा तो ब्रह्म है। चूँकि वह अबाध्य है, इसी कारण सद्रूप है। इसी कारण स्वयंसिद्ध आत्मा के ज्ञान को न तो हम किसी प्रमाण से लब्ध फल के अन्तर्गत परिगणित कर सकते हैं और न तो पाश्चान्त्य दर्शनपरम्परा में प्रसिद्ध ज्ञान के विश्लेषणात्मक (Analytic) तथा संश्लेषणात्मक (Synthetic) वर्गीकरणों में रख सकते हैं। यह अवश्य है कि इस प्रकार से स्वयंसिद्ध आत्मा को हम बाद में किन्हीं अन्य तर्कों तथा प्रमाणों के द्वारा भी सिद्ध कर सकते हैं, इसी कारण अनेक स्थलों पर शङ्कर इसका स्पष्ट सङ्केत देते हैं कि—“जिस प्रकार से धर्मजिज्ञासा में केवल वेद प्रमाण हैं, उसी प्रकार से ब्रह्म में केवल वेदान्त प्रमाण हों ऐसा नहीं है क्योंकि ब्रह्म का ज्ञान अनुभवावसायी होता है तथा भूतवस्तुविषयक होने के कारण विभिन्न प्रमाणों से उत्पन्न हो सकता है, ब्रह्म को हम विभिन्न प्रमाणों के द्वारा जान सकते हैं क्योंकि भूतवस्तुविषयक ज्ञान के विषय में किसी एक प्रमाण का नियम हो यह आवश्यक नहीं है।”<sup>18</sup> इसी कारण अद्वैतावबोध के लिए यम, नियम, आसन, प्राणायाम, प्रत्याहार, धारणा, ध्यान तथा समाधि इस प्रकार से आठ साधनों की चर्चा भी की जाती है। इनकी सहायता से अद्वैतावबोध की योग्यता प्रमाता में आ जाती है। परन्तु इतना अवश्य स्मरण रखना होगा कि समस्त प्रमाण तथा अनुभव अद्वैत का बोध जब भी करायेंगे तो सीधे-सीधे अद्वैत का बोधन नहीं कर सकेंगे क्योंकि प्रमाणों की प्रवृत्ति के क्रम में ही विभिन्न प्रकार के द्वैतों का प्रक्षेप हो जाया करता है। इसी कारण दृश्यमात्र के मिथ्या होने का उद्घोष अद्वैती किया करते हैं।

अन्य प्रमाण जब भी आत्मा का ज्ञान करायेंगे तो किसी न किसी उपाधि से युक्त आत्मा का ही ज्ञान करायेंगे। नैयायिक आदि भी जो आत्मा का प्रत्यक्ष मन के द्वारा सम्भव मानते हैं, वह भी आत्मा को स्वरूपतः प्रत्यक्ष का विषय नहीं मानते, अपितु ज्ञान आदि आत्मा के विशेष गुणों का योग होने पर ही आत्मा का मानसप्रत्यक्ष होता है, ऐसा मानते हैं। इस कारण उपाधिविशिष्ट आत्मा ही उनके मत में भी ज्ञान का विषय हो सकता है, निरुपाधिक आत्मा नहीं। फिर जिस उपाधि के आधार पर उसका भान होता है, उसी उपाधि के आधार पर उपहित का पारमार्थिक भेद स्वीकार करना कहाँ तक उचित है? उपाधि के

आधार पर सिद्ध होनेवाला भेद तो औपाधिक ही होगा। वह तात्त्विक नहीं हो सकता। जिस स्तर या प्रविधि से अद्वैत आत्मा की सिद्धि होती है, उस स्तर या प्रविधि से विभिन्न द्वैतों की सिद्धि नहीं होती। यह तथ्य स्वयं ही पारमार्थिक तथा व्यावहारिक इन दो विभागों की ओर सङ्केत प्रदान करता है। इस प्रकार औपाधिक विभिन्नताओं को स्वीकार कर लेने पर भी पारमार्थिक रूप से अद्वैत के साथ हमारे लौकिक भेदानुभव का कोई विरोध नहीं है। द्वैत तथा अद्वैत ये दोनों ही स्वीकार्य हैं, परन्तु दोनों भिन्न-भिन्न स्तरों पर स्वीकार्य हैं, एक ही स्तर पर नहीं। यह प्रश्न हो सकता है कि अद्वैत को ही किस कारण पारमार्थिक भूमि पर स्थापित किया जाये, द्वैत को ही क्यों नहीं हम पारमार्थिक भूमि पर स्थापित कर लेते? चूँकि अद्वैत की भावभूमि पर ही समस्त द्वैतों की प्रतिष्ठा है, अद्वैत आत्मतत्त्व की सिद्धि समस्त प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहार, शेष समस्त व्यवहारों, समस्त द्वैतों की सिद्धि तथा समस्त प्रमाण प्रवृत्तियों की पूर्वगामी है, इस कारण उसी को पारमार्थिक भूमि पर स्थापित किया जा सकता है, द्वैत को नहीं। द्वैत को तो व्यावहारिक भूमि पर ही स्थापित करना होगा।

उपाचार्य

दर्शन एवं धर्म विभाग

काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय

वाराणसी

Email—sachchitmishra@gmail.com

### संदर्भ एवं पाद टिप्पणी

1. योगसूत्र 1.9
2. गणितीय तर्कवाक्य हमको केवल विभिन्न शब्दों या गणितीय सङ्केतों का प्रयोग किन अर्थों में हुआ करता है, इसका स्पष्टीकरण देते हैं। इसी कारण उनको प्रमाण के रूप में नहीं लिया जा सकता। यह बात अपने आपमें अत्यन्त अजीब लग सकती है कि हमें गणितीय प्रपोजीशन्स कोई भी नवीन जानकारी नहीं देते हैं। पूरा का पूरा गणित यदि हमें कोई नवीन ज्ञान नहीं प्रदान करता तो उसका उपयोग क्या है? हम सभी जानते हैं कि विभिन्न परिगणनों के द्वारा हम कुछ ऐसा जानते हैं जिसको आकलन या परिगणन करने के पूर्व नहीं जान रहे होते हैं। परन्तु इस विषय को विश्लेषणात्मक सत्यों के विषय में विभिन्न पाश्चात्य विद्वानों ने जो विवेचन किया है उसके परिप्रेक्ष्य में देखने पर यही बात सामने आती है।

तार्किक सत्य टॉटोलॉजी के अन्तर्गत ही परिगणित होने के अधिकारी हैं, टॉटोलॉजी हम उसको कहते हैं जहाँ पर कि उद्देश्य से अतिरिक्त कोई भी बात विधेय में नहीं कही जा रही हो, जैसे प्रसिद्ध उदाहरण है 'अ अ है'। रसेल तथा ह्याटहेड ने यह सिद्ध करने का प्रयास किया है कि गणित को हम तर्क में ही अन्तर्भूत कर सकते हैं तथा इसी कारण गणितीय सत्यों को भी तार्किक सत्यों में ही अन्तर्भूत कर सकते हैं। हालाँकि वे समग्रता में इस कार्य में सफल नहीं हुए। परन्तु वे काफी हद तक इस कार्य में सफल हुए हैं। विटगेंस्टाइन गणितीय सत्यों को टॉटोलॉजी के अन्तर्गत परिगणित न करते हुए उनको तादात्म्य के अन्तर्गत परिगणित करना पसन्द करते हैं। हालाँकि इन दोनों बातों में बहुत अन्तर नहीं है। इस प्रकार न तो तार्किक सत्य और न तो गणितीय सत्य ही किसी भी प्रकार से हमारे ज्ञान में वृद्धि करते हैं। वे केवल एक ही प्रकार से हमारे ज्ञान में कुछ वृद्धि करते हैं वह यह कि वे हमको एक कथन से दूसरे कथन को निर्गत करने में सक्षम बनाते हैं, जिसको कि हम पहले से ही वस्तुतः जानते होते हैं। इसी कारण इन दोनों के बारे में ए. जे. एयर कहते हैं कि—

The point is that neither say anything about the world. The only way in which they can add to our knowledge is by enabling us to derive one statement from another: that is, by bringing out the implications of what, in a sense, known already. P.12, Ayer, A. J., Editor's Introduction, Logical Positivism, The free Press, New York. 1966.

तर्क के इस टॉटोलॉजिकल चरित्र को विस्तार से समझने के लिए रूडोल्फ कार्नेप का आलेख The old and the New Logic द्रष्टव्य है। इसी प्रकार इस विषय को हैन्स हॉन भी अपने आलेख Logic, Mathematics and Knowledge of Nature में सुस्पष्ट रीति से प्रस्तुत करते हैं। ये दोनों ही आलेख Ayer, A. J., के द्वारा सम्पादित Logical Positivism, The free Press, New York. 1966 में क्रमशः पृ.133 से 146 तक तथा 147 से 161 तक संकलित हैं। हैन्स हॉन इस विषय को स्पष्ट करने के लिए एक बहुत ही अच्छा उदाहरण देते हैं—यदि हम 24 में 31 का गुणा करें तो हमें 744 प्राप्त होता है। क्या यह नवीन जानकारी नहीं है? इदम्प्रथमतया तो ऐसा ही लगता है, परन्तु ऐसा है नहीं। इस प्रकार से हम वस्तुतः किसी नवीन जानकारी को प्राप्त नहीं करते। इस सारी गणना के माध्यम से हम सीधे-सीधे मात्र इतना जान पाते हैं कि  $31 \times 24$  का पर्याय है 744, अर्थात्  $31 \times 24$  के स्थान पर हम 744 का प्रयोग हम निश्चिन्त भाव से कर सकते हैं। इसका तात्पर्य यह हुआ कि जिस प्रकार शब्दकोश के माध्यम से केवल हमें पर्यायवाची शब्दों का पता चलता है, उसी प्रकार से गणितीय चिह्नों के माध्यम से भी हमें विभिन्न

शब्दों के पर्यायों के बारे में ही जानकारी प्राप्त होती है। नैयायिक तो टॉटोलाजिकल वाक्यों की सार्थकता ही नहीं मानते हैं। इसका विशिष्ट विवेचन गदाधर भट्टाचार्य के ग्रन्थ व्युत्पत्तिवाद में आये घटो घटः इस विवाद में देखा जा सकता है। इसका मूल कारण यही है कि यह वाक्य कहीं से भी नवीनता का सङ्केत नहीं देता।

3. We saw that the reason why they cannot be confuted in experience is that they do not make any assertion about the empirical world. Ayer, A. J., P. 84. Language, Truth and Logic, Dover Publications, New York 1952
4. वस्तुतः पश्चिम में भी अनुभववादी दार्शनिकों के आगमन के बाद से प्रत्यक्ष ही ज्ञानमीमांसा के केन्द्र में इसी कारण रहा।
5. यद्रूपेण यन्निश्चितं तद्रूपं न व्यभिचरति, तत् सत्यम्। यद्रूपेण यन्निश्चितं तद्रूपं व्यभिचरति तदनृतम्। (तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद् शाङ्करभाष्य २-१-१)
6. ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम्। ...केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रं तत्। ब्रह्मसूत्र शाङ्करभाष्य १-१-४
7. सर्वव्यवहारणामेव प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताविज्ञानात् सत्यत्वोपपत्तेः। स्वप्नव्यवहारस्येव प्राक् प्रबोधात् (ब्रह्मसूत्र शाङ्करभाष्य २-१-१४)।
8. यद्यपि आचार्य शङ्कर प्रातिभासिक, व्यावहारिक तथा पारमार्थिक इस प्रकार से सत्ताओं का विभाग नहीं करते, परन्तु परवर्ती आचार्यों ने विशेष कर विवरणप्रस्थान के आचार्यों इस विभाग को आवश्यक माना है। मुझे ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि आचार्य शङ्कर के वचनों में निहित तार्किक अनिवार्यता को समझते हुए इस प्रकार से व्याख्यायित कर रहे हैं।
9. न च प्रमाणं प्रमाणान्तरेण विरुध्यते। प्रमाणान्तराविषयमेव प्रमाणान्तरं ज्ञापयति। (बृहदारण्यकोपनिषद् शाङ्करभाष्य २-१-२०)।
10. न ह्यग्निः शीत आदित्यो न तपतीति वा दृष्टान्तशतेनापि प्रतिपादयितुं शक्यम्, प्रमाणान्तरेणान्यथाधिगतत्वाद्ब्रह्मस्तुनः। बृ. भा. 2.1.20
11. न हि शास्त्रं पदार्थान्यथा कर्तुं प्रवृत्तम्, किं तर्हि यथाभूतानामज्ञातानां ज्ञापने। बृ. आ. उ. भा. 2.1.20
12. इस प्रसङ्ग में अद्वैतवेदान्तपरम्परा में अनेक मत हैं—

एक मत कहता है कि लौकिक परमार्थ दृष्ट रजत के अभाव को विषय करता है, शुक्ति में होनेवाला रजताभाव का ज्ञान। परन्तु इसमें समस्या उपस्थित होती है कि लौकिक परमार्थ दृष्ट रजत पुरोवर्ती शुक्ति में प्रसक्त हुआ है या नहीं, यदि हुआ है तब तो अन्यथाख्याति हो जायेगी क्योंकि जो अन्यत्र है उसीका ज्ञान यहाँ पर हो रहा है। यदि

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प्रसक्त नहीं हुआ है तो किसका निषेध किया जायेगा, क्योंकि जो प्रसक्त है उसीका निषेध किया जाना चाहिए। इसपर समाधान दिया जाता है कि लौकिकपरमार्थत्वेन प्रतिभासमान रजत का अभाव ही विषय किया जाता है।

परन्तु इस समाधान में समस्या यह है कि प्रतिभासमान रजत में लौकिकपरमार्थत्व तो है ही नहीं, इस कारण लौकिकपरमार्थत्वेन प्रतिभासमान रजत तो व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्न प्रतियोगिताक अभाव हो जायेगा। और व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्न प्रतियोगिताक अभाव सिद्धान्ततः स्वीकार्य नहीं है। इस प्रकार का अभाव कुछ ऐसा अभाव होगा जैसे गोल त्रिकोण का निषेध। परन्तु गोल त्रिकोण का निषेध सम्भव नहीं है क्योंकि गोल त्रिकोण किसी प्रमाण के द्वारा नहीं जाना जा सकता। इसमें द्वितीय समस्या यह है कि जिस धर्म को प्रकार बनाकर प्रतियोगि का ज्ञान होता है, उसी धर्म को प्रकार बनाकर अभाव का ज्ञान होता है। रजत की प्रतीति लौकिकपरमार्थत्व को प्रकार बनाकर नहीं होती इस कारण लौकिकपरमार्थत्वेन रजत का अभाव भी नहीं बोधित किया जा सकता।

द्वितीय समाधान दिया जाता है कि त्रैकालिक निषेध के द्वारा प्रतिभासमान रजत का अभाव ही विषय किया जाता है। इस समाधान में समस्या यह है कि प्रतिभासमान रजत तो सामने अवस्थित है उसका निषेध कैसे किया जा सकेगा? इस समस्या का समाधान यही कहकर दिया जाता है कि वस्तुतः प्रतिभासमान रजत के होने पर भी उस रजत के अनिर्वचनीय होने के कारण उस प्रतिभासमान रजत का निषेध सम्भव होता है। मिथ्यात्व या अनिर्वचनीयत्व का तात्पर्य यही तो है कि प्रतीतिविषय में ही त्रैकालिकनिषेध का प्रतियोगि होना।

तृतीय समाधान यह दिया जाता है कि प्रतिभासमान रजत की प्रतीति होने पर भी बाजार आदि में अवस्थित रजत की स्मृति होती है, उसी का निषेध निषेधप्रतीति के द्वारा किया जाता है। इस पक्ष में जिस प्रतिभासमान रजत की प्रतीति सामने हो रही है उसका निषेध नहीं किया जा रहा है, अपितु स्मर्यमाण आपणस्थ रजत आदि का निषेध निषेधप्रतीति के द्वारा किया जाता है।

13. तेन मिथ्यालम्बनं ज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानम्, न स्वतो ज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वमस्ति, बाधाभावात्। पञ्चपादिका पृ.95
14. उच्यते—अज्ञानस्य स्वकार्येण वर्तमानेन प्रविलीनेन वा सह ज्ञानेन निवृत्तिर्बाधः, तथाविधानवबोधनिवृत्तौ बाधप्रसिद्धेरिति। पञ्चपादिकाविवरण, पृ.108



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15. यद्धि यस्यानपेक्षं रूपं तत्तस्य तत्त्वम्, यदन्यापेक्षं न तस्य तत्त्वम्। तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद् भाष्य २.२.७
16. अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्? न, अविद्याकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य। न हि शास्त्रमिदन्तया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपिपादयिषति। किं तर्हि? प्रत्यगात्मत्वेनाविषयतया प्रतिपादयदविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृवेदनादिभेदमपनयति। ब्र.सू. भा. 1.1.4
17. न ह्यात्माऽऽगन्तुकः कस्यचित्, स्वयंसिद्धत्वात्। न ह्यात्माऽऽत्मनः प्रमाणमपेक्ष्य सिध्यति। तस्य हि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणान्यप्रसिद्धप्रमेयसिद्धय उपादीयन्ते। न ह्याकाशादयः पदार्थाः प्रमाणान्तरनिरपेक्षाः स्वयंसिद्धाः केनचिदभ्युपगम्यन्ते। आत्मा तु प्रमाणादिव्यवहाराश्रयत्वात् प्रागेव प्रमाणादिव्यवहारात् सिध्यति। न चेदृशस्य निराकरणं सम्भवति। आगन्तुकं हि वस्तु निराक्रियते, न स्वरूपम्। य एव हि निराकर्ता तदेव तस्य स्वरूपम्। ब्र.सू. भा. 2.3.7
18. न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम्, किन्तु श्रुत्यादयोऽनुभवादयश्च यथासम्भवमिह प्रमाणम्, अनुभवावसानत्वाद् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य। ब्र.सू. भा. 1.1.2

## भासर्वज्ञ द्वारा संशय-सूत्र की व्याख्या: भाष्य एवं वार्तिक के परिप्रेक्ष्य में

अरुण मिश्र

इस आलेख का उद्देश्य भासर्वज्ञ द्वारा संशय-सूत्र की व्याख्या को न्यायभाष्य एवं न्यायभाष्यवार्तिक के परिदृश्य में स्पष्ट करना है। भासर्वज्ञ का न्यायसार एवं न्यायभूषण न्याय के प्रतिष्ठित ग्रन्थों में से एक है। भूषण को समझने के लिए भाष्य एवं वार्तिक का उल्लेख आवश्यक है क्योंकि भूषणकार द्वारा प्रस्तुत अधिकांश प्रकरण या तो भाष्य से मेल खाता है या पुनः वार्तिक से। यही भूषण की वैशिष्ट्य है और इसी विशिष्टता में भूषण की क्लिष्टता भी है। इसीलिए इस आलेख में भाष्यकार एवं वार्तिककार के मतों को भूषणकार के मत के समानान्तर रखने का प्रयास किया गया है। इस क्रम में यदा कदा तात्पर्यटीका एवं परिशुद्धि का भी उल्लेख मैंने किया है।

भासर्वज्ञ संशय-सूत्र की व्याख्या प्रमाण के लक्षण को स्पष्ट करने के लिए करते हैं। प्रमाण को सम्यक् अनुभव के साधन के रूप में परिभाषित करने के फलस्वरूप भासर्वज्ञ के लिए सम्यक् अनुभव को असम्यक् अनुभव से पृथक् करना आवश्यक था जिससे कि संशय एवं विपर्यय को प्रमा नहीं कहा जा सके। संशय एवं विपर्यय दोनों में असम्यक्त्व पाया जाता है इसीलिए प्रमाण के लक्षण को स्पष्ट करने के लिए दोनों के स्वरूप का निर्धारण आवश्यक है।

“सम्यगनुभवसाधनं प्रमाणम्। सम्यग्रहणं संशयविपर्ययापोहार्थम्।”<sup>1</sup> सम्यक् अनुभव के साधन को भासर्वज्ञ प्रमाण कहते हैं। सम्यक् पद का प्रयोग कर वे संशय एवं विपर्यय को प्रमा से बहिष्कृत करते हैं। प्रभाकर मीमांसकों का यहाँ आरोप है कि प्रमाण का यह लक्षण प्रमाण का समानजातीय अर्थात् प्रमाणाभास को प्रमाण से भिन्न करने में असमर्थ है। भूषणकार उत्तर देते हैं कि संशय एवं विपर्यय को प्रमा से बहिष्कृत करने के लिए ही सम्यक् पद का प्रयोग किया गया है। “प्रमाणस्य समानजातीयानि व्यवच्छेद्यानि नैव सन्तीति यो मन्यते तं प्रत्याह-सम्यग्रहणं संशयविपर्ययापोहार्थम्।”<sup>2</sup>

अपोह में प्रमाण-फल के आधार पर संशय एवं विपर्यय की सम्यक् अनुभव से व्यावृत्ति करते हैं। दूसरे शब्दों में संशय एवं विपर्यय से अनुभव की व्यावृत्ति अपोह है। उससे उनके साधन भी प्रमाणत्व से रहित होते हैं और प्रमाण नहीं कहे जा सकते। फल के

सम्यक्त्व और असम्यक्त्व से ही प्रमाण और प्रमाणाभास का निश्चय करने में हम समर्थ होते हैं। फल के सम्यक्त्व में साधन को प्रमाण तथा असम्यक्त्व में प्रमाणाभास कहते हैं। फल की विशेषता 'विषय के साथ सम्यक् होना' है और फल की इसी विशेषता के कारण हम यह व्याख्या कर पाते हैं कि वह अनुभव सम्यक् है। भूतार्थ का निश्चित स्वभाव प्राप्त होना सम्यक्त्व है और उससे विपरीत अनुभव—जिससे विषय का निश्चित स्वभाव प्राप्त नहीं हो—असम्यक् कहलाता है।<sup>3</sup> लोक और शास्त्र दोनों में संशय और विपर्यय के व्यवहार से पता चलता है कि संशय और विपर्यय दोनों में असम्यक्त्व पाया जाता है। दोनों के स्वरूप की चर्चा करनी चाहिए क्योंकि जिसके स्वरूप का ज्ञान नहीं है उसे न स्वीकार किया जा सकता है और न अस्वीकार।<sup>4</sup>

भासर्वज्ञ संशय को अनवधारित अर्थात् अनिश्चित ज्ञान कहते हैं—“अनवधारणज्ञानं संशयः”<sup>5</sup>। भाष्यकार भी संशय को अनिश्चित ज्ञान ही मानते हैं। उनके अनुसार “यत् तदनवधारणज्ञानं स संशयः”<sup>6</sup> भाष्यकार आगे लिखते हैं कि “विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः संशयः”<sup>7</sup> विषय के प्रसंग में उदित अनेक विरोधी विचारों में किसी विशेष-धर्म के ज्ञान की अपेक्षा करनेवाला ज्ञान संशय है।

‘विशेषापेक्ष’ पद को स्पष्ट करते हुए वार्तिककार कहते हैं कि विषय के विशेष-धर्म के ज्ञान की अपेक्षा या आकांक्षा विशेषापेक्षा कहलाता है। विशेष-धर्म को अनुपलभ्यमान अर्थात् अज्ञात होने में ही उस विशेष-धर्म की अपेक्षा या आकांक्षा संभव है। “विशेषस्यापेक्षा आकांक्षा सा चानुपलभ्यमाने विशेषे युक्ता।”<sup>8</sup> विशेषापेक्ष पद से विशेष-धर्म की स्मृति का भी बोध होता है। विशेष-धर्म के अज्ञात होने के अतिरिक्त संशय में उस विशेष-धर्म की स्मृति भी अपेक्षित है। यहाँ प्रश्न किया जाता है कि वह कौन सा विशेष-धर्म है जो स्मृति का विषय-वस्तु है? क्या यहाँ ज्ञाता को विषय का उस विशेष-धर्म की स्मृति हो रही है जिसके प्रसंग में संशय है, या किसी अन्य विशेष-धर्म की स्मृति हो रही है, या किसी अन्य विषय के विशेष-धर्म की स्मृति हो रही है?<sup>9</sup> वार्तिककार इन प्रश्नों को नकारते हुए कहते हैं कि विशेषापेक्ष एक सामान्य कथन है और इससे किसी निश्चित विषय का विशेष-धर्म इंगित नहीं होता। विशेषापेक्ष पद के प्रयोग से हम यह नहीं कहते कि हमें किसी विशेष विषय के विशेष-धर्म की स्मृति हो रही है, या किसी अन्य विषय का। यदि हमें पूर्व में ज्ञात विषय के विशेष-धर्म की स्मृति होती है तो वह स्मृति पूर्व में अनुभूत विशेष-धर्म की होती है। यदि संशय ऐसे विषय के प्रसंग में हो रहा है जो पूर्व में तो अज्ञात था परन्तु

वह विषय किसी ऐसे विषय के सदृश है जो पहले ज्ञात था, तो वह स्मृति उस अन्य विषय के विशेष-धर्म का होता है जो विषय पहले ज्ञात था। यह स्मृति विषय के सादृश्य के आधार पर होता है।<sup>10</sup> विशेषापेक्ष का अर्थ स्पष्ट करते हुए टीकाकार कहते हैं कि विशेषापेक्ष नामक वचन से विशेष-धर्म की अपेक्षा का बोध होता है। यद्यपि इच्छा में अपेक्षा होती है तथापि वाक्य के सामर्थ्य के आधार पर यह स्पष्ट है कि अपेक्षा अर्थात् जिघृक्षा में सत्य को ग्रहण करने की इच्छा होती है। चूँकि संशय में सत्य जानने की इच्छा होती है, अतः सत्य जानने की इच्छा को संशय का हेतु नहीं कहा जा सकता। विशेषापेक्षा अर्थात् जिघृक्षा लक्षण से यहाँ बोध होता है कि पहले के अनुभूत वस्तु के धर्म के सादृश्य के आधार पर उत्पन्न स्मरण में दो विशेषों में सत्य का ग्रहण करना लक्ष्य है।<sup>11</sup>

विमर्श पद का अर्थ वार्तिककार स्पष्ट करते हैं कि विषय के प्रसंग नें नाना प्रकारक अर्थों का होना विमर्श कहलाता है।<sup>12</sup> तात्पर्यटीकाकार विमर्श को संशय का सामान्य-लक्षण मानते हैं। उनके अनुसार सूत्र में संशय पद लक्ष्य का निर्देश करता है और विमर्श संशय का लक्षण है।<sup>13</sup> वाचस्पति के अनुसार एक धर्मी में नाना प्रकारक विरोधी अर्थों का होना विमर्श कहलाता है।<sup>14</sup> 'एकस्मिन्' और 'किंस्विद्' पदों के प्रयोग के आधार पर उदयन कहते हैं कि विमर्श पद से संशय के दो लक्षण सूचित होते हैं- (1) विषयतः और (2) स्वरूपतः।<sup>15</sup> जब यह कहते हैं कि विषय स्थाणु है वा पुरुष तो संशय विषयतः होता है और जब यह कहते हैं कि विषय इस प्रकारक है वा उस प्रकारक तो संशय स्वरूपतः होता है।<sup>16</sup>

'विशेषापेक्ष' और 'विमर्श' पदों को स्पष्ट करने के पश्चात् भूषणकार द्वारा प्रस्तुत संशय का लक्षण "तत्रानवधारणज्ञानं संशयः" के विरोध में उठाये गये पूर्वपक्ष तथा उत्तरपक्ष की चर्चा आवश्यक है। ज्ञान निश्चयात्मक होता है, और अनवधारण अनिश्चयात्मक। अतः अनवधारणज्ञान में अनवधारण पद के प्रयोग से अनिश्चयात्मकता और ज्ञान पद के प्रयोग से निश्चयात्मकता आ जाती है। इस तरह पूर्वपक्ष के अनुसार संशय के इस लक्षण में व्याघात होने के कारण यह लक्षण उचित नहीं है।

भूषणकार उत्तर देते हैं कि जिस प्रकार 'गो' शब्द गो जाति के लिए प्रयुक्त होता है उसी तरह 'ज्ञान' शब्द का प्रयोग भी ज्ञान जाति के लिए होता है। जिस प्रकार गो, पंज आदि शब्द अपने अर्थ का बोध व्युत्पत्ति के बल से नहीं, अपितु जाति के बल से अपना अर्थ बोधित करते हैं उसी तरह ज्ञान शब्द का भी ज्ञानत्व -जाति के लिए प्रयोग होता है। भूषणकार के अनुसार ज्ञानत्व जाति निश्चित ज्ञान और अनिश्चित ज्ञान दोनों में पायी जाती

है। इसलिए अनवधारण ज्ञान को अनिश्चित ज्ञान कहने में कोई आपत्ति नहीं है। चूँकि ज्ञानत्व जाति निश्चित ज्ञान में भी पायी जाती है और निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष (जो अनवधारित होता है) में निश्चयात्मकत्व होता है, अतः निर्विकल्पक प्रत्यक्ष का संशयत्व संभव नहीं है।<sup>17</sup> निश्चयात्मकत्व अनवधारण से उत्पन्न स्मृति में अनुमेय होता है। यथा-‘यह वस्तु वहाँ नहीं है’, ‘उसके सदृश वह वस्तु है’ आदि। इस प्रकार से उत्पन्न स्मृति अपने पूर्वानुभव के निश्चयात्मकत्व को सूचित करता है। जिस अनुभव से अनिश्चयात्मिका स्मृति उत्पन्न होती है वह संशय है क्योंकि वहाँ अनिश्चयात्मकत्व है। चूँकि स्मृति में हम अनुभव से उत्पन्न आकार का ही अनुकरण करते हैं और अनुभव निश्चयात्मक या अनिश्चयात्मक होता है, इसीलिए स्मृति भी निश्चयात्मक या अनिश्चयात्मक होगी।<sup>18</sup>

पूर्वपक्ष है कि सिर-हाथ नामक विशेष-धर्म के दर्शन के विना प्रथम दृष्टानुभव से उत्पन्न ज्ञान किस कारण कभी निश्चयात्मक तथा कभी संशयात्मक होता है? भूषणकार उत्तर देते हैं कि अदृष्ट आदि सामग्री के कारण ऐसा सम्भव होता है। क्योंकि यदि समस्त स्थलों में प्रथमतः विशेषदर्शन होने की स्थिति में ही दृष्टानुभव निश्चयात्मक होता हो, तो विशेषदर्शन के निश्चयात्मक होने के लिए उसके पूर्व एक अन्य निश्चयात्मक ज्ञान होना चाहिए, उसके पूर्व कोई और निश्चयात्मक अनुभव होना चाहिए। इस तरह अनवस्था दोष आ जायेगा। क्योंकि विशेषदर्शन के निश्चयात्मक होने के लिए उसके पूर्व भी कोई न कोई निश्चयात्मक ज्ञान होना चाहिए। यदि विशेषदर्शन अनिश्चयात्मक हो तो समस्त विश्व ही अनिश्चयात्मक हो जायेगा। परन्तु सिर-हाथ नामक विशेष-धर्म के निश्चयात्मक दर्शन के बिना भी उत्पन्न पुरुष का ज्ञान सर्वदा अनिश्चयात्मक नहीं होता। इस अनवस्था दोष से बचने के लिए यदि आप अदृष्टवश ही विशेषदर्शन के निश्चयात्मक न होने पर भी उसके उपरान्त उत्पन्न ज्ञान को निश्चयात्मक मानते हैं, तो विना विशेषदर्शन के ही अदृष्टवश ही किसी स्थल में निश्चयात्मक तथा किसी स्थल में अनिश्चयात्मक अनुभव होता है, ऐसा मान लीजिए। बीच में एक विशेषदर्शन को मानने की क्या आवश्यकता है? जिसमें कोई प्रमाण सम्भव नहीं है। इस कारण यह स्पष्ट है कि विशेष (सिर-हाथ) के दर्शन के विना भी कुछ ज्ञान निश्चयात्मक और कुछ अनिश्चयात्मक होते हैं। अतः ‘अनवधारणज्ञानं संशयः’ संशय का निर्दुष्ट लक्षण है।<sup>19</sup>

पूर्वपक्ष की मान्यता है कि ज्ञान सदैव निश्चयात्मक होता है। उत्तरपक्ष की मान्यता है कि ज्ञान निश्चयात्मक या अनिश्चयात्मक हो सकता है। भूषणकार का यह मत वार्तिक

द्वारा पोषित है। भूषणकार का उत्तर विषय और विषय के स्वरूप के ज्ञान के भेद पर भी आधारित है। यह भेद उदयन ने भी परिशुद्धि टीका में विमर्श नामक पद को स्पष्ट करने के क्रम में किया है।

भूषणकार द्वारा प्रस्तुत पूर्वपक्ष वार्तिककार ने सर्वप्रथम उठाया था। वार्तिक में प्रस्तुत पूर्वपक्ष के अनुसार ज्ञान या प्रत्यय को अनिश्चित कहना एक व्याघाती वचन है।<sup>20</sup> वार्तिककार उत्तर देते हैं कि यहाँ प्रत्यय के स्वरूप का अवधारण हो रहा है न कि विषय के स्वरूप का। संशय का ज्ञान तो हो रहा है परन्तु उसके विषय का ज्ञान नहीं। संशय का ज्ञान होने से इसे प्रत्यय कहने में कोई आपत्ति नहीं होनी चाहिए।<sup>21</sup> यदि विषय के स्वरूप का ज्ञान कहा जाता तब अनवधारण-ज्ञान व्याघाती होता। परन्तु यहाँ संशय का ज्ञान हो रहा है इसीलिए व्याघात नहीं है। वाचस्पति के अनुसार वार्तिककार का उत्तर उनके इस विचार पर आधारित है कि प्रत्यय निश्चित ज्ञान के लिए प्रयुक्त होता है, जिससे यह कहा जाता है कि संशय का ज्ञान तो निश्चित है परन्तु संशय के विषय के स्वरूप का नहीं।<sup>22</sup> वाचस्पति के अनुसार प्रत्यय शब्द परमार्थतः ज्ञान का पर्याय है और ज्ञानत्व सामान्य संशय में भी पाया जाता है, इसीलिए विरोध नहीं है।<sup>23</sup> इस तरह स्पष्ट है कि “अनवधारणज्ञानं संशयः कहने में कोई दोष नहीं है।

संशय को उत्पत्ति के आधार पर भासर्वज्ञ पाँच प्रकार से विभाजित करते हैं।<sup>24</sup> इस कारण संशय का लक्षण निरर्थक नहीं है क्योंकि यह लक्षण संशय को विभाजित तथा विशेष लक्षण को स्पष्ट करने के लिए किया गया है। इसी को ध्यान में रखकर न्यायसार में ‘स च’ पदों का प्रयोग है।<sup>25</sup>

भासर्वज्ञ संशय को उसकी उत्पत्ति के आधार पर पाँच भागों में विभाजित करते हैं (1) समानधर्म के ज्ञान से उत्पन्न संशय, (2) अनेक धर्म के ज्ञान से उत्पन्न संशय, (3) विप्रतिपत्ति से उत्पन्न संशय (4) उपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से उत्पन्न संशय, और (5) अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से उत्पन्न संशय। यही संशय के पाँच प्रकार हैं। यहाँ यह ध्येय है कि संशय के हेतु के विषय में न्याय में मतैक्य नहीं है। वार्तिककार मात्र प्रथम तीन को संशय का हेतु मानते हैं और इतर पदों को उनका विशेषण मानते हैं।<sup>26</sup> भाष्यकार ने पाँचों को संशय का हेतु माना है। भूषणकार भाष्य का अनुकरण करते हैं तथा वार्तिककार का खंडन करते हैं। इस बिन्दु पर आगे चर्चा की जायेगी।

### समानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय:

विषय में समानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय की उत्पत्ति होती है।<sup>27</sup> दूर से द्रष्टा जब किसी दीर्घ और ऊर्ध्व वस्तु को देखता है तो उसे संशय होता है कि क्या वह स्थाणु है वा पुरुष? यहाँ पर संशय समानधर्म के ज्ञान से उत्पन्न हो रहा है। यहाँ पूर्वपक्ष है कि समान-धर्म के ज्ञान मात्र से संशय की उत्पत्ति नहीं हो सकती। भूषणकार पूछते हैं कि इस प्रकार से अर्थात् समान-धर्म के ज्ञान से संशय की उत्पत्ति न मानी जाये तो संशय कैसे होता है? अनवधारण से संशय होता है, यह कहना दूसरे शब्दों में समान-धर्म के ज्ञान से संशय की उत्पत्ति होती है, यही स्वीकार करना है।<sup>28</sup> पूर्वपक्ष के अनुसार यहाँ अतिव्याप्ति दोष आ जाने से यह कथन उचित नहीं कि समान-धर्म के ज्ञान मात्र से संशय की उत्पत्ति होती है। यह समस्या और इसका निराकरण दोनों ही वार्तिककार एवं तात्पर्यटीकाकार ने स्पष्ट किया है। अतिव्याप्ति के आरोप पर विचार करते हुए वार्तिककार एकदेशी नैयायिकों को उद्धृत करते हैं। एकदेशी नैयायिकों के अनुसार 'समानधर्मोपपत्तेः' के साथ 'अव्यवच्छेदहेतोः' जोड़कर संशय के हेतु को समझना चाहिए। उन लोगों के अनुसार तज्जातीय ओर विजातीय में उपलब्ध समान-धर्म के ज्ञान से तथा दोनों में अव्यवच्छेद होने से संशय की उत्पत्ति होती है। आशय है कि मात्र समान-धर्म का ज्ञान ही संशय का हेतु नहीं हो सकता, अव्यवच्छेद होना भी आवश्यक है। अन्यथा विविध ज्ञान जो कि निश्चयात्मक होते हैं, वे भी संशयात्मक हो जायेंगे क्योंकि वे भी तो समानधर्म के ज्ञान से उत्पन्न होते हैं। यदि मात्र समानधर्म के ज्ञान से संशय की उत्पत्ति मानी जाये तो कृतकत्व सभी अनित्यों का समान धर्म है, उसके ज्ञान से शब्द के अनित्यत्व का संशयात्मक ज्ञान ही होना चाहिए था। परन्तु 'कृतकत्वमात्र' के ज्ञान से ही हमें शब्द के अनित्यत्व का निश्चयात्मक ज्ञान होता है। यहाँ कृतकत्वरूपी समान-धर्म का ज्ञान होने पर भी तज्जातीय और विजातीय में व्यवच्छेद के फलस्वरूप 'शब्द अनित्य होता है' नामक ज्ञान संशयात्मक नहीं होता। शब्द के नित्यत्व का व्यवच्छेद करके 'शब्द अनित्य होता है' नामक ज्ञान निश्चयात्मक ही होता है।<sup>29</sup> वाचस्पति मिश्र चर्चा को आगे बढ़ाते हुए कहते हैं कि उन एकदेशी नैयायिकों के अनुसार व्यवच्छेदहेतु नामक धर्म भी समान होता है लेकिन वह नित्यत्व या अनित्यत्व के प्रसंग में संशय का हेतु नहीं है। जैसे कृतकत्व साध्यधर्मी शब्द में और दृष्टान्तधर्मी घट में समान होता है और यह नित्यत्व या अनित्यत्व के संशय का हेतु नहीं है, अपितु साध्यधर्मी में अनित्यत्व के

अयोग का व्यवच्छेद करता है। अतः समानधर्मोपपत्तेः के साथ 'अव्यवच्छेदहेतोः' भी कहना चाहिए।<sup>30</sup>

भूषणकार पूर्वपक्ष का निराकरण करते हैं कि तज्जातीय तथा विजातीय में समान-धर्म का ज्ञान होने से विषय अनवधारित रहता है और फलतः संशय होता है। भूषणकार के अनुसार असाधारणकारण का तज्जातीय के व्यवच्छेद के लिए और सामान्यलक्षण का विजातीय के व्यवच्छेद के लिए प्रयोग किया जाता है। सामान्यलक्षण से ही हम विशेषलक्षण जान पाते हैं। उससे यह अर्थ सिद्ध होता है कि सामग्री रहित समानधर्म के ज्ञान से अनवधारण-ज्ञान की उत्पत्ति होती है। उन अनेक-धर्म रूपी अव्यक्त सामग्री से जनित संशय के लिए तज्जातीय विजातीय हो जाता है। भूषणकार कहते हैं कि अन्यत्र भी इस प्रकार से ही संशय की व्याख्या करनी चाहिए। अतः भूषणकार के अनुसार संशय के इस लक्षण में अतिव्याप्ति दोष नहीं है।<sup>31</sup> जो 'अव्यवच्छेदहेतोः' को अतिव्याप्तिदोष से बचने के लिए जोड़ना चाहते हैं, वार्तिककार के अनुसार उन्हें 'समान' पद के अर्थ का ज्ञान ही नहीं है। यह संभव नहीं है कि एक ही धर्म विषयों में समान भी हो और व्यवच्छेदहेतु भी हो। तज्जातीय और विजातीय में उपलब्ध समान-धर्म व्यवच्छेद हेतु नहीं हो सकता। जो तज्जातीय में पाया जाता है और विजातीय में नहीं पाया जाता, वही व्यवच्छेद हेतु हो सकता है। वार्तिककार के अनुसार 'व्यवच्छेद-हेतु' ओर 'समान' पदों में कोई समानार्थता नहीं है। तज्जातीय और विजातीय में समान-धर्म होने के फलस्वरूप हम दोनों में व्यवच्छेद नहीं कर पाते और फलतः संशय की उत्पत्ति होती है। वार्तिककार के अनुसार संशय के इस लक्षण में अतिव्याप्ति दोष नहीं है और उससे बचने के लिए 'अव्यवच्छेदहेतोः' कहने की आवश्यकता नहीं है।<sup>32</sup>

अब प्रश्न उठता है कि क्या मात्र समान-धर्म का ज्ञान संशय की उत्पत्ति के लिए पर्याप्त है? इस प्रश्न का उत्तर देते हुए वार्तिककार कहते हैं कि समान-धर्म का ज्ञान ही पर्याप्त नहीं है अपितु उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था भी आवश्यक है। इसी आवश्यकता को ध्यान में रखते हुए वार्तिककार ने इन दोनों को विशेषण कहा है। संशय की उत्पत्ति के लिए समान-धर्म के अतिरिक्त उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था आवश्यक है। विषय 'इस प्रकारक है वा इस प्रकारक नहीं है' कहने में असमर्थ होते हैं तो संशय की उत्पत्ति होती है। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से यह बोध होता है कि द्रष्टा यह निर्णय नहीं कर पाता कि विषय 'यह है या यह नहीं है', 'विषय ऐसा है, या ऐसा



नहीं है'। पुनः संशय की उत्पत्ति के लिए वार्तिक के अनुसार विशेषाकांक्षा भी आवश्यक है।<sup>33</sup> वार्तिककार के अनुसार 'यह (पुरुष) है, या 'यह (पुरुष) नहीं है, के प्रसंग में उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि व्यवस्थित (निश्चित) नहीं होते हैं तो विशेषाकांक्षा होने में संशय की उत्पत्ति होती है। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि को व्यवस्थित नहीं होने का अर्थ स्पष्ट करते हुए वाचस्पति कहते हैं कि शिर-पाणि का प्रत्यक्ष और वक्र कोटर का अप्रत्यक्ष होना पुरुष का साधक-प्रमाण है, और उससे 'यह पुरुष है' ऐसा निश्चयात्मक ज्ञान की उत्पत्ति होती है। साधक-प्रमाण का विरोधी बाधक-प्रमाण होता है। शिर-पाणि का अप्रत्यक्ष होना तथा वक्र कोटर का प्रत्यक्ष होना पुरुष का बाधक प्रमाण है। इससे 'यह पुरुष नहीं है' ऐसा निश्चित ज्ञान होता है। साधक-बाधक प्रमाण का अभाव ही उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था है। उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि को अव्यवस्थित होने से तथा विशेष-धर्म की स्मृति की अपेक्षा से संशय की उत्पत्ति होती है।<sup>34</sup> वार्तिककार को शंका थी कि क्या समान-धर्म का ज्ञान ही संशय का पर्याप्त हेतु है? वाचस्पति के अनुसार इसीलिए उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था नामक दो पदों को जोड़ा गया है।<sup>35</sup> इसी शंका को भूषणकार प्रस्तुत करते हैं कि जब समान-धर्म का ज्ञान ही संशय का हेतु है तो पुनः सूत्रकार द्वारा उपलब्धि एवं अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था का ग्रहण क्यों किया गया? पुनः उत्तर देते हैं कि वार्तिक के अनुसार इन पदों का ग्रहण कुत्सित समस्याओं के समाधान के लिए तथा सहकारियों को उद्धृत करने के लिए किया गया है। यहाँ यह ध्यान देना चाहिए कि वार्तिककार के अनुसार उपलब्धि तथा अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था संशय के हेतुओं का विशेषण है, इसीलिए उन विशेषणों की उपादेयता को स्पष्ट करना वार्तिककार के लिए आवश्यक था, भूषणकार के लिए नहीं। भूषणकार तो उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को दो पृथक् हेतु मानते हैं। भूषणकार वार्तिक के मत को स्पष्ट करते हैं कि वार्तिक के अनुसार समान-धर्म के ज्ञान से ही संशय की उत्पत्ति के सभी कारण स्पष्ट नहीं होते। उदाहरण स्वरूप जाते हुए द्रष्टा को जब घास दिखाई देता है, तो उसे घास का समान-धर्म तो दिखाई देता है परन्तु संशय की उत्पत्ति नहीं होती। वार्तिककार के अनुसार इस समस्या के समाधान के लिए उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था का ग्रहण सूत्रकार द्वारा किया गया है। इस उदाहरण में उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था का ग्रहण नहीं हो पाने के कारण संशय की उत्पत्ति नहीं हो पाती है। परन्तु अव्यवस्था के ग्रहण से संशय के सभी सामग्रियों का प्रतिपादन नहीं हो पाता है अर्थात् उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि

की अव्यवस्था के अतिरिक्त कुछ अन्य सामग्रियों का प्रतिपादन भी आवश्यक है।<sup>36</sup> घास में संशय इसलिए नहीं होता क्योंकि वहाँ विशेषापेक्षा नहीं है। संशय की उत्पत्ति के लिए समान-धर्म का ज्ञान ही पर्याप्त नहीं है, अपितु विशेषापेक्षा भी आवश्यक है। विषय में विशेष-धर्म की अपेक्षा करना विशेषाकांक्षा कहलाती है, और वह स्मृति रूपा होती है। पहले जब स्थाणु तथा पुरुष को देखा था तो स्थाणु का विशेष-धर्म यथा वक्रकोटरादि और पुरुष का विशेषधर्म यथा शिर-पाणि भी देखा था। वे गुण स्मृति रूप में होते हैं और उन्हीं गुणों की आकांक्षा विशेषाकांक्षा कहलाती है। विशेषाकांक्षा भी संशय की उत्पत्ति के लिए आवश्यक है और उसके बिना संशय की उत्पत्ति नहीं होती। यह उल्लेखनीय है कि समान धर्म का ज्ञान होने पर भी सहकारिकारणों के न रहने से संशय की उत्पत्ति न हो तो उससे समान-धर्म ज्ञान का संशय के प्रति अकारणत्व सिद्ध नहीं होता क्योंकि इस स्थिति में सभी के अकारणत्व का प्रसंग उठेगा।<sup>37</sup> वार्तिककार कहते हैं कि समानधर्म का ज्ञान और विशेषाकांक्षा होने पर भी यदि उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि के प्रसंग में निश्चितता हो तो संशय की उत्पत्ति नहीं होती है। जब द्रष्टा को किसी वस्तु के सामान्य और विशेष गुण का प्रत्यक्ष होता है तो वह निश्चित है कि क्या उपलब्ध और क्या अनुपलब्ध है? पुनः जब द्रष्टा दूरस्थ हो जाता है तो उसे विशेष गुण का प्रत्यक्ष नहीं होता है, उसे मात्र समान-धर्म का प्रत्यक्ष होता है जो उस विशेष वस्तु के अतिरिक्त अन्य में भी उपलब्ध होता है। द्रष्टा को विशेषाकांक्षा भी है। परन्तु द्रष्टा को दूरस्थ होने के उपरान्त भी उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था नहीं है। द्रष्टा निश्चित है कि वह क्या देख रहा है और क्या नहीं देख रहा है। इस परिस्थिति में समान-धर्म का ज्ञान और विशेषाकांक्षा होने के उपरान्त भी संशय नहीं होता है, क्योंकि उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था का अभाव है।<sup>38</sup> वार्तिककार के मत को वाचस्पति मिश्र वृक्ष के उदाहरण से स्पष्ट करते हैं। उद्यान में द्रष्टा जब पुष्प पत्र से युक्त शाखा को हवा के कारण नृत्य करते हुए, कोयल को शाखा पर गाते हुए देखता है, तो द्रष्टा को निश्चय होता है कि वह वृक्ष का अनुभव कर रहा है। पुनः जब वह दूरस्थ हो जाता है तो उसे विषय हाथी के समान दिखाई देता है। उसे पुष्प, पत्र, शाखा आदि नहीं दिखाई देते हैं। दूर से द्रष्टा को मात्र दीर्घत्व और स्थूलता दिखाई देता है जो वृक्ष और हाथी में समान होता है। परन्तु अभी भी द्रष्टा को वृक्ष के विशेष गुण की स्मृति है। यहाँ समान-धर्म का ज्ञान और विशेषाकांक्षा होने से संशय होना चाहिए कि विषय वृक्ष है वा हाथी। परन्तु द्रष्टा को निश्चय है कि विषय वृक्ष है, हाथी नहीं। वाचस्पति की मान्यता है कि यहाँ साधक-बाधक

प्रमाण का अभाव नहीं होने से संशय नहीं होता। अतएव संशय की उत्पत्ति के लिए साधक-बाधक प्रमाण का अभाव अर्थात् उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धिका अभाव भी आवश्यक है।<sup>39</sup>

उद्योतकर एवं वाचस्पति के उपर्युक्त मत को प्रस्तुत करते हुए भूषणकार कहते हैं कि दूर में अवस्थित प्रियतमा में विशेषाकांक्षा और समान-धर्म का ज्ञान होने पर भी संशय नहीं होता है क्योंकि यहाँ उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था जिसे संशय का निश्चित कारण माना गया है उसका अभाव है। कहने का तात्पर्य है कि विशेषाकांक्षा ही सहकारिकारण नहीं अपितु उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था भी आवश्यक है और उसके अभाव में भी संशय नहीं होता है।<sup>40</sup>

वार्तिककार विशेषाकांक्षा की उपादेयता को स्पष्ट करते हैं कि नाव से जाते हुए या झूले पर झूलते हुए द्रष्टा को समान-धर्म के ज्ञान से तथा उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि अव्यवस्थित होने से विषय के प्रसंग में संशय होना चाहिए कि विषय वृक्ष है वा हाथी। परन्तु यहाँ संशय नहीं हो रहा है, क्योंकि विशेषाकांक्षा नामक तीसरे सहकारिकारण का अभाव है।<sup>41</sup> वाचस्पति भी तदनुसार ही इसकी व्याख्या करते हैं।<sup>42</sup> भूषणकार भी इसके अनुसार ही कहते हैं कि सभी सहकारिकारणों से सहकृत ही समान-धर्म को संशय का हेतु कहा जा सकता है।<sup>43</sup>

भूषण के अनुसार वार्तिककार द्वारा वैसे स्पष्ट रूप से नहीं कहा गया है, परन्तु समान-धर्म के ज्ञान से उत्पन्न संशय के अन्य उदाहरणों में भी ये सभी सहकारिकारण पाये जाते हैं। जिस प्रकार से समान-धर्म के ज्ञान के संशय-हेतुत्व की व्याख्या वार्तिककार सहकारियों को स्वीकार करके करते हैं, उसी तरह अनेक-धर्म के ज्ञान के संशय-हेतुत्व की व्याख्या भी सभी सहकारियों को स्वीकार करके करते हैं।<sup>44</sup>

### अनेकधर्मोपपत्ति से संशय

भासर्वज्ञ के अनुसार विषय के अनेक धर्म के ज्ञान से संशय की उत्पत्ति होती है। उदाहरण स्वरूप शब्द के श्रावणप्रत्यक्षविषय तथा आकाश का विशेषगुण होने से संशय होता है कि शब्द नित्य है वा अनित्य। श्रावणप्रत्यक्षविषय होना तथा आकाश का विशेषगुण होना ये दो गुण शब्द में हैं। इस कारण अनेकधर्मोपपत्ति हो रही है। अनेक पद से तज्जातीय और उसके विपरीत विजातीय का बोध होता है।<sup>45</sup> भाष्यकार भी उसी रीति से अनेक पद से समानजातीय और असमानजातीय दोनों का बोध स्वीकार करते हैं। उदाहरणस्वरूप पृथ्वी को उसके गन्धवत्त्व के आधार पर उसे उसके समान जातीय जल से

तथा विजातीय गुण और 'कर्म से भिन्न करते हैं। इस विशेष-धर्म के ज्ञान से संशय की उत्पत्ति होती है। विभागजन्यत्व शब्द का विशेष-धर्म है। शब्द का यह विशेष-धर्म शब्द को उसके समानजातीय और विजातीय से भिन्न करता है और संशय होता है कि शब्द द्रव्य है या गुण है या कर्म।<sup>46</sup>

भूषणकार इस विशेष-धर्म को व्यावर्तकधर्म कहते हैं जो विषय को तज्जातीय और विजातीय से भिन्न करता है। वह व्यावर्तकधर्म भेदसाधक होने के कारण अनेक का असम्बन्धी होता है या अनेक में वर्जित होता है या अनेक प्रत्यय का हेतु होता है। सभी स्थितियों में मध्यम पद के लोप होने से अनेकधर्म एक समस्त पद है और सभी प्रकार से असाधारणधर्म का बोध कराता है। विषय का यही असाधारण धर्म उसे उसके तज्जातीय और विजातीय से भिन्न करता है, तथा संशय उत्पन्न करता है। उदाहरणार्थ शब्द के आकाश-विशेष का गुण होने से संशय होता है कि क्या शब्द नित्य है वा अनित्य।<sup>47</sup>

यहाँ प्रश्न होता है कि विषय का असाधारणधर्म संशय कैसे उत्पन्न कर सकता है? क्योंकि असाधारण-धर्म अपने विरुद्धधर्म के साथ विषय में उपलब्ध नहीं हो सकता जिससे असाधारणधर्म की उपलब्धि को उसके विरुद्ध-धर्म की स्मृति का हेतु माना जाय और पुनः संशय की उत्पत्ति हो। प्रतिबद्धार्थ की स्मृति ही संभव है और जिस विषय के प्रति हम प्रतिबद्ध नहीं हैं उस अप्रतिबद्धार्थ के दर्शन में स्मृति संभव नहीं है। यदि अप्रतिबद्धार्थ के दर्शन में स्मृति संभव माना जाय तो सभी अनुभूतार्थ की स्मृति का प्रसंग उठना चाहिए। और विरुद्ध-विशेष की स्मृति के विना संशय संभव नहीं है, तथा असाधारण-धर्म अपने विरुद्ध-धर्म के साथ विषय में उपलब्ध नहीं हो सकता है, इसीलिए असाधारण-धर्म संशय का हेतु नहीं है।<sup>48</sup>

द्वितीय प्रश्न है कि विषय का असाधारण-धर्म धर्मी का विशेष-धर्म होता है जिसके दर्शन से हम संशय से निवृत्त होते हैं, तो वह असाधारण-धर्म संशयहेतु कैसे हो सकता है? गोत्व के दर्शन से गाय में संशय नहीं हो सकता, और यदि ऐसा हो तो संशय का अनुच्छेद ही नहीं हो सकेगा। समानधर्म के ज्ञान से उत्पन्न संशय की निवृत्ति असाधारण धर्म के ज्ञान से हो जाती है, परन्तु असाधारण धर्म के ज्ञान से उत्पन्न संशय कैसे निवृत्त होगा? इसलिए असाधारण-धर्म संशय का हेतु नहीं है।<sup>49</sup>

इस समस्या का समाधान कुछ लोग करते हैं कि विषय का असाधारण-धर्म उसको समानजातीय और विजातीय दोनों से भिन्न करता है, फलतः आसाधारण-धर्म को उनके विरुद्ध-विशेष के साथ देखा जा सकता है। यथा घटादि नामक सजातीय में तथा घटादि से भिन्न आत्मादि नामक विजातीय में घटत्व और आत्मत्व जैसे नित्य सत्ता को अनित्य के साथ होना असंगत नहीं है। शब्द में श्रावणत्व और आकाशविशेषगुणत्व दोनों होने से यह स्पष्ट नहीं होता कि यह विशेषण नित्य शब्द का है वा अनित्य शब्द का।<sup>50</sup>

इस समाधान को वार्तिककार ने उठाया है कि अनेक पद में प्रयुक्त 'न' को पर्युदास बोधक मानने से अनेकधर्म पद से विषय में दो अव्यभिचारी विरुद्ध-धर्म का होना स्थापित होता है। इस तरह अनेकधर्म का अर्थ यहाँ 'एकस्मादन्यः' किया गया है। जैसे शब्द में श्रावणत्व और कृतकत्व नामक दो विरुद्ध अव्यभिचारी धर्म पाये जाने से संशय होता है कि शब्द नित्य है वा अनित्य। शब्द का श्रावणत्व नामक धर्म नित्यत्व का अव्यभिचारी, और कृतकत्व नामक धर्म अनित्यत्व का अव्यभिचारी होता है। परन्तु नित्यत्व और अनित्यत्व विरुद्ध धर्म होने से संशय होता है कि शब्द नित्य है वा अनित्य। यह प्रतितर्क कहलाता है।

वार्तिककार इसका खंडन करते हैं कि एक ही विषय नित्य और अनित्य दोनों नहीं हो सकता अर्थात् एक ही विषय के दो रूप संभव नहीं है, इसीलिए एक ही विषय में दो विरुद्ध अव्यभिचारी धर्म संभव नहीं हैं। यदि दोनों विरुद्ध-धर्मों को विषय का अव्यभिचारी मानते हैं तो विषय एक नहीं अपितु दो होना चाहिए जो वस्तुतः है नहीं। इसीलिए दो विरुद्ध-धर्म एक ही विषय का अव्यभिचारी-धर्म नहीं हो सकते हैं।<sup>51</sup> 55 वार्तिककार के इस तर्क को संक्षिप्त में प्रस्तुत करते हुए भूषणकार कहते हैं कि नित्यत्व और अनित्यत्व में परस्पर परिहार सम्बन्ध होने से दोनों को एक विषय में होना संभव नहीं है।<sup>52</sup>

विषय के अनेक-धर्म और समान-धर्म में अभिन्नता स्थापित करते हुए यह कहा जा सकता है कि विषय का अनेक-धर्म संशय का कारण नहीं है क्योंकि वह समानधर्म से भिन्न नहीं है। अतः अनेक-धर्म को संशय का पृथक् हेतु कैसे माना जा सकता है? किसी के मत से भूषणकार इसका समाधान देते हैं कि समान-धर्म से साधारण-धर्म का और अनेक-धर्म से असाधारण-धर्म का बोध होता है इसीलिए दोनों को पृथक् हेतु माना गया है।<sup>53</sup>

इस प्रश्न पर विचार करते हुए वार्तिककार कहते हैं कि जब साधारण-धर्म के ज्ञान को संशय का हेतु कहा जाता है तो इसका अर्थ यह नहीं कि साधारण-धर्म जब समान रूप से सभी में हो तो संशय की उत्पत्ति होती है अपितु ऐसी स्थिति में संशय की उत्पत्ति तब

होती है जब ज्ञाता इस प्रकारक अन्वय में अव्यभिचार स्थापित करने में अक्षम होता है। उसी तरह असाधारण-धर्म संशय का हेतु तब होता है जब ज्ञाता अन्य उदाहरणों में असाधारण-धर्म का अभाव स्थापित नहीं कर पाता है। इसीलिए धर्म का अनेकवृत्तित्व या एकवृत्तित्व संशय या निर्णय का हेतु नहीं, अपितु व्यभिचार अथवा अव्यभिचार संशय या निर्णय का हेतु है। जहाँ व्यभिचार है वह संशयहेतु होता है और जहाँ अव्यभिचार है वह निर्णयहेतु। अन्वय की स्थिति में विधीयमान को सर्वत्र स्थापित करने की अक्षमता तथा व्यतिरेक की स्थिति में प्रतिषिध्यमान को सर्वत्र स्थापित करने की अक्षमता संशय का कारण है। जब साधारण-धर्म का ज्ञान संशय का हेतु होता है तो वहाँ विधीयमान का व्यभिचार होता है अर्थात् विधीयमान को सर्वत्र स्थापित नहीं कर पाते हैं। जब अनेक-धर्म का ज्ञान संशय का हेतु होता है तो वहाँ प्रतिषिध्यमान का व्यभिचार होता है अर्थात् हम यह नहीं कह पाते कि अन्य उदाहरणों में प्रतिषिध्यमान नहीं है। इसी भिन्नता के आधार पर दोनों को पृथक् हेतु कहा गया है।<sup>54</sup>

भूषणकार वार्तिक का अनुकरण करते हुए अनेक-धर्म को असाधारणधर्म के पद से व्याख्या करते हुए कहते हैं कि नित्य से व्यावृत्त विषय अनित्य, तथा अनित्य से व्यावृत्त विषय नित्य होता है। परन्तु शब्द श्रावणत्व और आकाशविशेषगुणत्व दोनों से विशेषित होने से नित्य और अनित्य दोनों से व्यावृत्त हो जाता है। फलस्वरूप हम यह नहीं जान पाते कि शब्द नित्य से व्यावृत्त होने से घट के समान अनित्य है, या अनित्य से व्यावृत्त होने से आत्मा के समान नित्य। नित्य और अनित्य में परिहार सम्बन्ध होने से एक ही विषय नित्य और अनित्य दोनों नहीं हो सकता। अतः संशय होता है कि शब्द नित्य है या अनित्य। सहकारिकारण की उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था के सातत्य से संशय के उच्छेद को असंभव नहीं कहा जा सकता, इसीलिए भूषणकार के अनुसार अत्यन्त-संशय की समस्या नहीं उठनी चाहिए। शब्द के कृतकत्व नामक विशेषधर्म के अदर्शन के फलस्वरूप संशय के अनुच्छेद पर प्रश्न चिन्ह नहीं लगाना चाहिए। जिस तरह शब्द के श्रावणत्व के आधार पर शब्द के नित्यत्व पर प्रश्न चिन्ह नहीं लगाया जा सकता, उसी तरह शब्द के कृतकत्व नामक विशेष-धर्म के परिणामस्वरूप उसके अनित्यत्व पर प्रश्न चिन्ह नहीं लगाना चाहिए, क्योंकि कृतकत्व और अनित्यत्व का अविनाभाव अन्यत्र पाया जाता है। इससे स्पष्ट है कि विषय का असाधारण-धर्म संशय का हेतु है।<sup>55</sup>

अत्यन्त-संशय के प्रसंग में भी भूषणकार वार्तिक के मत का अनुकरण करते हैं। वार्तिककार के अनुसार यह कहना उचित नहीं कि शब्द को निश्चयात्मक रूप से नित्य या अनित्य नहीं कहा जा सकता। कुछ लोग शब्द को निश्चयात्मक रूप से नित्य, और कुछ लोग निश्चयात्मक रूप से अनित्य मानते हैं। अतः अत्यन्त-संशय का प्रसंग उठाना उचित नहीं है। ज्ञाता यदि एक ही विषय में दो विरुद्ध अव्यभिचारी धर्मों को देखता है तो ज्ञाता को दोनों धर्मों के सामर्थ्य को यत्न से समझना चाहिए क्योंकि दोनों ही उस विषय के ज्ञान के साधन नहीं हो सकते। दोनों धर्मों के तुलनात्मक ज्ञान से यह निर्णय करना चाहिए कि दोनों में से कौन साधन है और कौन नहीं। चूँकि शब्द का नित्यत्व प्रमाण से बाधित है, और उसे नित्य नहीं कहा जा सकता है, इसीलिए उसे अनित्य समझना चाहिए।<sup>56</sup> भूषणकार 'अनेकधर्म' को 'अनेक' और 'धर्म' के कर्मधारय के रूप में विग्रह करते हैं। इससे एक अधिकरण में उपलब्ध अनेक विरोधी धर्म संशय उत्पन्न करते हैं, ऐसा अर्थ प्राप्त होता है। जैसे-क्या मन क्रियावान् होने के कारण तीर के तुल्य मूर्त है या मन के अस्पर्शत्व के कारण आकाश के तुल्य अमूर्त? मूर्त और अमूर्त में परस्पर परिहार सम्बन्ध होने से दोनों एकत्र नहीं रह सकते, फलतः संशय होता है कि मन मूर्त है या अमूर्त।<sup>57</sup>

विरोधी यहाँ पक्ष रखते हैं कि उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से सर्वत्र और सर्वदा संशय की उत्पत्ति नहीं होती। उनका कहना है कि दोनों विरोधियों के बल तुल्य होने से संशय नहीं अपितु निर्णय की अनुत्पत्ति होती है। भूषणकार उत्तर देते हैं कि निर्णय के अनुत्पादन से ही संशय का होना स्थापित होता है, फलतः विरोधी का मत मान्य नहीं है। निर्णय की अनुत्पत्ति में हम अचेतन दीवार की तरह स्थिर नहीं रहते अपितु आलोचना और प्रश्न करते हैं। आलोचना या प्रश्न संशय के विना संभव नहीं है, इसलिए निर्णय की अनुत्पत्ति ही संशय को सिद्ध कर देती है। यदि पूर्वपक्षी कहे कि निर्णय की अनुत्पत्ति में संशय नहीं अपितु विषय का ग्रहण नहीं होता तो भूषणकार कहते हैं कि ऐसा मानने से विप्रतिपत्ति से भी संशय न होकर विषय को अग्रहीत होना चाहिए। विप्रतिपत्ति के साथ अनेक धर्म का कोई ऐसा विशेष सम्बन्ध नहीं होता है जिस आधार पर यह कहा जा सके कि विप्रतिपत्ति से संशय नहीं अपितु विषय का ग्रहण नहीं होता। इसके अतिरिक्त अनध्यवसाय का भी संशय में अन्तर्भाव प्रतिपादित हो जाने से यह कहना उचित नहीं कि विप्रतिपत्ति से संशय नहीं अपितु अनध्यवसाय होता है। दूसरे स्थल पर पूर्वपक्ष स्वयं विषय में दो विरोधी धर्मों की उपस्थिति को संशय का हेतु कहा है। उन लोगों ने स्वयं कहा है कि "क्या गमनत्व

को कर्मत्व का पर्याय कहे या अपर सामान्य? इस प्रश्न पर विचार करते हुए वे कहते हैं कि उत्क्षेपण नामक गमन पृथक् रूप से अभिहित होता है, फलतः वह कर्म का पर्याय हो जाता है, और उत्क्षेपण अनुगत प्रत्यय होने से अपर सामान्य कहलाता है। इस प्रकार संशय होता है कि गमनत्व को कर्मत्व का पर्याय कहें या अपर सामान्य। इससे सिद्ध है कि अनेकधर्मोपपत्ति संशयकारण है।<sup>58</sup>

### विप्रतिपत्ति से संशय

भाष्य एवं वार्तिक का अनुकरण करते हुए भासर्वज्ञ विप्रतिपत्ति को संशय का तीसरा हेतु मानते हैं। विषय के प्रसंग में दो विरोधी कथन सुनकर ज्ञाता को विप्रतिपत्ति होती है, और फलतः संशय होता है। उदाहरण स्वरूप (1) कुछ लोग इन्द्रिय को भौतिक और कुछ लोग अभौतिक कहते हैं, अतः संशय होता है कि इन्द्रिय भौतिक है वा अभौतिक, (2) कुछ लोग आत्मा को शरीर से भिन्न और कुछ लोग अभिन्न कहते हैं, अतः संशय होता है कि आत्मा शरीर से भिन्न है वा अभिन्न। (3) कुछ लोग आत्मा को नित्य और कुछ लोग अनित्य कहते हैं, अतः संशय होता है कि आत्मा नित्य है वा अनित्य।<sup>59</sup> वार्तिककार के अनुसार संशय का यह तीसरा हेतु वक्तागत होता है। श्रोता विषय के प्रसंग में वक्ताओं के मुख से विरोधी कथनों को सुनकर यह निर्णय नहीं कर पाता कि कौन सही कह रहा है और कौन मिथ्या, अतः श्रोता को संशय होता है।<sup>60</sup>

### उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था से संशय

इन तीन हेतुओं के अतिरिक्त भूषणकार उपलब्धि तथा अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को पृथक् रूप से क्रमशः चौथा एवं पाँचवां हेतु मानते हैं। भासर्वज्ञ के अनुसार ये दोनों संशय के स्वतंत्र हेतु हैं। यहां यह उल्लेखनीय है कि इन दोनों के स्वतंत्र हेतुत्व के प्रसंग में शास्त्रकारों में मतैक्य नहीं है। यद्यपि भाष्यकार एवं भूषणकार का तर्क भिन्न है तथापि दोनों इन्हें पृथक् हेतु मानते हैं। वार्तिककार प्रथम तीन को ही संशय का हेतु मानते हैं, तथा उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था एवं विशेषापेक्षा को प्रथम तीन का विशेषण मानते हैं।<sup>61</sup> वार्तिककार स्पष्ट रूप से कहते हैं कि उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था पृथक् रूप से संशय कारण नहीं है।<sup>62</sup> संशय के पाँच हेतु हैं, यह सूत्रार्थ नहीं है।

भूषणकार के अनुसार “विधिमुखेन प्रवृत्तं ज्ञानमुपलब्धिः” अर्थात् विधान करते हुए प्रवृत्त ज्ञान उपलब्धि है, और “प्रतिषेधमुखेन प्रवृत्तं ज्ञानं ज्ञानानुत्पादश्च अनुपलब्धिः” अर्थात् निषेध करते हुए प्रवृत्त ज्ञान या ज्ञान की अनुत्पत्ति अनुपलब्धि है। दोनों ही पृथक्



रूप से संशयहेतु हैं। विषय में उपलब्धि-योग्य धर्म के ज्ञान से संशय की उत्पत्ति उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था के फलस्वरूप होता है। इस अव्यवस्था के फलस्वरूप ज्ञाता विषय में विशेष-धर्म की अपेक्षा करता है जो विमर्श कहलाता है और विमर्श की स्थिति में दो विरोधी और प्रतिद्वन्द्वी विचार सामने आते हैं जो संशय उत्पन्न करते हैं।

यहाँ प्रश्न सम्भव है कि यदि उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का हेतु माना जाय तो सर्वत्र उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि के विषय में संशय होना चाहिए। भूषणकार के अनुसार यह प्रश्न तब उठता जब उपलब्धि-मात्र या अनुपलब्धि-मात्र को संशय का हेतु कहे परन्तु यह कहना यहाँ इष्ट नहीं है।<sup>63</sup> यह मान भी लिया जाय कि उपलब्धि-मात्र या अनुपलब्धि-मात्र संशय का कारण नहीं है, तो भी उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का पृथक् हेतु मानना उचित नहीं है क्योंकि उन दोनों की कारणता समान-धर्म की कारणता में अन्तर्भूत है, इसकी उससे भिन्नता नहीं है। यदि यह कहा जाय कि उपलब्धि या अनुपलब्धि के विषय को सत्य या असत्य नहीं कह पाने से संशय होता है तो यहाँ पर उपलब्धित्व या अनुपलब्धित्व सामान्य समान-धर्म हो जाता है। यदि यह कहा जाय कि उपलब्धमान या अनुपलब्धमान जल-पिशाचों को उसे विद्यमान या अविद्यमान नहीं कह पाने से संशय होता है तो यहाँ ज्ञान का अवभासित्व या अनवभासित्व सामान्य समान-धर्म है और इस तरह यह समान-धर्म से भिन्न नहीं। इस आधार पर यह कहा जा सकता है कि उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय का पृथक् हेतु कहने का औचित्य नहीं है।<sup>64</sup> भूषणकार स्वयं इन दोनों हेतुओं को प्रयोजन के आधार पर पृथक् हेतु मानते हैं, परन्तु वह भाष्य में प्रस्तुत समाधान की चर्चा करते हुए अपना मत प्रस्तुत करते हैं। अतः भाष्य और वार्तिक का मत यहां उल्लेखनीय है।

भाष्यकार उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था के पृथक् हेतुत्व पर चर्चा करते हुए कहते हैं कि समान और अनेक-धर्म ज्ञेयस्थ होता है, तथा उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि ज्ञातृस्थ, अतः इस भिन्नता के कारण दोनों को पृथक् हेतु मानना अनिवार्य है।<sup>65</sup> वार्तिककार को भाष्य का यह मत मान्य नहीं है। भाष्यकार पर कटाक्ष करते हुए वह कहते हैं कि यह समझ में नहीं आता कि समान और अनेक धर्म कैसे ज्ञेयस्थ होता है? उनके अनुसार उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को पृथक् रूप से संशयहेतु नहीं मानना चाहिए। उनके अनुसार समान-धर्म का ज्ञान, अनेक-धर्म का ज्ञान तथा विप्रतिपत्ति ही संशय के हेतु

हैं और इतर पद उनके विशेषण। वार्तिककार पूछते हैं कि विषय के धर्म को संशय का हेतु कहें या पुनः उनके ज्ञान को? उनके अनुसार समान और अनेक-धर्म संशय का हेतु नहीं, अपितु उनका ज्ञान संशय का हेतु है और वह ज्ञाता में होता है। अतः यह कहना उचित नहीं कि समान और अनेक-धर्म ज्ञेयस्थ, तथा उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि ज्ञानस्थ होते हैं। चूँकि यह भेद नहीं है इसीलिए वार्तिककार के अनुसार उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को पृथक् हेतु मानने का कोई औचित्य नहीं है। समान और अनेक-धर्म का विधीयमान और प्रतिषिध्यमान के आधार पर भेद किया जाता है। विधीयमान से हम विषयों में धर्म की उपलब्धि को दर्शाते हैं, और प्रतिषिध्यमान से अन्य विषयों में धर्म की अनुपलब्धि को दर्शाते हैं। इस भेद के आधार पर समान और अनेक-धर्म के ज्ञान को संशय का पृथक् हेतु माना गया है। विप्रतिपत्ति नामक संशय का तीसरा हेतु वक्तागत होता है। श्रोता विषय के प्रसंग में वक्ताओं से विरोधी कथनों को सुनकर यह निर्णय नहीं कर पाता कि कौन वक्ता सही कह रहा है और कौन मिथ्या। अतः श्रोता को संशय होता है। इस आधार पर विप्रतिपत्ति को संशय का हेतु कहा गया है। परन्तु उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को पृथक् हेतु मानने का कोई औचित्य नहीं है।<sup>66</sup>

भूषणकार वार्तिक के मत का खंडन करते हुए प्रयोजन के आधार पर उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को क्रमशः चौथा एवं पाचवाँ हेतु मानते हैं। भूषणकार का कहना है कि अनुपलब्धिमात्र के आधार पर चार्वाक देवतादि को असत्य कहते हैं, उपलब्धिमात्र के आधार पर पूर्वमीमांसक शब्द में स्थायित्व स्थापित करते हैं, लोकायतिक शरीर में चैतन्य स्थापित करते हैं तथा जैन सामान्य का उसके आश्रय से अभेद स्थापित करते हैं। इन मतों के निराकरण के लिए संशय आवश्यक है। अतः उपलब्धि और अनुपलब्धि की अव्यवस्था को संशय के हेतु के रूप में पृथक् रूप से कहा गया है।<sup>67</sup> भूषणकार का यह मत उन्हें वार्तिककार से ही नहीं भाष्यकार से भी भिन्न कर देता है।

निदेशक (शैक्षिक)

भारतीय दार्शनिक अनुसंधान परिषद्

नई दिल्ली

Email—pahitol@gmail.com

## संदर्भ एवं पाद टिप्पणी

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स्वरूपमस्य प्रतीयते, न पुनरयं विषयस्वरूपमवधारयति, अतश्च संशयः। प्रतीयत इति हि प्रत्यय इत्युच्यते। वहीं पृ. 84

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23. परमार्थस्तु प्रत्ययशब्दो ज्ञानपर्यायः। ज्ञानत्वं च सामान्यं संशयादिष्वप्यस्तीति न विरोधः। वहीं, पृ. 205
24. स च समानधर्मानेकधर्मविप्रतिपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिकारणभेदात् पंचधा भिद्यते। न्यायसारः सभूषणः, पृ.13
25. यद्येतावतैव संशयलक्षणं निरवद्यं 'समानानेकधर्मोपपत्तेः' इत्यादि सूत्रं तर्ह्यनर्थकम्? नानर्थकं विभागार्थं विशेषलक्षणार्थं च। तदर्थमेवाह-स चेत्यादि पंचधा भिद्यते इति। वहीं
26. तत्र समानधर्मोपपत्तेरनेकधर्मोपपत्तेर्विप्रतिपत्तेश्च त्रिविध एव संशय इतरपदविशेषणाद् भवतीति सूत्रार्थः। न्यायभाष्यवार्तिकम्, पृ.83
27. समानधर्मात् किमयं स्थाणुः पुरुषो वेति। न्यायसारः सभूषणः, पृ.13
28. समानधर्मादिमात्रादसंभवः संशय इति चेत्, न, अनवधारणात्। न ह्येवमवधार्यते समानधर्मादेव संशय इति, किं तर्हि? वहीं
29. अव्यवच्छेदहेतोरिति वक्तव्यम्। यदिदं समानधर्मोपपत्तेरिति पदम एतस्मिन्नव्यवच्छेदहेतोः समानस्य धर्मस्योपपत्तेरिति वक्तव्यम्। न हि केवला समानधर्मोपपत्तिः संशयकारणं भवति। अन्यथा कृतकत्वादिनापि संशयः स्यात्। समानं हि कृतकत्वं सर्वानित्यानामिति व्यवच्छेदहेतुत्वान्न भवति। न्यायभाष्यवार्तिकम्, पृ.85
30. अव्यवच्छेदेति। ते किल मन्यन्ते व्यवच्छेदहेतुरपि धर्मः समानो भवति। यथा कृतकत्वं साध्यधर्मिणि शब्दे दृष्टान्तधर्मिणि च घटादौ समानम् न चासौ नित्यानित्यत्वसंशयहेतुः, अपित्वनित्यत्वस्यायोगं साध्यधर्मिणि व्यवच्छिनत्ति। अतोऽव्यवच्छेदहेतोरिति वक्तव्यमित्यर्थः। तात्पर्यटीका पृ.204
31. इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षवदसाधारणकारणवचनं समानजातीयव्यवच्छेदार्थम्, विजातीयव्यवच्छेदस्तु सामान्यलक्षणेनैव कृतत्वान्नानुक्रियते, सामान्यलक्षणानुवादेन विशेषलक्षणं द्रष्टव्यम्। तेनायमर्थः सिध्यति-समानधर्मसामग्र्यन्तः पतितानवधारणज्ञानं भवति, तदनेकधर्माद्युपलक्षितसामग्रीजनितेभ्यः संशयेभ्योऽर्थान्तरमिति। एवमन्यत्रापि व्याख्यातव्यमित्यतो नातिव्याप्तिदोषोऽप्यस्ति। न्यायसारः सभूषणः, पृ.14
32. न, समानार्थापरिज्ञानात्। व्यवच्छेदहेतुश्च, समानश्च धर्म इति न युज्यते। व्यवच्छेदहेतुर्नाम विवक्षिततज्जातीयवृत्तित्वे सति यो विजातीयावृत्तिः स व्यवच्छेदहेतुः।

- तस्य च समानार्थता नास्ति। समानो हि नाम विवक्षिततज्जातीयवृत्तित्वे सति अन्यजातीयवृत्तिः। तस्मादव्यवच्छेदहेतोरिति न वक्तव्यम्। न्यायभाष्यवार्तिकम्, पृ. 85
33. सोऽयं साधारणो धर्म उपलभ्यमानः संशयहेतुः, किं केवल इति? न केवलः। किं तर्हि? उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातश्च। यदि चोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी न व्यवस्थिते भवत इति। किमेतावन्मात्रं साधनमिति? नेत्युच्यते। यदि च विशेषाकांक्षा भवति समानधर्ममुपलभते। उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी न व्यवतिष्ठेते इदन्तया नेदन्तया वा। विशेषाकांक्षायां च सत्यामर्थसन्देहो भवतीति। वहीं
34. उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी न व्यवतिष्ठेते इति। शिरःपाण्यादीनामुपलब्धिर्वक्रकोटरादेरनुपलब्धिः पुरुषस्य साधकं प्रमाणम्। तद्विरुद्धस्य वा शिरःपाण्यादेरनुपलब्धिर्वक्रकोटरादेरुपलब्धिः पुरुषस्य बाधकं प्रमाणम्। तद्वि पुरुष एवायं वा इदन्तया व्यवतिष्ठते, इदंतानिषेधेन वा नायं पुरुष इत्यनिदन्तया व्यवतिष्ठते तदभावोऽव्यवस्था। तदनेन साधकबाधकप्रमाणभावो दर्शितः। विशेषाकांक्षायां चेति विशेषस्मृतिदर्शिता। तात्पर्यटीका, पृ 206
35. अत्रैवोपलब्धीत्यादिपदद्वयं शंकापूर्वकं योजयति। वहीं
36. सूत्रकारेण तूपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थादिग्रहणं कुचोद्यपरिहारार्थं सहकार्युदाहरणार्थं च कृतं, न त्वनेनैव सम्पूर्णा सामग्री प्रतिपाद्यते, अदृष्टान्तःकारणादेरनभिधानात्। कुचोद्यं पुनरत्रैवं भवति-समानधर्मोपलम्भोऽपि, सत्यपि तस्मिन् गच्छतस्तृणादिषु संशयानुपलब्धेरिति। न्यायसारः सभूषणः, पृ. 14
37. विशेषापेक्षा इति विशेषेष्वपेक्षा आकांक्षा स्मृतिरूपा यस्य संशयस्य कारणत्वेन स तथोक्तः। किमुक्तं भवति? विशेषाकांक्षा च यतः संशयकारणम्, अतः तामन्तेरणापि संशयो न भवति। न च यस्य सदभावेऽपि सहकारिकारणाभावात्कार्यं नोत्पद्यते तस्याकारणत्वमेव, सर्वस्याप्यकारणत्वप्रसंगादिति। वहीं
38. एवं समानधर्मोपपत्तेर्विशेषापेक्ष इति चोच्यमाने सामान्यधर्मदर्शने सत्यपि विशेषापेक्षायां च सत्यामुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्योर्व्यवस्थानात् न भवति संशयः। एवं च यदायं द्रष्टा दृष्टपूर्वं सामान्यविशेषवन्तमर्थमुपलभते, तत्र चोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी व्यवस्थिते भवतः। सोऽयं द्रष्टा तस्मात् स्थानाद् यदाऽपैति ततोऽस्यापगमाद् विषयविप्रकर्षानिमित्तादल्पविषया विशेषा नावभासन्ते। महाविषयं सामान्यमवभासते। उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी पुनर्व्यवस्थिते भवतः। विशेषानुस्मृतिश्चास्ति, न च सन्दिह्यते। न्यायवार्तिकम्, पृ. 86

39. विदूर्वती कुंजरसदृशधर्मवन्तमनुभवति, तदास्यास्ति समानधर्मोपलब्धिः। अस्ति च करितरूपविशेषस्मृतिः, न तु साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभाव इति न संशये। न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका, पृ. 207
40. नन्वेवमपि दूरस्थायां प्रियतमायामुभयसद्भावेऽपि संशयो न भवति, अतोऽकारणं विशेषाकांक्षासहितोऽपि समानो धर्म इति। अस्योत्तरम्-उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धव्यवस्था इति। विधिप्रतिषेधत्वेन निश्चयकारणाभावादित्यर्थः। एतदुक्तं भवति न विशेषाकांक्षैव सहकारिकारणं किन्तूपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धव्यवस्थापीत्यतस्तदभावेऽपि संशयो न भवति। न्यायसारः सभूषणः पृ.14
41. एवं समानधर्मोपपत्तेरुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धव्यवस्थातश्चेति पद द्वयेऽपि नौयान प्रेखादिगतस्य न भवति संशयः। न्यायभाष्यवार्तिकम्, पृ. 86
42. नौदोलाद्यारूढो हि गच्छन् विदूरे आरोहपरिणाहवद्वस्तुदर्शनेऽपि सत्यपि च साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावे विशेषस्मृत्यभावात् नग इति वा नाग इति वा न संदिग्धे। न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका, पृ. 207
43. तथा वेगेन गच्छतः पनसादिषु वृक्षसमानधर्मोपलम्भेऽप्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धव्यवस्थायामपि विशेषाकांक्षाभावान्न संशयो भवतीत्यतः सकल सहकार्युपेतस्यैव समानधर्मस्य संशयहेतुत्वमभ्युपगम्यत इति। न्यायसारः सभूषणः, पृ. 14-15
44. अदृष्टादेश्च कार्यान्तरेष्वपि साधारणत्वादनभिधानेऽपि सहकारित्वं लभ्यते इत्याभिप्रायवताऽत्र नोक्तम्। समानधर्मवदनेकधर्मदिरप्यशेषसहकार्युपेतस्य संशयहेतुत्वं व्याख्येयमिति। वहीं, पृ. 15
45. अनेकधर्मादिति विवक्षितजातीयं तद्विपरीतं चानेकम्। वहीं, पृ. 15
46. अनेकधर्मोपपत्तेरिति। समानजातीयमसमानजातीयं चानेकम्। तस्यानेकस्य धर्मोपपत्तेः विशेषस्योभयथा दृष्टत्वात्। समानजातीयेभ्योऽसमानजातीयेभ्यश्चार्थाः विशिष्यन्ते। गन्धवत्त्वात् पृथ्व्यादिभ्यश्च विशिष्यते, गुणकर्मभ्यश्च। अस्ति च शब्दे विभागजन्यत्वं विशेषः तस्मिन् द्रव्यं, गुणः, कर्म वेति सन्देहः। विशेषस्योभयथा दृष्टत्वात्। वात्स्यायनभाष्यं गौतमीयन्यायदर्शनम्, पृ.25
47. अनेकधर्मादिति। विवक्षितजातीयं तद्विपरीतं चानेकम्। अनेकस्माद् व्यावर्तको धर्मोऽनेकस्यासंबन्धी वाऽनेकस्मिन्प्रतिषिद्धो वाऽनेकप्रत्यहेतुर्वा

भेदसाधकत्वेनेत्यतोऽनेकधर्म इति सर्वत्र मध्यमपदलोपेन समासः,  
सर्वथाप्यसाधारणधर्मोऽभिप्रेतः। तथा चाकाशादिविशेषगुणत्वात् किमयं शब्दो नित्यः  
स्यादनित्यो वेत्युदाहरणम्। न्यायसारः सभूषणः, पृ.15

48. कथं पुनरसाधारणो धर्मः संशयं करोति? न ह्ययं विरुद्धविशेषैः सह कदाचिदुपलब्धोऽपि  
येनास्योपलम्भः स्मृतिहेतुः स्यात्। न चाप्रतिबद्धार्थदर्शने स्मृतिर्युक्ता, सर्वदा  
सर्वानुभूतार्थस्मृतिप्रसंगात्। न च विरुद्धविशेषानुस्मृतिमन्तरेण संशयो भवति, अदृष्टत्वात्।  
वहीं
49. अपि चायमसाधारणो धर्मः स्वधर्मिणां विशेष एव, विशेषदर्शनाच्चान्योऽपि संशयो  
निवर्तते, कथं ततः संशयो भवतीति? नहि गोत्वदर्शनाद् गवि संशयः प्रादुर्भवन्नपुलभ्यते,  
अनुच्छेदप्रसंगाच्च। यस्तावत्समानधर्मदर्शनोत्पन्नः संशयः स विशेषदर्शनाच्च निवर्तते, यस्तु  
विशेषदर्शनादुत्पन्नः, स कुतः प्रध्वंसमासादयिष्यति? तस्मान्नासाधारणो धर्मः  
संशयहेतुरिति। वहीं
50. वहीं पृ.15-16
51. तदयुक्तम्, असंभवात्। न ह्यव्यभिचारिणौ विरुद्धावेकस्मिन्नर्थे धर्मो संभवतः वस्तुनो  
द्वैरूप्यासंभवात्। यद्युभावव्यभिचारिणौ स्याताम्, एकं वस्तु द्वयात्मकं भवेत्। न चैतदस्ति।  
तस्मात् नोभावव्यभिचारिणाविति। न्यायभाष्यवार्तिकम्, पृ. 89
52. न च नित्यत्वानित्यत्वयोरेकत्र संभवोऽस्ति परस्परपरिहारस्थितिधर्मत्वात्। न्यायसारः  
सभूषणः, पृ. 16
53. पूर्वं साधारणधर्मवत्त्वमुक्तमिदानीं त्वसाधारणधर्मत्वमित्येतावतैव विशेषेण  
पृथग्वचनमित्येके। वही, पृ.16
54. यथैव साधारणो धर्मः संशयहेतुरिति नान्वयिनः साधारणत्वे सति संशयहेतुत्वं भवति,  
अन्वयाव्यभिचारात्। एवं व्यतिरेकिणोऽपि सत्यप्यसाधारणत्वे  
विपर्ययसम्बन्धस्याव्यभिचारात् हेतुभाव इति। तस्मात् नैकवृत्तित्वमनेकवृत्तित्वं वा  
संशयकारणत्वे निर्णयकारणत्वे वा हेतुः। किं तर्हि? साधारणासाधारणत्वे सति  
व्यभिचाराव्यभिचारौ संशयनिर्णयहेतू, यो व्यभिचारी स संशयहेतुः, योऽव्यभिचारी स  
निर्णयहेतुरिति यदि तर्ह्युभयोर्व्यभिचारित्वात् संशयहेतुत्वम्, ननु  
समानधर्मोपपत्तेरित्यनेनैव गतमेतत्। गतार्थत्वात् न संशयकारणत्वेन पृथगुपादेयमिति?  
सत्यम्, न व्यभिचारितामन्तरेणान्यत् संशयकारणम्, अपि तु व्यभिचारितायां सत्यां  
विधीयमानव्यभिचारः प्रतिषिध्यमानव्यभिचारश्चेति भेदः। समानधर्मोपपत्तेरित्यनेन



विधीयमानस्य व्यभिचार उपदिश्यते, अनेकधर्मोपपत्तेरित्यनेन प्रतिषिध्यमानो व्यभिचार इति। एतावता च भेदेन पृथगभिधानम्। वही, पृ.16

55. वयन्त्वसाधारणेनैव रूपेणास्य संशयहेतुत्वं वर्णयामः। कथमिति? नित्येभ्यो व्यावृत्तत्वम्, अनित्येष्वेव दृष्टं अनित्येभ्यो व्यावृत्तत्वं च नित्येष्वेव दृष्टम्, अयन्तु शब्दः श्रावणत्वादिविशेषेण नित्येभ्योऽनित्येभ्यश्च व्यावृत्तः तन्न जानीमहे किं नित्येभ्यो व्यावृत्तत्वाद् घटादिवदनित्यः स्यादुतानित्येभ्यो व्यावृत्तत्वादात्मादिवन्नित्य इति। न च नित्यत्वानित्यत्वयोरेकत्र संभवोऽस्ति परस्परपरिहारस्थितिधर्मत्वात्। न चात्यन्तसंशयप्रसंगः, सहकारिकारणस्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थादेः सातत्येनासंभवात्। नाप्यनिवृत्तिप्रसंगः, कृतकत्वादिविशेषदर्शान्निवृत्तेः। न च विशेषत्वसाम्याच्छ्रावणत्वादि-वत्कृतकत्वादितोपि संशयप्रसंगः, कृतकत्वादेरनित्यत्वाविनाभावित्वेनान्यत्रोपलब्धत्वादिति। तस्मादसाधारणोऽपि धर्मः संशयहेतुरिति स्थितम्। वही, पृ.16
56. यदा पुनरेवम्भूतौ धर्माविकस्य वस्तुनो भवतः, तदोपलब्धा तस्य वस्तुनः किं प्रतिपत्तव्यमिति? तदा तयोरेव धर्मयोः सामर्थ्याधिगतौ यत्नः कर्तव्यः। नोभावत्र साधनम्। कतरोऽत्र साधनं कतरश्च न साधनमिति सामर्थ्याधिगमे यत्नः करणीय इति। यत्नश्च क्रियमाणोऽनित्यत्वसाधनेष्वेवावतिष्ठत इति। कुतः? नित्यत्वस्य प्रमाणबाधितत्वात्। तच्चोपरिष्ठात् वक्ष्यामः। तदेवं व्यवस्थितमेतत्, अनेकधर्मोपपत्तेरसाधारणात् धर्मात् संशय इति। न्यायवार्तिकम्, पृ. 91
57. अथवानेकश्चासौ धर्मश्चेति कर्मधारयस्तेन विरुद्धानेकधर्मस्यैकत्रोपलभ्यमानस्य संशयहेतुत्वं लभ्यते, यथा किं नु क्रियावत्त्वात् शरवन्मूर्तं मनः स्यादुतास्पर्शत्वादाकाशवदमूर्तमिति? न च मूर्तत्वामूर्तत्वयोरेकत्र सम्भवः, परस्परपरिहारस्थितिधर्मत्वात्। न्यायसारः, पृ. 16
58. उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थादेश्चात्रापि सहकारित्वमतो न सर्वदा सर्वत्र वा संशयप्रसंग इति। तुल्यबलत्वे तयोर्विरोधान्निर्णयानुत्पादकत्वं स्यान्न संशयोत्पादकत्वमिति चेत्, न, अतएव तत्सिद्धेः। नह्ययं निर्णयानुत्पत्तावचेतनकुड्यादिवदास्ते विपर्येति वा, किं तर्हि? पर्यालोचयनं प्रश्नं वा कुर्वन्नुपलभ्यते न च संशयमन्तरेण पर्यालोचनं प्रश्नकरणं वा युज्यते। अनध्यवसाय इति चेत्-अथ मन्यसे निर्णयानुत्पत्तावनध्यवसायोऽस्य न तु संशय इति, तदयुक्तं, विप्रतिपत्तितोऽपि अनध्यवसायप्रसंगात्। न हि विप्रतिपत्त्या सहास्यानेकस्य धर्मस्य विशेषः कश्चिदस्ति। किं चानध्यवसायस्यापि संशयेऽन्तर्भावप्रतिपादनात्।

- प्रदेशान्तरे च विरुद्धधर्मद्वयस्य संशय हेतुत्वेन स्वयमुक्तत्वात्। तथा च गमनत्वं किंकर्मत्वपर्याय आहोस्विदपरं सामान्यमिति? प्रश्नं कुर्वतः कुतस्ते संशय इत्यनुयोगं च कृत्वा सर्वेषूत्क्षेपणादिषु कर्मत्ववदनुगतप्रत्यहेतुत्वमुत्क्षेपणादिवत्पृथगभिहितत्वं च धर्मद्वयं संशयहेतुत्वेनोक्तमिति। तस्मादनेकोऽपि धर्मः संशयहेतुरिति। वहीं, पृ. 16-17
59. विप्रतिपत्तिरिति, व्याहृतः प्रवादो विप्रतिपत्तिः। तां श्रुण्वतः पूर्वोक्तसहकारिसदभावे सति संशयो भवति- किं भौतिकानीन्द्रियाण्युताभौतिकानीति? किं शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मास्त्युत नास्ति? नित्योऽनित्यो वेत्यादिविप्रतिपत्तयो द्रष्टव्या इति। वहीं, पृ. 17
60. विप्रतिपत्तेरित्ययं वक्तृगतः संशयहेतुः। केऽत्र सम्यक्प्रतिपन्नाः के मिथ्येति श्रोतुः संशयो भवति। न्यायभाष्यवार्तिकम्, पृ. 92
61. तत्र समानधर्मोपपत्तेरनेकधर्मोपपत्तेर्विप्रतिपत्तेश्च त्रिविधः एव संशय इतरपदविशेषणाद् भवतीति सूत्रार्थः। वहीं, पृ. 84
62. तत्रोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्योस्तावत् पृथक् संशयकारणत्वं न भवतीति चर्चितमेतत्। वहीं, पृ. 91
63. एवं च सर्वत्राप्युपलब्धिविषयेऽनुपलब्धिविषये च संशयप्रसंग इत्यनुपपन्नं चोद्यम्। न ह्यत्रोपलब्धिमात्रमनुपलब्धिमात्रं वा संशयकारणमिष्टमिति। न्यायसारः सभूषणः, पृ. 18
64. भवतु नामैवं तथाप्यनयोः समानधर्मादर्थान्तरत्वं नास्ति। कथं? यदि तावदुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिविषय एव सत्यासत्यत्वेन संशयस्तदोपलब्धित्वमनुपलब्धित्वं च समान्यम्। अथोपलभ्यमानानुपलभ्यमानेषु जलपिशाचादिषु विद्यमानाविद्यमानत्वेन संशयः, तथापि ज्ञानावभासित्वमनवभासित्वं च समान्यमिति। वहीं, पृ. 18
65. पूर्वः समानोऽनेकश्च धर्मो ज्ञेयस्थ उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी पुनर्ज्ञातृस्थे। एतावता विशेषेण पुनर्वचनम्। वात्स्यायनभाष्यम्, पृ. 26
66. तत्र समानोऽनेकश्च धर्मो ज्ञेयस्थः उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी पुनर्ज्ञातृस्थे इति भाष्यम्। तत्रोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्योस्तावत् पृथक् संशयकारणत्वं न भवतीति चर्चितमेतत्। समानः अनेकश्च धर्मोऽज्ञेयस्थ इत्येतदपि न बुद्ध्यामहे, किमत्र धर्मः संशयकारणमुत ज्ञानमिति? न धर्मः संशयकारणमित्यनेकधा समर्थितम्। समानानेकधर्मज्ञानं तु संशयकारणम्। तच्च ज्ञातरि वर्तत इति नास्ति भेदः। समानानेकधर्मयोस्तु पृथगभिधाने उक्तं प्रयोजनम्, विधीयमानप्रतिषिध्यमानधर्मभेदादिति। विप्रतिपत्तेरित्ययं वक्तृगतः संशय हेतुः। केऽत्र सम्यक्प्रतिपन्नाः के मिथ्येति श्रोतुः संशयो भवति। एतावता भेदेन पृथगभिधानम्। न्यायवार्तिकम्, पृ. 91-92

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67. अत्रैकै परिहरन्ति-समानोऽनेकश्च धर्मो ज्ञेयस्थः, उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी पुनर्ज्ञातृस्थे एतावता विशेषेण पृथग्वचनमिति। वयं तु ब्रूमः- प्रयोजनवशात्पृथगभिधानम्। कथम्? अनुपलब्धिमात्रेण वादिनः स्वर्गापूर्वदेवतादेरसत्त्वमिच्छन्ति। उपलब्धिमात्रेण शब्दे स्थायित्वं शरीरे चैतन्यादिकं सामान्यादेः स्वाश्रयेणाभेदं चेच्छन्ति। तन्निराकरणार्थमुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिमात्रस्य संदेहनिमित्तमुक्तमिति। न्यायसारः सभूषणः, पृ.

18

## A NOTE ON ŚŪNYATĀ IN BUDDHISM

A.K. CHATTERJEE

The most striking feature in the development of Buddhist thought throughout its career in the course of the millennia has been the bewildering variety of schools and sub-schools, sects and sub-sects, which separate themselves from their parent bodies, forming different sects which stray apart and again come together, differentiating themselves from each other and again joining together in a syncretic school. Its history is thus simply mind-blowing, very complicated and confusing.

Despite these complications, there is yet something, which connects all these schools and sects, some common strand running through all of them, which makes them schools of *Buddhism*, which is the identifying tag as it were, binding them together. The notion of *Śūnyatā* is one such distinctive feature. Whatever their mutual quarrels, each school claims to be some variation of the theme of *Śūnyatā*.

The long career of Buddhism is usually traced through three distinct phases, viz. (I) the early *Ābhidharmikas*, comprising mainly *Theravāda* and *Sarvāstivāda*, with the *Sautrantika* playing a pivotal role in the rise of later schools; (II) the great *Mādhyamika* philosophy, critical and strongly negativistic, which can be taken to be the midpoint of the history of Buddhist thought, and lastly (III) the idealistic school of the *Yogācāra*. After this last phase there is no further doctrinal development, at least in India, though *Vajrayāna* emerged as a very strong continuation of *Mahāyāna* ideas, yet introducing several esoteric rites and rituals, which however does not make it stray too much away from the *Mādhyamika* and the *Yogācāra* philosophies.

The notion of *Śūnyatā* looms large in all these developments and acts as the connecting thread of all the Buddhist schools. To take up the *Ābhidharmika* schools (also known as *Hīnayāna*, but that being a derogatory term, is to be avoided). We take up for

consideration only the *Sarvāstivāda* school, which alone was influential in the subsequent developments. *Sarvāstivāda* is literally the theory that everything exists (*sarvam asti*). The external object as well as the knowing subject, both are ontologically real. It seems to favour a realistic theory of knowledge.

But there is here a radical twist; by ‘everything’ is not meant that any whole (*pudgala*)- whether that of an external object, or that of the knowing subject- is real. Any sort of wholeness or substantiality is anathema to the Buddhist. The whole is a construct, a figment of imagination, and is to be analyzed into its constituents which alone are real. ‘Everything exists’ is to be understood as the real existence of these constituents or parts, technically known as ‘*dharmas*’. *Dharmas* exist but *pudgala* does not. The theory is thus that of *pudgala- Śūnyatā*. The *pudgala* is merely imagined to exist, but is essentially, ‘void’ devoid of any reality. The external objects are constructed out of their parts, being nothing apart from the later. The sage asked the king about the reality of the chariot apart from the wheels, the seat, the railings etc, and convinced the king that the chariot is essentially naught.

Similarly the subject also is nothing in itself but is to be analysed into its five constituents, known as *skandhas*, viz. *rūpa*, *vedanā* etc. Hence a *pudgala*, whether objective or subjective, is essentially void (*Śūnya*).

But soon difficulties arose with regard to the notion of *pudgala- Śūnyatā*. If *dharmas* alone are real, and they are all isolated or discrete, how do they come together, and why only some *dharmas* go into make up one ‘person’, and not the other *dharmas*? The *Vātsīputrīyas* and *Sāmmītiyas* were led to believe that there must be some sort of continuity in the life of a ‘person’, who has to exist from birth to death in order to make possible the fact of memory and recognition, personal identity many and other recalcitrant phenomena. These schools believed in the existence of a quasi-self (*pudgalātmavāda*) over and above the *dharmas*. All this is highly heretical and apostatic, but is revealing how the ground is being prepared for the advent of the *Mādhyamika*.

The logic employed by the *Sarvāstivāda* is half-baked says the *Mādhyamika*. The former says that there is no whole apart from

its parts, and it is therefore purely fictitious. But the *Mādhyamika* contends that the whole and the parts are relative categories and one is not available without the other. Without a father there can be no son, but without a son one cannot call himself a father. The *Sarvāstivāda* has proved only one side of the dilemma, and has denied the reality of the whole. But in upholding the reality of the parts he has betrayed his own logic, since it is inexplicable how the parts have come together without something to hold them together. In the logic of relations one term cannot be salvaged and the other term denied. They are mutually dependent, and are void (*śūnya*) in their isolation (*parasparāpekṣikī siddhiḥ na tu svābhāvikī*).

The basic relativity is between existence and non-existence, between 'is' and 'is-not'. These again could be conjunctively affirmed as "both 'is' and 'is-not'" or again disjunctively denied as neither 'is' nor 'is-not'". These four alternatives exhaust all possibilities of judging. Each is an exclusive view (*dṛṣṭi*) at the cost of the other, but because of mutual dependence this exclusiveness is not tenable (*dṛṣṭiśūnyatā*). Four basic kinds of *dṛṣṭis* form the *catuṣṭkoti* of the *Mādhyamika*. It may be mentioned here that the *Mādhyamika* is going beyond its brief. He maintains that he has not added anything to the *dṛṣṭis* but analyses them as he finds them. But *catuṣkoṭi* is not a part of any metaphysical system, and must therefore be a *Mādhyamika* discovery. One can ask him as to how he comes to know that there are only four possibilities—neither more nor less. Why not the scheme of threefold predication as in Advaita *Vedānta* or even seven-fold predication as in Jainism. Hence *catuṣkoṭi* itself must be metaphysical and is to be viewed as lapse on the part of the *Mādhyamika*.

Be that as it may, the *Mādhyamika* argues that all the four possible standpoints are void (*śūnyatā*), devoid of any essentiality, because they are all vitiated by an inner self-contradiction. A position is not simply refuted by an opposite viewpoint; if you do not agree with me, so much the worse for you; I can only pity you for your stupidity. But when the opposition is within me I am startled and am compelled to review my position. And then I find that contradiction is endemic, not in this view or that, but in viewing as such. Affirmation depends on negation by 'A' can be

affirmed only denying 'not-A'. Similarly negation is significant only by presupposing a positive ground which negation leads to.

But what is the point of this kind of wholesale denial, denial of everything thought of, denial of thought itself, whatever form it takes. Denying everything right and left appears as sadistic or psychopathic. But what does negation lead to? Negation is to be understood and appreciated, not for its own sake, but as an impartial tribunal before which any metaphysical construction—affirmative or negative – has to stand trial. *Śūnyatā* is thus the conscience of philosophy, the 'impartial spectator', which does not accept, or even deny, any system. For it, all systems are tenable from their own points of view, but all untenable from the point of view of self-consistency. It accepts all views (*sarvam hi yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate*) and rejects all. *Śūnyatā* is an invitation to reason to commit suicide.

But the *Mādhyamika* presents a very desolate landscape where nothing but 'nothingness' is to be found. So attempts were made to tone down the dreariness of *Śūnyatā* and supply some positive content to it. Jainas, we are told, are split into the Digambara and the *Śvetāmbara* sects. We can speak of two versions of *Śūnyatā*, viz digambara *śūnyatā* and *śvetāmbara śūnyatā*. *Śūnyatā* for the *Mādhyamika* defies all predication, and stands therefore stark naked. The *Yogācāra* accepts this version of *śūnyatā* but tones it down and clothes it by a constructive account.

The *Yogācāra* starts with a pure idealistic system where the subject is everything, the external object, nothing. Consciousness is the sole reality, and the so called object existing outside is created by consciousness, and projected as if it were outside. This creative projection is the cosmic illusion, since the object is nothing outside consciousness (*vijñaptimātram evaitad asadarthābhāsanāt*). The clinching argument for this position is the non-availability of any object without consciousness (the so called *sahopalambha-niyama*). Apart from consciousness anything confronting it is like the appearance of the double moon when the eyelids are pressed.

But this is not the complete story of the *Yogācāra*, though all the Brahmanical systems made this subjectivistic position their butt of criticism. Idealism in reality is only the preparation for the emergence of a much more drastic theory. Idealism is only one part of the picture and has to be sublimated into the more radical position of *Śūnyatā*. It is not to be forgotten for a moment that the *Yogācāra* is also *Śūnyavāda*, albeit of the *Śvetāmbara* variety.

Subject and object, the knower and the known, are correlative categories and one becomes void without the other. Just as in the father-son relationship we cannot have one without the other, so also an object is an object only when it enters into the ken of knowledge. That is to say, nothing can be known without being known. But consciousness assumes the role of a subject only when it is confronted with something outside it, i.e. 'which is an 'other' to it. Without 'otherness' then is no knowledge.

Nothing has done more injustice to the *Yogācāra* than being branded as subjective idealism. Idealism is certainly the first step to be taken; we denounce the category of the 'other'. And we have also to remember that consciousness, when disrupted by an external object, gets fragmented and thus becomes momentary. But *kṣṇika-vijaññānāda* is not the last word. When the object or the 'other' is negated, the subject function of consciousness also lapses. Voidness pertains to the subject-object dichotomy (*grāhadvaya-śūnyatā*). This is the constructive or speculative aspect of the idealistic version of *Śūnyatā*. Not being confronted with any alien intruding into its peace, consciousness rests in itself (*cittasya citte sthānāt*) and becomes non-momentary. As long as it is pulled outwards it gets dissipated into moments, but when it comes back to itself (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*) and regains the pristine purity of pure consciousness, it becomes unruffled and quiescent (*vijñaptimātratā*).

Thus, the long and torturous journey of the notion of *Śūnyatā* comes to an end. It begins with the *pugala-śūnyatā* of the *Ābhidharmika*, for whom the 'whole' in any shape is a construct, but the parts which go to make it up (the *dharmas*) are real. Then we come to the pure criticism of the *Mādhyamika* who denounces any kind of relativism (*pratītya-samutpāda*) and stops with pure critical awareness of various views (*ḍṛiṣṭi śūnyatā*) which cannot



be given any content to it. This apparent lacuna is made good by the *Yogācāra* who gives an idealistic twist to *Śūnyatā* (*grāhadvaya- śūnyatā*), but ultimately dropping even this idealistic garb (*śvetāmbara*), and arriving at a consciousness which cannot be characterized even as consciousness (*acitta, anupalambha*). The pretence of wearing a fig-leaf is finally given up.

Ex-Professor,  
Department of Philosophy and Religion,  
Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi

# MUST JÑĀNA BE PROPOSITIONAL?

P. K. MUKHOPADHYAY

## Part – I

Any student of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy knows that belief and knowledge are two central notions in epistemology. Part of what we intend to do in this paper is to raise and try to answer the question: Do we have in Indian epistemology any notion that corresponds to the notion belief? In recent times, we in India often use the two terms knowledge and jñāna interchangeably. We do not normally doubt or deny the legitimacy of doing so, just as we do not often inquire if there is in Indian epistemology any notion corresponding to the notion belief. Some may think that such questions are banal. For there is no compelling reason why there must be one to one correspondence between philosophies of any two countries or cultures in respect of notions used or problems discussed. But from another point of view the question seems to make quite good sense. It seems reasonable to expect that the basic epistemological concerns of two philosophies, granting that they are equally adequately developed, should be fairly similar; and there should be close correspondence between the concepts used and distinctions made in them. To put it differently, it is expected that in any such two cultures, the logic used and analysis offered in the clarifications of the central notions and problems will be similar. Against this background how are we suppose to understand the situation that one of the two cultures or the epistemology in it, say Indian epistemology, uses less number of concepts or draws less number of distinctions than the contemporary epistemology of the West. How the logic or analysis employed in Indian epistemology compares with the corresponding logic or analysis, which is used in Western epistemology? Can

they be equally rich and effective? Generally speaking, the system or theory that uses less number of distinctions and concepts should be considered simpler and hence better. This simplicity is a great virtue of a theory. The case may not be so easily settled. Sometimes the simplicity is only apparent; behind the apparent simplicity there remains hidden the poverty of the theory. In principle therefore in the case in hand the theory, which uses less number of concepts and distinctions may prove to have a stronger logic or a poorer epistemology. If with less number of concepts and distinctions or with simpler logic we can answer all or the same set of questions, establish all or the same set of truths, explain all or the same set of phenomena then any logic or analysis which uses greater number of concepts and distinctions must stand theoretically condemned. Where fewer concepts and distinctions are the result of our inability to be sufficiently or adequately discerning then the (apparent) virtue of simpler logic hides the poverty of epistemology. But it may equally be the case that the distinctions to capture which one group of philosophers feel the need for additional concepts are, in the view of another group of philosophers, actually unimportant or useless, at least philosophically speaking. For some such reasons we want to determine if the Indian epistemologists have over-looked any important problem or distinction or if the problems and distinctions that they did not consider are or are in their opinion unimportant. (The same holds about contemporary epistemology of the West). It is only against this background that we want to ask and discuss the question if Indian philosophers had any concept corresponding to the concept of belief. And the question is not banal.

In more than one respect jñāna can compare, with belief, (we shall examine later whether jñāna can compare with belief in the most important respect i.e. the respect in which belief agrees with or differs from knowledge). This is not to deny that there are or may be important dissimilarities also. Both belief and jñāna are relatively wider concepts in terms of which we unify different

cognitive attitudes. Perceiving, inferring, remembering, are all instances of belief irrespective of their truth or falsity. Similarly, pratyakṣa, anumāna, etc. are all cases of jñāna no matter whether they are true or false. However, in the context of the distinction between belief and knowledge the most important point of comparison of jñāna with belief would be the respect in which belief differs from knowledge. But comparison in this respect requires us to find out in Indian epistemologies a concept corresponding to the concept of knowledge. And all that has been said above in connection with the question of finding out the Indian counterpart of belief applies equally here. Here again students of Indian philosophy are naturally led to search for a concept nearly equivalent to the concept of knowledge. They sometimes find the concept of pramā to answer their search. We shall examine later how the pair belief and knowledge compares with the pair jñāna and pramā.

Belief, we have said, is a unifying concept. But there is also another concept that can serve the purpose and serve it better; it is the notion of propositional attitude. It does not only include all the cognitive attitudes so far said to have been unified by belief but also the cognitive attitudes of believing and knowing themselves. And it seems that there are reasons to hold that when belief is used as a unifying principle it is used just in the sense of propositional attitude. Thus the cognitive attitudes, which are allegedly unified by the notion of belief, are, at least in so far as they are propositional attitudes, unified in terms of sameness and similarities of their content (viz. proposition). It may even be held that by hypostatizing an entity like proposition the contemporary epistemologists could unify those cognitive attitudes. So their expedient of disposition etc. did help them little. They have avoided admitting mental act or state only at the cost of admitting the controversial entity called proposition. Whatever that may be, jñāna will be a very poor counterpart of belief unless it takes something like proposition as its content. Thus we are led to asking

and answering the question is there in Indian epistemology any concept comparable with the concept of proposition? We shall come to this later on. (We shall then inquire if Greek epistemologies had any such notion.) But even if we accept belief to be a unifying concept, jñāna seems to be more unifying in that there are some cognitive attitudes that the concept of belief leaves out but jñāna includes.

The cognitive attitude of doubting is a case in point. Doubting is not a case of believing but it is a propositional attitude. And I may suggest that the concept of propositional attitude rather than the concept of belief or believing as a nearer counter part of jñāna. It is often claimed that propositional attitude is an extensional concept and has extensional clarity, but proposition, under some interpretation at least, is a thoroughly intentional concept. But from another point of view, say ontological point of view or factual point of view, the notion of belief, unlike that of propositional attitude, seems to have efficacy as well as legitimacy.

In the light of what we have said, the discussion of doubt or saṃśaya may prove to be useful in determining how jñāna compares with belief. For doubt may provide us with at least one definite case with reference to which belief may be held to be less unifying than the concept of propositional attitude and jñāna. But one may object that the concept of propositional attitude cannot be put up against belief as a better unifying principle unifying among other things belief itself as well as some other cognitive attitudes that cannot be said to be cases of belief or believing. For, the concept of propositional attitude seems itself to presuppose or involve the concept of belief. We understand proposition as what is believed or more accurately what is believed in common in a number of different acts of belief. But it is exactly this argument which seems to be invalidated by the case of doubt if, as we suggest, doubting is not a case of believing but counts as a propositional attitude. And this may impress one as to the importance of the discussion of the attitude of doubting.

Some may raise the objection that we have so far said in effect that one way of effectively comparing belief and jñāna is to study how the pair Jñāna-saṃśaya compares with the pair belief - doubt and vice-versa. But this requires that one should first establish if saṃśaya is or can be the Indian counterpart of doubt. (This objection can be repeated indefinitely with the result that we can hardly ever get started in demonstrating that jñāna is more inclusive than belief. We would rather ignore this objection and begin by taking saṃśaya to be the counter part of doubt with the hope that if we are grossly mistaken in this then the mistake will show itself up in course of the discussion). We may have occasion to say something about how saṃśaya stands to doubt independently of how jñāna stands to knowledge.

To come back to our point, propositional attitude may compare better than belief with jñāna. In one respect, belief seems to be a better candidate than propositional attitude. On the view, still held by some people, that belief is a concrete psychological state or event, which can be studied introspectively or psychologically. One may admit some simple generic property corresponding to belief. And the notion of conceptual unification can be given, it seems, a clearer account in terms of such simple generic property. Thus, we admit jñāna to be a concrete state or event and we admit the corresponding simple, generic property viz. jñānatva. And when we say the notion of jñāna unifies perceiving, remembering, doubting etc. we mean all these mental or internal states or acts exemplify jñānatva. On the mental state view of belief, we could admit a simple generic property comparable to jñānatva but we can hardly do so on the disposition view of belief or behaviouristic view of propositional attitude. On such a view, propositional attitude hardly signifies any introspectible property, which is simple and generic. But then unification in terms of the concept of propositional attitude is really in terms of content, which the cognitive attitudes being unified have. In other words to say believing, remembering, doubting etc. are propositional attitudes is to say that they all take proposition as content. This

proposition compares closely and favourably with the generic property referred to above both in respect of simplicity and ability to unify. Those who admit generic properties corresponding to belief and jñāna, seem to believe these properties to be introspectible or at any rate knowable items of reality. Believers of propositional attitudes, however, excepting perhaps a few, seem to take proposition to be more a matter of logical presupposition or theoretical construct than a concrete fact or item of reality. Proposition as concrete reality is, in the opinion of many, a dubious entity, which is neither mental nor physical. Jñānatva or the property of being a belief is on the other hand held to be (whether correctly or not is a different question) less dubious entity. It is not at least an entity of a third world.

Unifying the diversity of epistemic phenomena might have been felt as a common concern by both Indian epistemologists and their contemporary western counterparts. But while the jñāna theorists and belief theorists took the logic of fact approach, the propositional attitude theorists seem to generally prefer logic of the language or word approach. For, the contemporary attitude theorists view proposition linguistically or behaviouristically. So taken they escape the charge of hypostatizing dubious entity. Their account of epistemological phenomena takes the form of a logical analysis of epistemic terms. So their epistemology including the account of how different epistemic phenomena are unified is relative to a particular logic of a particular language. Their account in terms of propositional attitude will hold good only if we admit a certain form of sentences – a 'that' clause following epistemic verbs– correspond to every epistemic context such as doubting, believing etc. The judgment on the viability, let alone the value, of such an account seems to imply that propositional construction is an epistemic universal, which in every language constructions involving epistemic verbs are necessarily propositional construction in the sense described. In any case belief (or better believing), as we understand it here, (and this is the common way in which it is understood by the contemporary epistemologists) and

in the sense in which it constitutes a part of the definition of knowledge and compares with knowledge – is a propositional attitude or takes proposition as its content. This feature of having proposition as content serves as a unifying property, if we are allowed to speak in terms of property, or principle. But unifying property of a class of things is the exclusive common property of that class of things; as such the unifying properties also serve the purpose of differentiating the things they qualify from things of other classes. The utility of admitting such properties is measured by their ability to perform this differentiating function as well. This is just the other side of the (optimally broad) unification. But the property of having content that characterizes beliefs fails to distinguish belief from knowledge and therefore this property may be construed as too-wide as a property of unifying belief states or episodes only. It on the other hand unifies all cognitive states and distinguishes them from such states or acts as do not have propositional content. As we found belief is too narrow as a unifying principle as it fails to unify everything, which can be unified in terms of propositional attitude. Similarly, the property of having proposition as content is too wide as it includes knowledge also and hence fails to distinguish belief from knowledge and vice versa. It is too wide if it is a pervasive epistemological concern that distinction between belief and knowledge is to be maintained, clarified and justified. So far the characterization of belief as propositional attitude is useless for our purpose; if possible, we have to find out, the Indian counterpart of belief particularly in the sense of belief in which belief is contrasted with knowledge.

We have seen that belief cannot be distinguished from knowledge in terms of the feature of having proposition as content or being a propositional attitude. The way out is to admit proposition to be of different kinds. Unless we admit different types of propositions to form contents of belief and knowledge respectively they, taken as propositional attitude, cannot be distinguished. Belief and knowledge do not differ from each other as propositional attitude but as having different sorts of proposition



as content. One difficulty is that the sort of proposition, which form content of the propositional attitude of knowing, can and often does form content of believing. The converse is not true. This shows the belief is a wider class within which falls the class of knowledge. However, we should not hastily conclude that knowledge is just such belief, which has a true proposition for its content.

We need to further examine how far this distinction in terms of truth works. But what is more important is a general methodology of distinguishing different propositional attitudes and or knowledge and belief in terms of their different contents. If the methodology is to be perfect then there is to be one to one correspondence between different types of contents and different types of attitudes. Certain one type of attitude should take as its content only one type of content (say, true proposition). This, as we have just shown, is not the case. But the purpose of distinguishing may be served less rigorously if one of any two attitudes cannot take for its content the contents of the other also.

Distinguishing different types of cognitive states or attitudes in terms of their different contents is not confined to contemporary Western philosophers only. Some Indian philosophers also, as we will show, distinguish different types of cognitive states in terms of the distinction of their respective content. Again, the Greek philosophers, from whom the contemporary epistemologists claim to have derived their belief about the distinction between knowledge and belief, are taken to hold that knowledge and belief differed in respect of their content. Both the Indian and contemporary epistemologists must admit one consequence of this way of distinguishing different types of cognitive attitudes for otherwise their views will be inconsistent. But the contemporary epistemologists do not always accept this consequence and as a result give us if not an inconsistent theory, at least a not very clear theory. In fact, if they wanted to maintain the sort of distinction between knowledge and belief as their Greek predecessors did then they could not hold that addition of further conditions could turn belief into knowledge. It even seems that

they have employed a paradigm of non-empirical knowledge in their epistemology of empirical knowledge.

Thus if the property of involving belief cannot unify doubting, the property of having as content a proposition cannot distinguish belief from knowledge. And the respect in which belief differs from knowledge is that though a belief necessarily has content yet one's believing does not entail the content believed. To put it differently, the primary question is what does one know, when one knows? Alternatively, what one believes when one believes? The answer, which, the contemporary epistemologists give, in each case, is proposition. One believes a proposition when one believes and whenever one knows one knows some proposition. However, the distinction between these two types of cognitions or propositional attitudes is that believing does not entail the proposition, which forms its content, but knowing entails the proposition, which it takes as its content. From the construction "x knows that *p*" we can legitimately detach or infer that *p*. However, the converse is not true. There may be occasion when it is possible for us or the individual cogniser to detach the propositional content – the proposition is true – and yet we cannot ascribe knowledge to the cognizer. On such occasion we can at most ascribe to him the propositional attitude of believing. Be that as it may, do we find an Indian counterpart of this distinction between belief and knowledge? One may claim that the pair *jñāna-pramā* is the counterpart of the pair belief-knowledge. This claim could be stronger if it could be shown that *jñāna* did not entail its content while *pramā* does.

*Pramā* by definition is true while *jñāna* could be both true and false. There still remains a distinction. *Pramā* itself is true, but when we say knowledge is true it means the proposition which forms content of knowledge (to which the propositional attitude of knowing is directed) is true. Alternatively, knowledge is, roughly speaking, a belief that takes a true proposition as its content. We will see later that this analysis of Greek notion of true belief may not be acceptable to the Greeks themselves. But for the present, there should be available something corresponding to the notion of a proposition if it is proposed that Indian account of *pramā* and

belief corresponds to the account of knowledge and belief just sketched. Supposing that this is not the case then there would arise more interesting and intriguing questions. If without admitting proposition one can give a good account of the distinction between knowledge and belief or what correspond to them then why in some culture and epistemology the need for proposition was felt? There must be some other fact or phenomenon which the Western epistemologists found hard to explain without admitting or involving proposition. But how then Greek or Indian epistemology could make do without proposition? Were these epistemologies poorer or richer in comparison to (contemporary) Western epistemology? We are thus led to the necessity of first determining if in Indian epistemology we meet with any concept that may be legitimately the Indian counterpart of proposition. In tandem, we would discuss whether Indian epistemologists did not feel the need for admitting something like proposition because they did not find any problem or phenomenon to solve or explain which something like it would be necessary. The other alternative would be that there was such a problem or phenomenon but Indian epistemology was not enough developed to detect or solve this.

So far as the classical Greek epistemology is concerned, one is likely to inquire how far it is correct to claim that contemporary Western epistemology is closely similar to it or is derived from it. If difference of their content were made constitutive of the difference between knowledge and belief then that would be more in line with the Greek tradition from which the contemporary epistemologists claim to have derived their notion of belief and knowledge. We need to first examine this claim. And we shall do this the next part.

## **Part - II**

What the contemporary epistemologists call the classical definition of knowledge is believed to be derived from the Greeks and particularly from Plato. Necessary components of this definition are proposition or propositional construction, justification and belief. I deliberately refrain from juxtaposing proposition requirement and belief requirement. But so far as

justification is concerned, Plato uses such notion to distinguish between persuasion and instruction. To impart knowledge is to instruct while to produce conviction is not (necessarily) to instruct. Even a lawyer and an orator can convince (Theaetetus, p.908 of Jowett's translation and edition of Plato's writings including the Dialogues and Letters). Justification is a necessary component of the definition of knowledge given and accepted by the majority of contemporary Western epistemologists. Plato seems to take justification in the sense of account, which in its turn depends much on the question whether what is believed or known is absolutely simple or complex or, as I would prefer to say, structured or unstructured. We may return to it later.

So far as the proposition component of the definition of knowledge is concerned, it seems correct to say, in spite of Hintikka, that paradigm of knowledge or belief with Plato was not propositional knowledge. Even Hintikka admits that that-clause - construction or propositional construction is not particularly abundant or important in Plato. And I think 'direct object construction', to borrow a coinage from I.M. Crombie, is more predominant in Plato. Again even when he rarely uses the notion of proposition (it is needless to say, I mean expression equivalent to 'proposition'), as in Cratylus he does not use the notion in a very precise or modern sense. He takes proposition sometimes as that which says what is true and at other times as what is itself true.

Paradigm of knowledge with Plato is, in modern terminology, thing- knowledge rather than propositional knowledge. And so it is, I think, with the Indian epistemologists. This is not necessarily a point of weakness of these epistemologies. In fact, I would like to speak in this paper in defence of thing-knowledge. There is nothing unusual with it. The difference between these two constructions or accounts would be philosophically important if there is some philosophically interesting and important problem, which one of these two constructions can handle better. Some<sup>1</sup> seems to suggest that with

thing knowledge as paradigm Plato could only give a very unsatisfactory account of falsity in speech. For on such a view one seems to be compelled to say 'that when I make a false statement I say nothing'. This observation may not be very fair. For Plato represents Socrates as saying that one can think what is *not* only "when he believes something and what he believes is not true". And again he says to think (say) what is not is to think (say) nothing; and to think (say) nothing is not to think (say) at all.

Even if Combric's criticism or diagnosis is otherwise unacceptable he at least brings out one thing explicitly and clearly (whether or not truly as well). There is one specifiable motivation for introducing proposition or preferring propositional construction rather than direct object construction as the paradigm of knowledge in epistemology. Russell has explicitly brought out this motivation in his statement of the requirements for a theory of truth, or for that matter, theory of knowledge. Russell says that we cannot explain error in terms of direct object construction. No state of mind is there, which can be described as erroneous knowledge of things. In addition, since every theory of truth must also admit what is the opposite of truth, namely, error, we cannot make do in theory of truth with thing knowledge. In other words, theory of acquaintance does not take note of falsehood while theory of belief does. Thus, one motivation for introducing proposition or statements is to provide room for falsehood. Truth as well as falsehood belongs to the theory of belief rather than theory of acquaintance i.e., to the theory of propositional knowledge rather than to the theory of (direct) knowledge of things.

However, in this sense proposition is hardly distinguishable from belief itself. Russell explicitly says that truth and falsehood are properties of belief. And he further argues that in case of falsehood there cannot be any direct contact or relation with the thing or object. So direct object construction, or paradigm of knowledge of things, is inappropriate in the context of a theory of truth in the sense in which truth is the opposite of falsehood. A theory of truth must be able to specify truth and distinguish it from

falsehood. And a theory of knowledge which contains as its necessary part theory of truth in the sense explained must use as its paradigm propositional knowledge.

It should be noted, however, that if Plato ultimately rejects the account of falsehood according to which false thinking is thinking things that are not, the reason why he rejects this account is not that it is in terms of things rather than in terms of proposition. Thus, rightly or wrongly Plato does not seem to think that talking about falsehood will be impossible without involving propositional construction and hence proposition. Even when he considers at length about impossibility of false opinion in *Enthydemus*, he speaks in terms of things. Nor was he unaware of certain possible epistemological account, which found no room for falsehood between the mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive alternatives of knowing and not knowing. Thus if Plato was very much aware of the fact of error and was also aware of certain possible versions of epistemology which could not make any room for falsehood and if at the same time he spoke almost regularly in terms of thing knowledge, then we can hardly say that in his opinion falsity, cannot be explained except in terms of proposition. At least we cannot impute such a view to Plato. On the contrary, it is quite clear, from his normal practice of taking thing knowledge as the model that he thought that truth could be explained without resorting to the notion of proposition. In *Theaetetus* Plato uses another two notions of account and description. One may be tempted to take these notions as equivalent or near equivalent of the modern notion of proposition. However, I find no reason for such a conjecture. I already spoke a little about the notion of account, I shall return to the notion of description later.

Before, however, I leave the notion of proposition, I wish to mention that even in our time there is no complete uniformity of opinion as to either the meaning of the term 'proposition' or the value of this notion. In his refreshing paper 'what we Believe' Alan R. White has traced the view that a proposition is what we believe when we believe in something to Moore, Russell and Price with the suggested comparison with relevant passages from Locke and

Hume. White has also shown that this notion is inconsistent with the definition of proposition given by the same philosophers as meaning of a sentence. He in any case concludes that proposition is not the content of belief; nor is any general answer possible as to what we believe when we believe that  $p$ . So even though Plato sometimes speaks in the form 'what he believes is not true' we should not automatically take him to resorting to or involving proposition.

I think that the notion of proposition has been brought to the forefront by the conceptual paradigm of contemporary philosophy in general and of epistemology in particular which are dominated by the theme of communication or linguistic communication. Operating with such a paradigm the contemporary epistemologists have given prominence to proposition as sentence meaning. Not very long ago proposition was itself taken to be a linguistic entity, the linguistic counterpart of the mental phenomenon of knowledge or judgment. (This is very much like the conception of *abhilāpavākya* in Indian philosophy. How such *vākyas* succeed in communicating *jñāna* is, as has been confirmed by some knowledgeable scholars, a very difficult problem in the Nyāya theory of language). In any case, the Greek, at least the Platonic, paradigm was not communication. To put it more accurately in the matter of philosophical knowledge or the knowledge of reality language or sentence is a very inadequate vehicle. And this view is corroborated by the Indian philosophers also.

To return for a while to the question of justification, Plato distinguishes does draw distinction between conjecture and true opinion and also between opinion (or belief) and knowledge. He further says that unless a belief is accompanied by an account it does not amount to knowledge. However, this account can hardly be construed as justification – justification that is among the constituents of what is claimed in the contemporary period to be the classical definition of knowledge. According to the

contemporary epistemologists, what is justification or adequate justification, is debatable. But it is somehow related to what they count or describe as accredited sources of knowledge. Knowledge or an episode of knowledge is derived from one or other accredited source of knowledge. A belief, which is otherwise true but is not derived from some accredited source of knowledge, is not knowledge. In contemporary epistemology, memory, besides inference and perception, is regarded as such an accredited source. But Plato holds that knowledge or true belief, say, about pleasure, does not result from memory. And as far as perception is concerned, he does not grant it the status of knowledge giving source.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, what is claimed to be a view of knowledge derived from Plato does not seem to reflect the spirit of Platonic philosophy. And the reason seems to be the following. The contemporary epistemologists have altogether a different approach or orientation towards knowledge. In the conception of Plato in particular and the Greeks in general, knowledge is not (exclusively or even basically) theoretical and abstract. Paradigm of knowledge was not scientific knowledge as we understand it today. It is rather philosophical knowledge, directed towards definite goals like efficient governance of the state or instructing individuals about the ways of releasing the soul from bodily pleasure. In other words, practical philosophical knowledge and not the theoretical scientific knowledge was the Platonic paradigm. Determined by such orientation Plato was primarily interested in thing knowledge and understood by thing in this context, object or reality. For the same reason his idea of knowledge was not primarily a knowledge communicable by linguistic means. All these points need elaborate discussion, arguments and adequate textual documentation. (It is very difficult to decide on the evidence of his Dialogues alone which view in a particular matter was really Plato's and which view was held by others). But I shall quote only two passages, and of these, one is from one of Plato's letters, in support of my reading and interpretation of Plato. I hope the students of Indian



philosophy will be pleasantly surprised to find close affinity of orientation. Some contemporary epistemologists on the other hand may find that their conception of knowledge was predominantly classical.

Let me discuss the second passage (or passages) first, “He said that true belief with the addition of an account was knowledge, while belief without an account was outside its range. Where no account could be given of a *thing*<sup>3</sup> it was not knowable..... But how he distinguished these knowable things from the unknowable ... What may be called the first elements of which we and all other things consist are such that no account can be given of them. Each of them just by itself can only be named, we cannot attribute to it anything further or say that it exists or does not exist, for we should at once be attaching to it existence or non existence, whereas we ought to add nothing if we are to express just it alone.... there is no formula in which any element can be expressed; it can only be named, for a name is all there is that belongs to it. But when we come to things composed of these elements, then just as these things are complex, so the names are combined to make a description (account), description being precisely a combination of names. Accordingly elements are inexplicable and unknowable, but they can be perceived, while complexes are knowable and explicable, and you can have a true notion of them. So when a man gets hold of the true notion of something without an account, his mind does think truly of it, but he does not know it, for if one cannot give and receive an account of a thing, one has no knowledge of that thing. But when he also got hold of an account all this becomes possible to him and he is fully equipped with knowledge”.

A student of Indian philosophy will feel tempted to compare and contrast this account of knowledge with some Indian conceptions. He will also note that shades of different theories, which are so sharply distinguished by the Indian philosophers, have been allowed to run into each other here. But a contemporary epistemologist will find that the notion of account elaborated above and said to form a necessary component of knowledge is

quite different from what he finds included as evidence or justification condition in the 'classical' definition of knowledge.

In his letter appearing as number seven in standard editions, Plato writes 'One statement at any rate I can make in regard to all who have written or who may write with a claim to knowledge of the subjects to which I devote myself no matter how they pretend to have acquired it, whether from by instruction from others or by their own discovery. Such writers con in my opinion have no real acquaintance with the subject. I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in future, for there is no way of putting it in words like other studies. Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance on instruction in the subject itself and of close companionship, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining'. 'For everything that exists there are three classes of objects through which knowledge about it must come; the knowledge itself is a fourth, and we must put as a fifth entity the actual object of knowledge which is true reality. We have then, first, a name, second, a description, third, an image, and fourth, a knowledge of object.'

Again a student of Indian philosophy will find so much of similarities of orientation. It is really tempting to quote and discuss comparable passages from the classical texts of Indian philosophy. But we shall resist the temptation and pass on to the next part of the paper. It is to be hoped, however, that it is clear that Plato is operating with a conception of knowledge which is different from the contemporary notion of knowledge shared by the logical or analytical school of philosophers.

### **Part-III**

I believe that in some sense, which cannot be adequately clarified here, the ruling idea of knowledge with Plato and the Indian philosophers has two notable features. Knowledge is

predominantly practical – it is knowledge of reality or *tattva* pursued with some ulterior motive; further it is primarily viewed after the model of direct object construction. I, however, think that what did not materialize with the single individual Plato, did take shape in the tradition of each and every Indian philosophical school. In India as supplementary to a theory and practice of 'philosophical' knowledge, there developed elaborate systems of logic and epistemology. And in this process, the conception of knowledge in all its dimensions and varieties received sufficient attention elaboration and analysis. It can therefore be legitimately hoped that even while operating with direct object construction view of knowledge the Indian philosophers developed some acceptable account of falsehood – the phenomenon which so much interested and puzzled Plato. It is likely that in the process they have developed a notion of something like a proposition. If we can discover this then we can make a good start in comparative study of the epistemologies of India and of the contemporary West. In the first part, we found that the notion of proposition was so crucial for meaningful comparison between certain basic epistemic concepts (such as knowledge and *pramā*) of the two traditions in question.

At one place in the Theaetetus, it has been said that true belief is knowledge. And from practical point of view, there is no possibility of our being in doubt as to what knowledge is and what is not a case of knowledge. There can be no mistake in believing what is true, for we cannot fail to notice (always) that the consequences of such belief are satisfactory. Such consequences include successful volition or practical success. A Naiyāyika like Vātsyāyana will not perhaps *define* true cognition as one, which leads to practical success. But even he will take practical success as an evidence for the truth of the corresponding cognition. Nobody can be in doubt whether he has attained practical success, at least in limited and well defined cases like successful drive for discovering if there is, say, a hidden thorn in a bunch of flowers. But it is equally true that we cannot be in doubt, nor can we mistake if ever we met with practical failure at least in well-defined cases. Supposing that there is in this case a corresponding erroneous cognition behind our failed practical move, what would

be the Nyāya account of that within the framework of thing – knowledge? Russell, as we said, specified as one of the requirements of a theory of truth that truth should be taken as the correlative of falsehood. He thereby evidently intended that a theory that cannot make sense of falsehood or cannot give an account of it, cannot be considered as an adequate theory of truth, as we understand it. To fulfil this requirement we must admit, it seems, something that can be true as well as false i.e., which can take both the properties of truth and falsehood. If this sounds as puzzling as the contention that left-hand card is right-hand card in the Goodman game, then the same sort of explanation may be given as was given by Goodman. The requirement in question is, put simply, that true and false must come under one genus or determinable; and belief is, admitted or postulated as such a determinable. When Russell said that some theories of truth failed just because this basic requirement was not satisfied he might have made tacit reference to Plato. It is true that in the scheme of Plato there is hardly any common class, within which both opinion (*doxa*) and knowledge (*nous*) could be brought. Nor can there be any logical relation of contradiction between opinion and knowledge as they relate to completely different types of object. If thing model proved inadequate, it was not simply because the chosen model was a thing model but because the things to which opinion and knowledge relate are absolutely different. Hence, knowledge cannot be false, at least in the sense, in which opinion can be; or opinion cannot be true at least in the sense in which knowledge can be. Either Plato should have two different notions of each of truth and falsehood, or he must unambiguously say that what is true cannot be false and vice versa even in the sense in which right-hand card can be a left-hand card. Plato did not develop these points sufficiently and as such his theory was left in an unsatisfactory state. The Advaita Vedāntins on the other hand fully developed a theory fulfilling all these requirements. They did not in the first place, construe contradiction as a relation between knowledge (belief) or propositions, in fact they redefined the notion of contradiction in such a way that it obtains between say *jñāna* (in a special sense) and the object of *jñāna* (of a certain kind). However, we cannot discuss this point as it falls beyond the scope of this paper.

All the contemporary epistemologists seem to accept the Russell requirement. A Naiyāyika also construes the relation of contradiction or *pratibadhya-pratibandhaka-bhāva* as relation between things that belong to the same class or come under the same determinable. The contemporary epistemologists have their inclusive notion of belief or proposition. But what would be such an inclusive notion for the Naiyāyikas? The notion (or class) of *jñāna* may readily suggest itself. But in that case *jñāna* is to yield to exclusive division into *pramā* and *bhrama*. We may take *jñāna* to mean only non-recollective cognition, that is, *anubhava* or cognition other than memory. But even then *jñāna* can hardly compare with belief, which is usually taken to yield to the logical division into truth and falsehood. For, the notion of *apramā* is more inclusive than the notion of falsehood (*bhrama*, *viparyaya* or *viparīta niścaya*). The result is that *pramā-bhrama* distinction cannot really compare with truth-falsity distinction, for this distinction cannot be jointly exhaustive of *jñāna* and hence they are not mutually exclusive forms of *jñāna*. If the division of *jñāna* into *pramā* and *bhrama* were a case of logical division then there would be no place for such varieties of cognition as *saṃśaya*, *sambhāvanā* etc. In other words, considered as a case of logical division *pramā* and *bhrama* come directly under *niścaya* and not under *jñāna*. Thus the criterion which distinguishes *pramā* from *bhramā* is not adequate for distinguishing *pramā* from *saṃśaya*. The point has been seriously considered whether the definition of *pramā* as *avyabichāri (jñāna)*, as in Gautama, can exclude both *bhrama* and *saṃśaya* etc. The standard answer is that it cannot. For, *saṃśaya* or doubt, for example, is neither a *pramā* nor a *bhrama*. So it would be ideal if we can find some property which can distinguish both *pramā* and *bhrama* on the one hand (and at once) from *saṃśaya* (and *sambhāvanā*) on the other. But such a property will be in the most relevant sense the common determinable within which *pramā* (truth) and *bhrama* (falsehood) are determinates. It is believed that the property of being *niścaya* i.e., being in the definitive or of assertive mood (i.e. being a case of assertion) characterizes both *pramā* and *bhrama* but not *saṃśaya*. This property – the property of being of the form of an assertion i.e., being of the form of *niścaya* – is common to both *pramā* and *bhrama* and it distinguishes each of *pramā* and *apramā* from *saṃśaya*. So far this notion of assertive

form or niścayākāra compares so well with the contemporary epistemologist's notion of belief. It may be said that what corresponds to belief in Indian epistemology – the Indian analogue of belief – is niścaya or awareness having the form of definitive cognition (niścayākāra jñāna) expressible in a sentence in the assertive mood. Just as belief admits of exclusive classification or division into truth and falsehood so also niścaya divides itself exhaustively into pramā and bhrama (and not into pramā and apramā). Even so there is no strict correspondence. We speak of the truth and falsity both *of* belief but it is non-idiomatic to say false knowledge. However, on many occasion or we may say that even in its standard use, false belief is short belief having a false proposition as its content. Similar analysis holds for true belief also. However, even if belief is not itself true or false, there is neither truth nor falsehood where there is no belief or assertion. We therefore suggest that niścaya be rendered into English as assertion or cognition having the form of an assertion (expressible in a sentence in the assertive mood). This assertion includes both affirmation and denial.

The reason why we cannot take jñāna to be the Samskṛt equivalent of belief is that jñāna is not fully exhausted by pramā (truth) and bhrama (falsehood). Jñāna includes besides niścaya (which is logically divisible into pramā and bhrama) other forms of cognitive attitudes as well. In fact just as (truth and falsehood) pramā and bhrama are varieties of Jñāna so also types of awareness which are neither pramā nor apramā are also included within Jñāna. Pramā, viparyaya, samśaya, sambhāvanā, āhārya, are all cases of jñāna. I suggest that the, notion of propositional attitude may be taken as the notion in contemporary epistemology which corresponds to the notion of Jñāna. Just as belief, doubt, suspicion, assumption etc. are all propositional attitudes so also niścaya, samśaya, sambhāvanā, āhārya (jñāna) are all cases of jñāna. Regarding the suggestion that propositional attitude is the counterpart in contemporary epistemology of the Indian notion of jñāna, we need to keep two things in mind. I presume in the first place that all propositional attitudes are cognitive attitudes; however we cannot prejudge either that all cognition is essentially propositional or that there are not cases of thing knowledge also.

Secondly, one cannot be sure as to where to place nirvikalpaka jñāna or cases like śābdaparāmarśa. Both these appear to present some difficulty. Though the difficulty is genuine we at this stage can only hope that some explanation could be found for these cases consistently with or along our line of thinking as presented here.

Belief, propositional attitude, niścaya (or niścayākāra) and jñāna are all saviṣayaka, that is, have some content. They all are intentional states or involve a reference beyond themselves. Plato denies belief without object as much as a Naiyāvika rejects nirviṣayaka jñāna or niścaya. Now the question is what is this viṣaya or object? It is clear from what we have said above, that this object is a thing rather than a proposition according to Plato as well as Naiyāyikas. We need to examine now with what success Naiyāyikas can explain the phenomena of falsehood, error or linguistic communication in terms of their preferred model of thing knowledge. Many think that for any satisfactory account of these phenomena (and there are other such phenomena) we need to employ the notion like proposition. Alternatively, we need to closely examine Nyāya theories of falsehood (also truth) and linguistic communication if we are to discover anything in these theories that may be taken to correspond to the contemporary epistemologist's notion of proposition.

We think that contemporary notion of proposition was either unknown to Plato or, at least, it was undeveloped in his thought and writing. The view of knowledge as propositional is not peculiarly Platonic. And the contemporary emphasis on this aspect of knowledge I assume, is partly determined by the logico-linguistic bias of the contemporary Anglo-American philosophers who discuss with amazing thoroughness and rigour problems of knowledge and meaning with their characteristic logic of word approach. In the pre-contemporary modern period, knowledge was not regarded as propositional in the sense that cognitive verbs more frequently and naturally yield to a propositional construction or govern a that clause. The modern philosophers commonly used to identifying knowledge with proposition or take proposition as linguistic expression or counterpart of the psychic episode of knowledge. One may find in the Platonic distinction between

perceiving and knowing an evidence of Plato's admitting proposition in the modern sense. For this distinction may be seen to be comparable with the contemporary distinction between perceiving and judging resorted to, to avoid things like negative fact, or to explain (perceptual) error. We do not see the absence of butter on the table, we only judge that there is not any. But the fact remains that in Greek philosophy propositional construction was not particularly frequent. And with the Naiyāyikas also the direct object construction is the paradigm.

We sometimes speak of Greek conception of knowledge, British conception of knowledge and so on. But I do not think there is any such thing as Indian conception of jñāna. It does not seem easy to discover a common minimum core of all the different conceptions of jñāna etc. which the different of schools of Indian philosophy have. I still think that both the Greek and the Indian orientation are practical. Or, to put it more accurately, the orientation of the Greeks or of the Indians is not exclusively theoretical. Visaya (or object) of jñāna (knowledge etc.) is not just (any-) thing, it is *artha* in that technical sense of the term in which it is the goal or basis of practical activity. This core meaning is retained when the notion of *artha* is used in more theoretical contexts. Thing knowledge or direct object construction is nearer to the Nyāya conception of jñāna. Thus no matter whether he is a Plato or a Naiyāyika, if he says that jñāna is saviṣayaka, viṣaya should not be taken to mean a proposition. It is safer to understand by viṣaya, content of some kind or other.

It has been alleged that in the direct object construction view of knowledge, knowledge is a hit or miss game. If it is a case of hit then we have knowledge and truth otherwise we do not have false belief but we have no belief. Plato rightly detected that on such a view there is no alternative between knowing and not knowing, there is no room for false belief or doubt. The same seems to hold for every view of knowledge which takes thing knowledge as paradigm. The problem of *apramā niścaya* or *viparyaya* is that we cannot construe it as not 'knowing' or absence of jñāna. Even if we take it as mistake it is not, Plato rightly says, a



case of confusing between what we know and what we know; or between what we know and what we do not know; or between what we do not know and what we do not know. Plato is not explicit if falsity could be construed as believing in a false proposition. He is rather explicit that falsity is not a case of believing in things immutable. It is not, as an Advaitin would say, tattvāvedaka; it is not knowing the Kūṭastha. But whether Plato says it or not, many philosophers including almost all the contemporary epistemologists say that false belief is believing in a false proposition. And this proposition is, as it is somewhat inconsistently held to be, both what we believe and the meaning we convey during linguistic communication. A Naiyāyika holds that though every jñāna is saviṣayaka yet every jñāna is not sākāra in a technical non-Buddhist sense of 'ākāra'. Niścaya always yields to the 'knowing as' construction. And what 'knowing that' construction achieves in the case of the propositional view of knowledge, 'knowing as' construction achieves within 'thing knowledge' model. Every niścaya, that is belief having the form of an assertion, is a case of knowing as. In niścaya something is cognized as such and such i.e., as having such and such property. The property as possessing which something is cognized in an act of niścaya is called prakāra. The thing which is known as having prakāra (or the property corresponding to the prakāra of the cognition in question) in such act is called viśeṣya relative to that act. Thus every niścaya yields to the analysis into viśeṣya and prakāra form. And when we say that every niścaya is sākāra we mean every niścaya admits of such analysis, or in this sense, has a viśeṣya-prakāra form (or simply form). This roughly corresponds to subject predicate form. All niścayākāra cognitions have a viśeṣya-prakāra form but not conversely.

This form or ākāra which we detect in every act of niścaya is not a separable feature of niścaya. An internal cognitive state is a sort of indivisible unity. It cannot be physically analyzed into different parts. But we can distinguish within its content a viśeṣya (subject) and a prakāra (predicate). Just as subject and predicate are distinguishable but not separable parts of the content of a

cognition so also the ākāra and the niścaya (assertive cognition) of which it is the akāra can be distinguished but not separated. In this sense one may, if one likes, call this ākāra a logical notion than a factual property, though a Naiyāyika would prefer to call it a factual property or real feature of niścaya.

We have earlier seen that niścaya or cognition of the type niścaya or which has niścayākāra admits of a logical division into truth (pramā) and falsehood (bhrama). And now we see ākāra is an inseparable form of niścaya. The Naiyāyikas discover and assert a relation between these two facts (of saprakāarakatva and pramā-apramā-anyataratva of niścaya). This notion of ākāra goes into every definition of both pramā (truth) and apramā (falsehood) given by the Naiyāyikas. They admit niścaya and ākāra of niścaya. And they further admit this contingency that the thing which is known as having some property in an act of niścaya (sometimes) has or (sometimes) does not have it. Now we think we have two comparable pictures

#### Picture 1

Belief → Proposition → states of affair → holds (fact) or does not hold

#### Picture 2

jñāna → niścayākāra (buddhi) → viśiṣṭārtha → tadvati tatprākāraka (fact)/ tadabhāvavati tatprākāraka (niścaya)

Whether the objection urged by Plato and the contemporary epistemologists against negative fact vitiate both these accounts is a question into which we will not enter here except for making the brief remark that every niścaya is saviṣaya and the viṣaya of a niścaya is viśiṣṭārtha. Just as a niścaya (definitive cognition) has a subject predicate form (viśeṣya-prākāra ākāra) so also its content is a structured one and not something simple; this content has a thing property (dharma-dharmī) form. The point is that the niścayākāra of the Naiyāyikas, is not, but is comparable with proposition. The

content of this niścaya, which in its turn corresponds to fact or states of affair, is a viśiṣṭārtha which being a structured content also has a form. It is by virtue of this form that niścaya though a case of direct object construction or thing knowledge can have the property of being either true or false. Thus distinction between truth and falsity can be possible even within the direct object construction view of belief, cognition, buddhi or niścaya of the Naiyāyika-s just for the reason that the content of such cognition, though not a proposition, has a form and a structure. And it is to be further explored whether this ākāra theory is vitiated by the standard objections against subject-predicate view of knowledge (proposition). These are all areas which deserve serious attention from the competent scholars who intend to undertake seriously a comparative study. Be that as it may, it seems that for fruitful comparative study of epistemic concepts we should be able first to identify in Indian epistemology some notion comparable with the notion of proposition. And we suggest that the notion of niścayākāra along with viśiṣṭārtha may be given a fair trial. For that we require to reconstruct or reformulate or rewrite (notionally) every propositional construction by using these two notions. Such a task can hardly be achieved in a single paper or even by a single person.

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We shall however try this concept in only one context where the need for proposition is felt most urgently. And this also we shall do in barest outline with a view to get an idea of both how prospective is this notion of niścayākāra and if and what problems are associated with it.

The notion of proposition has been introduced in the epistemic context of truth falsity and in the linguistic contexts of communication and meaning. The Indian analogue of proposition conceived linguistically or as the meaning of sentences, is, it may be agreed, vākyārtha. This vākyārtha should not be simply equated with fact even in the context of truth. For in the context of veridical perception also there is a corresponding fact. But this fact cannot be said to be vākyārtha. This is not for the simple and insignificant

reason that in case of perception no sentence has been uttered or written. The reason is more subtle which we cannot discuss here adequately. It may, however, be remembered that vākyārtha is a technical notion the meaning of which cannot be equated with the totality of the etymological meanings of the constituting words. Some idea may, however be got about the real import of the notion of vākyārtha if we consider the relation of this notion with the notion of niścayākāra introduced already. Sentential knowledge, in fact every kind of knowledge other than perceptual knowledge, is, according to the standard Nyāya view, necessarily of the form of assertion or niścaya. In other words sentential knowledge or sabda jñāna is always of niścayākāra. Thus for the reason stated above sentential knowledge is essentially of the kind of knowing *as* yet there is this difference. In case of sentential knowledge we have to construe the whole sentence just as concatenation of names. And since and so far as only names are involved here the concatenating relation (barring a very few exceptional cases) is identity (abheda). In the context of sentential knowledge therefore that construction is a special device for framing names –a device which some contemporary logicians like Quine seems to have noticed in their own works. Thus though sentential knowledge does not differ from other kinds of knowledge including perceptual knowledge in respect of being instances of niścayākāra yet, to put it in a handy if not so clear a way, while in other kinds of knowledge the ākāra is Viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇākāra in case of sentential knowledge it is abhinnākāra. One problem remains of which many think no satisfactory solution is possible. The problem how can there be successful linguistic communication?<sup>4</sup>

If we want to communicate certain information, which we have derived perceptually then the information, so to say, will have a Viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇākāra. But to communicate this information we shall have to use certain sentence on hearing which the hearer can only have cognition of abhinnākāra. This problem does not seem to create much trouble in the, matter of successful communication. In other words this does not, we think, create any problem with regard to inter person identification so much necessary for speaker-hearer communication. But how exactly this difficulty is avoided here seems to be another interesting and challenging topic of

research. In spite of all these it remains true that the notion of nisćayākāra serves the same or nearly the same purpose, plays the same or nearly the same role both in the context of truth falsity distinction and in the context of linguistic communication. This notion of nisćayākāra again is taken from the epistemology, which works with thing knowledge as paradigm. This vindicates the claim that the direct object construction model is quite adequate for both, for a theory of falsehood and a theory of linguistic communication.

Ex-Professor,  
Department of Philosophy  
Jadavapur University, Kolkata  
Email: pkm20021@gmail.com

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

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1. Crombie for example.
2. See Phaedo, Philebus.
3. Italics added.
4. For comprehensive discussion of this and related problems please see authors article "A Transparency Theory of Language" JICPR Volume XXVI Number 1 pp.1-28

# PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY: AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

Indian Philosophers have undertaken some methods of education regarding the determination of the truth of an object. These methods are neither biased nor dogmatic, but based on some ethical and educational values. In the Nyāya school the right cognition of categories leads us to the attainment of the mundane and transcendental values which are called *dr̥ṣṭa* (seen) and *adr̥ṣṭa* (unseen) well-being (*niḥśreyasa*). The ethics of propagating such view lies in the fact that the right cognition of the categories can associate us with mundane well-being which has got some pragmatic value in our life. At the same time the import of the transcendental value like emancipation etc has not been ignored. The right cognition of the categories like '*pramāṇa*', ('means of knowing') '*vāda*' ('debate to arrive at truth without any desire to get victory over the opponent'), '*jalpa*' (argumentation for achieving victory, but not truth), '*vitandā*' (argument only to refute others views without substantiating one's own), '*chala*' ('adopting tricks in argumentation', '*hetvābhāsa*' (fallacy of arguments') etc leads to the former, while the right cognition of the 'objects to be known' ('*prameya*') leads to the latter.<sup>1</sup> In a debate between an opponent and a proponent the determination of truth which is called technically *vāda* is the main objective of the Naiyāyikas leaving the question of victory aside. In the *vāda* type of debate there should be the adoption of one of the two opposing sides (*pakṣa-pratipakṣa-parigraha*), which is defended by *pramāṇa* and *tarka* (*pramāṇa-tarka-sādhanopālambha*) and which is not opposed to the established tenets (*siddhāntāvirudhha*). If the desire of victory prevails in debate, and determination of truth is bypassed, it is called *jalpa*, which is not taken as an ideal pattern of

forwarding arguments in a philosophical debate. If some one only refutes the opponent's view without forwarding his own, it is called *vitandā*,<sup>2</sup> which is not honoured as a better philosophical method. Hence each and every theory based on philosophical doctrine is called *vāda*, e.g., *nirvikalpakavāda*, *Apohavāda*, *Īsvaravāda* etc.

Truly speaking, in philosophy no standpoint is to be taken as final and hence all positions are ad hoc. The Indian term for Philosophy is *darśana* (literally seeing) which actually means 'critical subsequent seeing' (*anvīkṣā*). It is the ethics of Philosophy that nothing can be taken in blind faith, but it should be judged through the critical eyes. To follow something without proper reflection gives us a training to follow blindly what our tradition says and hence there is no fresh air to receive a new idea. That is why; *ānvīkṣikī* or critical thinking has occupied an important role in Philosophy. Such phenomenon is also described as *manana* by the Advaitins. It is nothing but a mental exercise, which when in respect of a particular meaning of a word there is doubt as to the conflict with other *pramāṇas* causes knowledge in the form of *tarka*, which ultimately removes doubt.<sup>3</sup>

In order to bring clarity about some concept the Naiyāyikas have forwarded their argument in a very precise educative manner of *uddeśa* (mere introduction of the object), *lakṣaṇa* (definition of the object) and *parīkṣā* (critical examination of the same), which makes a particular system more philosophically alive. If a researcher wants to know something, he may be given a rough idea about the object through *uddeśa* (*nāmamātreṇa vastusamkīrtanam uddeśaḥ*).<sup>4</sup> At the successive moments one should give a definite description of the object which is called *lakṣaṇa*. To describe an uncommon characteristic of the intended object, which can eliminate it from other objects ('*atattva-vyavacchedako dharmah*') is called 'definition' ('*lakṣaṇa*'). At the end it is essential to judge what is said earlier as definition and to see whether or not it is free from defects. *Parīkṣā* hence is to be taken as an ascertainment of reality (*tattva-nirṇaya*). *Parīkṣā* or examination is a method which

examines a theory to know whether or not it is such (*lakṣitasya idamittham bhavati iti nyāyatah parīkṣaṇam parīkṣā*)<sup>5</sup>.

While critically reviewing a certain standpoint one may partly or wholly reject or re-interpret the earlier view of the opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*). It is the custom that the whole system achieves philosophical growth through opponent-proponent-debate. The opponent's standpoint is taken so seriously by the proponents that the explanation of opponents given by the proponents is more understandable to us than that of the opponents, which evidences the intellectual honesty of the philosophers. If the opponent's view is not tenable; it is expressed as *tanmandam* i.e. the thesis achieves less merit. The position of the opponent which is considered absurd, is described as *tattuccham* i.e., the thesis is ignorable.

Invariable concomitance (*Vyāpti*) between probans and probandum is an important factor in attaining the inferential cognition. The Naiyāyikas admit that the knowledge of coexistence between probans (*hetu*) and probandum (*sādhya*) as well as the absence of the knowledge of deviation are the causes of ascertaining *Vyāpti* or invariable concomitance. In case of doubt of the ascertainment of the invariable rule (*Vyāptigraha-śaṅkāyam*) *Tarka* or *Reductio-ad-absurdum* is the method by applying which the said doubt of deviation between *hetu* and *sādhya* can be removed. Hence the role of *Tarka* in such cases cannot be ignored and its significance should be brought forward.

In the Nyāya system the cognition is accepted of two types: definite cognition and the cognition in the form of doubt. The doubt of deviation may arise in some cases from the doubt of limiting adjunct (*upādhi*), and sometimes from the knowledge of the common attributes (of *hetu* and *sādhya*) like coexistence etc. along with the absence of the knowledge of any specific characteristic features of them. That is, the absence of the knowledge of the specific characteristic feature as well as the knowledge of common attributes (like coexistence etc) give rise to the doubt of deviation. Such doubt can be removed by *Tarka* (*Reductio-ad-absurdum*), which counters the opposite standpoint



(*vīpakṣabādhaka*). The doubt of deviation can be removed through the application of *Tarka*, which is the limit (*avadhi*) of doubt. So *Tarka* along with the perception of the coexistence of *hetu* and *sādhya* and non-perception of the deviation (*vyabhicāra*) of the same would become the cause of ascertaining *Vyāpti*.

It cannot be argued that *Tarka* is not possible without repeated observations. For, a wise can apply *Tarka* with the help of the perception of the coexistence and non-perception of deviation (*vyabhicāra*) of the same in only one instance.

If the above-mentioned view is accepted, there would occur the defect called *Infinite Regress* (*anavasthā*) as *Tarka* is not possible without having the knowledge of *Vyāpti*. It can be explained in the following manner.

The definition of *Tarka* as found in the *Nīlakanṭhāprakaśikā* on *Dīpikā* of *Tarkasaṅgraha* runs as follows: ‘*Ahāryavyāpakavattābhramajanya āhāryavyāpyavattābhramastarkaḥ*’<sup>6</sup>. That is, *Tarka* is an imposed (*ahārya*) erroneous cognition of the existence of a pervader (*vyāpaka*), which is produced, by another imposed erroneous cognition of the existence of a pervaded (*vyāpya*). What is to be understood as *ahāryajñāna* (imposed cognition)? In reply it can be said that the knowledge, which is produced out of one’s desire at the time when there is the contrary knowledge, is known as *ahāryajñāna* or imposed cognition (*virodhijñānakalinecchāprayojyajñānatvam ahāryajñānatvam*). If the knowledge in the form: ‘There is fire in the lake’ (*hrado vahnimān*) is produced out of one’s desire at the time when there is the existence of the contrary knowledge in the form- ‘There is the absence of fire in the lake’ (*hrado vahnyabhāvavān*), it is called an imposed one.

Such *Tarka* is of two types: determinant of the definite valid knowledge (*viśayapariśodhaka*) and remover of the doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśaṅkānivartaka*). The former in the form: ‘If it has no fire, it has no smoke’ (*yadyam vahnimānna syāttadā dhūmavān na syāt*) determines the certainty of the existence of fire in a particular locus (i.e., mountain). Here by the absence of the

*āpādya* or the consequence (i.e., by the absence of the negation of fire) the certainty of the existence of the absence of *āpādaka* (i.e., the absence of the negation of smoke) is ascertained. In such a way, doubt as to the existence of fire on the mountain in this particular case may be removed by applying this type of *Tarka*<sup>7</sup>.

The perception of the coexistence with the help of the methods of agreement and difference is to be understood as the cause and effect relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) between smoke and fire. As this type of *Tarka* is not sufficient for ascertaining *Vyāpti*, the latter type of *Tarka* i.e., *vyabhicāraśaṅkānivartaka tarka* is to be resorted to. In the *Tarka* in the form: ‘If smoke deviated from fire, it would not have been caused by fire’ (*dhūmo yadi vahnivyabhicārī syāt tarhi vahnijanyo na syāt*), the first part is known as *āpādaka* or ground and the second part *āpādya* or consequence. In *āpādaka* there is invariable concomitance determined by *āpādya*.

The form of *Vyāpti* is: ‘where there is deviation of fire, there is the negation of being a product of fire’ (*yatra yatra vahnivyabhicāritvam, tatra tatra vahnijanyatvābhāvaḥ*). In this form of *Vyāpti* the first part is *vyāpya* (pervaded) and the second one *vyāpaka* (pervader). In the same way, it can be said that the *āpādaka*-part is the pervader and the *āpādya*-part is pervaded. So *Vyāpti* or invariable relation is included in *Tarka*. In order to remove doubt about the existence of *Vyāpti* determined by *āpādya* and existing in *āpādaka* in the form: ‘whether *āpādaka* is pervaded by *āpādya* or not’ (*āpādakaḥ āpādyavyapyo na vā*) in this *Vyāpti*, the necessity of applying another *Tarka* will come into being. In this *Tarka* too there is another *Vyāpti*. In order to remove the doubt of the above-mentioned form existing in this *Vyāpti*, another *Tarka* will have to be resorted to and in this way the defect called *Infinite Regress* (*anavasthā*) would crop up.

The above-mentioned view is not tenable. For, the doubt of deviation does not arise in *Vyāpti* of a *Tarka*, for it would involve contradiction (*vyāghāta*) in respect of one’s own activity and hence, the necessity of another *Tarka* does not arise at all. One can

doubt so long as there does not arise any contradiction in respect of one's own practical activity. A man is permitted to bear any doubt about *Vyāpti* between smoke and fire, in so far he does not seek fire in his practical life in order to get smoke. If he has a slightest doubt regarding *Vyāpti* between smoke and fire, he should not seek fire for having smoke. In this way, it can be said that a man takes food to satisfy his hunger and takes recourse to words to make others understand his desires etc. So, one's own activities indicate the absence of doubt in them. Moreover, if we were to doubt, our doubting would be subject of doubt.<sup>8</sup>

*Tarka* is a kind of hypothetical argument. Both the parts of *Tarka* are full of imaginary thought. If smoke were endowed with doubt of deviation of fire, it would not be caused by fire. If the first part is true, the second part would also be true. But it is known through experience that the second part is not true in so far as we do not get any smoke, which is not caused by fire. From the falsity of the second half, the falsity of first half (i.e., smoke is deviated from fire) is determined. In our everyday life also we remove doubt in respect of something after following this method of argumentation. From the knowledge of consequence the idea of an antecedent is revealed. *Tarka*, being a kind of mental construction, is useful for removing doubt and hence *Tarka*, though invalid (in the sense of not being a source of valid cognition) is the promoter of the *Pramāṇas*. This *Tarka* is otherwise known as *āpatti* i.e., the introduction of the undesired through which the desire is established. It is also a kind of indirect method through which the truth is ascertained. If the negation of P is proved as absurd, it would automatically follow that P is true. For these various reasons much importance has been laid on this method in the Navya Nyāya.

In this way, doubt can also be taken as a philosophical method, because only reason can be applicable towards the object which is in doubt, not ascertained and not known (*nānupalabdhe nirṇīte'rthe nyāyaḥ pravarttate, kim tarhi samśayite'rthe*). To determine the nature of reality the role of 'dialogue' ('*samvāda*')

and ‘repeatedly questioning’ (*paripraśna*) bears some educational value.

The Indian logicians are very cautious about the probable vitiation of their arguments by the fallacies of ‘contradiction’ (*bādhita*), ‘unfoundedness’ (*asiddha*), etc and logical defects like ‘circularity’ (*anyonyāśraya*), ‘logical cumbrousness’ (*gaurava*) etc. All these are essential to convince a serious scholar.

Lastly, it can be said that ‘dialogue’ (*samvāda*) between opponents and proponents is a method adopted in education. Without ‘free and fair’ discussion between two parties no philosophical decision is to be arrived at. Educational philosophy started when Naciketā asked his teacher, Yama, about the reality of this world and self in the *Kaṭhōponiṣad*, when a disciple opens a dialogue with his teacher about the movement of our mind and sense-organs in the *Kenōponiṣad*, when Arjuna wanted to know the efficacy of war with the relatives and superior from the Divine Teacher in the *Bhagavadgītā* and when Nāgasena, a disciple of Buddha, opens a dialogue with the King Milinda regarding the unreality of self in the *Milindapraśna*. Hence, dialogue or *samvāda* has been admitted one of the methods of education in Indian tradition.

Professor  
Department of Philosophy  
University of North Bengal  
Darjeeling—73013 (W.B.)  
Email--*raghunbu@yahoo.co.in*

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1. *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.1. and *Nyāyabhāṣya* on the same.
2. *Nyāyasūtra*-1.2.1-3 and also *Nyāyabhāṣya* on the same.
3. Mananam nāma śabdāvadhārite’rthe mānāntaravirodh-  
aśaṅkāyām. tannirākaraṇānukūla-tarkātmaka-jñāna-janako  
mānasa-vyāpāraḥ. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Viśayaparichheda.

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4. Tatra nāmadheya-śabdena padārtha-mātrasyābhidhānam uddeśaḥ.  
*Nyāyabhāṣya*, 1.1.2.
  5. *Nyāya-darśana*, Vol.1, Edited by Phanibhushana Tarkavagisha,  
p.82, WBSBB, 1989.
  6. *Tarkasaṅgraha* with *Dīpikā* with seven commentaries, Ed. By  
Satkari Sarma Bangiya, Chowkhamba, p.235.
  7. *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under verse no 137.
  8. *Ibid*

# IMPOSSIBILITY OF JĪVANMUKTI IN ADVAITA- VEDĀNTA

ARVIND KUMAR RAI

The belief in the attainability of *mukti* (liberation) is one of the fundamental postulates of Indian Philosophy. It is never challenged by any system of thought except *Cāvāka*. *Cāvākas* do condemn it, because they regard this wish to be free from pain as secular. *Mukti*, which implies at least the absolute freedom from pain, is the result of spiritual wish. The distinction between pleasure and pain is the work of secular wish. It treats pleasure as remedy for pain. But for spiritual wish, pleasure in its potentiality is not different from pain.<sup>1</sup> The two are different forms of the same evil (*avidyā*). *Mukti* is something beyond pleasure and pain.

The question arises: Does the attainability of *mukti* always coincide with the disappearance of the body? It is well-known that *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga* and *Advaita Vedānta* agree in answering this question in a negative way. They all accept two kinds of *mukti*, viz, *jīvan-mukti* and *Videha-mukti*. *Jīvan-mukti* is the kind of *mukti* that can be attained even while being embodied. Janaka, the renowned king of Mithilā in the *Upaniṣads*, and *Śrī Kṛṣṇa* are our examples here. Our contention is that the Advaitin can hold the concept of *Jīvan-mukti* only at the expense of giving birth to inconsistency in their system. The concept is very much fitted in a system where *pariṇāmavāda* and independent reality of *prakṛti* do have some place. But system, which reduces *prakṛti* to absolute nought (*māyā*), and modifies *pariṇāmavāda* into *vivartavāda*, has no right to adhere to such an alien view.

From the Advaitic point of view, the fall of body must coincide with the dawn of *Brahman*-knowledge. Advaitins hold that *avidyā* is destroyed by *vidyā*. Body too is a product of *avidyā*. Therefore, it must not persist after the attainment of *Brahman*-knowledge. *Videhamukti* is the only kind of *mukti* that results from holding the Advaitic position.

It is not surprising that a group of Advaitins goes to the extent of regarding *Jīvan-mukti* as simply a figurative concept. Maṇḍana, *Sarvajñātmamuni*, *Prakāśānanda* and *Dharmarāja* do not consider *Jīvan-mukti* as a genuine concept. Maṇḍana regards the description of *sthītaprajña* in the second chapter of the *Gītā* as the description of a highly advanced *sādhaka*<sup>2</sup>. It was contended by S. Kuppuswamy Sastri in his introduction to the *Brahmasiddhi* that Maṇḍana furnishes two conflicting views regarding this point. One view is that the attainment of Braman-knowledge is immediately followed by falling of body (*dehapāta*); and the other view allows the persistence of body due to nescience (*avidyā saṃskāra*) even after the attainment of knowledge. The former of these two views is against the concept of *Jīvan-mukti*, while the latter supports it<sup>3</sup>. But Prof. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, in his introduction to *Bhāmatī*, opposes this view.<sup>4</sup> He contends that Maṇḍana holds only a single view that there is a final liberation only on the dissolution of body. Thus Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* is against the concept of *Jīvan-mukti*. The author of the *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka*, *Sarvṣātmamuni*, is also against the concept of *jīvan-mukti*. He holds that *sadyo-mukti* (immediate liberation) alone is to be considered as genuine *mukti*; the texts which speak of *Jīvan-mukti* are purely eulogistic, intended to hearten the aspirant. Body is a product to nescience, it can not remain when knowledge arises<sup>5</sup>.

But, the majority of Advaitins is in favour of upholding the doctrine of *jīvan-mukti*. There are three types of *Karma*, viz. *sañcita*, *prārabdha* and *kriyamāṇa*. The part that is manifested, started on its course of fruition in this life is called *prārabdha*, the part that is un-manifested is called *sañcita*, and new karma which is being generated in this life is *kriyamāṇa*. After the realization of Brahman, *jīvan-mukta* acquires no new karma as he no longer feels the solicitations of desire. The *sañcita* is burnt off in the fire of knowledge, destroyed in its embryonic stage. It is only the *prārabdha* Karma which forces the body to exist even after the attainment of knowledge. Once the *prārabdha* karma begins to operate, the process must continue due to original momentum, just as the wheel of the potter keeps revolving even after the completed

pot is taken off. Śāṅkara also gives the illustration of a man who sees two moons, owing to some defect in his eye, though he knows very well that the moon is one.

One can ask: How can after the cessation of *avidyā*, the momentum be still there to account for the persistence of the body. It is replied that to the *jīvan-mukta* himself the momentum of his bodily life is nothing in reality. It is positively existent only to others within division. The world, including the bodies of individuals, is but the community of the self-emerging karma-units (emerging through the grace of God), which is the obverse face of the moral law. If the body of *jīvan-mukta* were annihilated for others also there would be violation of this law, which is absurd.<sup>6</sup>

But the question arises: Is the *jīvan-mukta* conscious of *avidyā* or not? If he is not aware of *avidyā*, he cannot be aware of bound souls too. That is to say, he must have arrived at a state when no more souls would appear to him bounded. And this cognition is either a delusion, or valid; in first case there could have been no release, and in second all souls should have been released. Both conclusions clearly are invalid. And if we accept the suggestion of Prof. Bhattacharya, there would be no escape from this dilemma.

It is to avoid this difficulty that some hold that *jīvan-mukti* is not the identification with *Brahman*. The author of the *Siddhānta-leśasaṅgraha* holds that identification with *Brahman* results only when all souls are released. Up to that time, release can consist only in identification with *Īśvara*. The function of the body of *jīvan-mukta* is possible no doubt, due to an intelligent guidance, but the guidance is not by a particular soul. It is by *Īśvara* with whom the released soul has become one. One may ask: “How can *avidyā* which has ceased to be for a released soul exist for *Īśvara*”. The reply is that our conception of *Īśvara* is of a pure being standing over against nescience, not bounded by it. This nescience is in truth neither real nor unreal, being indeterminable. But as we conceive the Lord, he is certainly limited by nescience, though when we become the lord on release, it will not be experienced as a limitation.<sup>7</sup>



But if *mukti* be regarded only as identification with *Īśvara*, real *mukti* (identification with Brahman) will turn out to be only a fiction. That will lead to the conclusion that *Brahma-anubhava* is not a matter of inaction. Not only this, but intuition of Brahman too, which is regarded by Advaitin as self-validating and self-shining, is fallacious. Because it is nothing but delusion of a *mukta* who mistakes the experience of *Īśvara* as the experience of Brahman. For these undesirable consequences, we cannot accept the view that *jīvan-mukti* means identification with *Īśvara*.

*Vedānata Deśika*, a *Viśiṣṭādvaitin* argues that the Advaitin concept of *jīvan-mukti* is not tenable. He asks: what is the meaning of this term? He proposed six alternatives: (1) cessation of the body etc. while embodied (*dehādi-bheda-nivṛttiḥ*), (2) the cessation of the appearance of the body (*pratibhāsa-nivṛttiḥ*), (3) the cessation of the activities depending on the body, (4) the cessation of the merits and demerits accruing from the function of the body etc., (5) the cessation of the pleasure and pain caused by it, or (6) the cessation of something else.<sup>8</sup> Discussing these alternatives to some length *Vedānata Deśika* rightly comes to the conclusion that none of them is tenable.

It is argued by some of the modern interpreters of advaita that release does not depend on embodiment or disembodiment. Dr. Radhakrishnan says, ‘the presence of body makes no difference to the state of release, which is, in essence, the freedom from worldly bounds. The state of release consists not in persistence or annihilation of plurality, but in the incapacity of the pluralistic universe to misguide for the Jīvan-mukta. Obviously the world of plurality including his own body does not perish, only he has the right perspective regarding it. In the state of release the world of plurality does not disappear, but is lit up by another light.’<sup>9</sup>

Dr. Radhakrishnana holds the view that the state of releases merely implies the lapse of worldly values. It has nothing to do with either embodiment or disembodiment. *jīvan-mukti* implies only a change in our way of looking

towards objects. But such a view goes against the concept of *avidyā* in *Advaita*. *Avidyā* is responsible not only for our way of looking towards objects, but also for the objects. Therefore change in our way of looking must bring the annihilation of objects. As Prof. K.C. Bhattacharya remarks, the lapse of value in *advaita* implies the lapse of all given-ness. He says, “The acosmism of Śaṅkara goes beyond both realism and idealism by reducing world to absolute illusion, by interpreting the vanity of life as implying the denial of all given reality”.<sup>10</sup>

So far, we have argued that the conception of *jīvan-mukti* is not consistent with other major doctrines of *advaita*. It remains, however, to show how this concept is very much fitted in the systems like *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*.

It is clear from the above discussion that the concept of *jīvan-mukti* will be genuine only when it merely implies the lapse of worldly values, and not the lapse of all given-ness. As in *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*, where *prakṛti* is as real as *puruṣa*, attainment of *jīvan-mukti*, will not reduce *prakṛti* to absolute nought. Therefore the continuance of body, even after the attainment of *mukti*, does not present any serious problem for *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*. The cause of empirical life is the non-discrimination (*aviveka*) between *Puruṣa* and *buddhi*. According to *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*, only the discrimination (*viveka*) between them is the chief aim of life, and not the annihilation of *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* may very well exist after the attainment of *mukti*. This can be understood by understanding their view regarding the illusion (*khyāti*). When a white crystal is placed by the side of red flower, it appears red. The flower and crystal, both are equally real. We come to mistake the colour of crystal because we overlook the point that the flower is something different from the crystal. The relata are real, only the relation between them is false. Whereas in *Vedānta* one of the relata too comes under the category of falsity. Not only the relation between *Brahman* and world is false, but the world too is false (*tuccha*) from the ultimate stand-point. But in the case of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, the moment we realize that there are two things—flower and

crystal, the error vanishes. Similarly, the right knowledge (*viveka*), which is the cause of *mukti* in *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga*, affects only the relation between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* remains unaffected by it. Therefore, the concept of *jīvan-mukti* is in harmony with the other principles of *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*. We arrive at the conclusion that the advaitin's belief in *jīvan-mukti* is legacy from *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, a legacy which should be renounced, as it has served to confuse adherents and opponents alike. We arrive at the conclusion that the concept of *jīvan-mukti* very much fitted in a system where the lapse of worldly values does not entail the lapse of all givenness, the *Advaita-Vedānta* is not such a system.

Professor  
Department of Philosophy and Religion  
B.H.U., Varanasi

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1. Parināmtāpasamskāraduḥkhaiguṇavṛttivirodhācca duḥkhaveva sarvaṃ vivekinaḥ. *Yoga-sūtra* 2.15.
  2. Sthitaprajñastāvanna vīgalitanikhilāvidyaḥ siddhaḥ, kintu sādḥaka evāvasthāviśeṣaṃ prāptaḥ. *Brahmasiddhi*, by Maṇḍana ed. by S. Kuppaswamy Sastri (Madras Government Oriental Manuscript Series, 1937), p. 39.
  3. Ibid
  4. *Bhāmati : catusūtrī* ed. by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, p.XLII-XLIV.
  5. Jīvanmuktipratyayaśāstrajātaṃ, jīvanmukte kalpate yojanīyam. Tāvanmātreṇārtha-tvopapatteḥ sadyomuktiḥ samyagetasya hetoḥ. *Sāṅkṣepa-Śāriraka*, 4-39.
  6. *Śāṅkara's Bhāṣya on Brahma-Sūtra*, 4.1.15.
  7. *Vācaspati, Bhāmati : Catuṣsūtrī*, ed. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, p. XLVIII.
  8. Kā ceyañjīvanmuktiḥ? Kiṃ jīvata eva dehādibhedanivṛttiḥ, uta pratibhāsasya, atha tadarthānapravṛtteḥ. Yadvā tanmūlapuṇyapāpādeḥ, athavā sukhaduḥkhādeḥ. Yadvā anyasya kasyaciditi. *Śatadūsaē*, Ved 31.
  9. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 584.
  10. K.C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 96.

# ANEKĀNTAVĀDA IN JAINISM AND MODERNITY

MUKUL RAJ MEHTA

Most of the Jaina *Āgamic* literature was composed during c. 5<sup>th</sup> B.C.- 3<sup>rd</sup> A.D., but some of *Āgamic* texts like Nandīsūtra and the present edition of Praśnavyākaraṇa were composed in c. 5<sup>th</sup>- 6<sup>th</sup> A.D. In the most important councils (*Vācanās*), which were held at Mathurā and Vallabhī in c. 4<sup>th</sup>-5<sup>th</sup> A.D. respectively, for editing and rewriting of these *Āgamas*, some new additions and alterations were also made and that is why some of the *Āgamas* contain philosophical information, developed later in c. 4<sup>th</sup>-5<sup>th</sup>, in Jaina philosophy<sup>1</sup>. There is a good deal of philosophical discussion in the *Āgamas*: (i) Sutrakṛtāṅga. (ii) Prajnāpanā, (iii) Bhagavati, (iv) Nandī, (v) Sthānāṅga, (vi) Samavāyāṅga and (vii) Anuyogadvāra. Sutrakṛtāṅga refutes the prevailing philosophical schools of thought. In this work, *Bhutadvaitavāda* and *Brahmadvaitvāda* has been refuted and the doctrine of separate and independent soul and the doctrine of the plurality of souls is established. The doctrine of *Karma* and its effects has been proved. The theistic concept of God has been rejected. It is established that the world (*samsāra*) is beginning less (*anādi*) and endless (*ananta*).

Several other theories of philosophy prevailing at that time, like *Akriyāvada*, *Vinayavāda*, *Ajnānavāda*, were refuted and the validity of *Kriyāvāda* (activism) were propounded. In the Prajnāpanā we get a detailed discussion about the nature of the soul (*Jīva*) from various points of view. In the Rājaprasaniya, after an elaborate refutation of the atheistic thought, there is an exposition of the Atman and the other world with copious illustrations and expositions of different concepts. In the Bhagavati we get a beautiful study of the topics like *Naya*, *Pramāna*, *Saptabhangi*, and *Anekāntavāda*. Nandisutra discusses the nature and types of knowledge. In the Sthānāṅga, there is discussion of the important topics like *Ātman*, *Pudgala* (matter), *Jnāna* and other topics. In the philosophical doctrines of Mahāvīra, there are

references to *Nihnavavāda*, which refers to the single point of approach or view of *ekānta*. *Samavāyāṅga* contains discussions on topics like *Jnāna*, *Naya* and *Pramāna* etc., etc.. The *Anuyogadvāra* has a discussion of the connotation of the term and incidental references to *Pramāna* and *Naya* and other principles. In the commentaries (*Tikās*) of these *Āgamas* we find vivid discussions on philosophical topics. Among the commentators the names of *Sanghadasagani* and *Jinabhadragani* are frequently mentioned. They lived in the 7th century of *Vikrama* era. *Jinabhadragani* has written an important commentary called *Visesāvasyakabhāṣya*. *Sanghadasagani*'s *Brhatkalpabhāṣya* is a classical work, which contains an exposition of the codes of conduct of *Śramana* from the philosophical as well as argumentative points of view.

*Ācārya Haribhadra*, a renowned Sanskrit commentator, has written his commentary in Sanskrit on the basis of the ancient *Cūrnis*. In these commentaries he has made special use of philosophical discussions. In the *Āgama* literature, prominence has been accorded to epistemological and scientific discussions; however the philosophical aspects has not received much attention as in religious literature other than the *Āgamas*. The primary reason for this is that the *Āgama* literature is mainly meant for *sādhakas* (seekers of truth). For the learning of the *sādhakas*, there are frequent repetitions at many places. These *Āgamic* works make special mention of the injunctions regarding the codes of conduct for the *sādhakas*. But in the later literature, importance has been given to discussion of philosophical topics.

*Tattvārthasutra* is the most important work of *Ācārya Umāsvāti*. It is a comprehensive philosophical work, which discusses various subjects including philosophy and science. Here, we find most enlightened discussions of subjects like Philosophy, Ethics, Geography, Cosmology, Natural Philosophy and the *Karma* theory. *Ācārya Umāsvāti* has also written a commentary (*Bhāṣya*) on his *Tattvārthasutra*. In the 6<sup>th</sup> century A.D. *Ācārya Pujyapāda* has written a commentary on *Tattvārthasutra*. It is called *Sarvārthasiddhi*. *Akalanka* and *Vidyānandi* have also written commentaries on this work. *Akalanka*'s *Rājavārtika* and *Vidyānandi*'s *Śloka-vārttika* are important works. These *Ācāryas* belonged to the *Digambara* tradition. In these works, we get very thought provoking discussions of the philosophical topics. In the

Śvetāmbara tradition, Ācārya Siddhasena and Haribhadra have also written commentaries on the Tattvārthasutra. This was in the 8th or 9th century A.D. We find in these works evidence of a distinct development of Jaina logic and philosophy. It would not be an exaggeration to say that just as Dharmakīrti's commentary Pramānavārttika on Dignāga's Pramānsamuccaya became the centre of the development of Buddhist logic, so also the commentaries on Tattvārthasutra became the central base for the development of Jaina logic.

We get important commentaries on Tattvārthasutra in the later period, as for instance, Malayagiri's commentary in the 12th century, A.D., Cirantanamuni's in the 14th century A. D. and the commentary of the great logician Yaśovijayaji in the 18th century A.D. In addition to these, there are several other writers of the *Digambara* tradition who have written commentaries on Tattvārthasutra. We have commentaries of Srutasāgara and Vibuddhasena, Yogindradeva, Yogadeva, Laksmideva and Abhayanki. In the 20th century also we have several commentaries on the Tattvārthasutra in Hindi and Gujarāṭi languages. The Tattvārthasutra nearly marks the end of *Āgamayuga* (age of *Āgamas*)<sup>2</sup>. The *Āgamas* are mainly concerned with the religious code of conduct and moral preaching. Pt. Dalasukha Mālvaniā rightly observes that *Anga Āgama* deals with moral code of conduct (*Caritānuyoga*) rather than metaphysics (*Dravyānuyoga*)<sup>3</sup>.

**Tradition of Anekāntavāda** : Theory of non-absolutism (Anekāntavāda) is the significant contribution of Jaina philosophy. Its first phase begins with the preaching of Mahāvīra in c. 6<sup>th</sup> B.C. and goes up to the compositions of Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra (first half of the c. 4<sup>th</sup> A.D.). It was the period of origination of Anekāntavāda. Basically, the non-violent and tolerant attitude of Mahāvīra helped much in the development of non-absolutistic principle of Anekāntavāda. In Sūtrakṛtāṅga, he clearly says- "one who praises one's own view-point and discards other's view as a false-one and thus, distorts the truth, will remain confined to the cycle of birth and death".

It indicates that Mahāvīra preached the uttermost carefulness regarding one's speech. In his opinion, speech should

be un-assaulting as well as true. He warned his disciple monks against making unwarranted-categorical assertions or negations. He instructed them to make only a conditional statement<sup>4</sup>. It is the Vibhajjavāda from which the theory of non-absolution (Anekāntavāda) emerged. Sūtrakṛtāṅga<sup>5</sup> records various contemporary one-sided doctrines regarding the nature of soul and creation of the universe. Mahāvīra's approach to all these doctrines is non-absolutistic or relative. In every case, whether the problem of eternalism (Śāśvatavāda) and nihilism (Ucchedavāda) about the soul, finiteness and infiniteness of the world, identity and difference of body and soul or monism and pluralism, Mahāvīra's approach was never absolutistic but relativistic. Accordingly in Jainism, Reality (*Sat*) is defined as possessing origination, decay and permanence<sup>6</sup>. This three-fold nature of *Sat* is the foundation of Anekāntavāda. Knowledge about *Sat* will always be partial and relative and our statement about *Sat* must always be relative<sup>7</sup>.

The second phase of the development of Anekāntavāda is with Siddhasena Divākara's Sanmatitarka (c. 4<sup>th</sup>-5<sup>th</sup> A.D.) and goes up to Haribhadra's works such as Saddarśanasamuccaya, Śāstravārtāsamuccaya (c. 8<sup>th</sup> A.D.) etc. This phase has three main characteristics- firstly, apart from the Āgamic Nayas, i.e., Dravyārthika (Substantial) and Paryāyārthika (modal), Nīścaya (real) and Vyavahāra (practical view-point), the doctrine of Seven-fold Nayas, i.e., Naigama (considering both the general and particular properties of the thing), Sangraha (considering general properties of an object), Vyavahāra (considering specific properties of an object), Rjusūtra (confined only to the present mode of an object), Śabda (treating with synonyms), Samabhirūdhā (taking into consideration only etymological meaning of word) and Evambhūta Naya (denoting object in its actual state of performing its natural function) was developed. It is to be noted that in earlier Āgamas such as Ācarāṅga, Sūtrakṛtāṅga, Uttarādhyayana etc., this concept of seven-fold view-point (Nayas) is absent. Only in Anuyogadvārasūtra and Nandīsūtra, the concept of seven-fold view-point is found but these are the works of the c. 2<sup>nd</sup> - 4<sup>th</sup> A.D.. In Samavāyāṅga, it is an interpolation. Secondly, in Tattvārthasūtra (c. 4<sup>th</sup> A.D.) the number of basic viewpoints are five. The Samabhirūdhā and Evambhūta are accepted as sub-types of Śabdanaya. Siddhasena Divākara (c. 4<sup>th</sup>-5<sup>th</sup> A.D.) has accepted six

Nayas in Sanmatitarka, he does not mention Naigama Naya. Mallavādī (c. 5<sup>th</sup>) mentions twelve Nayas in ‘Dvādaśāranayacakra’. These twelve Nayas of Mallavādī are some what different in their names and presentation. Though the author showed the relationship between the traditional seven Nayas and his twelve Nayas<sup>8</sup>. In Tattvārthasūtra it was only eight while in Dhavalātīkā of Śātkhandāgama, its numbers were increased up to eighty. Siddhasena Divākara clearly mentions in Sanmatitarka that number of view-point can be as much as the way of linguistic expressions<sup>9</sup>.

It is in the Bhagavatīsūtra, where for the first time these different ways of expressions (*Bhargas*) are found. In Bhagavatīsūtra<sup>10</sup> while dealing with the concept of hell, heaven and abode of Siddhas, Lord Mahāvīra mentioned only three ways of expression, i.e., affirmation, negation and inexpressibility, but while dealing with the aggregates of the different numbers of atom, he mentioned more than twenty-three ways of expressions. Pt. Dalsukha Mālvanī says that of course we have seven predications or Saptabhangī in Bhagavatīsūtra. In Siddhasena Divākara’s Sanmatitarka, this theory of seven-fold predication is logically presented for the first time. After that in Āptamīmāṃsā of Samantabhadra (c. 5<sup>th</sup>), Sarvārthasiddhi of Pūjyapāda (c. 6<sup>th</sup>), Pañcāstikāya and Pravacanasāra of Kundakunda (c. 6<sup>th</sup> A.D.) and some other later works of this period, the doctrine of seven-fold conditional predication has been discussed in detail. Some of the noteworthy Jaina logicians from Siddhasena to Yaśovijayajī, are Mallavādī, Haribhadra, Akalank, Vīrsen, Vidyānandi, Devasūri, and Hemchandrāchārya. This is the period between 5th to 16th century.

The term *Anekāntavāda* consists of three terms: ‘*Aneka*’, ‘*Anta*’, and ‘*Vāda*’, The term ‘*Aneka*’, means ‘many’, ‘*Anta*’, means ‘aspects’ or ‘attributes’ and ‘*Vāda*’ means ‘ism’ or ‘theory’. In its simple sense, it is a philosophy or a doctrine. It is a theory of many-fold aspects. It has been described and translated by modern scholars variously. In the ‘Jaina Lakṣanāwali’, it means, instead of differences of main and peripheral, Anekānta is the enunciation of mutually different view points, religious differences



of existence and non existence.<sup>11</sup> To quote Dr. Nath Mal Tatiya - "in consistency with this background, a Jain's *Sādhu* (monk) is required to be very cautious about his speech (*Ācārāṅga Sūtra* II.4). He is prohibited against making unwarranted categorical assertions or negations (Ibid, II.4c.) A wise man should not joke, nor should he explain without resort to conditional expressions. (*Sūtrakritāṅga* I.14, 19). He should explain with the help of '*Vibhajj Vāya*', conditional expressions (*Sūtrakritāṅga* I.14.22). Monier Williams gives the meaning of 'Anekānta', not alone, a skeptic; a Jain, an *Arhat* of the Jainas. Prof. S.N. Dāsgupta expresses it as 'relative pluralism' against the 'extreme absolutism'. Dr. Chandradhar Sharma translates it as "doctrine of manyness of reality". Dr. Satkari Mookerjee expresses it as a doctrine of 'non-absolutism'. Closely associated to 'Anekāntavāda' is Syādvāda. Which is also expressed as a theory of 'conditional predication' or "theory of relativity of propositions." Since the doctrine of 'Anekāntavāda' is opposed to absolutism or monism (Ekānta-vāda) we may prefer "doctrine of 'non-absolutism'" to convey the meaning of Anekāntavāda. More important aspect of Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda is, however, the subtlety with which it introduces the practice of *Ahimsā* (non-violence) even in the realm of thought. The moment one begins to consider the angle from which a contrary viewpoint is put forward, one begins to develop tolerance, which is the basic requirement of the practice of '*Ahimsā*'.

Mahāvīraswāmī says - "To deny the co-existence of mutually conflicting viewpoints about a thing would mean to deny the true nature of reality" Anekāntavād is a doctrine of multifacetedness of reality, it is a philosophy or doctrine of non-absolutism, it explains reality metaphysically. Expression of truth is relative or non-absolute, truth is expressed in many ways. One cannot make definite statement about truth or existent, each statement is true in its own limited sense. To understand the nature of existent, one requires the vision of seeing an entity from all directions which is Anekāntavād. Syādvāda is a philosophy or doctrine of relativity. *Syāt-* means certain point of view. The method or language of expressing multifacetedness is called Syādvād.

**Contemporary Relevance :** Some verses from Haribhadra (8th century A.D.) and Hemchandra (12th century A.D.) are the best examples of religious tolerance in Jainism. Haribhadra says : "I bear no bias towards Lord Mahāvīra and no disregard to the Kapila and other saints and thinkers, whatsoever is rational and logical ought to be accepted." Hemchandra says: "I bow to all those who have overcome attachment and hatred, which are the cause of worldly existence, be they Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva or Jina ". Thus Jaina saints have tried all the times to maintain the harmony in different religious faiths and tried to avoid religious conflicts. The basic problems of present society are mental tensions, violence and the conflicts of ideologies and faiths. Jainism has tried to solve these problems of mankind through the three basic tenets of non-attachment (*Aparigraha*), non-violence (*Ahimsā*) and non-absolutism (*Anekānta*). If mankind observes these three principles, peace and harmony can certainly be established in the world<sup>12</sup>.

Application of Anekāntavād is to replace certitude with relativity in thinking and increase tolerance for others view points. It leads to a dynamic philosophy of life, life of friendliness and harmony, partnership and participation, universal love and equality. It brings change in our outlook, thought and action. It is an integral, balanced and effective approach towards egalitarian society. The spirit of Anekānta is very much necessary for the transformation of conflict management of society, specially in the present days, when conflicting ideologies are trying to assert supremacy aggressively. It is evident in all streams including social, political, economical, educational, religious, national and international scenario. Anekānta brings the spirit of intellectual and social tolerance. For the modern society, what is awfully needed is the virtue of tolerance. This virtue of tolerance i.e. regard for others ideologies and faiths has been maintained in Jainism from the very beginning. Mahāvīra mentions in the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, those who praise their own faiths and ideologies and blame those of their opponents and thus distort the truth will remain confined to the cycle of birth and death.' Jaina philosophers have all the time maintained that all the view points are true in respect of what they

have themselves to say, but they are false in so far as they refute totally other's view-points.

Prof. Amartya Sen<sup>13</sup>, in his volume, has provided a perspective which highlights the relevance of the culture of open discussion in confronting public problems. The efficacy of arguments and the practice of dialogue rather than physical force and straightaway imposition of views, unfortunately which has been the general practice, has been highlighted. Prof Sen says, "Plurality is not alien to us in India". It has been supportive of various religious experiences, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, Islam and Christianity. He further writes about India's intellectual pluralism; heterodoxies as different as skepticism and atheism have been co-existing with the mainstream of religious and philosophical schools of thoughts.

Therefore, according to Prof. Sen, an approach which is suited to plurality, should be more fruitful in meeting social problems in India. As far as the concept of pluralism in the Indian genius is concerned, Prof. Sen's analysis appears similar to *Ācārya* Haribhadra's idea of 'Anekānt' who had, perhaps, visualised a grouping of various faiths. 'Anekānt' philosophy has a pluralistic character, and therefore, the same may be a very relevant approach to tackle social conflicts worldwide.

Jaina tradition is marked by the simplicity of its ethics like compassion, tolerance, supportiveness, self-restraint, non violence and abjuring wealth, which can be easily understood by the common man. As for the philosophical part, Jainism contains no mystic factor, but that which is of great social relevance. In Jaina tradition, principles of Sarvodaya, Anekānt and Syādvād were designed for deliverance of the individual and the society from all types of negativities, whether social or economic. The principles of Jainism are conducive to social harmony. Jainism puts no hurdles in any body's route and imposes no gospels.

Here, I would like to refer and quote the speech<sup>14</sup> and thought of Padmashree Dr. Lal Ji Singh, a renowned Scientist, where what he said was the perfect example of the spirit of Anekāntavāda as contemporary relevance even in the modern science-

*"4. Setting up Institute of Translational Research in which, clinicians, basic researchers such as engineers, chemist, physicist,*

*biologists, biochemists, biotechnologists, computer scientists, statisticians, mathematicians and other experts may work together to develop new technologies.”*

This was responded by Dr. Lal Ji Singh during my discussion on some points with him on internet regarding his speech, delivered at a conference. This idea of Setting up Institute of Translational Research in which different minds may work together, keeping in their mind that other minds are also active in the same activity with different points of views, which are also to be taken in consideration while establishing any theory or research or invention. How an interesting and perfect practical example and spirit of Anekāntavāda !

Modernity of Jainism is obvious from the events like, marriages between Hindu and Jaina families can be seen very often now a days, and that is only because there is no cultural rigid ness between these two religions. The difference between Hinduism and Jainism is regarding their philosophical ideas, and philosophical traditions. Common people are concern with day to day religious life rather then philosophical discussions, and day to day life of a Hindu and Jaina is more or less same. This is the reasons why there have been no communal riots and blood sheds between Hindus and Jainas. There are cases of religious conversion in other religions now a days, but there are no such cases of conversion in Jainism, which shows the depth of cordiality in them.

Reasearch Scientist “C”  
Deptt. of Philosophy & Religion  
B.H.U., Varanasi- 221 005  
[mukul\\_maha@rediffmail.com](mailto:mukul_maha@rediffmail.com)

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## THE ANTI-THEISTIC VIEWS OF KUMĀRILA

DEBAMITRA DEY

In this world, a vast section of human race, namely, the theist bears a feeling about the existence of God. Very often, we find that a large section of the mass shows some kind of gestures whenever they come across a temple or a mosque or a church. But from the dawn of human intelligence till date, a particular question is still important: Does God really exist? Is there any proof in this regard? Years after years, philosophers, scholars, preceptors, monks and even atheists have tried to find out the answer. Various schools of Indian Philosophy have also expressed their views in this context. In this paper, an effort is made to present the anti-theistic views of the Mīmāṃsā School.

In our colloquial behaviour, it is seen that most often the words, such as, *deva*, *devatā*, *Īśvara*, are used as the synonyms of 'God' but there lies some difference between the terms '*devatā*' (god) and '*Īśvara*' (God). It can be said that the term *deva* or *devatā* (god) is synonymous with the word 'deity', which means possessor of some special qualities. Even an ordinary person can also attain '*devatva*' by performing some special deeds. In various Upaniṣads it is stated in a clear way that if a person chooses the path of knowledge or wisdom i.e. *jñānamārga*, he can attain *devatva*.<sup>1</sup> It is also mentioned at the same place that it is a temporary state; when the fruit of virtuous act comes to an end, one has to come back to one's previous state.

Normally, *Īśvara* (God) is described as omniscient, omnipresent and possessor of eternal knowledge. In this context, we have to look at the scenario of Indian Philosophy for a particular purpose. It is known to all that Indian Philosophy is divided into two chief divisions, namely the *āstika* and the *nāstika*. The term *āstika* is used to mean a particular school, which accepts the validity of the Veda, and the term *nāstika* is used to mean the opposite.

Among the main schools of Indian philosophy, Cārvāka, Jaina and Buddhist are placed in *nāstika-prasthāna* as they never

accept the validity of the Vedas, whereas the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, Sāṅkhya and Vedānta are referred as the *āstika* ones. But it is noteworthy that some of the *āstika* schools, namely, the Sāṅkhya and the Mīmāṃsā do not accept God's existence. There is no doubt that Sāṅkhya is the one of the oldest systems of Indian Philosophy and some opine that at the early stage it was a materialistic system. Later due to the influence of Yoga, it has become a *Theist prasthāna*. Therefore, it is quite understandable that being a materialist system at an early stage, Sāṅkhya felt no reason for the acceptance of God. Even in its mature state, that standpoint remains the same as earlier. But the Mīmāṃsaka's view is quite amazing in this context. Though in Mīmāṃsā, the existence of *svarga, naraka, karmaphala, paraloka* is recognized and even proved but surprisingly it does not admit the existence of God. The reason is that the Mīmāṃsaka accepts the Veda as '*apauruṣeya*' (impersonal). On the contrary, the Nyāya School has described God as the author of the Vedas. A few scholars of Indian philosophy have opined that at the earlier stage even the Vaiśeṣika School was a non-theist system. But later both old and new commentators have introduced the concept of God into the system and explained some of the sutras in favour of God's existence.<sup>2</sup> But in the *Yuktidīpikā* which is one of the oldest commentaries of Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika school is clearly stated as a non-theist (*nirīśvaravadin*) one.

Not only the *nāstika* schools of Indian philosophy have refuted the existence of God, but some of the *āstika* systems have also travelled the same path. In this regard, we can specially mention Kumārila Bhatta's *Ślokavārtika* wherein Kumārila has refuted God as an entity in the section *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*. Kumārila was the founder of the Bhāṭṭa sect of Mīmāṃsā School and a contemporary with Śaṅkarācārya. In his work, by some excellent arguments, he rejected the existence of God. In the following section, we would like to present some of his opinions in brief.

It is mentioned that the Mīmāṃsā School has refused the existence of God as an entity quite strongly. From an early stage, they have refuted the idea. The founder of the school, Jaimini has expressed the view in his book, i.e., *Jaiminīya Sūtrāgrantha* and later commentators have also followed him in the same way.

Kumārila contradicted the idea of God by saying that it is not possible to be omniscient or to be the knower of everything as the cause of knowledge does not exist. Moreover, according to Mīmāṃsā School, knowledge is a kind of action; therefore, it is not possible to accept the idea of eternal or absolute knowledge and the idea of its possessor is baseless.<sup>3</sup>

Kumārila has refuted the idea of God as the creator of the universe quite in a radical way. It is worth mentioning that sometimes his arguments are almost similar with those of the *nāstika* schools. He has commented that the thesis that God has created this universe is not easy to explain and pacify the objections could be raised. As there was nothing before Him, how it is possible for us to know what condition was there at that time? Alternatively, how did the pattern of the universe come to Him? Kumārila questioned again, if at the time of creation nothing was existent except God, then where He existed at all. What was His actual form?

Was He a mortal one with a body made of five elements, i.e., *pañcabhūta*?<sup>4</sup> Kumārila offers the tentative answers that might were proposed by the theists and finally rejects them. He said that as there was the absence of any kind of substratum at the time of creation, it is not anyway possible to accept that God was existent at that time. Where did He exist? Again, if we accept that at that time God was an incorporeal entity, He would not have been able to produce any kind of effort from the desire of creation. God did not have a body like mortal being as a mortal being's body is a product of the five main elements, i.e. *pañcabhūta* and those elements were not there at that time of creation.<sup>5</sup>

Kumārila again asked if at the beginning of this world there was none other than God then who saw and told others about the creator or the creation. Again, if there is no proof in this context then there is no need to investigate about it anymore. He further commented that as God was without any means at the time of



creation, then it is not natural for Him to have a desire of creation. The opponent can reply that God is omnipotent, His will of creation is enough to do the act, but the Mīmāṃsaka will confront it by saying that as God is not corporeal in form, so no kind of will is ever produced. The opponent might propose an answer to this question that God could produce His own body at that time. Kumārila contradicts it saying that an incorporeal being cannot form his own body and if it is stated that there was a creator who created God then there will arise a state of non-finality (*anavastha*).<sup>6</sup>

According to the view of Kumārila, God cannot be eternal by any means as the effects originated from Him are non-eternal by nature. Kumārila comments in a sarcastic way that the world is full of sorrows, so whoever has created this world cannot be a benefactor by nature or the creator did not create it rationally. Kumārila repeated his opinion and inquired again that if God was without any means at the time of creation, then how did He create this world? The theist can answer that *dharma* and *adharma* were existent and they existed in God at that time. But the Mīmāṃsaka asks again, for what reason those two things, i.e. *dharma* and *adharma*, did exist at that time and who created them? Moreover, it is not possible to create a whole world only with *dharma* and *adharma*. At least some kind of elements is needed. Here an objection may arise that it is seen that a spider can make cobwebs out of nothing. But this objection is refuted by Kumārila by saying that due to the consumption of food, a particular kind of sap is produced which is actually the main ingredient of the cobweb. Here we can see it clearly that Kumārila does not only reject the idea of God as accepted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School but also the idea of Brahman as accepted in *Upaniṣadic* philosophy. Anyway, the abstract of the argument is that only *dharma* and *adharma* are not sufficient for the creation of this world.<sup>7</sup>

In this context, Kumārila discusses another point in a logical way. He raised the question that it is generally observed more often that in case of creation, compassion acts as the cause which happens due to suffering or happiness. As God is not a mortal being, so no kind of suffering is ever experienced by Him and as a consequence of this no kind of compassion also is ever produced in

Him. So without any compassion, how can God initiate any form of creation? Kumāṛila comments quite sarcastically that as God has never experienced sufferings, He could make this world only from contentment. Actually, it is impossible to create something without any kind of sufferings. Kumāṛila makes a statement that if God is omnipotent, so nothing is impossible for Him. However, if it is admitted that without suffering creation is not possible at all, then God's independence as a creator is completely meaningless.<sup>8</sup>

Kumāṛila asks, what is the actual purpose of God behind the creation? Without any purpose, even a foolish person never takes any initiative to do any work. So do we assume that there was either lack of rationality or absence of inclination behind the creation of the world? Some theist scholars have opined that the whole act of creation is a kind of sport.<sup>9</sup> Kumāṛila rejects the idea by saying that any kind of sport or play is performed to attain joy. As God is not a mortal one, so there is no probability of the attainment of joy. Hence, it can be inferred that by His act of creation, only His gratification is expressed. Moreover, according to Kumāṛila the act of creation cannot be done playfully. The act is neither easy nor amusing. Ultimately, the idea about the creation of this world as an act of play by God is rejected.<sup>10</sup>

Apart from these arguments, Kumāṛila has given many more reasons to establish non-existence of God. It is very much amusing to note that being a scholar of an *āstika* system; he has refuted the existence of God quite firmly. In conclusion, he stated finally that at the beginning of this world God's existence was not perceived by anyone, in future also nobody would be able to know Him.<sup>11</sup> Thus there is no need to accept the very existence of God as omnipotent, omniscient and as the creator of this world by an astonishing metaphysical argumentation.

In conclusion, it can be said that the anti-theistic tradition in Indian philosophy is quite ancient by nature. It is found that from a very early Vedic period to the new era of Indian philosophy, the question about God's existence remains as a constant topic of philosophical discussion. It is not unpredictable that the *nāstika* schools have strongly refuted any kind of proof about the existence of God, but the view of *Mīmāṃsaka* is undoubtedly astonishing in

this regard. Kumārila Bhatta has presented some of his excellent arguments to reject the idea of *sarvajña* by the Buddhists. By his act of refutation of *sarvajña*, God's existence is naturally rejected as God cannot be stated as God if He is not a *sarvajña* by Himself. So when Kumārila is directly rejecting the idea of God, he does not discuss again about that property, i.e. *sarvajñatva* of God.

We like to draw the attention to this important question now that what were the social or historical causes behind the rejection of God's existence by the *Mīmāṃsakas*. However, a few *Mīmāṃsakas* the followers of Kumārila and Prabhākara have accepted the existence of God, but actually the *Mīmāṃsakas* are the descendants of the *Yājñikas* who do have faith in the rituals and sacrifices but not in the God. In the *Vedāntasūtras* also this view of Jaimini is referred as *pūrvapakṣa* and it is stated very clearly that the natural objects (such as the sun, fire etc) are emphasized as God due to the imagination of mankind.

To give an answer to the question mentioned in the last paragraph, we can summarily say that due to the epistemological standpoint of not accepting the Vedas as a creation of man, (*apauruṣeya*) the *Mīmāṃsakas* rejected the idea of God. Moreover, it is very hard to answer that if God is full of mercy, then why his creation, the man, suffers from sorrows. If it is replied that man suffers due to his work and the fruit of it, then it is unnecessary to recognize God as an entity. For this reason the *Mīmāṃsakas* denied the existence of God but accepted sacrifices (*yajña*) and the fruits produced from it.

Lastly, we can say that the reasoning of *Mīmāṃsā* School is so much strong in this context that to establish God's existence, Udayanacarya, a profound scholar of Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika school, has to confront them more than once. In his work, i.e. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Udayana showed the objections presented by different schools of Indian Philosophy about existence of God and refuted them one by one. Finally it can be said that though according to the theist schools, God is omnipotent, omniscient and the creator of this world but His existence can only be established

by none other than His own creation, i.e. Man. Through this insignificant work, a tribute is offered to the great stalwarts of Indian philosophy.

Assistant Professor  
Department of Sanskrit  
Bethune College, Kolkata  
Email--deydebamitra@yahoo.co.in

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# LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION

(Cognitive Holistic Understanding)

D.N.TIWARI

What is the content we communicate by language? Is language communicative by nature or is it communicative by some device? Some of Indian and western philosophical theories that approach communication believe that speaker's intention is communicated through verbal noises and hearer understands his intention. Wittgenstein accepts that meaning cannot be language and the fact is not a meaning. Meaning for him is the way the fact is represented and thus it is intention of the speaker that is communicated. Hearer's understanding of speaker's intention according to Wittgenstein is due to agreement in forms of life on which the working of language is based. Forms of life is the frame of reference we learn to work within when trained in the language of our community that is the learning of the rituals and practices of the users with which usage of language is inseparably bound. Is intention communicable through language? Is it sharable? Is the form of life constituted by intention? If it is yes then the question is: is intention identical to ideas or propositions? If it is not, how does it concern with communication? Before responding the aforesaid question I want to make a one line remark on the narrative of frame of life. Form of life that is constituted by the frame of references or propositions is not fixed and not final and thus complete agreement is not possible because it can serve as a set of ideas for explaining certain things but not complete communication because it is not possible to house the propositions and their meanings in a fixed boundary or certain frame of references. I do not find any genuine Wittgensteinian logic for accepting intention and frame of references as identical.

Intention by and large is a psychological entity. It is neither reference nor a thing to be referred to. Wittgenstein does not accept it a form of life that can be communicated and shared. References

can be transmitted and can be heard because of biological fitness but they require to be produced first. Communication is not confined to speaking and hearing; it is awareness accomplished by language and is fit for serving as the cause of responding to that as well. Frames of references are abstracted; they may be the objects of awareness but they themselves are not awareness. Intention being *aśabda* (void of references) is not communicable. It being psychological may affect behavior but may not accomplish communication. It can be said that language conveys only the meanings that may be literal, intended and non-intended but it is impractical to say that in all its uses it conveys only intended meaning. Intended meanings are not possible if the literal meaning which serves as the cognitive ground for them is not accepted beforehand. Language communicates meanings and not the things. Meanings of language and intention in a use are different. Meaning is directly expressed by language and intention is presumed on the basis of meaning that is non-different from the language. It is very difficult to decide the intention involved in the use of language first and then to respond it. Different persons understand the intention of the speaker differently. For example, different listeners understand different meanings of the speaker's addresses 'the sun is set'. A neighbor of ailing great man may understand 'the great man is died, a herd man may take it for 'it is high time to herd the cows in', a student may take it 'it is time to bring the study of books to an end, to a dancer it may mean to get ready for the performance and so on so forth. Overall, the language is not figurative; it is expressive by nature. The expressive meaning of the sentence 'sun is set' is expressed in the mind of all the listeners and that is imposed on different allegiances of the different persons and thus serves as the basis of different intended meanings. To accept intention as communicable phenomena is not only an underestimation of the power of language but also a fallacy of giving psychological phenomena a position of public communication that leads to absurdum. In brief, intention, in fact, is not communicable entity. It is just a psychological guessing of hearer's understanding on the basis of speaker's locution and therefore it may cause unnecessary confusion regarding what is

actually communicated and thus that may prove a hindrance in communication. No intended meaning is possible without the expressive meaning the language expresses because that alone serves as the cognitive ground for different intended meanings of the same sentence.

If meaning is the way the fact is represented, Wittgenstein has no way out except accepting the difficulties as real. He neither accepts meaning as a fact nor denies language as fact. Being a representationist, he cannot accept the non-difference of the representation and the thing it represents. In his case it is intention of the speaker that is communicated and thus there is no escape from subjectivism and arbitrariness in the understanding of communication; that may be a case of underestimation of the power of language.

Here in, I propose to analyze and interpret Cognitive holistic understanding on Language and communication. Indian Grammarian's maxims serve as guide to my present discussion. The theory discussed here in believes that philosophical reflection is not only based on but also is confined to the objects expressed by language in the mind and the language expresses cognitive or intelligible beings only that is itself and its meaning. Cognition ceases to be so if it is isolated from language; it is always infused by language. Language is the guide in the matter of cognition; it is not only means but also the cognitive ground for conversation and communication.

Communication is performed by language. Non-communicability is due to extraneous factors like uses of garbs or tokens with which we do not have proximity with or we lack observation of their uses by elders of our community or by taking intention, which in each case is subjective, which we know by imposing on the meaning of language or by conjecture . Different language speaking communities use different sorts of garbs and it is easy to communicate with the garbs of our proximity that is the language



token used by the community in which one is born and grown up. Communication is not just dispatch and file but accomplishments of cognition through garbs, that is, articulate utterances/noises. How it is responding the speakers and hence sharing of thoughts in between the speakers and listeners is discussed after few paragraphs.

Conversation and communication are not two types of activities because the former, for the purpose of the discussion in the present paper, is informal spoken communication. Both of them involve cognitive activities. A speaker communicates thoughts to the hearer and the later responds through language. How is the knowledge accomplished by articulations? How is sharing possible? Does a reply to these questions come out from the concept of language itself or from other factors? Let us start discussion with the nature of language first. Is language confined to articulations which are mere verbal sounds or noises (dhvaniyān) that are material in nature? Is it restricted to the marks we use by proxy for verbal noises/articulations that is material marks/writings (lipiyān) on a piece of paper or board?

Communication is not limited to marks and sounds we write, read and speak. Pāṇinian grammarians use the term 'vaikharī' for them. They are not arbitrary marks. They are learnt by the observation of their uses by the elders of the community one is born. By convention, practice and habit these learnt noises and written marks used for them occupy the form of life that acts in such a way that their deviated uses flash them grammatically wrong. However, communication is not confined to speaking and hearing of verbal noises (vaikharī) only. It is, in fact, accomplishment of cognition in which there is sharing of thoughts through language (śabda).

In the very beginning of Mahābhāṣya(Paspaśāhnika 1/1), Patañjali has given two different definitions of śabda. An observation of them one by one is very relevant for the present discussion because through them, he intends to explain functions the language performs.

1. He has himself raised the question as to what is the śabda (language) in articulate utterance 'gauḥ'. Is it a thing possessing dewlap, tail, horn, hoof, etc.? He says: no; that is substance. Is it gestures and efforts made by the speaker while uttering gauḥ? He says: no, that is an action. Is it colour-white, etc.? No, that is a quality. Is it common and essential property of different individual cows? No, that is universal. Passing through this dialectical reasoning, he conclusively defines it as "yenocāritena sāsnālāngūlakakudakhuraviṣāṇinām sampratyayo bhāvati sa śabdaḥ". According to this definition, śabda is that which, when manifested by hearing verbal – utterances, reveals cognition of the objects. Objects of cognition are ideas/concepts, that is, intelligible beings which figure in mind by language. They are also existences which with contrast to external existences /physical Being (with capital 'B') are called intelligible being (with small 'b'). Sanskrit term ' upacārasattā' is used for it which is translated in English as secondary beings. Śabda and Artha are only such beings as they only figure by language or are expressed by language.

Śabda is the expresser. According to the definition, it is awareness of the objects for which English terms 'thought' or 'idea' may be used. While using these terms we have to have the idea in the mind that all thoughts, all ideas, all units of language are concepts (sampratyaya). These are intelligible beings and are objects proper of our philosophical reflections, investigations and analysis.

2. Pratīta padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ityucyate", according to this definition, verbal-noises in usual communication are taken by perception and practice as the language (śabda). In the expressions like śabdāṃ kuru (do speak), śabdāṃ mā kuru (do not make a noise), śabdakāri ayam māṇavakaḥ (this child is noisy), etc., used in day-to-day communication, verbal-noises (dhvani) are popularly taken as śabda i.e.; the conveyor of meaning. According to this definition of language (śabda)

verbal-noises, which are conventionally given for a meaning, are only called śabda. Any noise (dhvani) produced by mutual friction of the parts of bodies is not language (śabda). Verbal utterances in this sense are language (śabda) only because they are produced by vocal organs of the speaker when one intends to speak for conveying meaning. In this sense the ringing of bell, thundering, etc. are not language (śabda). Since hearers understand some or the other meaning by them also, it is proper to say that those meanings are not without their signifiers. Knowledge ceases to be so isolated from the language that reveals them thus.

In this regard, it is useful to remark that the word 'uccāritena' used by Mahābhāṣyakāra in the first definition distinguishes the phonetic element and the word 'sampratyayaḥ bhavati' emphasizes the concept or awareness character of language that flashes forth in the speaker before speaking and in the listeners after hearing the utterances spoken by the speaker. The definition given by him clearly points out that the flash is not abstracted universal but is awareness which is simply manifested by occurrences and instances of articulations. The momentary utterances are produced only when there is incentive to speaking of which the cognition is the cause. Being mere tools they cannot cause cognition in the listeners because cognition is not caused but is revealed. Tools, discretely or collectively, cannot cook themselves.

Bhartṛhari has incorporated both of the definitions given by Mahābhāṣyakāra in his conception of śabda. He uses the term sphoṭa for Patanjali's concept- language (sampratyaya) and the term Vaikharī for verbal noises (dhv aniyā). He has used the former in very few verses only and even so when he concerns with specific mention of indivisibility and universality character of it but has used the term śabda often and again. The term sphoṭa does not stand only for given concepts but for their flashing also; it is madhyamā-śabda, thoughts or ideas. The givenness of the concept and its revelation are two different things. A concept is given but cannot be known. It is known only when it flashes forth and that is why it is called sphoṭa. Sphoṭa is indivisible unit of awareness. It is indivisible because there is no possibility of real division in awareness; it is a unit because a

complete sense is satiated by it. The term śabda as used by Bhartṛhari comprises of both the verbal-noises/utterances as the body, more specifically garbs that manifest the concept language and the latter as the soul more specifically thought or concept that, with contrast to transient verbal noises, is the constant content of knowledge. The signifier is a better fitting modern idiom for 'śabda' if the term is taken in the sense of the unit that expresses a complete signified non-differently.

The sphaṭa is manifested by garbs or tokens. It may be manifested by any amount of garb- by a letter, a word or a sentence – token. In some cases, a large number of subordinate –sentences and sentence- tokens fall short in manifesting it. Moreover, its manifestation is not sufficient for conveyance of meaning. Manifested by the tokens of our proximity we learn in a language community or any token we learn by convention, the sphaṭa reveals its own nature from which meaning is revealed. The term śabda includes flashing or sphaṭa and the token through which it is manifested. Tokens comprise of verbal noises, written marks, gesture, sign, symbols and sensory data we acquire by our sensory perception can be grouped under the term 'garb' because they serve as tool in manifesting the sphaṭa. The śabda, in each case, flashes forth from which its meaning is known non-differently. Thus, both of the definitions of Mahābhāṣyakāra are equally essential for understanding the conception of śabda.

In sensory perception senses like eyes, etc., are separated from the external objects like pot, etc, which they perceive by contact. But that is not the case with cognition by language, Śābdikas believe in the active theory of knowledge (Vākyapadīya, 1/55-56). In cognition by language, it reveals own self first from which its meaning is revealed. The expresser (śabda) like senses does not illuminate the objects only but like soul it is awareness of itself and the objects that it illuminates as well and that is why it is defined as the luminosity and the illuminative force, the expresser and the expressed (prakāśaka-prakāśya and grāhaka- grāhya). It is awareness of itself and its meaning which are only objects that figure in by it. Senses do not perceive themselves first before they perceive the external objects

but the language expresses its own nature first from which its meaning is revealed non-differently. The senses are separated from the objects after perceiving and that is why the cognition of the cognition of objects or self awareness of the awareness of the objects always remains a problem for solving which the theorist presumes some other source like mind. Mind is not just a grasping and processing but a flashing faculty. Mind as gasping power may be important issue of psychological studies but its flashes are the object proper for philosophical reflections. Different from sensory perception, the language, in a verbal cognition, is not separated from its objects; being the self awareness of the awareness of objects which are thoughts or ideas, it serves as the sound ground of awareness of thoughts and responding awareness of the communicated content.

In this connection a question is often raised. How is śabda the expresser (vācaka)? This is a question about expressive power (śakti) on the issue of which there is a lot of controversy in Indian theories of language. The controversy can be grouped chiefly into two –first: those who accept that there is power or ‘powers in śabda’ and second: ‘śabda itself is the power’; it is called so because of being power. For the former theorists three independent powers namely literal (abhidhā), suggestive (lakṣaṇā) and implicative (vyanjanā) inhere in śabda . Indian Rhetoric and Naiyāyikas accept all of the three powers in language because of which it conveys three different types of meanings- Abhidheyārtha, lakṣyārtha and vyangyārtha. Mimansakas accept only first two of the powers. Māhima Bhaṭṭa, a Mimansaka in his vyaktiviveka, is seen in favor of accepting expressive power only and argues for inclusion of lakṣaṇā under the category of inference. Nyāya theory of language accepts śakti in the word because of which a word (vācaka) denotes a vācya (meaning). Śakti for them is desire of God in some cases and of men in other cases. Desire is desire and is always subjective. If it is said that it is objective because of the reason that it is created by God then there is every reason to deny that position. A śabda is called so because of it being the power. Naiyayikas do not accept śakti in sentences. Sentential -meaning is outcome of the association of word-meanings (sansarga maryādā) as resurrected in memory (smṛti). They donot accept memory as means of valid knowledge. In such a situation the knowledge by Vedic

statements will be memory and hence not evidential and thus it will not serve as *pramāṇa*. A word has a *śakti* and therefore it must be the unit of communication. Whether communication is accomplished by a word or by a sentence is an issue that Nyaiyayikas require to answer in consonance with their view of word as *śakti*. If *śakti* is there with word then either the theorists have to deny sentential meaning or have to accept it figurative. In both of the cases the sentences cannot be *pramāṇa*. Moreover, meaning, in their theory, is psychological and subjective element on the basis of which communication that is public sharing is not possible.

The system of language and grammar do not accept power (*śakti*) or powers in *śabda*. They admit *śabda* is *śakti* because it is expressive by nature. It is expresser (*vācaka*) because it expresses its own self and its meaning (*vācya*). It is called *śabda* because of being power. The language reveals all meanings- primary, secondary and implicative. The primary meaning is the popular one for which the language is considered naturally fit. Being popular, primary meaning is known first to the audience and if that is not conducive to a use, it is imposed by some similarity on secondary or intended meaning. If the two are not conducive to a use the non-intended meaning is known by the closeness or proximity of the primary meaning.

Meaning in all cases is always the meaning of language; *Śabda* is *śakti*; it expresses all meanings out of which the popular one is taken primary that serves as the ground for intended and non-intended meanings. In brief, all meanings are revealed directly by language. Here we find a concept of three levels of convention because of which language conveys three types of meanings.

Language is autonomous; it expresses not only itself but its meaning independently without dependency on any exterior subject or object. Cognition is accomplished by language independently of things-in-themselves and our sense-experiences to them. It reveals without any commitment to physiological, psychological and metaphysical entities and our allegiances to them. Here, I do not talk about the ontological commitment of language but I want to make a one line remark that ontological commitment theory is an outcome of our infatuation with two misguiding ideas that are i. Thought is

separate and independent from language and that ii. Language is confined to tools of representing or referring things that is thing-in-themselves. Contrary to it, the cognitive holistic philosophy of language considers that śabda is not produced but revealed and what is produced is verbal noise, the garb of the former.

Meaning is not a thing-in-itself or an experience isolated from language. Meaning as Wittgenstein thinks is not a way the fact is represented but is intelligible being non-different from śabda; language and meaning are only intelligible beings. Language reveals independently of any external –empirical or transcendental, metaphysical or psychological entity.

Conversation and communication involve a speaker and audience. But their simple presence is not sufficient; communication is accomplished through articulate utterances that the speaker speaks and the audience listens to. Verbal noises for which Pāṇinian grammarians use the term vaikharī is very like Wittgenstein forms of life framed by observation of spoken and written garbs used by the elders of the community in which one is born and learn to work within when trained in the language of our community that is the learning of the rituals and practices of the users with which usage of language is inseparably bound. No conversation, no communication is possible without the garbs the former transmits and the latter receives. Not only conveying and receiving occurrences but the accomplishment of cognition is also necessary for any response to the problem of conversation and communication between a speaker and a hearer. It can be asked as to what is the need for which a philosophy accepts the flashing of concept-language (sphoṭa).

Since a response to this question is very important for throwing light on the issue of conversation and communication, I am taking up the question for discussion first from the position of a speaker:

I have pointed out earlier that conversation and communication cannot take place without verbal noises. Producing of verbal noises for those cognitive activities requires incentive to speak. What does serve as the cause of incentive to speak? There is no possibility of their producing if the flashing or sphoṭa as the cause of incentive to speak is not revealed. For a clear understanding of the process of

producing articulate utterances let us observe the verse from Pāṇiniśikṣā 6/7 accepted by almost all masters of Pāṇinian tradition of philosophy of language. According to it, prior to speaking, expectancy (vivakṣā) to speak is caused in a speaker and that is caused because of flashing or revelation of sphoṭa before hand. This flashing causes incentive to speak. Because of expectancy, the mind (mana) associated with intellect (buddhi) stimulates digestive fire (jaṭharāgni). This stimulation stirs up the vital air (prāṇavāyu) and touching with stations of different letters (varṇasthāna) in the head moves fast upward from the navel to head. Knocked from the top of the skull, the air stirs down fast through the throat vibrating speech centers from which it is externalized in the form of verbal noises to be distinguished as dental, palatal, etc. Since we are accustomed and habitual in the art of speaking we do not mind the subtleties involved in the emergence of verbal noises. Verbal noises are material in nature; they cannot produce themselves. In brief, no verbal sound can be produced or there is no possibility of speaking if the sphoṭa, the flash of understanding that causes incentive for speaking is denied. Sphoṭa is accepted as the cause of incentive to the production of articulations.

From the position of audience, it needs mention that conversation and communication are not confined to speaking and listening of verbal noises; it is accomplishment of cognition (sampratyaya) by language. Verbal noises produced by the speaker when grasped by the audience manifest the sphoṭa. Listening is not sufficient for cognition. Cognition is not abstraction out of the utterances which are only vehicles helping manifestation. Manifested sphoṭa reveals its own self from which its meaning is revealed non-differently. The sphoṭa, in some cases, as I have pointed out earlier, is revealed even by uttering a single letter (ekopyavarṇaḥ vākyārthasya pratyāyakaḥ (Vākyapadīya.2/40), by a single word (vākyam tadapi manyante yatpadam caritakriyam (Vākyapadīya.2/225), by a sentential garb, by a gesture, by perception, and in some cases it may not be revealed even by hearing a large number of subordinate sentences and sentential garbs. Thus, the question of its long or short is useless. It is a flash of awareness having no length, breadth, no



parts, and no division but in all cases, the cognition is revelation of sphaṭa or flashing of consciousness.

Analysis of involvement of speaker and audience as discussed above can be put in brief respectively as follows-

Activities from speaker's side-

- i. The consciousness flashes forth as idea (sphaṭa) in the mind of the speaker and that serves as the cause of expectancy to speak.
- ii. Sphaṭa causes incentive to speak or to produce verbal noises for communicating.
- iii. Because of incentive the digestive fire (jatharāgni) is stimulated from which air stirs up.
- iv. By effort (yatna-from navel to throat) and specific effort(prayatna- from throat to skull up and down ) the air stirred up so comes out vibrating vocal organs -leaps, teeth, nose, throat, palates, etc, from the mouth as verbal noises/utterances that is called production of articulations.

From audience side-

- i. Rotating vibrations of the utterances of the speaker spread out in the space.
- ii. They toss about the space in the ears of the listeners in the sequence the speaker produces them. This is called hearing.
- iii. Hearing of the sequences gradually manifests the sphaṭa of the listeners.
- iv. Manifested by the sequence the sphaṭa flashes forth its own nature from which its meaning is expressed non-different.

The analysis presented above very clearly presents the idea of production and diffusion of verbal noises but that is not sufficient for explaining conversation and communication in which there is a sharing of thought. Sharing of thoughts concerns with conception of infusion of language and thought and ubiquity of thought as well. Let us start with the infusion of language and thought first.

It is worth noticing that even the idealists of the East and the West are very close to the realists and pluralists on the relation of

language and thought. They accept that language and thought are substantially different. There is no possibility of non-difference of reference and referent or representation and the thing represented. Analysis and translation of one is not acceptable to them as that of the other because the other is always transcendental or separate from the former. But as we have observed earlier, it is due to their infusion that any study of language by languages becomes not only possible but also interesting and philosophical. If we deny the infusion thesis we cannot find a cognitive ground for explaining any conversation and communication which, in fact, are accomplishment of cognition to both, the speaker and the audience. Most of the philosophers of language accept verbal noises/articulations as vehicles. Of what are they vehicles? They are vehicles of thoughts. Hearing of them manifests the thoughts transmitted to the audience. Manifested by them the thoughts of language first and then its meaning are revealed to the audience. Sharing between the speaker and audience becomes possible because of ubiquity of *sphoṭa* that is flashing of concepts or thought.

Systems of Indian philosophy except *Vyākaraṇa* assume language as representation or reference of which there are entities they represent or refer in empirical world or world of experience. Language, if defined as references or as marks/designations (written or verbal) standing by proxy for the things, is not self – operative. It requires a cognitive base for its own acceptance and for cognitive-operations made through them. Material entities vary from community to community and even, from person to person in the same language community. It is a trivial way of taking language as confined to speaking and hearing or to writing tokens and reading them only and thinking signified as that which is referred to or is represented by those tokens/marks. The philosophy discussed here in accepts *śabda* as unit awareness by nature for the revelation of which *garbs* serve as tool.

The infusion of language and thought is the basic maxim of holistic philosophy of language (the issue is discussed with great

clarity in the paper 'Cognition, being and Possibility of Expressions, JICPR, vol. xiv, no.1, pp.65-73, 1996'. Their infusion does not mean that the two are different entities which are identified casually. It simply means that language is thought and the thought is the language; it is awareness. The thought is sharable and not the fleeting physical sounds that are tool helping only in the manifestation of the former. It is because of language being thought that reading, writing, speaking are taken as cognitive activities. It is on the basis of non-difference of language and thought that analysis of language by language is possible and the translation of thought from one garb to different garbs is feasible. If meaning or thought is different from language or if it is transcendental signified, transcendental from language and reality then no cognitive activity will be possible. Cognition ceases to be so isolated from language.

Knowledge means determinate knowledge and this determination without infusion of thought and language is unthinkable. Meaning is known even by the uses like hare's horn, barren's son and sky-flower. Can one think of even 'indeterminate thought' isolated from language 'indeterminate'? 'Indeterminate' is also known thus because language determinates it so.

In earlier paragraphs I have discussed about production of articulate utterances and its cause. Now, I take up the question of their transmission to audience. How does this transfer act on for reception and cognition through it? In this regard, we have to observe another passage from Mahābhāṣya that reads 'śrotopalabdhirbuddhinirgrāhyaḥ prayogenābhijvalitaḥ ākāśadeśaḥ śabdaḥ - Paspāhnikā- 1/2'. According to this passage, śabda is sky pervading. Articulate utterances are vibrations of air through the vocal centers and these vibrations when spoken twirling around through the space pervaded by air toss about the auditory organs of the audiences. They are receptive to auditory sense and then gradually manifest the sphoṭa. Manifested by the garbs heard in the sequence produced by the speaker, the sphoṭa reveals itself to the audience. Since sphoṭa is awareness by nature, its ubiquity is the ubiquity of consciousness of the Beings to which it can flash. Ubiquity means givenness of consciousness to all human beings

because of which they are naturally fit for determinate flashes. To animals and insects it acts on as their specific instincts because of which they perform their animal activities and to others because of which they act on for responding changes, adaption and reproduction.

The idea of articulated utterances as sky pervading throws sufficient light on the fact as to how they are heard by the audience even spoken from a distant place. The modern scientific inventions have proved that sounds, being vibrations, can be transmitted from distant place through good conductors like air, wires made of copper, etc. and can be received and even be preserved. The observation of Mahābhāṣyakāra emphasizes two matters of fact. First, verbal noises are not quality of sky or atom but quality of language (sphoṭa) that produces them. Learning the art of speaking by observing tones, notes, gestures of the mouth, diction, illocutionary and locutionary functions involved in articulating by elders of the community cultivate fittingness of the speaker and the audience because of which they respond in the way they learn. Verbal utterances are tools in sharing but they themselves are particular and momentary and hence not sharable phenomena. They cannot be accepted sharable because of the reason that there is involvement of bodily efforts (yatna) and specific efforts (prayatna) in their articulation and similar system of the responding audience. Sharing is a cognitive activity of which one is aware of while communicating. How is this sharing possible? I have pointed out earlier that sharing is possible because of two factors first- ubiquity of the sphoṭa and second- its manifestation through the transmittable verbal noises. Generally, one thinks that similar biological system given to the speakers and listeners and their cultivation by convention are the factors that count for communication. The question arises: how does it concern with sharing of thoughts which are not biological entity? It is ubiquity of sphoṭa that serves as the cognitive ground of sharability of thoughts. It is flashing in the speaker that causes incentive to speak and the verbal sounds are produced. Hearing of them manifest the

sphoṭa in audiences who understand speaker's content communicated through utterances and thus a sharing, responding and communicating as cognitive activities become possible. Sharing implies responding and that is the proof in ensuring that communication is successfully taking place. If we deny ubiquity, productivity, awareness and self awareness of sphoṭa in a cognitive activity like communication, there would be no cognitive ground for sharing and thus there will be impossibility of communication.

How can the fact that from speaker's exposure to a finite stock of more or less grammatically well formed utterances the listeners/learners can produce and understand a potentially infinite number of unfamiliar utterances? In response to the question Chomsky, in Kantian pattern, pleads for faculty of innate rules behind linguistic performance. We are genetically endowed with a language faculty that maps exposure to linguistic input in a specific language into generation of a grammar for that language in the individual that accounts for the above phenomena.

Language faculty as Chomsky thinks is internal, innate and genetically inherited form of language. It is not dictated by linguistic experience. A child is born with a perfectly programmed knowledge of universal grammar which he applies in learning language. The mentally represented grammar is called transformational generative grammar and it is through it that innumerable sentences which has not been encountered before can be generated. Since it is creative aspect of language as the internal grammar and that accounts for directing and determining performance system because of which we understand a potentially infinite number of unfamiliar utterances from a finite stock of more or less grammatically well formed utterances of the learner, Wittgensteinians criticize Chomsky's view by saying that linguistic understanding is competence or ability and relation between it and its performance or exercise is not causal. Their further remark is that to say that linguistic understanding, the mastery of syntactic structure is to accept that meaning is embedded in mental process. The social character of meaning is sacrificed for the autonomy of the rules associated with it.

Chomsky is a linguist who in order to explain the problems of communication by exposure of utterances accepts part of brain endowed with rules and calls it an innate grammar faculty. Had he been a philosopher of language he might have thought of reflecting on and analyzing the cognition and not on psychic analysis of brain on the pattern of a Freudian psycho-analyst for explaining the problems of language. Philosophically interesting and fresh conclusion may come out if the problem is approached as it flashes. Communication is not a mechanism but cognition by expression. It is not performed only by spoken language to which Chomsky's attempt is confined. It may be performed by gestures, symbols and signs also. It may be analyzed at different levels of cognition, objects of cognition and on the basis of different functions like locutionary, illocutionary and parlocutionary performed by the language as we find in J. L. Austin's analysis. Again some other analyst of brain may differ from both of the theorists and can adopt a different view point.

The theory discussed here in accepts that cognition, communication and philosophical reflections are not only based on but is confined to the beings the language expresses. Language expresses only the intelligible beings that figure by language in the mind.

Sentential-meaning is interpreted in the analytic scheme as the association of word-meanings. The theory accepts universal as the meaning of words by which communication cannot be accomplished. In case of its accomplishment of meaning by a word or even by a letter only we accept the implication of kinds of actions denoted by verbs categorized remotely into six- gets birth, exists, grows, alters, increases and decreases. Accordingly at least six types of qualified meanings apart from the popular or primary meaning are known by a nominative word. The other logic of knowing a host of unfamiliar sentences from few spoken utterances is that the words, and so are their meanings, are universal. Universal is that in which not only universals but

individuals inhere. Universal revealed in the listeners by the speaker's few articulations is the cause of identical cognition by several sentences and their meanings. Out of the two-the universal and the individual the former is directly revealed and that which is revealed is imposed by similarity, proximity or by imposition on individuals which are known by imposition, implication or by inference as the ontic substratum of the former. Several universals, individual, action, substantives, etc., inhere in the cognition revealed in the mind and because of that not only knowing but sharing and responding become possible in a communication. Communication is accomplished not by isolated words but by sentences because they express a complete sense exhausting further expectancy if any in the cognition of a qualified meaning and by the imposition *of which several intended and non-intended sentential –meanings of our allegiances are also cognized* consequently.

Autonomy of the language gets a proper place in theory discussed here in because of accepting language as an expresser which when manifested by the tools expresses itself, its own nature first and its meaning is expressed non- differently by it. It expresses all sorts of intelligible –beings independently of existences outside. Language is competence in the sense that it is expresser and it expresses its own nature and its meaning as well. It is of awareness nature and is naturally fit to express all its meanings categorized grossly into primary, intended and non-intended.

Chomsky approaches understanding through utterances and when he does not find a cause for explaining creativity of language on the basis of transient individual utterances he assumes the role of genetic rules. In lieu of talking of competence and autonomy of language he talks about competence and autonomy of faculty of Grammar or innate rules. The creativity he talks is not the creativity of language but of mind. This primacy of mind has no get rid of subjectivism on one and leads to an underestimation of the competence and autonomy of language on the other hand. Innate rules cannot mutate to the ruling subject which unlike

Chomsky is not a generic code or programming of the brain. Moreover, on the basis of Chomsky's grammar, a ghost in brain, the communication if it is confined only to speaker's transfer of utterances and hearing, transforming and creating by the mind of audience can be explained but if communication is taken as accomplishment of cognition then the cognition of the object of cognition and self-awareness of them will not be explained. Innate rules can produce objects of knowledge but they cannot be the object in and of knowledge. Knowledge is the knowledge of an object of knowledge and self-awareness as well. Chomskian grammar is not clear on the issue of self-awareness.

The theory discussed herein considers language itself as potency; it is logically and naturally competent to flash out itself and meanings when there is expectancy; it is creative by itself and thus its creativity is autonomous. All units of language –letters, word, suffixes, and prefixes sentences are universal and the meaning these units express non-differently are also universal. The universal when manifested by utterances reveals its own nature from which its meaning is revealed non-differently. A number of individuals inhere in a universal and even universals also inhere in a universal. These infinite numbers of individuals and universals inhering in the universal which is revealed when manifested by the finite number of utterances spoken by the speaker and heard by the listeners flash and thus make his response to the former possible.

Sharing includes producing and transmitting the articulations, knowing and responding flashes which consequently serve as the proof in successful accomplishment of communication. Any proper interpretation of these cognitive activities in between the speakers and hearers is not possible if the ubiquity of sphoṭa, the flashing as object of knowing, reflecting and their awareness, are denied. The sphoṭa is the flashing of consciousness and the flashing is the cause of incentive to speak and hence of producing the verbal noises in the speakers and the responders. This flashing without being exhausting in any of it is



new in each of the occurrences and the instances; it serves as the object of knowing and of responding to cognitive activities. Since sphoṭa is expresser of objects, awareness of them and their self-awareness as well, there is possibility of knowing and responding promptly on the speaker's dispatches.

Professor and Head  
Department of Philosophy and Religion  
B.H.U., Varanasi  
Dntphil@rediffmail.com

# A PEEP INTO THE SECRETS OF INTRAVENOUS EXISTENCE

(*Bauddhārtha*)

MADHU KAPOOR

Let me begin with a passage from A Mad Tea Party (Alice in Wonderland).

Said the Hatter, “why you might just as well say that ‘I see what I eat’ is the same things as “I eat what I see”! You might just as well say, “added the March Hare, “that I like what I get” is the same thing as “ I get what I like” ! You might just as well say, added the Dormouse, who seemed to be talking in his sleep ‘that, I breath when I sleep’ is the same thing as ‘I sleep when I breath”!

How do we understand the distinction between the pair of sentences like:

I see what I eat=I eat what I see.

I like what I get= I get what I like.

I breath while I sleep = I sleep while I breath.

One can very well understand that the pair of sentences is not same; they generate different type of verbal cognition. They have the same set of words but their arrangements are different, hence they produce different levels of verbal cognition.

*Kumārila Mīmāṃsaka* remarked, “Words or speech can generate cognition in spite of entities being totally non-existent”.<sup>1</sup> In *Yoga Darśana*, it is called *vikalpavṛtti*; so to say, it is that which is devoid of any corresponding entity in the outside world yet the meaning is comprehended by the words uttered, (*Vastuśunya śabdānupāti jñāna*). Words when uttered compel to convey the meaning to the language speakers. *Patañjali*, the great Grammarian, defines the word as that ‘on the utterance of which an understanding occurs’.<sup>2</sup>

Understanding the meaning of a word is a kind of comprehension what has been uttered but that does not guarantee the truth of the statement. That is to say, I fully understand the

utterance what has been said but I do not subscribe to the truth of the view. B.K. Matilal calls it 'commitment free understanding' where I do not bear the responsibility of what has been said. In common conversation we say, "I understand your point but I do not subscribe to your view". I have given these examples in order to connect myself with the theme of the paper. In this paper, I will discuss the words that have no corresponding entity in the outside world. Let us take another example, when I say, "I am in pain", the doctor replies 'yes, I understand' and immediately goes for certain medical tests and prescribes medicine. But unfortunately he cannot share my pain. So there is a distinction between 'understanding the pain' (*bodha/sampratyaya*) and 'having the pain' (*upalabdhi*). The case may be such that 'understanding' is completely cut off from the 'having' aspect. Although in Indian tradition *bodha*, *sampratyaya* and *upalabdhi* are used synonymously yet today in an informative age we collect lot of facts but that does not generate wisdom, which we call *upalabdhi*.

One more example allows us to understand the gap between the understanding, that is, 'merely apprehending the information' and the action that follows accordingly, that is, showing my skill of performance. One may say 'he knows how to cook a particular item but when he was asked to perform he failed to do so. The gap between the 'knowing how to cook' and 'the skill of cooking' is clearly understandable in performing arts where one has to show one's ability in that particular art. Now one can say here that speech is also a kind of act so one can show one's ability in the field of verbal speech. This line of demarcation between the understanding and action becomes very thin. Mere knowledge is not enough to impart the skill. It requires practice and effort to perform that art. What I would like to emphasize is this that the age old triangle of thinking, feeling and willing can function separately and also collectively as well. There are several examples from our daily life, that show that there may not be any integration among the three faculties, such as 'I know but I do not feel like doing it' or 'I did it but I do not know how I did it' or 'I

feel like doing it but I do not know how should I do it' etc. The ideal situation, where all three are incorporated, is difficult to think of. The lacuna remains.

In this paper while discussing the problem, I will take up three lines of thought – one that establishes the existence of the so called unreal objects and the other which will take into account the nature of existence or *sattā / asti* from the Grammarians' point of view, specially of Patañjali, Bhartṛhari and Nāgeśa. And the third one will be a brief account for the mutual relationship of word-meanings ultimately culminates in sentence-meaning. How the uttered-sentence generates a meaning- is a very important issue for a so-called incompatible sentence like '*śaśaśraṅga*' which generates a meaning, the hearer understands.

I will discuss first the so-called 'unreal words' that have no corresponding entity outside, for examples words like 'hare's horn' (*śaśaśraṅga*), 'barren woman's son' (*bandhyāputra*) and 'round square' etc. We may also talk about the fairy tales and other fictional works where words roam around us and now and then challenge our capacity to understand the meaning of the expression.

## I

We have started with the proposition 'what is real and what is unreal' in case of words like 'hare's horn etc. If we mean by 'real' that which corresponds to the outside world, then a large amount of written words in the form of literature will be denied the entry into the purview of reality. It is a popular assumption that whenever we employ a word it refers to external object which can be regarded as the meaning of the word. But that is not always the case because there are vast collection of words which does not refer to, or show anything in the external world, yet we understand the meaning of the word uttered. Thus if we mean by 'real' that by which we 'understand something', then definitely the whole discarded literature as non sense (*alīka*) will come back in our fold with full dignity.

*Eṣa bandhyāsuto yāti khapuṣpa kṛtaśekharah/*

*Kūrmakṣīracāye snātaḥ śaśaśṛṅgaadhanudharaḥ||*

(Here the barren woman's son is going wearing a crown made of sky-flower, who has bathed in a pool of tortoise milk and carries a bow built of hare's horn.)

Why should one find this statement amusing if one does not understand the meaning? A referent in the external world is not required to understand the meaning of the above words. Thus meaning seems to be independent of external existence, that is, whether the either kinds of meanings exist or only external meaning exists. If like the *Vaiyākaraṇas*, we accept that existence is conceived in both the cases then there will be no gap between the so-called real and the so-called unreal entity. Just as a distinction is made between the pure words (*sādhu śabda*) and corrupt words (*asādhu śabda*) on the basis of certain grammatical index, but once the thin line of demarcation is broken there will not be any drawn-line between the two. The only criteria remains are to make hearer understands ones stand point. We do not like to enter into that arena right now. But we are now in great trouble once again. So we begin with the query: 'how do we understand the meaning of the sentence uttered to me? The first thing is: after hearing the sentence we gradually understand the meaning of the isolated words and by combining the meaning of the isolated words together we understand the meaning of the whole sentence. This is the simplest way to exemplify our position. But the undenyng fact is this that the meaning of a sentence is something more than the mere sum-total of the meaning of the words (*vilakṣaṇa bodha*). Words may have different meanings when they are individually apprehended but the moment they are united together in the form of a sentence, we have a unitary sense which is distinct from the meaning of the isolated words. This is particularly noticed by *Jagadīśa*, a *Navya Naiyāyika*. He said: the kind of sense derived from the various words combined together as a whole is called *vākyārtha*. It is not a mere collection of words that goes to constitute a sentence but the words composing a sentence should be such as words related to one another by mutual

expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*,) semantical compatibility (*yogyatā*) and proximity (*āsatti*) etc combined in order to convey the intended sense.

According to the *Mīmāṃsakas*, a sentence is a combination of words in which much stress is laid on oneness of sense. It implies that a sentence in its syntactical form gives rise to one single idea though on analysis it is found to be made up of words that are mutually expectant.<sup>3</sup> Or again it may be noticed here that, 'Arthaikatvādekam vākyam sākāṅkṣāñced vibhāge syāt'.

Thus, we can say following the path shown by Bhartṛhari that some additional significance, distinct from its parts, or, something more than a mere totality of them is required there in a sentence-meaning.<sup>4</sup>

Each of the co-related words in the example 'gaurasti', namely 'gauḥ' and 'asti; signifies its own meaning (a cow-an individual and existence) by the force of convention. When these meanings are found consistently co-related, i.e. when existence as an attribute is predicated of the cow, a distinct cognition (*vilakṣaṇa bodha*) as that of 'a cow having existence' is obtained from the association of meanings 'asti tāvad gauriti'. The cognition is called *śābdabodha* because it is derived from words, and also called *anvayabodha* as it actually and immediately follows from the correlation of meanings.

The process of *śābdabodha* requires that both the speaker and the hearer must be of the same linguistic community. When the speaker utters a sentence, the hearer must recollect the meanings of the individual words which are aroused because of the specific relationship between the word and the word-meaning. For example, the word 'pot' reminds the object pot to the hearer and not any other object. When all the relevant meanings are reminded because of their relationship with the words, then the total meaning of the sentence takes place. The relationship between the word and its object is determined by convention and that depends on the will of the God or the will of the human being as well as claimed by the *Naiyāyikas*. But the Grammarians call it a natural relationship

which is shown by the convention only. For example, even though there is a natural relationship between the mother and her child, still, unless it is shown that ‘she is the mother’ and ‘she is the child,’ nobody can realize the relationship.<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, the word ‘cow’ does not stand for horse because the relationship between the two is obtained naturally.<sup>6</sup> The natural capacity of the word to convey meaning is compared to the natural capacity of the visual sense organ. Just as the eyes have the natural capacity to perceive an object so is the natural capacity of the words to convey the meaning. The only difference is this that mere presence of visual sense organ (*satsvarūpa*) ensures the perception of an object whereas words convey their meanings only after being known (*jñāpaka*).<sup>7</sup>

This short description is very much essential to show that if the meaning of a word is natural it cannot be regarded as unreal as in case of śaśaśṛṅga. It must convey something. What is the meaning of a word? To some it is external entity, we can point out, “look it is there” The ‘pot’ refers to pot in the external world. Sometimes the meaning of the word refers to itself, for which Pāṇini-Sūtra says ‘svaṃ rupaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā (PS 1.1.68). The word ‘agni’ refers to itself and not to the burning fire substance.<sup>8</sup>

Thus even if the word śaśaśṛṅga does not have any corresponding entity; it refers to itself on the one hand and also to internal entity on the other hand. Thus it is not deprived of its real status. So we can say that the word ‘cow’ refers to the word ‘cow’ as shown by the alphabets c-o-w and it also shows the cow-animal in the external world as well as it refers to a cow within our mind (*bauddhārtha*).

*Nageśa* points out that it is difficult for the referentialists to justify a referent for a *nipāta* like ‘cet’ (if) etc. So the *Naiyāyikas* should have said that a *nipāta* which has no distinct meaning is only meant for making explicit what lies implicit in the meaning of some other words to which it is attached. For example, ‘ghaśca ghaśca ghaṭau’, here the word ‘ca’ does not refer to anything in

the world but it indicates that two objects are jointly taken in the word 'ghaṭau'. By the *vibhakti* 'Au'. Thus the *Vaiyākaraṇas* have to make enough concession for non-referring expressions which further prepare the ground for accepting the internal meaning (*bauddhārtha*).

## II

In this section we will show how Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* defends the theory that the meaning of the word lies in both external entity (*bāhyārtha*) and internal entity (*bauddhārtha*). In 'upadeśe'jananunāsika it' (PS 1.3.2), Patañjali distinguishes between 'upadeśa' and 'uddeśa'. For example, one who does not know 'what is cow', to him it is shown by pointing out that 'this is the cow', which is called *upadeśa* and when the object is not in front of us it is described in a certain way that is called *uddeśa*.

In order to answer the question 'Who is Devadatta?' one takes recourse to different adjectives like, 'he is one with armlets, earrings, a broad chest and round arms'-Devadatta is like this. Here Devadatta is a single person who is referred. All this talk of similarity is meaningful when only a single person is concerned. There cannot be different persons in one individual who is referred to. To make the word '*idrśa*' meaningful one has to admit that the word '*idrśa*' in spite of having no other referent apart from the one which the name 'Devadatta' refers to has a distinct thought for its meaning. The object is identified through adjectives and name as real Devadatta.<sup>9</sup>

In *Pāṇini-Sūtra* "hetumati ca (3.1.26), Patañjali has emphasized the importance of *bauddhārtha*. For example, the presence of the mythical character like *Kaṃsa* and *Kṛṣṇa* are felt right now because the person who plays the role of *Kaṃsa* and *Kṛṣṇa* put them into his mind and then characterize them. Unless an actor feels he cannot play the role of the above mentioned characters.<sup>10</sup>

If the existence of the intravenous entity (*bauddhārtha*) is not accepted then the past object cannot be retrieved in the present. Our behaviour and linguistic expression show this clearly in the following instances, 'go, (and see) *Kaṃsa* is being killed, *Kaṃsa* will be killed and what is the use of going there, he is killed already' etc.<sup>11</sup> What comes to our mind through language other



than the external being is also a being (*sat*), called *upacārasattā*. It comes to our mind non-differently by language and hence eternally related with the expression. Patañjali defines: '*na padārtho sattām vyabhicarati*', that is, the meaning of a word is never deprived of being (*sattā*). All external 'pots' may be destroyed even then, the meaning of the word 'pot' is non-differently revealed in the mind by the word pot. Now if the meaning is never deprived of its being or *sattā* what is the need of uses like '*sattā asti*', *being exists*. Such problems arise out of *Pāṇini-sūtra* (5.2.94) '*tadasyāstyasminniti matup*'. If the *padārtha* is never deprived of being then there is no need of using the word *asti* in the *sūtra* for qualifying the being as existent. An adjective is used with a being only if it, sometimes, is associated and, at other times, is dissociated with the being qualified.<sup>12</sup>

*Mahābhāṣyakāra* elucidates that the word that the *asti* in the *sūtra* under consideration stand for being 'which is existent neither in the past nor in the future, but in the present only. For example, the term '*goman*' is derived by the use of the suffix *matup* expresses 'the person possessing a cow at present'. The person who possesses a cow in the past, or will possess it in the future will not be termed '*gomān*'. Clarifying the issue *Mahābhāṣyapradīpakāra Kaiyaṭa* says that the use of the word *asti* as qualifier in the *sūtra* stands for Being (*sampratisattā*) having existence only in the present.<sup>13</sup>

As the being (*sat*) pertaining to the past and future also figure by language the use of the qualifier *asti* is not intended for them and therefore, it stands for external entity (*sampratisattā*) that exists only in the present. Clarifying the reason for doing so *Kaiyaṭa* has remarked that the use of the suffix (*sat+ta*) in the place of *laṭ* (present tense) in the derivation *sat+tā=sattā* suggests the existence in the present, and, as external being, is existent only in the present, the use of the word *sattā* is primarily taken for *bāhya sattā*. The mention of the existence of *buddhisattā* in present is not significant, because it is an existent that is presented in all tenses as said already. Past and future beings are existents only in the mind captured through language in communication. Though *Sattā* is popularly used for external entity but that does not mean that cannot exist in the present It can exist in the present when the external being is known, its existence is captured through

*upacārasattā* in language. *Sampratisattā* and *upacārasattā* are not separate from the point of view of cognition (*anyonyavyāvṛtta*). The *bauddhārtha* is existent in all the divisions of time (*abhinna kāla*), that is, past, future and present equally.<sup>14</sup>

The external being possesses fixed character, it cannot move into the opposite of being and non-being. But *buddhisattā* figures in the mind by language as being and non-being by respective words *asti* and *nāsti*. For example, the expression '*ghaṭo'sti*' and '*ghaṭo nātsi*'- both are known as positive event in the mind by respective words. *Bharṭṛhari* calls it *bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*. Still there is a difference between the *buddhistha sattā* and *sampratisattā*. *Bharṭṛhari* observes that the former is *upacarasattā* revealed by language and the latter is *mukhya sattā*, beyond cognition.<sup>15</sup>

The purpose of accepting *bauddhārtha* is that, as *Helārāja* says, just as crystal mirror do not undergo any change with the association of different things of different colours, though they configure things kept near them. *Upacārasattā* neither adds nor subtracts anything from the entity. It is always there.<sup>16</sup>

In the expression like '*abrāhmaṇa*' (*a*=prefix+*Brāhmaṇa* a nominal word) is provided to *Brāhmaṇa* if the *upacāra sattā* of *brāhmaṇa* is taken into consideration. The use of the expression '*abrāhmaṇa*' shows that the being of *brāhmaṇa* by the word '*abrāhmaṇa*' in external *ṣatriya* is imposed by the word. And if the word *abrāhmaṇa* is taken as a compound denoting integration of meaning (*vṛtti*) it serves as an independent expression (*vācaka*) of non-*brāhmaṇa*.. The negative particle is used to negate the idea of the negation of the external existence and not the external existence. *Mahābhāṣyakāra* satirically remarked in *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (3.2.6) that had it been the case that it negates the external entity, mere utterance the word 'negation' (*nañ*) in front of the enemy could have been washed off. Kings need not have to be equipped with the hoard of horses, elephants, army etc. for defeating enemy, The word *brāhmaṇa* is used so that one can understand that the denial is of *brāhmaṇa* and not that of any other thing, for if only 'not' had been used, the doubt would have remained as to who precisely is negated. There are too many things that can be related to the word '*a*'.<sup>17</sup>

The negative particle is a linguistic use. Just as dative case (*sampradāna kāraṇa*) is taught with the verb '*dadāti*' in the

expression ' *viprāya gām dadāti*'. The same case is taught with its negation as in the expression ' *viprāya gām na dadāti*'. The same rule is taught for both, *asti* and *nāsti*.

*Bhartrhari* further says that not only negative suffix (*nañ*) but the use of the words like 'birth' (*janma*), 'existence' (*asti*), 'change' (*vipariṇamate*), 'increase' (*vardhate*), 'decrease' (*apakṣiyate*) and 'destruction' (*vināṣyate*)- all these *saḍabhāvavikāra* is possible only on the basis of *upacārasattā* as the meaning figured in the mind. Now what is the meaning of birth (*jāyate*)? Generally we mean by it something which is the manifestation of a new form and prior to this form it was not there.<sup>18</sup>

In the expression '*ankuro jāyate*' (the sprout comes out) external being is not the meaning of the 'birth' because prior to their birth how can they exist and serve as the object of their own birth? If the sprout is already existent there will be no need for the expression of its birth (*janma*) and if it is non-existent then the birth of a non-existent is self contradictory.

The expression '*ankuro jāyate*' (the sprout comes out) stands for the agent (*kartā*, that is sprout here), for the object (*karma*), that is the form to be achieved, and the action (*kriyā*) that helps to fulfill the target.<sup>19</sup> *Bhartrhari* observes there is no difference between 'the agent of birth' and the form to be achieved by the action 'birth' of an external being and hence, 'the sprout comes out' is not possible of external existent, is taken as the meaning of the language. *Helārāja* says as the sprout has not completely come out, the expression *ankuro jāyate* is used for communicating its later form in which it comes out fully.<sup>20</sup>

The meaning of the word is accomplished as *Bauddhārtha* and not the external entity. If you say it is external entity only, then the use like 'The pot exists' becomes redundant and the use like 'The pot does not exist' would involve contradiction. One cannot use both 'exists' and 'does not exist' at the same time. But if we accept *bauddhārtha* then the above anomalies will be explained. The internal entity is referred by the word '*asti*' and the external entity is denied by the word '*nāsti*'. Although in both the cases they exist as internal entity. In fact if we do not subscribe to *bauddhārtha* then the expression like '*śaśaṅga nāsti*' (The hare's horn does not exist) and '*ankuro jāyate*' (The sprout has taken

birth) would not generate any verbal cognition, because ‘śaśaśṛṅga is nowhere in the external world , so how can it be negated. Similarly at the time of birth sprout does not exist so how can it be the locus of? Bhartṛhari says the existence is there in all the three times and for that we use the words, ‘asti’ and ‘nāsti’.<sup>21</sup>

Nāgeśa further says that in case of illusory perception also *bauddhārtha* plays an important role. Unless we have internal entity of snake or silver we can never mistake rope for a snake or silver for nacre. The existence of internal snake is imposed on the external rope. So if we do not have the internal entity of water we cannot be mistaken in a mirage. Unless we have the internal entity of the moon we cannot mistake it as two because of the defect of the eyes. In this way the whole world can be reduced to the illusory perception.<sup>22</sup> For the sake of illusory perception we have to accept the existence of internal entity otherwise it cannot be explained. The extreme idealists, like Nāgeśa see no difference between fiction, illusion and hallucination.<sup>23</sup>

Although Nāgeśa completely rejects the existence of the external entity still Bhartṛhari accepts both the entities. There are some entities which are formless, for them we have to take resort to *bauddhārtha*, for instance, *dharma*, *adharmā*, *svarga* etc.<sup>24</sup>

Unless the meaning is present in the mind the uttered word will not generate any verbal cognition in the mind of the hearer.<sup>25</sup> In case of *jñānalakṣaṇāsannikarṣa*, for example, ‘I see the fragrance of the sandalwood’ (*surabhi candanam paśyāmi*), the *samskāra* of the fragrance of the sandalwood in *smṛti* acts as the contact between the eyes and the sandalwood. *Jñānalakṣaṇā ca manaḥsamyuktā ātmavṛttisamskāraviṣayatvam* that also requires the existence of *bauddhārtha*, i.e. *bauddhārtha* of fragrance. Unless it is there in the *ātmā* it cannot be aroused by merely seeing the sandalwood.

Nāgeśa cited certain examples from *Vedānta śāstra* in order to establish the existence of *bauddhārtha*. It is said that before the realization of self (*ātmāsākṣatkāra*) the ordinary behaviour is regarded as mixture of truth and falsity. Linguistic behaviour like “This is mine” and “He is my son” etc are possible because of the presence of *bauddhārtha* (*Satyānrte mithunīkṛtya*). *Bauddhartha* stands for that which is in the form of *samskāra*. Mere perception of the external objects arouses the *samskāra* and grasp as an

external object. What is there in the mine becomes an external entity.

If the existence of the *bauddhārtha* is not accepted then the *Hiranyagarbha* (*Brahma*) who is the progenitor of the whole world would not have been so accepted. The ‘mere utterance of the word ‘*bhu*’ has created the world ‘– this *śruti* statement would be inconsistent. If the world would have previously existed and the word ‘*bhu*’ has been used then there is no point in creating the earth (*pr̥thivi*) etc, because it already exists. It is there in the mind of the creator and after uttering the word ‘*bhu*’, he externalizes that creation. Now this happens with every creative person. Writers, artists, poets, scientists have often attributed to their dreams creative ideas, insights, or formulations that they felt they could not have achieved by way of predominantly rational process of waking experience who first gets an idea and then create any piece of painting, poetry or sculpture or whatever it is.<sup>26</sup>

Even in *Nyāya-śāstra* the possibility of *āhāryajñāna* is accepted ‘*viparītaniścayakālīna āropa*’. Though I know that there is no pot on the floor still I can think that ‘there is pot on the floor’. This is a kind of knowledge which we voluntarily impose on the object, knowing fully well that the object is not there. The *Naiyāyika*, though denying the possibility of internal entity (*bauddhārtha*) accepts the possibility of *āhāryajñāna*, a kind of *mānasjñāna* through back door. Nāgeśa further shows that in *tarka*,  
*vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnābhāva*,  
*alīkapratīyogikābhāva* etc *buddhisattā* is there, though we do not like to enter into the detail for fear of being lengthy. What we call incoherent talk is after all a talk that generates meaning in the hearer.

### III

In this section I would like to brief an account of the different stages of speech-activity acknowledged in our Indian tradition. The *Vedas* and *Upaniṣada* are full of praises about the nature of *Vāk*. The word (*śabdatattva*) was regarded as the root principle of the world and was accorded a divine status by the Grammarians and philosophers like Bhartṛhari. The famous mantra of *Ṛgveda* ‘*catvāri vāk parimitāni.....*’ refers to four different stages of *Vāk-Parā*, *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī* that indicate the four different ways of regarding the authenticity of the *vāk tattva*. The

four stages generally talked about are the stages of *Vāk* from subtlest to the gross form.

The *Parā* is the absolutely divine stage in which word (*śabda*) and its meaning (*artha*) is merged in one- beyond our comprehension. The *paśyanti* is the second stage in which the two though merged are still separately felt. The third *madhyamā* is very much within our reach when we fully grasp the language and try to come out. The fourth *vaikharī* is when we fully express ourselves with vocal organ. It is this stage where we communicate and authenticity of the communicated word is challenged.

*Parā vāñ mūlacakrasthā, paśyantī nābhisaṁsthitā /*

*Hṛdisthā madhyamā jñeya, vaikharī kaṅṭhadeśagā //*

The *parā vāk* stage resides in *mulācakra*, the *paśyantī* resides in *nābhīpradeśa*, the *madhyamā* is resident in *hṛdadeśa* which is very much known to us and *vaikharī* is settled in *kaṅṭhadeśa* (throat). It is said:

*Vaikharī śabdaniṣpattimadhayamā śrutigocarā /*

*Āntārarthā ca paśyantī sūkṣmā vāganpāyinī //*

*Vaikharī* is heard by other person since it is that which makes our communication possible. The *madhyamā* is not *śrutigocara* because it stays in *hṛdadeśa*. The speaker can hear himself if he meditates on *śabda* “*svayaṁ kaṅṭhādhāne sukṣamataravāyubhīghātena upāṁśuśabdaprayoge ca śrūyamāṇa*”. The *paśyantī* is subtler than the above mentioned two and *parā* is the subtlest which is sometimes called *bindusvarūpa / nādasvarūpa*.

This short description is introduced here only to show the dignity of speech in our traditional literature. And I am going to defend the thesis that words uttered in any form will certainly produce understanding in the mind of the hearer otherwise how can he respond or react even if he thinks that it is not correct. I remember in this context the words of Nāgeśa. He argues that if someone calls me a liar, I am offended irrespective of the relationship between the uttered sentence and the fact since I understand fully the message being conveyed.<sup>27</sup>

It enhances our capability in several ways to understand the uttered sentence – be it fictitious, a lie or incorrect. It widens our scope of understanding and imagination and frees us from the bondage of written and spoken words to take plunge into yet to be unknown world of understanding. What we call non-sense is

deeply implanted in each of us, which cannot be rationalized –it can only be enjoyed.

Associate Professor  
Department of Philosophy  
Vivekananda College, Thakurpukur.  
Kolkata -700063  
[mattoo\\_k@yahoo.co.uk](mailto:mattoo_k@yahoo.co.uk)  
[madhukap@rediffmail.com](mailto:madhukap@rediffmail.com)

### NOTES AND REFERENCE

1. Atyantāsatyapyarthe jñānam śabdaḥ karoti he/ Tenotsarge sthite tasya doṣābhāvāt pramāṇata// Śloka-Vārttika on Codanā sutra verse 6
2. Yena uccāritena kasyacit sampratyayo bhavati sa śabaḥ (Mahābhāṣyaṁ 1.1.1.)
3. Ekārthah padasamuho vākyam’ (śābara-Bhāṣya under Mīmāṃsā Sutra 2.1.46)
4. Sambandhe sati yattvanyadādhikyamupajāyate/ vākyārthameva taṁ prāhurane kapadasamśrayam//. Vākyapadīyam Vākyakāṇḍam, kārikā.42)
5. Samyād yogyatā vinmātā putrādiyogavat (Vākyapadīyam 2.1.1) Svabhāvikaṁ śabdairarthānāmabhidhānam (Mahābhāṣyaṁ 2.1.1)
6. Yo hi gāmaśva iti bruyāna jatucit sampratyayaḥ syāt.(Mahābhāṣyaṁ)
7. Indriyāṇām svaviṣayeṣvanadīryogyata yathā / Anādirathaiḥ śabdānām sambandho yogyatā tathā // (Vākyapadīyam , Sambandhasamuddeśa, kārikā 29)
8. agniśabdo’agniśabdasyaiva grāhako bhavati, na jvālanah, pavako,dhūmaketuriti (Nyāsaḥ on PS 1.1.68)
9. Pratyakṣam tāvadākhyānamupadeśaḥ. Tadyathā-agojñāya kaścidah sakhāni karne vā grihītvā upadiṣati- ‘ayam gauḥ’iti.. Sa pratyakṣamākhyātamāh-‘upadisto me gauḥ iti . Guṇaiḥprāpaṇamuddeśaḥ. Tadyathā –kascit kāncidah- Devadattam me bhavānuddiṣatu iti. Sa ihasthah pāṭaliputrastham Devadattamuddiṣati ‘aṅgadī kuṇḍalī kirīṭī vyūdhorasko vṛtabāhulohitaksastunganāso vicitrabharana idṛṣo devadattaḥ iti. sa guṇaiḥ prāpyamānamāha ‘uddeṣṭo me Devadattaḥ iti. Indriyagocarārthasya yadākhyānam sa upadeśaḥ.

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Prasiddhadharmopādānena tu yatpratipādanam sa uddeśaḥ. Etaih śabdaiḥ yādrśo buddhāvarthaḥ pratibhāsate tādrśo bāhya ityarthḥaḥ. (Mahābhāṣya under PS 1.3.2)

10. Iha tu katham vartamānakālatā kaṁsaṁ ghātayati balibandhyatiti ca, cirahate ca kaṁsa cirbaddhena ca balau? Te'pi hi teśāmutpattiprabhṛtyavināśād tadṛddhivycikṣāṇaḥ sato buddhi viṣayān prakāśyanti. Ātaśca sataḥ. Vyālmīśraśca dṛśyante- kecit kaṁsabhaktā bhavati kecit Vāsudevabhaktāḥ. Varṇānyatvaṁ khalvapi puṣyanti- kecit kālamukhā bhavanti kecit raktamukhāḥ. Traikalyām khalvapi loke lakṣyati- gaccha hanyate kamsah, gaccha ghaṇiṣyate kaṁsah kim gaten hatah kaṁsa iti? (Mahābhāṣyam 3.1.26)
11. śabdopahitarupānśca buddherviṣayatām gatān / Pratyakṣamiva kamsādina sādhanatvena manyaet // (Vākyapadīyam, Sādhanasamuddeśa kārikā 5)
12. Sambhavavyabhicārābhyām viśeṣanamarthavāt (Mahābhāṣyam on Aṣṭādhyāyī 5.2.94)
13. Saṁpartisattāyāmiti vartamāna sattāyām vāhyāmasattā-yāmityarthaḥ. (Mahābhāṣyapradīpa on Aṣṭādhyāyī 5.2.94)
14. Evaṁ sattām padārtho hi na kascidtivartate (Mahābhāṣyapradīpa 3.3.51)
15. Athopacārasattaiva vidheyastatra lādayah/ janmanā tu virodhitvānmukhyā sattā na vidyate// (Vākyapadīyam Sambandha Samuddeśa kārikā 46)  
Vyapadeśe padārthānāmanyā sattaupacāriki  
Sarvāvasthāsu sarveṣā ātmarupasya darśikā// (Ibid. kārikā 39)  
Vāhyāvilakṣaṇa sattām buddhyopacarita vāhyārtha sattāyā hi anyā buddhisamāruḍhārthākārarupā sattā. Atayeva upacārikā iyaṁ. (Helārāja comments on Vākyapadīyam Sambandha Samuddeśa, kārikā 39)
16. Sphaṭikādi yathā dravyam bhinnairupairupāśrayaiḥ /  
Svaśaktiyogāt sambandhaḥ tādrupayaneva gacchati//  
Tadavacchabdo'pi sattāyām asyām pūrva vyavasthitaḥ /  
Dharmairupaiti sambandhaḥ avirodhi virodhihiḥ//  
(Vākyapadīyam Sambandha-Samuddeśa kārikā 40-41)
17. Yadi punar ayaṁ nivṛttapadārthakaṁ kimarthaṁ brāhmaṇa śabdaḥ prayujyateḥ? Evaṁ yathā vijñāyetāsyā padārtho nivartata iti. Neti hya ukte samdehaḥ syātaḥ kasya padārtho nivartata iti tatrāsamdehārthaṁ brāhmaṇaśabdaṁ prayujyate (Mahābhāṣyam



- on Aṣṭādhyāyī 2.2.6)
18. Ātmalābhasya janmākhā satā labhyaḥ ca labhyate/  
Yadi saj jāyate kasmād jāyate kathaḥ //  
(Vākyapadīyaṁ, Saṁbandha-Samuddeśa, kārikā 43)
  19. Sato hi ganturagamanam sati gamye pravartate/  
gantrvacenna janmārtho na cet tadvāna jāyate// (Ibid. 44)
  20. Evaṁ ca kṛtvāsrītapurvāvastha upacaritottarevasthāśca  
sanmurcchito'rthātmā jāyata ityabhidhānasya visayaḥ,  
(Helaraja on Vākyapadīyaṁ Saṁbandha-Samuddeśa kārikā 3.3.46)  
kimatrāphalaiti ced ātmamokṣarupeṇa iti brumaḥ  
( Helārāja on Vākyapadīyaṁ Kriyāsamuddeśa)
  21. Evaṁ śakyo'rtho'pi buddhisattāsamāviṣṭa eva na tu  
vāhyasattāviṣṭaḥ. Ghaṭa ityat eva sattavagamena ghaṭo'stiti  
prayoge gatārthatvādstiti prayoganāpatteḥ sattāyā virodhāt, Ghaṭo  
nāstityasyanāpattesca. Mama tu buddhisato  
bāhyasattātadbhavabodhanāya 'asti nāsti' iti prayogaḥ. Kinca  
'śaśaśṅga nāsti' 'ankuro jāyate ityato bodhanāpattiḥ mama tu  
buddhisannanukuro jāyata ityārtha sa sattāpi śabdavācyeti  
tadbhāvaḥ  
(Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntamañjuṣā page 364)
  22. Mṛgatrṣṇāyāmudakaṁ śuktau rajataṁ bhujangayorajjavām/  
Taimirikacandrayugapadaṁ bhrāntamkhilam jagadrupam//  
(Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntamañjuṣā page 389)
  23. Bandhyāputro na bhavati", "śaśaśṅga nāsti"ityādi  
vākyajanyabodhe bhramatvasya bauddhārtha svikāra āvaśyakah"
  24. Akāravantaḥ samvedyā vyaktasmrtinibandhanāḥ/  
Ye te pratyavabhāsante sanvinmātram tvato'nyathā//  
(Vākyapadīyaṁ, Vṛttisamuddeśa , kārikā 133)
  25. Śabdaḥ karaṇamarthasya sa hi tenopajanyate/  
Tathā ca buddhiviśayaddrthacchabdaḥ pratiyate//  
(Vākyapadīyaṁ, Saṁbandha-Samuddeśa, kārikā 32)
  26. Sā bhurīti vyāharat sa bhumimsrjat'iti śruṭeśca sṛṣṭeḥ prāg  
bhuhśabdadibhyastadarthajñānapurvakaṁ sṛṣṭiriti lābhena tadā  
bāhāyyā bhuvo'vhāvād bhuhśabdasyaśaktigrahapurvakaṁ  
kasyārthasya bodhah syāt.  
(Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjuṣā- p. 573)
  27. Mithyābhiśāpagālidānarupakādikavyajadukhadvesecchā-  
sukhādyanurodhene tatrāpi tadāvaśyakatvāt.  
(Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjuṣā- p.734)

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# PROPOSITIONS AND TRUTH

DURGESH CHAUDHARY

The question 'What is Truth?' can be replaced with the question 'What is it for something to be true? But what is it for what to be true? What sort of item this second 'what' must stand for? In other words, what are the bearers of truth? More accurately, our present concern is with the problem of primary bearers of truth.

In undergraduate logic classes, we teach that truth and falsehood may be predicated of propositions. Again, two sentences which are clearly two because they consist of different words differently arranged, may in the same context have the same meaning and be uttered to assert the same proposition.

So propositions are said to be primary truth bearers. Suppose someone uttered the English sentence. 'It is raining'. French sentence 'Il pleut' and German sentence 'Es regnet', so that what he said was true. The phrase 'what he said' can be used to refer to (a) the words or sentences the speaker used, or (b) to what the speaker meant, i.e. the proposition he expressed, and it is only to the latter, according to Pitcher,<sup>1</sup> that we can attach a truth-value. But we can argue, against Pitcher, that it does not follow from the fact that he could have said the same thing by uttering a sentence different from the one he did utter, that the sentence he did utter is not either true or false.

The term 'proposition' is used by philosophers as a technical one and has been introduced in very different ways and to serve a variety of jobs. It is assumed that a proposition is a meaning. 'Meanings of sentences are exalted as abstract entities in their own right, under the name propositions'.<sup>2</sup>

The following are two different accounts of a proposition, (a) A proposition is that which is expressed by synonymous declarative sentences. (b) A proposition is that which a speaker means to convey in uttering a particular sentence in a particular context. The senses of 'means' implicit in (a) and (b) are different. The different ways of using 'means' give rise to different concepts of a proposition. In (a) the proposition expressed by a sentence is identified by the family of sentences which are synonymous with

that sentence. This is not the case with (b), in which the account of a proposition is as that which a speaker means to convey in uttering a particular sentence in a particular context. For on this account, a speaker could utter sentences which are not synonymous in a particular context and express the same proposition. For example, someone may mean to convey that 'dinner is ready' simply by uttering the sentence 'dinner is ready' but he may mean to convey the same thing by uttering the sentence. 'It is time to wash your hands now'; and these two sentences are definitely not synonymous.

Carnap<sup>3</sup> tells that the term 'proposition' is used for two different concepts, firstly for certain expressions and secondly for their designata. In other words (a) as 'declarative sentence' (b) as 'that which is expressed by a declarative sentence'. He quotes 'Satz an sich' from Bolzano as other term for concept '(b)'. We can make an objection to both uses. In its first use it is just a declarative sentence and nothing more, hence we should abandon the use of 'proposition'. In its second use it is equated with Bolzano's 'Satz an sich', which itself is a highly obscure concept and leads us dangerously to Platonism. At any rate the latter concept is ambiguous.

'Certainly talk of propositions presupposes acceptance of the metaphysical truth that individuals belong to kinds'.<sup>4</sup> If there were propositions they would bring about a certain relation of synonymy or equivalence between sentences. The problem of individuation of proposition is the problem of definition of equivalence between sentences. 'The doctrine of propositions seems in a way futile on the face of it, even if we imagine that the individuation problem is solved. For that solution would consist in some suitable definition of equivalence of sentences; why not then just talk of sentences and equivalence and let the proposition go?'<sup>5</sup> The sum of the matter in a few words is that proposition are projected as 'shadows of sentences' and on the most favourable supposition they will give us nothing the sentences will not give.

Those who prefer to apply 'proposition' to things that are said or sayable, are not using the word without committing them to any particular opinion. When 'proposition' is understood in this

manner, it can be shown<sup>6</sup> that propositions are neither identical with sentences nor with utterances of sentences. Propositions are some kind of abstract entities.

The two views about propositions which are, (a) ‘a proposition is whatever can be asserted, denied, contended, maintained, assumed, supposed, implied, or presupposed.’<sup>7</sup> (b) ‘Meanings of sentences are exalted as abstract entities in their own right, under the name of propositions.’<sup>8</sup> We cannot hold together. ‘If propositions are asserted, denied, proved and so on, then they are not meanings; for meanings are not asserted, denied, or proved.’<sup>9</sup>

Sentences also, are candidate for the role of primary bearers of truth. All propositions are expressible by the use of some sentence in some language. From the beginning Alfred Tarski assumes without argument that if we use the word ‘true’ we must apply it to sentences – or rather we should say for precision, he accepts as correct a translation of his articles in which ‘sentence’ is used as a rendering of the word ‘Satz’ of his own German version.

Following Haack,<sup>10</sup> by a sentence we mean any grammatically correct and complete string of expressions of a natural language. For example, ‘Snow is white’, ‘Is the door shut?’ are sentences; ‘Is red’ and ‘Will to go’ are not. We need to distinguish between sentence-types and sentence-tokens. A sentence-token is a physical object, a series of marks on paper or of sound waves, making up an inscribed or spoken sentence. ‘Same sentence’ means ‘same sentence type’. A sentence type is either a pattern which similar tokens exemplify, or as a class of similar tokens. We accept typographical or auditory similarity as criteria for sentence types. Sentences with their main verb in the indicative mood are declarative, but ‘declarative’ is meant to be rather broader than ‘indicative’. It is declarative sentences, which are eligible for truth and falsity. More precisely we should maintain that the set of sentences which may properly be called true or false is only a sub-set of the set of declarative sentences; for some declarative sentences are meaningless and therefore do not admit of a truth-value.

Ziff<sup>11</sup> told that it is inconsistent to say of the sentence-type ‘The cat is on the mat’ either that it is true or that it is false, because some of its sentence-tokens have been and will be uttered

on occasions in which they are true and some on occasions in which they are false. Ziff's reason is sufficient only to establish that some sentence-types cannot be true or false. His argument does not work against those sentence-type all of whose sentence-tokens are true or all of whose sentence-tokens are false.

A sentence-type will take the truth-value 'true' if all its sentence-tokens are true, and will take the truth-value 'false' if all its sentence-tokens are false. Hence a sentence-type will lack a truth-value if, either, at least one sentence-token of it is neither true nor false, or one sentence-token of it is true and another false. So some sentence-types whose sentence-tokens are : '4+3=3+4', '5>3+4', 'Ice floats on water', will be 'true', 'false', and 'true' respectively; but some sentence-types of which the following are sentence-tokens: 'The cat is on the mat', 'I am tired' will come out as neither true nor false. So we can attribute a truth value to some sentence-types without inconsistency.

If it is not possible to identify uses of different sentence, or of the same sentence on different occasions, as making the same statement, without knowing that the sentence, when uttered in their respective contexts,, have the same truth-value, we should have a good case for saying that the epithets 'true' and 'false' attach primarily to sentence-tokens.

'If declarative sentence-tokens cannot be bearers of truth and falsity, neither can statements, assertions, propositions, or whatever else we want to admit as true or false.'<sup>12</sup>

Quine also, concludes in favour of sentence-tokens. 'What are best regarded as true and false are.....sentence-tokens, or sentences if they are eternal'<sup>13</sup> An eternal sentence is a sentence whose tokens all have the same truth-value. When we call a sentence eternal, we are calling it eternal relative only to a particular language at a particular time. Quine<sup>14</sup> claims that any sentence which is dependent on context for its truth-value can be expanded, in a given context of utterance, into an eternal sentence which is not so dependent and will be absolutely true or false. The expansion consists in the first instance of replacing tensed verbs by tenseless ones, together with time-indicators; secondly, of replacing 'indicator words' such as 'I' 'now' and 'this' by exact and objective spatio-temporal references; and thirdly, of filling out

incomplete descriptions and proper names so as to secure a unique for-all-time reference.

However, it may be doubted whether this expansion is in principle always possible, Quine nowhere illustrates it. Probably it is reasonable to say, as is shown by Sayward,<sup>15</sup> that there are few cases where no eternal sentence can be used, in place of the sentence-token used, in order to make the same assertion. Our use of sentence-token's truth and falsity is relative to those particular languages<sup>16</sup> in which utterances or inscriptions are made. Sentence tokens are always attached to their context also.

It is also necessary to note, that though sentence-tokens are physical objects, sentence-types are abstract, and the identity criteria for sentence-types require appeal to the notion of similarity, which itself is a problematic one.

Why should one prefer to have linguistic entities- sentence-tokens as the primary bearers of truth? Because they are at least in the public domain. Really there are problems remaining in giving a precise account of the candidates one favours, still I believe that sentence-tokens are most acceptable as primary bearers of truth and falsity.

Assistant Professor  
Department of Philosophy and Religion  
Banaras Hindu University  
Varanasi-221005  
Email—durgeshchaouhary164@gmail.com

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# RELIGION AS A HUMAN PHENOMENON

VS.

# OPENNESS TO TRANSCENDENCE

CLEMENS CAVALLIN

An issue hotly debated within religious studies due to its importance for the discipline's identity and status, is the choice between, on the one hand, a study of religion as a purely natural phenomenon and, on the other hand, a perspective that not *a priori* rejects the truth claims of religious traditions concerning supernatural realities. In the following, I will discuss these two approaches and sketch a position of my own.

1

## THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION

During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the openness to religious transcendence within religious studies has mainly been championed by the phenomenology of religion that advocates a sympathetic attitude to religion in general, hence favouring a *geisteswissenschaftliche* method of empathy – in this way, trying to map the world as experienced by the believer, though not committing oneself to any particular tradition. This has, however, never amounted to an attempt to erase the theoretical level, and, for example, the best known proponent, Mircea Eliade, constructed a general theory of religious thinking centring on the manifestations of the holy. This characterization of the unique (*sui generis*) religious way of thinking was then correlated to different religions, thus trying to make a case for the relevance of the theory.<sup>2</sup> The ontological reference of the phenomenological concept of the holy has though been an open question (Rennie 2006 [1996]). It could, on the one hand, be interpreted as a description of religious beliefs and practices, pointing to the fact that religious people act as though

certain material things or processes are manifestations of something powerful located beyond the empirical world; or the holy as a notion could be interpreted as actually referring to a supernatural entity that manifests itself in natural phenomena. In the latter case, the phenomenology of religion endorses a basic supernaturalism; and some critics have, therefore, accused Eliade's theory for harbouring an implicit theology (e.g. Wiebe 1999: 60; McCutcheon 1997: 27–50).

#### THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION AND METHODOLOGICAL ATHEISM

The advocates of a purely scientific study, on the other hand, mostly espouse some form of methodological atheism as the only viable alternative, heavily criticising any scholar or study that venture beyond that stance. The study of religion as a natural phenomenon is then considered to exhaust all aspects of religion; there is no lees left in the bottle labelled religion when the scientist has drunk his fill. The methodological atheism at this point almost imperceptibly turns into an ontological one and quite easily becomes inimical to religion as a false form of consciousness (as e.g. in Marxist theory).<sup>3</sup>

We could as an example take the position defended by Russell McCutcheon in his book *Critics not Caretakers* where he emphasizes that religion is to be studied “as a *thoroughly human doing /.../* without remainder” or with other words “with no mysterious distillate left over” (McCutcheon 2001: x, xi). At the same time, he asserts that this is a purely methodological principle, that he has no interest in any form of metaphysical reduction. The categorical dismissal of any ontological interest on his part seems though somewhat too strong as ontological features of course determine the accuracy of the methods used. If materialist monism is false, then that would quite naturally limit the usefulness of methodological materialism, and, on the other hand, if it is true, this would surely enhance its explanatory force (cf. Lopez 2001: 10).<sup>4</sup>

Secondly, the methodologically atheistic scholar studies religion as though religious thinking, morality and ritual are basically mistaken. It should then not come as a surprise that it is not well

received by those thus analyzed; it would be the same as to study democracy with the basic methodological principle that there is no rational basis for democratic governance; the critical scholar in this way taking a methodological totalitarianism as his guiding principle, but at the same time insisting that this does not decide whether after all democracy rests on legitimate grounds. The scholar of democracy working in this way would dig up all the evidence of the pernicious effects of democratic governance that he could find, and strongly object toward all colleagues that would see political studies at the university as being in the service of the democratic culture of the nation. I do not claim that these two domains, the (democratic) political and the religious are identical in all respects, but the analogy hopefully points to a lack of innocence in a methodological stance that *a priori* undermines the position of those individuals and institutions it scrutinizes.

Thirdly, this way of studying religion proceeds historically from an enlightenment criticism of religion as profoundly erroneous – methodologically naturalist scholarship of religion hence fits into a long tradition of scholarship that has not been excessively anxious to avoid the ontological dimension. So, if one could accuse Eliade of implicit theology, here the charge looms large that this approach builds on an implicit materialism. That in reality both the phenomenological *epoché* and the naturalist insistence on *only* method are ways of hiding, or insulating, an agenda for either promoting or counteracting religion in society.

#### METHODOLOGICAL AGNOSTICISM

A more modest approach is indicated by the concept of methodological agnosticism, which acknowledges the limits of scientific inquiry; that it by imposing on itself strict rules of jurisdiction cannot rule out that this analytical net cast over reality does not perfectly cover all that exists, or all aspects of what is placed under the microscope.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, agnosticism as a methodological principle could be more than a humbler form of atheism, by actually allowing religious truth claims the status of competing explanations, as the sociologist Douglas Porpora argues in his analysis of Peter Berger's influential combination of social constructivism and methodological atheism (Porpora 2006). Then, the agnostic attitude is truly methodological, that is, only a way on

which to proceed and not a description of the result. In this way, it distinguishes itself from epistemological agnosticism, which as atheism, precludes any possibility of a real knowledge of supernatural entities. The latter claim is though rather implausible if not backed up by some form of ontological materialism.

#### RELIGIOUS STUDIES IN SWEDEN

The reflections on religious studies in this article were formulated within the academic context of religious studies at a Swedish faculty of arts, and the natural attitude could hence seem to be a thorough secular, that is, a methodologically atheist perspective with an added marked emphasis on the cleavage between is and ought, and that between private and public. Sweden is after all famous for being one of the most secularized countries in the world. This is, though, complicated at several points. First, religious studies is, for example, at my university interwoven with Christian theology, though, exactly what is implicated by the latter label is sometimes unclear, but it mainly signifies a study of Christianity distributed over several disciplines such as church history, systematic theology and New Testament exegesis.<sup>6</sup> The structure of theology is, moreover, formed by the task to educate priests for the Swedish Church, the former state church of Sweden. The semidetached nature of the Swedish Church from the state is, hence, reflected in the ambivalent nature of the study of Christianity at the department, hovering somewhat uneasily between a normative, constructive theology and a neutral analysis of the historical instantiations of the Christian religion.<sup>7</sup>

Furthermore, other forms of normative pressure are constantly exerted upon research and teaching. In being a governmental institution, the university is under obligation to conform to a basic set of values, often diffusely defined, a feature which becomes conspicuous in the education of teachers who have an explicitly normative task to perform (Lindgren 2003).<sup>8</sup> We, as teachers of the teachers, cannot escape this injunctive mood without making our teaching irrelevant for the purposes of our students. And, as the financing system is directly correlated to the number of students and exams, it is not without impact on the institutional structure of religious studies.

These two normative dimensions are combined with an increased ambition on the part of politicians to make university subjects useful, that is, relevant for society, and not only to the international scholarly community in search for new knowledge.<sup>9</sup> Religious studies is accordingly, not in a Swedish context at least, a value free exercise in pure research, but a state financed venture with multiple tasks to perform for the common good. This, of course, raises the question of whether the scholar of religious studies should act as a public intellectual or not. In Sweden, that aspect of scholarly work has been defined as the third task (assignment) of university professors besides teaching and research.

#### IS AND OUGHT

So, there are large, if not insurmountable, difficulties connected with implementing a positivist distinction between, on the one hand, description and analysis, and, on the other hand, different kinds of normativity. Christian theology constitutes merely one of many types of normative discourse and structures of power that exercise influence on the practice of religious studies. But is this only to give in to pressures that should be resisted? Could it be that religious studies is woven on an intricate web of normative concerns, but that it ought to resist this tendency and try to disentangle itself as much as possible from that state of affairs? One of the most persistent advocates of such a position is the philosopher of religion, Donald Wiebe, who in his book *The Politics of Religious Studies* programmatically postulates:

A study of religion directed toward spiritual liberation of the individual or of the human race as a whole, toward the moral welfare of the human race, or toward any ulterior end than that of knowledge itself, should not find a home in the university. (Wiebe 1999: xiii)

This position entails a basic cleavage between is and ought in the sense that knowledge becomes a goal in itself, and any purpose with research and teaching outside of that is ruled out, both that of Eliade's New Humanism or those of atheists, or critics of religion, who want to expose and undermine religion (Cf. McCutcheon

2001: 142). Therefore, Russell McCutcheon, in his attempt at marrying modernist naturalism<sup>10</sup> with postmodern metatheoretical criticism, in this way giving the scholar of religion a public role as a critic poised to deconstruct religious discourse, does not find mercy before Wiebe's tribunal of a disinterested science of religion:

To put it simply, McCutcheon seems to believe that if, as a student of religion, one "reveals" the falsehood of religion and shows that it is not therefore a solid foundation on which to establish society, as a student of religion one has fulfilled one's duties as a public intellectual. (Wiebe 2005: 22)

To this McCutcheon replied in writing by several arguments and manoeuvres, for example, by dwelling on their friendship and common vision of religious studies, being perplexed that his former supervisor would in this way undermine the position of an ally, hinting jestingly at some sort of Freudian motive on Wiebe's part. Furthermore, McCutcheon remarked that the article analyzed by Wiebe was a remnant of a past stage in his, that is, McCutcheon's intellectual development, and besides that his position was not adequately rendered by Wiebe. This is though not the most interesting part of the reply for our present purposes, but at the end of his apologia McCutcheon goes on the offensive and criticises the vision of a value free science of religion that stays aloof from the drama of public debate. First, he attacks the basic principle of the objective scientific study of religion by pointing out that this is not in itself scientific, but that its status is akin to the problem facing the principle of verification put forward by logical positivists in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, a principle that to their dismay was non-verifiable, therefore invalidating itself (McCutcheon 2006: 123). The doorkeeper checking that no normative constraints enter into the study of religion is ironically himself animated by norms, goals and values: the value of no value.

The next criticism brought forth by McCutcheon is how it can be possible for political structures to create an apolitical sphere; an

objection which is a variant on the old argument that the effect must somehow be present in, or be of the same nature as, the cause. The autonomy of the university system is, however, not in itself produced by the political will, but by the renouncement of interference enshrined in legally binding documents. Even when allowing for the possibility of such an apolitical arena, McCutcheon criticizes the concept of religion as a neutral signifier, pointing out that it is intrinsically value laden and hence not an unbiased description of reality, but merely a construction, a feature which leads to that the discrete discipline studying precisely 'religion' is not a self evident part of the academy (cf. Fitzgerald 2000). Finally, his conclusion is that a value free study of religion is a case of wishful thinking (McCutcheon 2006: 125).

Perhaps it could be helpful, on the basis of the discussion above, to distinguish between at least two ways the relation between fact and value confronts religious studies. The first is the normative context that science and scholarship are located within, a situation which is unavoidable, while it is debatable to what extent this is a good thing; how far these forms of normative pressure should be able to influence the constitution of religious studies – and to what degree the values intrinsic to scientific work should be left free to structure the discipline: values such as the commitment to truth disregarding its usefulness and the freedom to choose research questions. With other words, we enter into the debate of academic freedom or autonomy, which is not simply a question of a dichotomy between a quest for pure knowledge contra the influence of values; but the tension is more precisely between conflicting set of values as borne out by the McCutcheon-Wiebe debate.

The second way religious studies enters, willingly or reluctantly, into the normative dimension, is concerned with how scientific knowledge should relate to instrumental solutions of problems (technology), and further what bearings that scientific (scholarly) knowledge should have for moral and political issues. In the case of technology, the goal is given, and the knowledge supplied by the academy is used as a tool; this could be a question of material construction such as the building of bridges, but also of social engineering as efforts to reduce the levels of poverty and illiteracy.



Insights gained by religious studies could, for example, enter into a discussion of how to handle a multicultural, multireligious society, something to which I think very few would object. Not even Wiebe rules this out (2005: 34). But, when it comes to define the ends, that is, to outline what is good, and consequently what place religion is to have in the good, ideal society, the scholar of religion is open to the charge of committing the naturalistic fallacy: trying to derive values from facts (Williams 2006 [1985]: 121–131).

It is also telling that attempts to exorcise theology from the study of religion and religion from society, at the same time often include the construction of a new ersatz religion. For example, the father of positivism, Auguste Comte, actually started his own religion *La religion de l'humanité* that was intended to replace outdated forms of supernatural religion, being hence a religion of immanence (Wernick 2001). This drive of the radically secular study of religion to take over the function of the object it studies, that is, religion, in order to strive for a truly scientific society, runs as a red thread from the Enlightenment and the French revolution to our time, though some are not comfortable with that zeal, as witnessed by the mixed reception to Daniel Dennet's book *Breaking the Spell* (2006), even from scholars otherwise sympathetic to the study of religion as only a natural phenomenon (e.g. Geertz 2008).

If the presence of theology at the same institution as religious studies raises the question of the legitimacy of a constructive, that is, a normative theology in a secular academic setting; then the same problem (the fact/value distinction) arises within the methodologically atheist study of religion as the question of what status is to be given to the wholehearted acceptance of the political imperative of usefulness, and the consequent participation in the debate on how the good society is to be constructed. Is it, as Weber argues, only legitimate for the scholar *qua* scholar to lay before the public and the decision makers what ways of action are possible; what results certain measures probably will have; and which courses of action are the most efficient to reach a given goal? While, at the same time, not addressing the question what ends that are to be considered as good and which as bad, or even evil? Has the scholar when overstepping this boundary then left his or her

professional role and consequently acts merely as a private citizen, who on the contrary has every right to argue publically for a position on such questions? (Weber 2005: 321–343).

#### THE POSTMODERN ERA WITHIN THE STUDY OF RELIGION

For me to enter into this discursive place of contesting narratives as a student in the 1990ies coincided with the increasing acceptance of a ‘postmodern’ position in the study of religion and academic theology in Sweden, a factor which further blurred the boundaries between rational and irrational; between is and ought.<sup>11</sup> Within this new paradigm, scholars championed in different ways and degrees a relativism that dethroned the modernist form of scientific rationality, arguing as McCutcheon that there is actually no value free or neutral position, but that all perspectives come with their metaphysical premises and built in values.<sup>12</sup> This made it theoretically possible to radicalize the sympathetic attitude of the phenomenologist of religion, in that theology and the methodologically atheist study of religion merely became different bids on what should count as true and good (Paden 1994: 58). In that case, no rational objection is really possible for adopting an explicitly theological or normative position also within religious studies; the constraints being merely those exercised by raw power, institutional inertia and tradition. For a theology hard pressed by rationalism this held out a promise of renewed legitimacy, though at a high price, as faith could not amount to more than fideism in a world without rational foundations: but then also science was portrayed as a kind of faith (cf. Milbank 2006). The Postmodern scepticism and relativism both in regard to rationality (truth) and morality (goodness) in this way opened up for an interpenetration of postmodern Lutheran theology and religious studies.

However, as the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century also was the scene of the transformation of Sweden from a more or less monolithically Protestant country into an increasingly multicultural and multireligious society incorporated in a globalized world, other important changes in my subdiscipline within religious studies, viz., the history of religions, were initiated. History of religions (science of religion) was from the beginning a project with several important sources: liberal Protestantism, philological investigations of old textual civilisations and a modernist critique of religion in

general and Christianity in particular (Hjelde 2000; Molendijk 2005). This contextual position of the scholar has been largely eroded by the postcolonial critique and the move to a multireligious society – the discipline of history of religions could even in the future develop into a label for a set of non-Christian theologies. This is not a development alien to the government which, for example, has plans for a state financed education of Muslim imams.<sup>13</sup> The present tendency is, consequently, not to disentangle the education of priests for the Swedish Church from the secular system of education, thereby finalizing the severance of church and state, but instead the intention seems to be to enlarge the project of state control of the education of religious specialists. If this is extended to religions from south and southeast Asia as Hinduism and Buddhism, then the relation between theology(-ies) and a secular religious studies will be even more complex. Furthermore, if the postmodern equalising of positions is embraced in a spirit of tolerance, this development could lead to a clash of academic theologies taking place within the institutional structure of religious studies, or, if one is an optimist, turn it into an arena for a fruitful interreligious dialogue.

With the postmodern wave came also a set of specific values of postmarxist criticism and emancipation, which mark a link of continuity with the modernist ethos of the Enlightenment tradition. This have motivated the second reaction to the phenomenology of religion, viz., a sharp criticism of its androcentrism, essentialism and conceptual, theological imperialism (e.g. Christ 1991; Shaw 1995: 66f; McCutcheon 1997). Instead of taking the plurality of perspectives and the lack of ultimate foundations as an invitation to a hermeneutical attitude of empathy, it motivated an ethos of deconstructionism, which aimed at exposing precisely the lack of rational foundation for religions and their dependence on structures of power, with other words, their ideological nature.<sup>14</sup> If such a criticism in a Marxist context rested firmly on a materialist ontology, the postmarxist position could not invoke any such foundation for its criticism and the consequent will to emancipation – the latter to be achieved mainly through the denaturalizing of any religious moral or societal ideal (e.g. see Docherty 1996). The allure of this approach, thus, rests first in its

softening of modernity's tendency to scientism, and secondly in its emancipatory potentialities. But the basic weakness lies in the relativism of truth and morality (and aesthetics), which in their extreme forms open up for a reduction of truth, morality and beauty to power and mere subjective opinion (cf. Milbank 2006: 318f; Eagleton 2003). Of course, for modernity the first of these relativisms was the more fatal, as morality and aestheticism in large measure already had been forced to retreat to the subjective sphere. In order for the postmodern critic of religion (or caretaker for that matter) not to lose his or her basis, this corrosive relativism has to be tempered, so at least one point of view, from where the criticism is to be launched, is less relative than what is criticised (Levy 2002: 18). Otherwise the criticism is only a case of one ideological position hammering away at another (cf. Porpora 2004).

We could see such a tension between the attractive and problematic sides of postmodernism reflected in the work of Gavin Flood, an Indologist and theoretician of religion. For example, his book *The Ascetic Self*, which revolves around the themes of interiority, self and ritualization, enacts this ambivalence as a balance between phenomenology and postmodern approaches. Flood recognizes his formation as a scholar within the phenomenology of religion, and though aware of the criticism levelled at that approach, remains loyal to it; his project is largely an attempt to reformulate the comparative approach of phenomenology, which rests on the idea of a common nature of the human person:

It [i.e. his book] also expresses a belief that goes against the grain of some contemporary thinking, that there are common features of human being that cut across historical and cultural divides – an insight expressed in earlier centuries as a belief in a common human nature. (Flood 2004: x)

This puts him into the same fold as the cognitive study of religion, though there the focus is on the common structure of the brain, while Flood, embedded in a hermeneutical tradition, is more

focused on universals of human thought expressed in texts. At the same time, Flood has internalized a postmodern (postcritical) theoretical perspective, and as formulated in his previous book *Beyond Phenomenology* (1999), he advocates a form of dialogism between scholar and informant, taking the critique put forward by deconstructionism as an argument for a more humble attitude toward religious traditions and persons than the modernist one, though he, at the same time, tries to eschew extreme forms of cultural relativism (2004: 22). Conscious that this exposes him, as Eliade previously, to the charge of an implicit theology, he formulates the following answer:

In the sense that I do intend to take very seriously ascetic claims about the nature of the self and world, then the book is certainly implicitly theological, although it is not theology because it does not stand directly within a theological tradition of discourse. I do not explore the theological implications of asceticism /.../ (Flood 2004: xi)

We could say that Flood tries to balance the comparative project of phenomenology, including its necessary prerequisite, a common human nature and its hermeneutically open attitude to religious truth claims, with a postmodern critique of exactly such essences and the uncritical affirmation of elite religious discourse. The result is that his work (and those inspired by it) has to live with strong internal tensions as that between universalism and relativism, and that between empathy and criticism.<sup>15</sup>

For my own part as a doctoral student, I tried, as Flood, a variant of the phenomenological approach, but rejected the basic principles of postmodern theory since they seemed to lead to (or presuppose) a tragic (or heroic) loss of the basic trust in human reason that is required when using it as a tool for exploring reality; a fall from grace that cultivates the suspicion that all scholarly work ultimately are baseless constructions. On the other hand, I perceived the phenomenological insistence on an exclusive hermeneutical perspective and the rejection of, for example, sociological or biological perspectives, as inadequate. I thus

struggled with finding a point of departure in order to construct, as I saw it, a defensible version of the project of a rational study of religion.

#### COGNITIVE STUDIES OF RELIGION

Now some 15 years later, the landscape has changed somewhat on an international level, though not yet in the Swedish context, with the growing strength of the cognitive study of religion, reaffirming the modernist position of the rationality of science and the irrationality of religious thought, though the latter due to its natural character is almost inescapable.<sup>16</sup> I really sympathise with the emphasis on the rational legitimacy of science, and consequently the study of religion, to which those working hard within this new paradigm bear witness; and in this sense I am most definitely a post-postmodernist (cf. Slingerland 2008). However, I cannot follow the political program of the so-called 'brights' that is based on this methodological and ontological reduction of religion to merely a natural, that is, a material phenomenon, and that hence labour for the reduction of the public influence of religion, (which anyway looks like a hopeless task if one is to take the statement of the innate nature of religion seriously).

#### A THOMIST PERSPECTIVE

This point of dissent is mainly due to that my trust in human reason, and the viability of a study of religion within the limits of reason alone, does not find its ultimate foundation in a materialist ontology. It is instead derived from a model of division of labour, as this is formulated in classical Catholic teaching, between, on the one hand, human reason proceeding without help from religious revelation, and on the other hand, theology based on revealed truths.<sup>17</sup> My reason for resisting scepticism is then not the same as many of those now at work within the old, but at the same time new, paradigm of religion as *only* a natural phenomenon. But, does this difference in foundation automatically banish me from a study of religion as a natural phenomenon? I want to argue no, as the important dividing line is not to be found in the answer to the question of whether religion is a natural phenomenon, that is, created by humans due to innate tendencies or capacities. The theory of anthropomorphism of Stewart Guthrie (1993), is, for

example, illuminating when considering how humans construct and interpret religious supernatural agents, but it does not decide the question whether any such being really exist. I do not see any principal problems with reductionism in the sense of exploring which natural causes that form and constrain the emergence and endurance of religious beliefs and practices. To argue for an exclusively hermeneutical perspective on religion seems to be irresponsible, as it ultimately has to rest on an ideal human being omniscient and omnipotent, that is, without constraints.

However, at certain points, there of course emerge distinctive differences between a study of religion as a natural phenomenon inspired by atheism, materialism and one motivated by a Thomistic philosophical position.<sup>18</sup> The former sees religion in its belief in a supernatural world populated by gods, demons and ghosts as essentially mistaken, while the latter maintains that religions are basically, if not in all details, on the right track. When entering the political arena there quite naturally emerges a controversy regarding the position of religion in the good society. This does not, however, need to be detrimental, as the public arena of a democratic society provides an opportunity of respectful reasoned debate on these issues.<sup>19</sup> And since, for example, my study of ritual interiorization (forthcoming) does not go into politics, and, therefore, does not advise the reader on any particular way of acting toward religious phenomena, but merely tries to focus on a particular spectrum of religious ritual activity and to discuss critically the tools for analyzing it, the different sources of inspiration for the project of a study of religion as a natural phenomenon, should not be of a decisive (or divisive) nature.

Another point besides the political one is that within the tradition of Thomistic philosophy, there is actually a special view of the scope of reason, a feature that puts it into conflict with philosophical modernity from the *via moderna* of the 14<sup>th</sup> century through Kant to logical positivism. The modern highly efficient reason with its focus on empirical verification, mathematical models and instrumental rationality is in large measure made possible by the rejection of metaphysics. In contrast, the scope of reason in Thomistic philosophy partly overlaps with the revealed truths handled by theology (*sacra doctrina*), because according to

Thomas some things though revealed, are also, though with great effort, knowable by human reason, as the existence of an ultimate being (Copleston 2003 [1950]: 312). The rejection of metaphysics on the part of modernity deprives religious discourse of its rational foundation, undercutting its legitimacy as knowledge by restricting valid knowledge to the aspects of the material world which are (at least indirectly) knowable through the human senses. This Ockhamian incision, however, also has its dangers as evidenced by the fate of logical positivism, as already alluded to, which insisted on verification as the criterion of meaning or truth, and because such a principle cannot be verified it was thus itself meaningless. It is difficult to argue for some kind of ontology, even a materialist one, without venturing into metaphysics. The same problem accrues to the foundation of first principles; one could even say that scepticism is the shadow of the absolute faith in a modernist down sized reason. Postmodernism and modernism being more like siblings than contraries (Delanty 2000). But, not even this point of divergence in philosophical outlook needs to become an insurmountable problem in the study of religion, as, for example, the discussion of whether the problem of infinite regress points in the direction of a prime mover does not necessarily arise within it.

Another way of proceeding would though have been to eliminate all traces of Thomistic inspiration from my (forthcoming) study, in an effort to privatize, in a secular context, my foundation for engaging in a rational reflection on a theme of religious behaviour. I have, nevertheless, decided not to do so, but instead chose to make this aspect of my reflections on ritual interiorization clearer by thinking through some of the implications in this prolegomenon. This is partly an act of intellectual honesty, but could also be important in that it points to the necessity that religious traditions within their own intellectual traditions construct arguments for a public arena of rational reflection, including the study of religion. The point here is that both the theist and the atheist need to formulate reasons and parameters for their participation in the study of religion, and that this motivation naturally proceeds from principles within their respective worldviews. Otherwise, the commitment to a reasoned



investigation of the phenomena of religion is merely a façade hiding a more primary agenda, either the promotion of a particular religion or the marginalization of religion in general.

This does not mean that the different foundations for the study of religion will be without consequence for the actual work done; such differences are only to be expected in the same way as a Marxist, a Freudian or a Rational Choice theoretician differs; it is part of the game so to speak. It is also important to make clear that I am not advocating that the participants in the study of religion bring with them parts of alleged revealed theology regarding ontology, morality, jurisprudence and politics; this would make the discipline of the history of religions, and the larger field of religious studies, into a collection of different theologies. The main point argued here is that the participation in the project of a scientific investigation of religion should be given a foundation and legitimacy within one's own world view, and not merely be a condition to endure until one can shed this objective varnish. That demands that religious traditions recognise the legitimacy and importance of this kind of study and that atheist scholars acknowledge that a materialist ontology is not self-evident.

#### RELIGIOUS STUDIES AND POLITICS

There could thus be multiple valid reasons for engaging in the investigation of religion as a practice flowing from the natural constitution of the human person. But this agreement, of course, does not extend to the political domain, and, therefore, it is important to keep apart the study of religion at the university and the political discussion of the value and place of religion in society.

There are several ways in which politics and religious studies should be distinguished. The first of these is when political correctness is required for teaching and doing research, then the common rational discourse, which does not exclude either religious or nonreligious motivations, will break down. Truth is subordinated to ideology, and, it all becomes a question of power, a not uncommon situation, but nevertheless I think, a sad one. Secondly, the search for accurate knowledge of religion, and the use of this knowledge in society, the technology of religious studies so to speak, have to be kept apart. The search for truth

should not be subordinated to short-sighted functional criteria; the academy can, given a certain amount of autonomy, construct a sphere of free intellectual inquiry, though it is of course not an absolute freedom, but a relative one. This is actually the first 'fundamental principle' of the *Magna Charta Universitatum Europaeum* signed in Bologna in 1988 by a large number of European Universities:

The university is an autonomous institution at the heart of societies differently organized because of geography and historical heritage; it produces, examines, appraises and hands down culture by research and teaching. To meet the needs of the world around it, its research and teaching must be morally and intellectually independent of all political authority and intellectually independent of all political authority and economic power.<sup>20</sup>

But am I here not relapsing into a problematic positivist distinction between truth and goodness (values)? One could argue that knowledge about religion resulting from the scientific study of it will also quite naturally have normative consequences. That it is not only so that the study of religion as a natural phenomenon is located in a web of normative constraints, but that it is organically connected to the actual handling of religion in society (both national and global) – that religious studies is simply an integrated part of the larger society, and all visions of a disinterested study of religion are merely exercises in wishful thinking, constructing an intellectual utopia.

However, what I am trying to do is to differentiate between the question of the foundation of a rational study of religion, and the question of the relation between science and politics. The attempt is to open up for an investigation of religion as a natural phenomenon in which multiple ways of coming to that project are considered legitimate. At the same time, this examination of religion should abstain from venturing into politics, prescribing the ways religion ought to be, or the ways it ought to be handled by the authorities, while simultaneously trying to keep politicians and religious authorities from intervening into the core of this project,

as it transcends the concern of a particular region, nation and religion.

I am thus here basically adopting the position of Wiebe, but this does not on my part amount to a total separation of is and ought.<sup>21</sup> The scholar does not operate in a moral vacuum. As resting on a Thomistic foundation, I adhere to the notion of natural law, or in modern parlance, universal human rights and obligations.<sup>22</sup> These should guide and structure also the academic study of religion. We as scholars are not value neutral or morally disinterested in this respect; research has to obey common principles of moral behaviour, when for example handling the anonymity or integrity of informants. This infuses the study of religion with a basic normative character, but nonetheless, it should – if it is true to its scientific nature – be primarily concerned with knowledge, and let politics be handled by politicians. These two practices could, of course, be combined in one and the same person, professionally active within religious studies and privately active in the public debate arguing about the role of religion or specific religions: something which is also true of all scholars in the field who are active in a religious organization, or an antireligious one.

The distinction sketched here between scholarship and politics is, then, not primarily based on a Humean separation of is and ought ('Hume's Guillotine', Black 1969: 100), but between different tasks and the circumstances that come with them (in a sense, a form of functional differentiation). For does that principle applied to itself not invalidate the very separation between fact and value? As one cannot, then, derive the norm that 'one should not draw normative conclusions from facts' from the factual *non sequitur* of value from fact (cf. Kainz 2004: 70f.). This normative conclusion presupposes the more general norm that one should be rational,<sup>23</sup> but as also that norm cannot be grounded in a fact as, for example, greater efficiency, we are led from value to value not coming to a halt until we reach an arbitrarily postulated final level of values.

Nevertheless, the political sphere cannot be a mere application of scientific knowledge (as in the scientist utopia), but is constituted by the rules of power (compromise, rhetoric, national interest,

ideological position etc.) operative in the society in which the university, and hence the scholar, is situated. How scientific knowledge is to be used does not follow automatically from its nature, but is decided by inserting it into certain value systems, e.g. communism or neoliberalism. In order for a scholar to engage in a political discussion, he or she then has to step into such a value system or some more fuzzy value community.

There is though one more way for the scholar to proceed, since the work done within the university is to be governed by general moral norms, as proscribed by natural law or human rights. Then an opportunity (which in a sense is non-political) is opened up to enter into the public debate by combining the general principles of natural law with the more detailed scholarly knowledge. An avenue of critique is provided, a sort of *phronesis* of religious studies.<sup>24</sup> This could, for example, be a combination of the principle of the intrinsic value of the human person and the discovery of certain forms of oppression within religious circles, or the inhuman treatment of a religious group by the state, as the Jews in Nazi Germany.<sup>25</sup> The problem, however, with such a way of reaching out into the larger society (the *j'accuse* of religious studies) is that it is not unlikely that the theories used within religious studies are already influenced by some ideological, or metaphysical position, which hence shapes the knowledge produced, and perhaps also influences the formulation of a specific version of what the natural law amounts to, or what is to be included in the catalogue of human rights. There is, hence, a probability that the social critique produced is predetermined by ideological positions, with other words, that it is already political in nature. I would though like to keep this form of normative application open together with the instrumental use of knowledge derived from religious studies, in so far as this is not in conflict with the basic principles of natural law.<sup>26</sup>

#### MY POSITION

The position sketched above acknowledges that religious studies as a form of theoretical reason is founded in a context of practical reason, inserted into a social web of goals and normative discussions. This is not only an empirical fact, but an unavoidable

and deeply human feature. My position, furthermore, takes to heart the basic moral character of all human action, that scholars are human persons also in their professional roles, not merely functionally differentiated bureaucrats bent on instrumental reasoning. The academic study of religion is hence not value neutral, but its service to the local nation and to humanity is to be found precisely in its possibility to freely search for knowledge. If the basic values of local politics or the economy, that is, power and economical gain, invade the study, the fundamental goal of scholarly work will be forfeited and paradoxically its usefulness lessened. At the same time, as argued above, the pursuing of the primary objective of science and scholarship is enabled by precisely normative systems such as positive law; the university in the Middle Ages was founded as a corporation granted special freedom in relation to the town and the local bishop guaranteed by the pope, emperor or king (Nardi 1992). The national state now has to guarantee this freedom in its statutes and by the distribution of tax money or by allowing private endowments and student fees. To this project of gaining knowledge about religion in general and about particular religions, both religious and nonreligious persons should be welcomed, but I insist on that they should not in a gesture of privatization leave their religious or nonreligious commitments behind them, but that they should derive from these the necessary inspiration and legitimization for participating in the study of religion. Otherwise the subject will be torn apart by more or less overt ideological agendas.

Nonetheless, this vision of religious studies could be considered fatally naïve, despite the reservations presented. The argument is then that a study of religion founded on a worldview which does not exclude supernaturalism, and a study based on a materialist ontology will look quite different. That, for example, the larger scope of reason constituted by the Thomistic philosophical perspective – which actually provides a foundation for a methodological theism – when meeting a modernist version of reason, which is more restricted, and therefore inclined toward a methodological atheism, will find itself in animated conflict. That the difference is really between a natural theology and a study of religion as merely natural, and that the two could never constitute

parts of the same practice due to the demand of theoretical coherence. This would then be merely a variant on the drama unfolding in our societies: the clash between a radical secularism and different religions trying to influence the formation of society. My position, when outlined against that background, is intended to be part of the larger attempt to establish (and to uphold so far it already exists) a common arena of reasoned inquiry into the phenomenon of religion by abstaining both from fideism and antireligious sentiments. As religious thought and practice together form one of the most basic and universal human activities, the understanding of them are vital for any attempt at understanding the human condition.

On a personal level, one could also see my newly assumed position on this issue as a development toward a more integrated intellectuality. That is, as an attempt to overcome a strange dichotomy between, on the one hand, a private sphere comprising a personal faith and the inspiration derived from a philosophical tradition connected to it, and, on the other hand, a public role seemingly demanding a professional simulation of atheism. This intellectual consistency is not only important on a psychological level as a prerequisite for effective scholarly work, but I believe it also carries with it important implications for the nature of the work carried out within the institutional structure of religious studies. One could in this manner move away from the situation where a fictional privatization of religious and ideological positions is upheld while in reality the opposite is the reality. I hence reject the proposal by Edward Slingerland (2008) of a pragmatic double truth approach, in which professionally the human person is to be considered as merely an advanced machine, a container for selfish genes, and morality as evolutionary derived behaviour for the survival of the group (or more correctly its genes), and poetry the result of overactive anthropomorphism, while, privately and in society, we should act as we had free will, art communicates sublime truths and morality has a binding force besides that supplied by raw power. In short: we should professionally be naturalists and privately humanists.<sup>27</sup> But, if scientifically materialism is to be considered as superior to supernaturalism, monism to dualism, and religion is simply a

delusion, then I see no reason why this could not be made the governing principle of private and public life. If, on the other hand, this is not only practically but theoretically impossible (e.g. self-contradictory), or has gruesome inhuman consequences,<sup>28</sup> this should be taken to indicate that something perhaps is awry with the theory. I will thus in contrast to Slingerland maintain a humanist (personalist) position, which resists the merging of the humanities into the natural sciences, while affirming the mutual benefits that could be gained from cooperation. At the same time, as Slingerland, I welcome that within the study of human culture and society (the human and social sciences) the impetus for leaving scepticism behind is growing.<sup>29</sup>

I have tried above to make my newly formed point of departure as clear as possible without becoming too long-winded, though I must confess that it is merely the temporary outcome of an ongoing part of research in religious studies, that is, to study religion is simultaneously a reflexive undertaking, a probing of one's own premises, religious or nonreligious.

Associate Professor

Department of Literature, History of Ideas, and Religion

University of Gothenburg

Gothenburg, Sweden

[Clemens.cavallin@lir.gu.se](mailto:Clemens.cavallin@lir.gu.se)

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

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1. The reflections on religious studies presented in this article were formulated in relation to my work on the monograph *Ritualisation and Human Interiority* (forthcoming).
  2. For a caustic criticism of *inter alia* the methodological aspects of Eliade's work see Leach 2006 [1966].
  3. The following quotation from Delos McKown's presentation of Marx's critique of religion, interspersed with quotations from Marx's own writings, illustrates the basic ethos of this position: "To him 'religion is the self-consciousness and self-regard of man, who either has not yet found himself or has already lost himself

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again.” Born out of and sustained by alienation, religion is a mode of consciousness both false and perverted; the happiness it offers, bogus and illusory. It renders man a ‘degraded, enslaved, rejected, contemptible being.’ In order to progress from these irrationalities to rationality and from perverted consciousness to truly human self-awareness, religion must be abolished, its disastrous effects transcended. Atheism, on the contrary, affirms and frees man from religious repression and heteronomy. (McKown 1975: 17). Cf. with McKown’s own perspective of naturalism, as presented in the introduction and the conclusion. He slides without any greater caution between methodology and ontology; naturalism and materialism as in the following exhortation “Accordingly, those who would understand religion in its total context must welcome Marx’s materialist approach as the necessary antidote to the mentalistic strategies of theologians and apologists.” (McKown 1975: 161) Cf. McLellan 1987 a book on the same theme and with a very similar structure, but written from a Christian perspective. The final lines (p. 172) points to the unity of theory and praxis and has a certain prophetic tinge: “But Marxism’s whole *raison d’être* /.../ lies in worldly success. Failure there is liable to be ultimately dispiriting, whereas for most religions it would serve more as a salutary (literally) warning.” After 1991 this could be more bluntly stated and Marxism characterized as a failed quasi-religion as Smith 1994. A move which is though seen by Timothy Fitzgerald as “an ideological attack on an alternative ideology.” (Fitzgerald 2000: 104)

4. In the same manner, the bewilderment before the belief in the supernatural, as expressed by Pascal Boyer in the following opening lines, must be seen against a backdrop of ontological materialism, otherwise it loses its rhetorical force. The puzzlement is then (if atheism is merely methodological) not a natural reaction, but generated by the methodological rejection of the reality of gods and ghosts, for if they were to exist, clearly to have such notions would be evolutionary advantageous: “Interaction with imagined nonphysical agents (gods, spirits, ghosts, etc.) is a puzzling cultural universal, as it is of no straightforward adaptive value, indeed is often costly to individuals or groups. One promising research strategy is to evaluate to what extent religious concepts and norms may be a by-product of evolved brain function.” (Boyer 2005: 3). In the same volume, Todd Tremlin makes a similar statement which is hard not to interpret in an ontological mode: “From a



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cognitive standpoint, religion is neither revelatory nor enigmatic nor inexplicable. Religion is simply one outcome of faculties of thought common to all normal brains. (Tremelin 2005: 69)

5. Cf. Ninian Smart (1973ff) who makes a distinction between ‘real’ and existent objects; and it is toward the second quality, i.e. existence, that the agnostic (bracketing) methodologically agnostic attitude should be directed. What is treated as real (e.g. a god) in religious discourse could therefore be nonexistent, and what is existent could be treated as unreal (e.g. evolution), but we as scholars of religion should abstain from existential judgements. This entails a focus on religious meaning as a human creation without any transcendent partner. The stance is thus a retreat in this respect (openness to transcendence) when compared with the phenomenology of Eliade, while at the same time it keeps the door to metaphysics ajar. The abstention of existential judgements is, however, problematic as the explanatory power of scholarship is crippled when it cannot brace its feet against an ontological framework, and this applies equally to hermeneutical teleological explanations. Eliade by his stronger emphasis on the ontic dimension of the holy had such a Archimedean point, which a retreating form of phenomenology as that of Smart cannot have. The suspicion of methodological agnosticism as merely a way of insulating religious discourse and practice from critique then arises quite naturally (e.g. Cox 2004).
6. At its inauguration in 1973, the department was named the Department of Religious Studies and located at the faculty of humanities. Systematic theology was merely one of the disciplines that together with philosophy of religion and ethics formed the subdiscipline “Faith and world view science” (*Tros och livsåskådningsvetenskap*). Part of the education for priesthood in the Swedish State Church was though offered from the beginning. In 2006, the department was enlarged by adding Latin and Greek, and renamed to the Department of Religious Studies, Theology and Classical Languages. The students could hence, for example, graduate with either a bachelor degree in religious studies or theology. The tricky point being though that there had not to be any difference in content between these two exams: the label being more one of convenience and pragmatic value. In 2009, religious studies and theology fused with the history of literature and the history of ideas into a larger department.

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7. For the Swedish context see Girmalm 2006 and Högskoleverket 2008; cf. the international discussion e.g. Oliver and Warrier 2008; Bird and Smith 2009.
  8. Cf. with article 26.2 in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
  9. For an example focused on sociology in a Swedish context see Jörnsten 2008.
  10. Of course naturalism comes in many forms and guises, but the general features relevant here are the ontological commitment that all that exists is part of the natural world and the epistemological principle that it (i.e. the natural world) can be studied in its totality by the empirical sciences. This means that the inverted thesis also holds, if something cannot in principle be studied by empirical science then it is not a real object. Naturalism is thus a philosophical position somewhat ironically abolishing philosophy as a separate discipline. Cf. Moser and Yandell 2000.
  11. For a comment on this general transition from Marxism to postmarxism within the humanities in Sweden see Nordin 2008.
  12. For a volume that tries to discuss and meet this challenge of postmodern thought to the project of comparative religion see Patton and Ray 2000.
  13. A committee of inquiry was initiated 2008-05-22 (to report at the latest the 2009-06-01) with directives specifying that it should find its point of departure in the basic principles governing the Swedish governmental support of religious organizations. These principles in short boils down to that “the religious organization should contribute to maintaining and strengthening the foundational values that the Swedish society rests upon /.../ ”. The next and final phrase is ambivalent and literally translated becomes: “that it is stabile and that it has its own vitality.” <<http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/10/57/84/8d4b5266.pdf>> 2008-05-23.
  14. I am here using ideology in the Marxist sense of false consciousness, see Pines 1993. But beside this use of ideology as a critical term there is also “the neutral conception” (Thomson 2001: 7173).
  15. This is similar to the McCutcheon’s project which by accepting postmodern approaches ultimately undermines his modernist naturalist position, as all discourses including social constructionism itself are social constructions, in the sense of arbitrary conceptualizations of the natural and social world. As

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Porpora writes “If social constructionist claims about science are also only social constructions, then they are deprived of all warrant. All assertions carry implicit truth claims that what is asserted is true (Habermas 1984). Applied reflexively to itself, social constructionism ends up denying the implicit truth of—or at least warrant for—its own assertions. Not only then do social constructionism’s assertions cease being anything that should claim anyone’s attention, they cease being even intelligible. Applied to itself, social constructionism becomes what Apel (1998) calls a “performative contradiction,” an utterance that contradicts the very performance of uttering it.” (Porpora 2006: 68). The most frequently recurring and devastating critique of radical postmodernism being its self-contradictory nature. See e.g. Monk 2004.

16. This is a point developed by Justin Barrett (2004) in his book *Why Would Anyone Believe in God?* in the direction of a natural theology; hinting at the possibility that the innate inclination toward religious thinking can be read as providing material for an argument from design: God thus having created us so that we would in a natural way form ideas about his existence and qualities. Humans in this way being natural theists. For a review confounded by and critical of this aspect see Bulkeley 2006.
17. As expressed in, for example, the encyclical *Fides et Ratio*: ” Faith therefore has no fear of reason, but seeks it out and has trust in it.” <[www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0216/\\_PA.HTM](http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0216/_PA.HTM)> 2008-05-23. This could be compared with the principle of NOMA (Non-Overlapping-Magisteria) as proposed by the late palaeontologist Stephen Jay Gould (1999). According to Gould science and religion have different areas of competence, that is, magisteria. The domain of science is that of facts, while religion properly is concerned with the human need for values and meaning. When religious discourse proposes something factual about the empirical world, then it has overstepped its proper sphere of teaching authority, and the same is true for science when it tries to answer ultimate questions, and define values such as what is good or beautiful. The differences as compared with a Thomistic approach is first that religion is emptied of its ontological and rational dimension, it is only concerned with irrational values, second that there is no mediating discipline as metaphysics (first philosophy) to provide a bridge between reason and faith. These ought to be totally separated, but most cordially acknowledge each other’s

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proper magisteria. The problem is where this act of separation of empirical fact from irrational value is to be located. Is it a fact or a value? If it is a value, a statement of how things ought to be, then this is within the magisterium of religion, and Gould as an agnostic scientist has clearly overstepped the border of his own making. Cf. Crick 2002. What is missing is thus a mediating metadiscipline such as philosophy.

18. I do not maintain here that Thomism exhausts the field of legitimate philosophical positions in Catholic discourse, but at the same time it has after Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1879) a privileged position e.g. in the central encyclical of pope John Paul II *Fides et Ratio* (1998), see § 43.
19. E.g. the volume containing the papers presented by Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger January 19, 2004 in a dialogue on secularization, reason and religion at the Academy of Bavaria (Habermas and Ratzinger 2006).
20. <[www.bologna-bergen2005.no/Docs/00-ain\\_doc/880918\\_Magna\\_Charta\\_Universitatum.pdf](http://www.bologna-bergen2005.no/Docs/00-ain_doc/880918_Magna_Charta_Universitatum.pdf)> 2008-05-07.
21. Cf. the very interesting and ambitious attempt by David Weissman (2006) of connecting ontology and normativity within a communitarian framework. His argument inspired by system theory and having the notion of constraint as a guiding principle ranges from nature through praxis and morality to aesthetics. It fits very well with the critical realist approach chosen in this study of ritual interiorization, especially the concept of emergence in relation to systemic structure functions as a bridge. For a realist ontology, his work provides a healthy antidote to a positivist vision of a pure rationality, and makes the reflection of religious studies on its own identity less problematic, though it still remains a difficult and politically sensitive task.
22. For the sake of the argument, there is no great difference between maintaining that the scholar is obliged to obey the general principles of natural law, or that the scholar benefits from and has to respect universal human rights. In both cases, no area of amoral rationality is possible which only recognizes norms for their contribution toward scientific efficiency. One could even argue that the concept of human rights requires a foundation in a form of natural law in order to be more than contingent conventions (e.g. Maritain 2001 61f.). For a discussion see Perry 1998.
23. The injunction to reason rationally constitutes the major premise of this particular practical syllogism (while Hume's guillotine is the

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minor), but it is also foundational for all scientific and scholarly activity, thus fulfilling the same function for reasoning as the first principle of natural law “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided” does for moral action. Cf. Kossel 2002: 174f.

24. One can though distinguish between phronesis and critique as John Dunne (1993: 16) in his reading of Habermas. Dunne, furthermore, elaborates the Aristotelian distinction between *phronēsis* as praxis (the life as a citizen, the end is to be found within the action performed) and *technē* as *poiēsis* (production, the end of action is found outside the action, the technique so to speak). These conceptual nuances could be used to characterize three different ways in which the theoretical and empirical insights of religious studies can be put into non scientific practice. First in a Weberian sense as *technē* fitting into deliberations in which the goal is already given; second as critique (Habermas), and thirdly as *phronēsis* in the more positive sense of providing directions for the good life of the citizens. The two latter, however, require a foundation outside the discursive space of religious studies, such as natural law or universal human rights.
25. The failure to do so is also a stance with moral value and political implications. For example, see the discussion of the connection between the philosophy of Heidegger and his involvements with Nazism (e.g. Rockmore 1992 and Phillips 2005).
26. This reaching out into praxis is thus not as radical and political in nature as the phronetic social (political) science envisioned by Bent Flyvbjerg (2001). I would like to emphasize that the epistemic dimension (though not identical with that of the natural sciences) is primary and the phronetic together with the technical are secondary (but not unimportant) for religious studies. For a sharp critique of Flyvbjerg’s position see Laitin (2006) and the refutation provided by Flyvbjerg (2006) in the same volume. The normative dimension of phronesis is, however, not provided according to Flyvbjerg by universal norms such as natural law, but by the common view among a specific group (Flyvbjerg 2006: 77). This postmodern reception of Aristotle seems to belong to the communitarian fold as implied by his references to Charles Taylor and Alasdair Macintyre.
27. Cf. the Thomistic rejection of the Averroist *veritas duplex* (double truth) theory concerning the relation between theological and philosophical truth. A position which, however, was not contrary to the law of non-contradiction, but: ”...one and the same truth is

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- understood clearly in philosophy and expressed allegorically in theology.” (Copleston 2003 [1950]: 198f.)
28. An example would be what the French Marxist Althusser called “*Marx’s theoretical anti-humanism*” (Althusser 2000 [1965]) which when taken to the practical level leads to results such as the crimes against humanity committed by communist regimes. On a more personal *ad hominem* level this theory-praxis nexus is played out in Althusser’s own life story as he strangled his wife and claimed no memory of it.
29. For example, Smith and Jenks 2006 within sociology. I find their criticism of modernist humanism including postmodernism in many aspects persuasive. It provides support for the position that any humanist position, in order to be taken seriously in the 21st century, has to free itself from idealism in order to be able to respond to the growing amount of knowledge within, for example, the fields of human cognition and biology which paints an increasingly finer grained picture of the limits of human freedom.

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# **SUFFERING IN BUDDHISM AND HRISTIANITY:**

## **A COMPARISON**

GRACE DARLING

Suffering is treated seriously in every religious philosophy. The tremendous depth and extent of human suffering, together with the selfishness and greed has caused so much pain that it cannot be simply ignored. Suffering can be both mental and physical and we also see moral wickedness which causes an enormous amount of pain. Human misery includes such major scourges as poverty, oppression, persecution, war, injustice, indignity, inequity, even several holocausts. Although a great deal of pain and suffering is caused by people's inhumanity (moral evil), there is yet more that arises from such natural causes as bacteria, viruses, earthquakes, tsunami, storm, fire, lightning, flood, and drought etc. (natural evil). The intensity, length and depth of human sorrow and suffering is so serious that a challenge to theism especially to monotheistic religion has been posed by Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) in the form of dilemma: if God is perfectly loving, God must wish to abolish all evil; and if God is all-powerful, God must be able to abolish all evil. But evil exists; therefore God cannot be both omnipotent and perfectly loving.<sup>1</sup> Many theodicies like the Augustinian theodicy (evil as privation and aesthetic point of view, 354-430 A.D.), Irenaean theodicy (c.130-c.202 A.D.) or process theodicy also arose to explain that the presence of suffering in this world need not explain away the existence of Omnipotent All-Loving (Perfect) God. Evil or sufferings can exist along with the existence of All-Loving Omnipotent Good God. On the other hand, we have some important Eastern religions like religions of Indian origin like Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism etc. which explain the cause of suffering mainly due to ignorance or because of man's *karma* (action: it can be both mental and physical action).

Many religions of the world accept the theory of *karma* either loosely or strictly. The religious philosophy that is strictly connected with the dealings suffering is Buddhism. On the other we have Christianity which teaches that suffering is not only caused by past sins but also has positive aspect including the supreme example of the suffering of Christ Jesus on the Cross for no fault of his own but for the sins of the world to reconcile God and man.

The teachings of Buddha are to be found in the three *Pitakas* or Baskets of the law which constitute the Pali canonical literature. They are: *Suttapitaka* containing the sermons with parables, *Vinaya pitaka* dealing with rules of conduct, and *Abhidhamma-pitaka* which deals with problems of philosophical interest. All these canonical works were compiled and completed before 241 B.C. when the third council of the Buddhists was held.<sup>2</sup>

Buddha was primarily an ethical teacher and reformer and not essentially a metaphysician. The message of enlightenment points to man the way of life that leads beyond suffering (*duhkha*) to *nirvāna*. So we have the ten indeterminate questions (metaphysical questions in nature that Buddha says are unprofitable while the soul is wreathing in pain) in Buddhism. According to Buddhism, ignorance is the root cause of all evil and sufferings. Due to ignorance there is attachment for worldly enjoyment that finally results in suffering. Moral evils are all the direct results of attached, egoistic human actions and the various natural evils are also indirect consequences of these very actions. Buddhism holds that man is in constant grip of suffering. **Four noble truths** of Buddhism are concerned with suffering. The most important teaching of Buddhism in a nutshell is the Four Noble Truth and so all the teachings of Gautama centre mostly around these **Four Noble Truths**:

1. There is suffering (/Life in the world is full of suffering) or *Duhkha-Arya-Satya* (nature of sufferings),
2. There is a cause of suffering (There is a cause of this suffering) or *Duhkha-Samudāya-Arya-Satya* (origin of sufferings, 12 links),

3. There is cessation of suffering (It is possible to stop suffering) *Duhkha-nirodha Arya-Satya* (the removal of suffering and the realization of the state of nirvana) and
4. There is a way out of suffering (There is a path which leads to the cessation of suffering) *Duhkha-Nirodha Gamini Pratipad Arya-Satya* (the path of leading to the removal of suffering, the eightfold path).<sup>3</sup>

After his Enlightenment, Buddha taught that life is full of suffering, there are reasons or causes of suffering, suffering can be stopped or there is cessation of suffering and there is a way out of suffering. These are the basic doctrine of his teaching. Life in this world is seen as suffering or full of sufferings in Buddhism. The relevant portion of the Four Noble Truths is found from *Samyutta-Nikāya* as:

*Now this, O monks, is the noble truth of pain: birth is painful, old age is painful, sickness is painful, death is painful, sorrow, lamentation, dejection, and despair are painful. Contact with unpleasant things is painful, not getting what one wishes is painful. In short the five khandhas [which are form, feeling (or sensation), perception (volitional disposition), predispositions (or impressions), and consciousness] of grasping are painful.*

*Now this, O monks, is the noble truth of the cause of pain: that craving which leads to rebirth, combined with the pleasure and lust, finding pleasure here and there, namely, the craving for passion, the craving for existence, the craving for non-existence.*

*Now this, O monks, is the noble truth of the cessation of pain: the cessation without a reminder of that craving, abandonment, forsaking, release, non-attachment.*

*Now this, O monks, is the noble truth of the way that leads to the cessation of pain: this is the noble Eightfold Path... [Radhakrishnan and Moore, 274-275].<sup>4</sup>*

The Buddhist interprets human life in terms of cyclic process involving birth, death and rebirth. This continuous and ceaseless process is the *Dharma-Chakra* or *Samsāra-Chakra* (the wheel of life or the wheel of existence). The wheel consists of twelve links or *nidānas*. Briefly speaking, *Suffering* is due to *birth*; which is due to *the will to be born*, which is due to our *mental clinging* to objects. Clinging again is due to *thirst or desire* for objects. This again is due to *sense-experience* which is due to *sense-object-contact*, which is again due to the *six organs of cognition*; these organs are dependent on the *embryonic organism* (composed of mind and body), which again could not develop without some *initial consciousness*, which again hails from the *impressions of the experience of past life (karma)*, which lastly are due to *ignorance of truth* or this *kārmic impressions* are a result of ignorance which is the first cause of the entire process. The whole process, consisting of the twelve links can be systematically arranged in the following order:

1. Ignorance (*avidyā*)
2. kārmic impressions (*Samskāra*)
3. Embryonic Consciousness (*viññāna*)
4. Psycho-physical organism (*nāmarūpa*)
5. Six sense organs (*sadāyatana*)
6. Sense-object contact (*sparsa*)
7. Sense experience (*vedanā*)
8. Desire to enjoy (*tanhā*)
9. Clinging to the enjoyment (*upādāna*)
10. Will to be born (*bhāva*)
11. Birth (*jāti*)
12. Old age and death (*jarāmarana*)

The Sanskrit term *pratiya samutpāda* (*pali, paticasamuppāda*) is literally translated as ‘arising (of a thing) after encountering (its’ causes and conditions)’. This term which is conventionally translated as ‘dependant origination’, ‘conditioned co-arising’ or ‘interdependent arising’ signifies the Buddhist doctrine of causality.<sup>5</sup> The Buddhist believes that the world goes

on according to the laws of cause and effect and the world is not created by any superhuman agency. *Karma* offers a comprehensive account of the whole fact of universal organization of worldly existence, in both its amazing disparity in individual allotments and in the aspects of shared and commonly experienced universality. Buddha comments in the following way:

*So, then, owing to the creation of a Supreme Deity men will become murderers, thieves, unchaste, liars, slanderers, abusive, babblers, covetous, malicious, and perverse in views. Thus for those who fall back on the creation of a God as the essential reason, there is neither the desire to do, nor the effort to do, nor necessity to do this deed or abstain from that deed [Anguttara-Nikāya].<sup>6</sup>*

According to the belief in the theory of karma, it is the past karmas that determine the family in which one is born as well as the nature of the body, as colour, shape, longevity, the number and nature of sense and motor organs. For example, *gotra-karma* is what determines the family into which one is born, *āyu-karma* determines the length of life, and *māna-karma* determines personality. There are also karmas like karma that clouds knowledge (*jñānāvaranīya*), that which clouds faith (*darśanāvaranīya*), that which produces delusion (*mohanīya*), that which produces feelings of pleasure and pain (*vedanīya*) etc. To be in bondage (*bandha*) means to be in the state of binding the soul to the body. In other words, bondage means the sorrow and sufferings attendant upon the physical body which is constituted by matter (*pudgala*) in accordance with karma. The notion of suffering has in Buddhism an existential dimension and extends over all aspects of human life in this world. Everything existing is produced from causes, is momentary and devoid of 'self' (that is, of any permanent unchangeable principle), and therefore is painful.

There is a means to come to the end of suffering. The means is to follow the middle path between the extremes of self-indulgence and self-mortification.<sup>7</sup> This fundamental teaching was expounded in the Buddha's first sermon called 'Sermon of the



Turning of the Wheel of the Law' (*Dhammacakkapavattana Sutta*) along with **the Eightfold Path** (*astangika-mārga*) which are: I. Right View II. Right Resolve, III. Right Speech, IV. Right Conduct, V. Right Livelihood, VI. Right Effort, VII. Right Mindfulness, and VIII. Right Concentration through self effort. In order to have right knowledge one will have to be disciplined, morally good and only then will one be able to gain the *Vidyā* (Knowledge) and attain *nirvāna*.

According to the Christian view, suffering is not always bad, suffering is not always caused by sins (karmas) but there are many reasons behind it. Suffering for the truth is a good virtue and it is a heroic deed. In Christianity life in this world is not full of suffering only. Suffering is just a part of life not the whole of it. There is joy, peace, happiness, comfort and so on. Life itself is very precious and worth living. It is a gift from God. There is only one life here on earth and after that God's judgement. The body is temporary but the soul survives death. There is no re-incarnation of the soul of man. Life is to be lived to the fullest of all good things. Man was created by God in His own image in order that God could have fellowship with him. Man was given responsibility to take good care of God's creation as a good ruler i.e., the earth. The first man Adam committed sin when he was tempted by the devil Satan in the Garden of Eden that because of sin, evil and death entered the world. Man has become sinner and sin had separated man from God. The consequence of sin is death. Sin or disobedience to God has spoiled the beautiful relationship that man was having with God. So God sent his son to die for the sins of the world to bring redemption that the good relationship between God and his creation including man would be restored. The Gospel of John 3:16 says, "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life". It is not the intention of God that any of His sentient creatures should suffer. It is not possible to say to any sufferer, 'God sent you this; He laid this affliction on you.'<sup>8</sup>

However, numerous passages throughout both Biblical and Rabbinic literature also indicate that suffering is a result of wrongdoing and is a punishment for sin (Proverbs 22:8). A direct relationship exists between suffering and wrongdoing, on the one hand, and between joyfulness and right action, on the other. The statement in Proverbs 22:8 that one brings about one's own suffering ("He that soweth iniquity shall reap calamity"). In His letter to Galatians, Paul writes: "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap" (Galatians 6:7). Numerous passages, both in the New Testament and in other Christian writings, indicate that suffering is the just payment for sin. Such a penalty may also come in the form of a swiftly executed death sentence, as in the cases of Ananias and Sapphira for telling lies in front of God (Acts 5:1-11). However, in John 9:3, **Jesus specifically rejects the notion that suffering is always the result of sin**, asserting that a man's blindness was caused neither by his own nor his parents' sin (but that the glory or power of God might be seen through the miracle that he performs also). Suffering also gives special insight and leads to self-transcendence and concern for others; without suffering, man is insensitive and given to self-interest and self-centeredness, As Exodus 23:9 admonishes: "Do not oppress a stranger, for you know the feelings of a stranger, since you, yourselves, were strangers in the land of Egypt."<sup>9</sup> In Leviticus 22:22, God commands; " You must not offer an animal that is blind, crippled, or injured, or that has a wart, a skin sore, or scabs. Such animals must never be offered on the altar as special gifts to the LORD." but in man he has declared that those who are broken and contrite in heart are desired and the Lord is near to them.

Explicit both in the New Testament and in the other Christian literature is the understanding that states: "Suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope" (Rom 5:3-4). We find a similar idea in Jeremiah 11:4 and in Isaiah 48:10, which states: "behold, I have refined thee but not with silver, I have chosen thee out of the furnace of affliction." More explicitly, in Philipians 3:8-10, Paul

asserts: "I have suffered the loss of all things ... in order that I may gain Christ and may be found in Him... that I may know him and the power of his resurrection and may share his sufferings, becoming like him in his death, that if possible I may attain resurrection from the death."

Jesus himself is described as a man of sorrow and grief other than his own but for the sins of the world. The sense that suffering is inescapable appears in Jesus' experience in the Garden of Gethsemane, where on the eve of his crucifixion, he prays to God, the Father: "Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup (referring to the cup of suffering that he will be going through very soon, tried and mocked, scorn, scourged, and enduring pain and shame and death on the cross) from me; nevertheless, not my will but thine, be done" (Luke 22:42). "The son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life as ransom for many." (Mark 10:45) The teachings of the Bible is centred on the love of God to all mankind in that God's own son came down to this sinful world to suffer and die for the sins of the world so that it is by **God's grace** that mankind will be freed from sins. From Biblical context, suffering is sometimes because of one's sin (or karma, nearest term) but not always. Man also suffers and receives punishment for the wrongs while a good man is blessed even unto his third and fourth generation but righteous man also suffers. For example, **Job**, a righteous man, went through untold suffering for his faithfulness. Believers are told to count it as a joy if we suffer for righteousness ("...count it all joy when you fall into various trials, knowing that the testing of your faith produces patience. But let patience have its perfect work, that you may be perfect and complete, lacking nothing." James 1:2-4)

Jesus said: In this world you will have tribulation; but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world." (John 16:33) and one day we shall also reign with him if we suffer with him (If we suffer, we shall also reign with him. 2 Timothy 2:12). The Christian life will be full of suffering, the cost of following Christ will be very high, man needs to surrender and sacrifice everything.

Suffering is generally considered in a negative sense in Buddhism that the whole life's religious struggle is to come out of suffering and attain *Nirvāna*. *Nirvāna* is the goal of Buddhism.<sup>10</sup> In my observation there are some positive aspects in suffering when viewed from the Buddhist perspective as well because if one suffers then the accumulated karmas are being burnt up to some extent that a person will be having another chance to acquire a higher life in the next life though existence of permanent soul is not accepted in Buddhism.

In Christianity also there are some elements of acceptance of reaping the harvest of what one sows. If one lives a righteous life, God will bless him and his offspring even up to the third and fourth generation. But at the same time if a man comes to God with true repentance for the forgiveness of sins feeling truly sorry for one's sins, God promises to forgive and also forget the sins of a truly repented person. In Biblical teaching, sins (nearest term can be the bad karmas) which will have negative effect can be removed completely. All have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God, and thus all will have to suffer the consequences of sin which is death. Yet, "If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just and will forgive us our sins and purify us from all unrighteousness." (1 John 1:9), Isaiah 1:18 says "Come now, let us reason together," says the Lord. "Though your **sins** are like scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they are red as crimson, they shall be like wool. Isaiah 43:24 also says; "I will forgive your sins and I will remember your sins no more". (God's forgiveness is "forgive and forget"). There is special place wide open for everyone who comes to him. This is the message of God's love offered to all.

Sin comes through one man Adam to all human race and forgiveness comes through Jesus Christ. According to the Bible, Jesus is the sinless son of God, sent by the Father God to die for the sins of the world, incarnated as man, died for the sins of the world (during the time Pontius Pilate was the governor of Judea, from 26-37CE under the Roman Empire) and rose again from the dead on the third day. Though Pilate found no guilt, he gave the

order to crucify Jesus by washing his hands in front of the public saying “ I found no guilt in him that he should be crucified but since you all wanted him to be killed, the order is given but I am not responsible for the death of this man), he was badly mocked, scorned by the ones he came to save, whipped, insulted, spade, scourged, badly tortured, forced to carry the cross in which he will be hung, he suffered the punishments of the sins of mankind that he bled and died as the Sacrifice for the sins of the world, rose from the dead on the third day in the first century A.D. To everyone who believes in this, is forgiven from the original sins and given a new, eternal life.

## CONCLUSION

Both of the religions show positive aspect of suffering though in a different form. Buddhism though tried its best to show the way that leads to the cessation of suffering yet portrays some positive aspects of suffering in the sense that many karmas will be worn out after one has suffer enough for the accumulated deeds including thoughts and speech. It is required that one will have to suffer for what one has done. According to the belief in the theory of karma, if one is poor intellectually, morally, materially, physically that too is because of one’s past karmas. One will have to reap what one sows. There is no escape from that. But all sufferings have a cause (dependent origination/ Pratītyasamutpāda). There is no unjust suffering.

In Christianity (including other Semitic religions) also, we find that one will reap what one sows. If one lives a good life God will bless him or her. If one carefully listens to God’s voice and obeys or does what is right then all will go well. But, to the disobedient, wicked people God says that he will punish them including their children to the third and fourth generation. It is seriously considered. One must live a good, honest, joyful, merciful, forgiving, helpful, faithful, diligent, God- fearing, unselfish sacrificial, holy, trustworthy, obedient, blameless life full of love for God and man and much more. That is the command of

God. That is the set standard for one to follow that all will go well. The consequence for righteous deeds and wicked deeds are clearly made known. But, not all sufferings are because of one's own sins, bad actions or bad karmas. There are many reasons for suffering. One may even suffer for others or because of others. One may also choose to suffer. As for instance, Moses chose to suffer with God's people than to be called the son of the King's daughter (Pharaoh's daughter) of Egypt and enjoy the riches of Egypt (Hebrew 11:24 *"By faith Moses, when he was come to years, refused to be called the son of Pharaoh's daughter; Choosing rather to suffer affliction with the people of God, than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season"*). One may suffer for standing for right. One may suffer for speaking the truth in this unjust, fallen world. In the Old Testament portion of the Bible we find many examples. Few among them can be cited here. Many Prophets of God in the Bible suffered untold punishment for speaking the truth, rebuking the wicked kings or against the immorality of the people etc. for example Elijah, Jeremiah, Micaiah (imprisoned, 1 Kings 22:27). John the Baptist was beheaded on Herod's orders, but at the request of his new wife, Herodias. She was angry with John for criticising Herod for marrying her, the wife of Herod's brother (Mark 6.14-29). One may suffer because one is trust worthy, for example Job (a faithful man of God suffered indescribable pain, agony, loss. Satan came to test his faithfulness to God by causing all his children to die, robbed him of all his sheep, cattle and belongings, and killed his servants. Finally he was assaulted physically by causing sores all over his body that he has to scratch his body with pieces of broken pot. All these events happened consecutively in a very short span of time. Job's friends were speechless after seeing that shocking condition of the very good, wealthy man of Uz. After several days they said that Job was suffering only because of his sins. Job knew it was not because of his sins. Seeing the wretched condition of Job, his wife asked him to curse God and die but he said "why should I curse God?" but instead said "though he slay me, yet will I trust in Him" (Job 13:15). Then, finally Satan could

not persuade Job to be unfaithful. In the end God again blessed him with many children who were born to him and his possessions were much more than before. He was tested to see if he will remain faithful in the worst of all condition of life. Yet he overcame and so was blessed (Job chapter 1 to 42).

In the New Testament, many followers of Christ suffered and died for the truth. Jesus Christ himself though sinless suffered shame, scorn, mental and physical agony, shed blood and died not for his own sin (because he was sinless) but died as a sacrifice for the sins of mankind that man will be set free from all bondage, sin, sorrow, forgiven and get new eternal life and live with God in heaven. All of the disciples of Jesus died violent deaths in order to tell the Good News of the Kingdom of Heaven except one. Many were scourged, imprisoned, scorned, mocked, stoned to death, killed or persecuted till death for their conviction and faith in God since the first century A.D till now. But many Christians died singing while they were being persecuted proclaiming that they saw Heaven's door open.... Suffering because of one's own sin is not an honour but suffering for the truth and for helping others is an honour.

Suffering is not a shameful thing. Suffering could be from Satan, or from man's own actions, it can be also because man lives in a fallen world (Original sin and its consequences affecting man and the entire nature that God has created. it can be purposeful, it can be to tests or proves one's faithfulness. It also provides opportunity for God's glory, man's transformation into Godly life, testimony and ministry, etc. in shaping man to be mature so that man may lack nothing (James 1:3-4). It is also a process. It could be to smoothen the rough edges of life/man's character that man becomes much more refined, polished, more wise, loving, more kind, understanding, stronger through suffering. It could even be the case that it will help one to believe in God's power rather than in men. It could also be the case to prove one's faithfulness towards God and man even in the hardest time of life. Sometimes, man suffers as chastisement from God or being disciplined by God

like a father disciplining his children when the children go in the wrong path. (*For those whom the Lord loves He disciplines, and He Scourges every son He receives. Hebrew 12:6*). Man also suffers for righteousness sake. (2 Timothy 3:12). Sacrificial suffering for others is praiseworthy.

There are many reasons behind suffering. There can still be more reasons for sufferings that we do not know now. Certain things are secret. (Some things are hidden. They belong to the Lord our God. But the things that have been revealed in these teachings belong to us and to our children forever. We must obey every word of these teachings. Deuteronomy 29:29). We will come to know more clearly when we see Jesus face to face (*Now we see things imperfectly, like puzzling reflections in a mirror, but then we will see everything with perfect clarity. All that I know now is partial and incomplete, but then I will know everything completely, just as God now knows me completely. I Cor.13:12*) According to Christian belief, suffering requires right response if it is to be successful in fulfilling God's purposes in one's life. Blessings of afflictions cannot be ignored.

Assistant Profesor  
Department of Philosophy & Religion,  
B.H.U., Varanasi  
gpanmei@yahoo.com

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

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## CONTRIBUTORS

**A K Chatterjee**, Ex-Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi

**P K Mukhopadhyay**, Ex-Professor, Department of Philosophy, Jadavapur University, Kolkata. pkm20021@gmail.com

**Raghunath Ghosh**, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, Darjeeling—73013 (W.B.). raghunbu@yahoo.co.in

**Arvind Kumar Rai**, Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, B.H.U., Varanasi

**Mukul Raj Mehta**, Research Scientist “C”, Department of Philosophy & Religion, B.H.U., Varanasi-221005. mukul\_maha@rediffmail.com

**Ambika Datta Sharma**, Professor, Dr. Hari Singh Gaur University, Sagar, Madhya Pradesh. sharma.ambikadatta@gmail.com

**Sachchidanand Mishra**, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, B.H.U., Varanasi. sachchitmishra@gmail.com

**Arun Mishra**, Director (Academic) Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi. pahitol@gmail.com

**Debamitra Dey**, Assistant Professor, Department of Sanskrit, Bethune College, Kolkata. deydebamitra@yahoo.co.in

**D N Tiwari**, Professor and Head, Department of Philosophy and Religion, B.H.U., Varanasi. Dntphil@rediffmail.com

**Madhu Kapoor**, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Vivekananda College, Thakurpukur. Kolkata -700063, mattoo\_k@yahoo.co.uk

**Durgesh Chaudhary**, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi-221005. durgeshchaouhary164@gmail.com

**Clemens Cavallin**, Associate Professor, Department of Literature, History of Ideas, and Religion, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden. Clemens.cavallin@lir.gu.se

**Grace Darling**, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi-221005. gpanmei@yahoo.com

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